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ABSTRACT
The drafters of the Constitution wisely and delib­
erately subordinated the armed forces of the nation under 
a civilian, the President of the United States. In the 
turbulent years since the early l ^ O ’s the military com­
mand function of the presidency has increased dramatical­
ly in importance as the Chief Executives have emerged as 
virtually unchecked wielders of enormous military might* 
This work examines Harry S. Truman’s role as 
Commander in Chief during the full period of his tenure, 
19i|-5“1953* The methodology employed is a generally 
chronological narration of the military events of the 
period as they relate to Truman. In each instance, an 
attempt is made to analyze the President's decision­
making process in terms of the information available to 
him, the existing pressures, and the relationship of his 
decision to his own rather well-defined concepts of how 
a commander in chief should function# Although recog­
nizing that it is not entirely possible to isolate any 
one function of the presidential office, or to determine 
with any great precision whether an act is political, 
diplomatic, or strategic in motivation, this study is 
preraissed on the belief that sufficient military distinc­
tions can be determined. The implicit operating assump-
iv
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tion is, of course, that there is value to be derived 
from an examination of the military function of the 
modern presidency.
This dissertation does not attempt a full military 
history of the period. Rather, it is a selective recount­
ing of those events in which Truman’s decisions were of 
some historic significance. Among the subjects examined 
at length is Truman's stewardship in the waning days of 
World War II. A separate chapter is devoted to the deci­
sion to use the atomic bomb against Japan and the postwar 
nuclear policies which the President established. As a 
reformer, Truman had a major effect on the military. His 
unification of the armed services, attempts to obtain a 
system of universal military training, and his order end­
ing racial segregation in the military are all analyzed 
in detail. A chapter on the Cold War concentrates on the 
Berlin Blockade, aid to Greece and Turkey, and the con­
tainment doctrine. The decisional process by which Tru­
man determined to involve the nation in the Korean War 
merited extended study, as did the President's conduct of 
the war itself. The activities of General Douglas Mac- 
Arthur as commander in the Par East in opposition to the 
limited-war policies of the President endangered the very 
basis of the civil-military relationship. How Truman re­
sponded to this major challenge to his authority as Com­
mander in Chief formed a fitting conclusion to this study.
v
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In the preparation of this work the major unpub­
lished sources employed were found in the Truman Library 
in Independence, Missouri, and the Modern Military Records 
Division of the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Ad­
ditional archival materials were found in the Historical 
Records Division, Chief of Naval Operations, Washington 
Naval Yard, and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in 
Abilene, Kansas, These materials, along with numerous 
government publications, published memoirs, and various 
secondary sources were examined in an effort to provide 
a balanced account of Truman's conduct of his role as 
Commander in Chief,
vi
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CHAPTER I
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
He’8 the absolute commander of the armed forces of 
the United States in time of war. He’s the commander 
of the armed forces when they're called out for any 
purpose, if he wants to take control of them. Nobody 
else can do it. It's his business to outline policy 
for the military. . . .  He has to know what the 
policies are about, and then he has to go to work on 
them. It's his privilege to appoint generals— and 
sometimes to fire them. • « .-*•
The awesome military powers of the presidency are
derived from one brief line in the Constitution (Art. II,
Sect. 2) which reads: "The President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the militia of the several States, when
called into the actual service of the United States."
This vaguely-worded clause provides the American President
with power resources that are both difficult to fully
2define and untested as to their absolute limits.
The war powers of the President are in fact so great 
and so indefinite that their nature will not be fully 
known until our Republic has passed through all its
1Truman Speaks (New York: Columbia University Press, 
I960), 6. Hereinafter cited as Truman Speaks.
^Dorothy Schaffter and Dorothy M. Mathews (eds.), 
"The Powers of the President as Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States," House Miscellaneous 
Documents, 8L|. Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 1, No. I4J4.3 (Washington:
1956), 16. Hereinafter cited as Schaffter and Mathews, 
"Powers of the President as Commander in Chief."
1
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2
trials and ceased to be. The President’s war powers 
are the unexplored "Dark Continent” of American 
Government .3
The broad spectrum of military powers now available 
evolved through customary usage, judicial interpretations, 
legislative enactments and the obvious exigencies imposed 
by modern military technology. Certainly James Madison 
and the other drafters of the Constitution had not 
anticipated that the clause meant any more than that the 
President was to have a general, supreme authority over 
the military. In the Federalist Papers (No. 69),
Alexander Hamilton wrote that the title of Commander in 
Chief "would amount to nothing more than the supreme 
command and direction of the military and naval forces, 
as first general and admiral of the Confederacy. • • . 
Discussing this military command function at greater 
length in No. 7^ of the Federalist Papers, Hamilton wrote:
The propriety of this provision is so evident in 
itself and it is at the same time so consonant to the 
precedents of the State constitutions in general that 
little need be said to explain or enforce it. Even 
those of them which have in other respects coupled 
the Chief Magistrate with a council have for the most 
part concentrated the military authority in him alone. 
Of all the cares or concerns of government, the
^Wilfred E. Binkley, The Man in the White House: His 
Powers and Duties (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958),
2 2 S 7 ----------------
^Clinton Rossiter (ed.), The Federalist Papers (New 
York: New American Library of World Literature, 1961), ljJ.8. 
Hereinafter cited as Rossiter (ed.), Federalist Papers.
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3
direction of war moat peculiar demands those qualities 
which distinguish the exercise of power by a single 
hand. The direction of war implies the direction of 
the common strength; and the power of directing and 
employing the common strength forms a usual and 
essential part in the definition of the executive 
authority.5
Hamilton seemed to feel that the division between 
civilian and military powers of the executive office should 
disappear, particularly in time of war.° Certainly, 
Hamilton, and most of the other Pounding Fathers, believed 
that the primary purpose of the Commander in Chief clause 
was to ensure that the President, in the exercise of his 
war (emergency) powers, would be unmistakably superior to 
any of his military or civilian subordinates. They 
conceived of a clearly-established path of authority all 
emanating from a single source, the civilian head of the 
executive branch of the national government.7
Slbid., No. 7k, W .
^Ernest R. May, "The President Shall Be Commander 
in Chief," in May (ed.), The Ultimate Decision: The Presi­
dent as Commander in Chief (New York: George Braziller,
1960), Hereinafter cited as May, "The President Shall 
Be Commander in Chief."
?At the beginning of the twentieth century, Secre­
tary of War Elihu Root accomplished a major re-organization 
of the War Department. Root was influenced in these reforms 
by the "New Hamiltonianism," which was an adaptation of 
business organizational techniques to governmental opera­
tions advocated by the Progressives. The Root reforms were 
predicated on the assumption that, ". . . clear lines of 
accountability provide effective political control." See 
Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The American 
Military Establishment in the^Twentieth Century (Prince­
ton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), 22> • 
Hereinafter cited as Hammond, Organizing for Defense.
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Civilian control over the conduct of military 
operations was accepted as a fundamental tenet. It was 
felt that the democratic process would be under constant 
threat if a military commander were to be granted ultimate 
authority for the conduct of the armed forces of the 
nation. In the states' ratifying conventions the only 
objection to this clause, as Joseph Story explained in his 
Commentaries, was that "it would be dangerous to let him 
(the President) command in person." But, Story added,
"The proprietary of admitting the President to be 
Commander-in-Chief, so far as to give orders and have a
Q
general superintendency, was admitted."
Numerous court tests of the war and emergency 
powers have worked their way through the judicial system. 
The general principle which has emerged is that the courts 
accept the President's supremacy over the military without 
significant limitations.
After studying hundreds of court cases involving 
tests of the President's military powers, Clinton Rossiter 
has concluded that the commander in chief enjoys ". . . a  
peculiar degree of freedom from the review and restraints
^Quoted in Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office 
and Powers, 1787-1957 (New York: New York University Press,1957)» 228. Hereinafter cited as Corwin, The President.
See also Clarence A. Berdahl, War Powers oif ‘ttie~“Executive 
In the United States (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois, 1920), 117. Hereinafter cited as Berdahl, War 
Powers of the Executive.
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of the judicial process." Rossiter1s study of the 
subject of the military functions of the Chief Executive 
led him to offer five "general propositions" by way of 
conclusions: (1) Judicial opinions regarding these powers
are expressed in uncharacteristically "guarded" terms;
(2) The teiminology of these Supreme Court decisions are 
quite general, avoiding explicit definition of the limits 
of the President's powers and any express delineation of 
those military powers belonging to the Congress or the 
President exclusively; (3) With respect to an "improper 
exeroise of the war powers" the Supreme Court has 
vacillated considerably regarding its own authority to 
act, leaving this a shadow area with respect to 
precedential evidence; (ij.) When granting the validity of 
an exercise of martial authority, the Supreme Court never 
bases its decision on the commander in chief clause alone, 
preferring, whenever possible, to cite any congressional 
action that can be construed as endorsement of the 
President's decisions; (£) The Court has been "realistic" 
in its decisions in this area, following in general the 
observation made by Chief Justice Hughes, in 193̂ +, that 
"the war power of the Federal Government . . . is a power
q7Clinton Rossiter, The Supreme Court said the 
Commander in Chief (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 19^17, 2. Hereinafter cited as Rossiter, Supreme 
Court and the Comnmnder in Chief.
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to wage war successfully (and that) so, also, we have a 
fighting constitution."'1’0
There seems little doubt that, so far as the courts 
are concerned, the President’s control over the armed 
foroes of the nation are complete and little subject to 
legal restraint.^ The judiciary, when confronted with ' 
tests of the war powers, have generally accepted Hamilton’s 
view that . . there can be no limitation of that 
authority which is to provide for the defense and 
protection of the community . . .  in any matter essential 
to the formation, direction, or support of the national 
f o r c e s . " ^ 2  Ross iter's study of this subject has led him 
to conclude that not only do the courts accept Hamilton's 
view, but that the Constitution encourages exercise of the 
war powers and the restraint on presidential use of these
•L0Ibid., l|-7» Rossiter cites the Hughes statement 
from Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 3 W 7  l|2STTOliT:--------------------------------
13-U.S., Congress, Senate, Committees on Foreign 
Relations and Armed Services, Powers of the President to 
Send the Anaed Forces Outside the UniTed States. CommTE’tee 
Print, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., l̂ jpl, 1-2. Hereinafter cited 
as Powers of the President to Send Armed Forces Outside the 
United states. See also U.S. Congress, House, Committee on 
Foreign Affa'irs, Background Information on the Use of United 
States Armed Forces in FtreignCounirl'es. House Report No.' 
127, 02nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951» 50-52. Hereinafter cited 
as Background Informat ion on the Use of United States Armed 
Forces in Foreign Countries.
^Rossiter (ed.), Federalist Papers, No. 23,
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powers is a "moral limitation" alone.^
The Constitution specifically delegates to Congress 
the power to declare war, to raise and support an army and 
navy and "to make rules for the government and regulation 
of the land and naval f o r c e s . T h e  language of these 
clauses would seem to indicate that the drafters of the 
Constitution intended that the legislative branch have 
coextensive powers over the armed forces in order to 
offset the possibility of a military dictatorship. While 
permanent military dictatorships have not resulted,
Congress has failed to exercise an effective check on 
presidential control over military policy. ^
Not only has the Congress been generally ineffective 
in limiting the President's use of military powers, but 
it has also often been unable to protect its own delegated 
military authority from executive usurpation. This is 
particularly true of the post-World War II era. The 
congressional role in formulation of military policy is
^3Rossiter, Supreme Court and the Commander in 
Chief, 8.
^See Article I, Section 8.
■^Dorothy B. James, The Contemporary Presidency 
(New York: Pegasus, 1969)* 15^*165. Hereinafter cited as 
James, Contemporary Presidency. See also, U.S., Congress, 
House, The Powers of the President as Commander in Chief of 
the Army and Navy o7 the United inTaTTes. House Misc. iDoc. 
Tj3j3, 81). Cong., 2 Sess., 1956, 1'6-lY. Hereinafter cited as 
Powers of the President as Commander in Chief*. . . .  See 
also, Berdahl, War Powers of the Executive, 117-18.
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peripheral at best, ordinarily being confined to lobbying 
for certain defense programs, the development of particular 
weapons systems and the creation, expansion or continuation 
of various military bases, " . . .  for reasons of 
constituency politics.
Aside from these considerations, in the normal 
course of events, Congress provides the force levels and 
military budgets requested by the President. It is 
difficult for Congress to challenge the validity of 
presidential requests in these two areas where the Presi­
dent must have legislative sanction. The only solid
ground for attack would be that the troop or budget
requests are not consonant with the broad objectives of
the nation’s military policies. As often as not, these
goals are established by the President (as a popular leader) 
in the first place. To attack these goals, or their 
proposed legislative implementation, would require sub­
stantial proof often not available to Congress. The 
President’s advantage lies in the fact that through control 
of the executive agencies, he monopolizes the available 
information. The Congress obtains its knowledge of 
military policy matters through hearings conducted by the 
various committees concerned with military and foreign 
affairs. Of necessity, the witnesses are high-ranking civil
^James, Contemporary Presidency, 165.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and military officials of the Pentagon, directly
responsible to the commander in chief:
As a result, the military exercises a near monopoly 
on presentation of alternatives to Congress. The 
widespread feeling of Congressmen has been found to 
be one of grudging acquiescence in military proposals, 
on the grounds expressed by one leading Representative 
on military affairs: "How the hell do we know that
should be considered anyway? We mostly reflect what 
the military men tell us.”17
The other great military check held by the Congress, 
the exclusive power to declare war, has seldom been 
employed, simply because the United States has been in a 
formally-declared state of war on only a few occasions.
Yet, in the period 1789-1956, there are more than one 
hundred separate instances of American military forces 
engaging in hostile actions on foreign soil at the order 
of the President, without a declaration of war or other 
form of prior approval on the part of the Congress.
In most cases the President's action was based on his
17ibid., 165-66.
^Charles S. Murphy to Richard B. Russell, February
19, 1951* Papers of Charles S. Murphy, White House Piles,
"Presidential Powers" folder, Harry S. Truman Library,
Independence, Missouri. Hereinafter cited as Murphy Papers,
Truman Library. See also, Powers of the President to Send
Armed Porces Outside the United Stages, 27 8. In an article
on the war powers, a national magazine wrote: "• • .U.S.
Presidents have ordered troops into position or action
without a formal congressional declaration a total of llj.9
times." Time, XCVI (June 1, 1970), 37. For a detailed
listing of the occassions on which U.S. troops were engaged
on foreign territory, see, Background Infomation on the
Use of United States Armed Forces in Foreign Countries,
  --------------
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judgment that an "emergency" situation existed, neces­
sitating immediate decision. Often the Congress has 
subsequently approved the President's action by a 
resolution or war declaration.^ The problem is, of 
course, that Congress is confronted with a fait accompli; 
it can endorse or condemn; it cannot undo . . . the 
spilling of blood being an irrevocable action by its very 
nature. A distinguished senator, Arthur H. Vandenberg, 
writing in 19h7> expressed the congressional dilemma this 
way:
The trouble is that these "crises" never reach 
Congress until they have developed to a point where 
Congressional discretion is pathetically restricted. 
When things finally reach a point where a President 
asks us to "declare war" there usually is nothing 
left except to "declare war."20
In practice, if not in law, once war or a national 
emergency has been declared, total military authority is 
assumed by the President. This power of command given to
■^Rossiter, Supreme Court and the Commander in 
Chief, 66; Henry H. Fowler, War Powers of the^P'reaicfent 
(Washington: Industrial College of "the Armed Forces, l9i|8). 
12-llj.» Hereinafter cited as Fowler, War Powers of the 
President. In fact, Congress has never declared war on 
its own' initiative, nor has it ever refused a President's 
request for a war declaration. Background Information on 
the Use of United States Armed Forces In Foreign CoutvErTes, T9T
^Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (ed.), The Private Papers 
of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
T952) , 3ij.2. Hereinafter cited as Vandenberg, Private 
Papers. Senator Vandenberg, a Republican from Michigan, was 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the 
80th Congress.
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the President is not effectively limited by the Congress,
nor willingly shared with that body by the commander in 
P Ichief. A staff study by lawyers attached to the White 
House, Justice, Defense and State departments in 19h® 
offered the opinion that ". . . i t  seems doubtful whether 
Congress has the Constitutional power to limit the
President’s freedom of action in disposing of the forces
??under his command." It is a fair general iz at ion to 
conclude from the published authorities and historical 
evidence that the constitutional separation of military 
powers is ignored in practice. The President today enjoys 
an almost exclusive control over the military forces of 
the United States.
James Madison was the first President to serve while 
the country was engaged in war. Marcus Cunliffe, in an
^Unsigned Report, "Constitutional Power of the 
President and of Congress to Determine Roles and Missions 
for the Armed Forces," Record Group (RG) 3i+C, Office of 
Administrative Assistant, Secretary of the Air Force,
Special Interest File 1|A, National Archives.
??Charles S. Murphy to John McCormack, February 19, 
1951* Murphy Papers, White House Files, "Presidential 
Powers" folders, Truman Library.
2^Berdahl, War Powers of the Executive, 121; Fowler, 
War Powers of the Pr e s i'dent', ITT; Ros si ter, Supreme Court and 
^EEe Commander in Chief, 75-77* Background Information on the 
Use of United l-TEates forces in ForelgrTCountriea, 50-5IiT 
Edwarcl h. Foley, Jr., "Some Inspects of the Constitutional 
Powers of the President," American Bar Association Journal, 
XXVII (August, 19*|1), h86.
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essay on Madison as commander in chief, acknowledges that 
"there seems to be an almost unanimous conviction (among 
historians) that . . . Madison was a ludicrous commander in 
chief. Cunliffe’s own view is that such a conclusion 
has not been proven. However, Cunliffe does agree that the 
Canadian campaign of 1812 resulted in a complete rout of 
the American forces; that the command of the war showed no 
discernible improvement in 1813; and, in l8ll|, "Madison was 
fortunate to escape military disaster and the possible 
collapse of the Union.
Madison lacked the leadership qualities necessary in 
a commander in chief, and his Secretary of War, William 
Eustis, was incompetent. Early in 1813, Madison improved 
American military prospects by replacing Eustis with John 
Armstrong. The new Secretary reorganized the command 
system of the War Department and replaced the superannuated 
Revolutionary War veterans with younger and more aggressive 
field commanders. The efficiency of the command structure 
was further advanced by the Congress in March, 1813: Legis­
lation passed authorizing the President to re-establish the 
offices of Inspector General, Surgeon General and Adjutant 
General and to appoint eight topographical engineers to the
^Marcus Cunliffe, "Madison (I8l2-l8l5)," in May 
(ed.), Ultimate Decision, 25. Hereinafter cited as Cunliffe, 
"Madia on (l6l2-l815)7"
2%bid., 25-26.
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pc.War Department. ° All of this would certainly not have 
been enough had England not been so completely preoccupied 
with defeating Napoleon. However, combined with a con­
siderable amount of good fortune, it was sufficient. The
War of 1812 represents neither victory, nor defeat. It
27was a draw.
Historians, as Marcus Cunliffe has indicated, have 
been all but unanimous in ascribing this military debacle 
to the timidity and ineptness of the Commander in Chief. 
Cunliffe has defended his own unwillingness to judge the 
Presidents exercise of the war powers by listing five 
factors that "inhibit" a true appraisal of Madison:
a) the unpopularity of the War of 1812
b) the limited, ill-defined, and peripheral nature of 
the war
c) the nature of Republican party doctrine
d) the lack of precedents to guide the nation or the 
president in war
e) friction between the principal figures involved in the war effort.28
Perhaps the judgments passed on Madison by others, such as
Bradford Perkins ("He reigned but he did not rule"),2^ have
2^U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 
American Military History (Washington, 1969), 139. Herein­
after cited as OCMH, American Military History.
27Ibid., llj.6.
2®Cunliffe, "Madison (1812-1815)," 1+5*
^Bradford Perkins, "Madison Was a Failure," in 
Perkins, (ed.), The Causes of the War of 1812: National Honor 
or National Interest? (New Sorlc:~Hoi't,"“Rinehart and Winston,i$62), 114.
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Ik
been too severe. And perhaps Cunliffe is correct in saying 
that the only fair assessment of Madison as commander in 
chief is that he conducted the war to the best of his 
a b i l i t y . He is certainly on firm ground in (d) above: 
Madison was handicapped by being the first to administer an 
unknown quantity, the executive power over the nation in 
war. But his conduct in this unfamiliar condition left 
few precedents to guide James K. Polk, the next wartime 
president.
Polk had indicated to the cabinet on his very first 
day in office that he would insist on the Rio Grande River 
as the southern border of Texas and that he considered 
acquisition of California a major objective of his 
presidency.^ Polk's offer to purchase the California 
territory was a sham exercise for he would accept only his 
own terms. And when Mexico refused to treat with the 
minister bearing his demands, the President ordered 
Zachary Taylor to move his forces south from the Nueces 
River to the Rio Grande, "an order that altered the 
situation by making war a probability rather than a mere 
possibility."-^ There can be little doubt that Polk
3°Cunliffe, "Madison (1812-1815)," 52.
^Otis A. Singletary, The Mexican War (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, I960), lij.9.
32ibid., 150-51.
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precipitated hostilities with Mexico. His objective in
doing so was to take by military conquest all Mexican land
north of the Gila and Rio Grande Rivers and from Texas
westward to the Pacific. ^
When war broke out he made it . . . clear that he 
intended to be the commander in chief. The president, 
Polk declared, was held responsib'le for the conduct of 
the war; he intended to be responsible, and he 
exercised that responsibility to the limit of his 
endurance. He determined the general strategy of 
military and naval operations; he chose commanding 
officers; he gave personal attention to supply 
problems; he energized so far as he could the General 
Staff; he controlled the military and naval estimates; 
and he used the cabinet as a major coordinating 
agency . . . .  The president was the center on which 
all else depended; Hamilton's doctrine of the unity 
of the executive power was seldom more truly 
exemplified.34
Polk clearly interpreted his function as commander 
in chief as including not only military policy-making and 
supreme command, but leadership in determining overall 
campaign strategy as well.^ Although devoid of any
^^OCMH, American Military History, 166.
^Leonard D. White, "Polk,11 in May (ed.), Ultimate 
Decision, $Q. Hereinafter cited as White, "Polk."
•a c?•̂ I b id., 60. Since general military terminology 
must be employed throughout this study, it is necessary to 
define what is meant by some of these terms. Tactics refers 
to the choioe of battle formations and the actual direction 
of forces when actively engaged with an enemy. Strategy 
originally meant the planning of operations by a nation's 
commanding generals, utilizing the personnel and materiel 
made available by the civilian leadership. With the growing 
technological complexity of modern warfare in the twentieth 
century, for the United States at least, this has come to 
mean that the civilian leaders in the executive branch 
determine general strategy and exercise control over all
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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military training, as were the majority of his cabinet and 
other advisers, the President did a sound job of 
administering the war effort. His decisions were sound and 
generally correct.
President Polk also established a precedent for 
future commander:.; in chief with respect to the war powers 
of the Congress. In the first place, it was Polk’s ordering 
of Taylor’s army into territory between the Nueces and the 
Rio Grande that led inevitably to blood-letting on both 
sides. Then, Polk asked the Congress to declare war on the 
basis of the hostilities which were engendered by his 
decisions. The Congress exercised its constitutional 
power to declare war, but, in reality, it merely acknowl­
edged an existing condition created by the President.
With respect to the other military controls granted 
specifically to the Congress by the Constitution, Polk also 
had his way. He demonstrated that in this area, the 
principle of separation of powers simply was not operable.
major operational decisions in the theaters of command. In 
either case, strategy is designed to implement policy, the 
latter being defined as the purpose for which a war is 
fought. Policy is formulated by civilian leaders, usually 
the President, who determine the priorities of men and 
supplies to be allocated to the military. These definitions 
are taken, in large part, from T. Harry Williams, Americans 
at War (Revised edition, New York: Collier Books, 19£>2) , 
TT-I^7 Hereinafter cited as Williams, Americans at War.
3^White, "Polk,” 73; Williams, Americans at War,
49-50.
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Congress, being a large, deliverative body with an inherent
inertia, showed that it was structurally incapable of
exercising coordinate authority over the conduct of war.
Polk led the Congress in the establishment and financing of
37the military and the disposition of these forces. In the 
first real test of its military authority, the Congress 
had - more by default, than design - relinquished its 
powers to the commander in chief.
During the Mexican War an effective unity of the 
military command structure was established, with James Polk 
as the single, ultimate source of all military decisions. 
The President had clearly shown in his conduct of the war, 
as Leonard White concluded in his study of Polk that "a 
president could be a commander in chief. A president
Oft
could run a war."
It is an irony of history that a Whig Representative 
from Illinois, who was highly critical of Polk’s extra­
ordinary war powers, was to become the next wartime 
commander in chief. Abraham Lincoln first gained national 
attention by his "Spot Resolutions" which attacked the 
President for ordering Taylor down to the Rio Grande and
37White, "Polk," 73.
38Ibid., 7k-7$>
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39justifying his demand for war on the resultant fighting. 
Lincoln consistently maintained that the Mexican War 
" . . .  was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced 
by the President."^0
Lincoln not only attacked Polk for unlawfully 
initiating the war with Mexico, he also condemned the 
methods exercised by the President in his conduct of the 
war. For example, in a speech at Wilmington, Delaware, in 
June, 181̂ .8, a newspaper recorded that Lincoln denounced 
Polk's administration as despotic, unresponsive to the 
will of the people and one characterized by an abusive 
use of power. The article, apparently paraphrasing 
Lincoln, continues: "The manner in which the present
Executive had carried on the Mexican war should condemn it 
. • • before the whole people. . . .  it was a war of
^Text of Lincoln's "Spot" Resolution, introduced in 
the House of Representatives, December 22, 18^7, is in Roy 
P. Basler (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (8 
vols., New Brunswick', New Jersey: kutgers University Press, 
1953), I> i|20-22. Hereinafter cited as Basler (ed.J, 
Collected Works of Lincoln.
^Lincoln to William H. Herndon, February 1, l81j.8, 
ibid., Lincoln repeated substantially the same
contentions elsewhere in this period. See, for examples, 
Lincoln, Speech to House of Representatives, January 12, 
I8k8, ibid., 2+31-32; Lincoln to Usher F. Linder, March 22,18̂ 8, TbTd., k57-58.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
conquest brought into existence to catch votes.
There is little reason to doubt that at least part 
of Lincoln’s attack on Polk's application of the war 
powers was motivated by partisan political considerations. 
In addition, Lincoln found himself in the awkward position 
of denouncing the autocratic powers of the commander in 
chief but voting in the House for war legislation that had 
the effect of continuing and extending these powers.
Lincoln voted his approval of the Administration's requests 
because he recognized the need to fully support the armed 
forces in what, in the final analysis, he believed to be a 
just war.^-2 Certainly many congressmen during Lincoln's 
presidency, finding themselves in the same quandary, 
could sympathize with the Representative from Illinois.
Even granting that Lincoln was influenced by
^The newspaper account of Lincoln's speech at 
Wilmington on June 10, l8k8, is taken from the Delaware 
State Journal, June 13, 18J+.8, as reprinted in Basler (ed.), 
Col 1 ected Works of Lincoln, I, If.75-76. The account of 
Lincoln's views Ts undoubtedly accurate, for in a letter two 
weeks earlier, Lincoln urged that the Whigs campaigning for 
Zachary Taylor in l8if.8, should not attempt to justify,
". . .Mr. Polk's mode of prosecuting the war." Lincoln to 
Usher P. Linder, February 20, l81f.8, ibid., lf.53*
^ I n  a House speech in January, l8i|.8, Lincoln said 
he hoped Polk could prove that Mexico attacked Amerioan 
territory, since he (Lincoln) was concerned about the "doubt­
ful propriety" of some of his votes on the war. Speech, 
January 12, l8ij.8, ibid., lf.31-if.2. See also Lincoln to 
Herndon, June 22, TBZjH, ibid., if.90-92.
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partisanship and the limited perspective of a back row seat 
in the House, it must still be acknowledged that he 
sincerely deplored in principle this erosion of congres­
sional authority. He revealed this genuine concern in a 
letter written in February, l8ij.8:
Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, 
whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an 
invasion, and you will allow him to do so, whenever he 
may choose to say he deems it necessary for such 
purpose— ancTyou allow him to make war at pleasure. 
Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in 
this respect. . . .
The provision of the Constitution giving the war- 
making powers to Congress, was dictated, as I under­
stand it, by the following reasons. Kings had always 
been involving their people in wars, pretending 
generally, if not always, that the good of the people 
was the object. This, our Convention understood to be 
the most oppressive of all Kingly oppressions; and they 
resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man 
should hold the power of bringing this oppressi'ori upon 
us. But your view destroys the whole matter, and . 
places our President where kings have always stood.n-3
Less than fifteen years later the author of this 
letter will stand, in the totality of the war powers he 
acquired as President, "where kings have always stood."
It fell to Lincoln to act as commander in chief in 
the first modern total war, a war involving all of the 
people and a complete commitment of all the nation's 
resources; a war without compromise or any limitation on its 
objectives.^ In the end, Lincoln, having tested many of
^Lincoln to Herndon, February lfj>, l8ij.8, ibid.,lj-51-52.
^Williams, Americans at War,
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the outer reaches of his constitutional grants of authority, 
emerged in the role of "emergency dictator," in effective 
control of a mighty military arsenal.^
With the fall of Fort Sumter on April llj., 1861, 
Lincoln began immediately to employ his emergency powers.
The effect of his actions will be to make the commander in 
chief clause "one of the most highly-charged provisions of 
the Constitution."^ The President called for a special 
session of the Congress to convene on July lj., 1861. But 
in the ten-week interim, Lincoln took steps that represent 
"perhaps the widest use of unilateral Presidential power 
without prior congressional sanction."̂ -7
Lincoln, basing his actions on the commander in 
chief clause of the Constitution as well as the clause 
instructing him "to take care that the laws be faithfully
^Robert A. Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United 
States: Conflict and Consent (Chicago: Rand, HcNally, X967)t 96. "Hereinafter cited as Dahl, Pluralist Democracy. The 
term, "dictator," is used here only "bo indicate the extent 
of Lincoln’s powers and the absence of any efficacious 
method of dividing the decisive powers with Congress. 
Lincoln's actions were justified by the emergency condition. 
While he often acted without statutory authority, the 
Congress willingly, ex post facto, provided the President 
with the legislative sanctions• Lincoln was a democratic 
ruler, granted a dictatorial range of powers as an ex­
pedient. Had he been a dictator in truth, he would not have 
submitted to a popular election in l86i|.
^Corwin, The President, 229*
^Background Information on the Use of United States 
Armed Forces in Foreign Countries, TBT
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executed," began by issuing a presidential proclamation on 
April 15* 1861, calling the militia into Federal service 
and demanding an end to insurrection.^"® In the weeks 
remaining before Congress convened, Lincoln ordered several 
extraordinary measures which he deemed necessary:
During this period of ten weeks Lincoln amalgamated 
the available state militias into a ninety days' 
volunteer force, called lj.0,000 volunteers for three 
years' service, added 23,000 men to the Regular Army 
and 18,000 to the Navy, paid out two millions from 
unappropriated funds in the Treasury to persons un­
authorized to receive it, closed the Post Office to 
"treasonable correspondence," subjected passengers to 
and from foreign countries to new passport regula­
tions, proclaimed a blockade of the Southern ports, 
suspended the writ of habeas corpus in various places, 
and caused the.arrest and military detention of 
persons "who were represented to him" as being engaged 
in or contemplating "treasonable practices"— and all 
this for the most part without the least statutory 
authorization.49
When Congress was assembled on July 4> it heard a
4®Dahl, Pluralist Democracy, 96; Paul M. Angle and 
Earl S. Miers (eds.T. H&e Living Lincoln: The Man, His 
Mind, His Times, And the War He Fought, Re construe ted~ From 
His Own Writings (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 1955), 395-96.
^Corwin, The President, 229. Similar lists, 
varying only in detail, can he found in 0CMH, American 
Military History, 189-90; Background Information on the Use 
of United States Armed Forces in ForeTgn Countries, TETjT 
Uilward S. Corwin and Louis "W7 Koenig, The~presidency Today 
(New York: New York University Press, 1956) , 3^* Herein- 
after cited as Corwin and Koenig, Presidency Today. See 
also, T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 7* Hereinafter cited as 
Williams, Lincoln and His Generals.
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powerful defense of his conduct by Lincoln-*® and soon after
passed a series of statutes authorizing the emergency
<1actions taken by the President. But this does not
diminish the fact that Lincoln had acted unilaterally and
boldly, establishing a number of precedents to guide
future chief executives. The belated congressional
sanction of these steps was little more than a gesture of
approval, albeit significant for the future. It is not
really noteworthy that Lincoln - or the other wartime
presidents - did not face any considerable opposition to
the use, or usurpation, of the war powers. During times
of national emergency the Congress has quite freely
transferred its war powers to the commander in chief, for
a fixed period of time, or the duration of the emergency.
"Congress too, likes to win wars," Clinton Rossiter has
pointed out, "and Congressmen are more likely to needle
the President for inactivity and timidity than to accuse
„52him of acting too swiftly and arbitrarily.
^Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, 
July Ji, 1861, Basler (ed.), Collected Works of Lincoln, IV, 
lj.21 -lj.1.
^Corwin and Koenig, Presidency Today, 32-33;
Background Information on the W e  o£ UnTted States Armed 
Forces in Foreign Countries, 1'8.
-^Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (New 
York: New American Library of World Literature, 1956),
18. Hereinafter cited as Rossiter, American Presidency.
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During the first three years of the fighting Lincoln 
did more than just determine policy and general strategy.
He decided theater and campaign strategies and, on occasion, 
developed and directed tactical maneuvers of forces in the 
field. He did so out of necessity, for he felt the 
ranking generals in the command structure had talents 
ranging from ineptness and timidity to gross incompetency. 
When Lincoln found - in Ulysses Grant - a soldier superbly 
capable of commanding amies in war, he turned over most 
tactical and strategic direction to his new commanding 
general, which is not to infer that Lincoln relinquished 
his authority to Grant. The President did allow Grant a 
great deal of command latitude, but only because Grant 
conformed his tactics to the President's strategic 
concepts.
Lincoln apparently believed and acted on the 
assumption that his emergency powers as commander in chief 
were sufficient for all situations produced by the Civil 
War. While he did work with and through the Congress as a 
general rule, he apparently felt no impelling obligation 
to wait for congressional authorization or for the 
judiciary's blessings, if he believed conditions dictated 
otherwise. This fundamental assumption of power was the
^Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, 8~9> 305-6.
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underlying policy upon which Lincoln's war administration 
was predicated.-^ Lincoln's own words can be used to 
support this contention. The most obvious example is his 
oft-quoted remark to the Congress in defense of his 
suspension of habeas corpus: 11. . . are all the laws, 
but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go 
to pieces, lest that one be v i o l a t e d ? A g a i n ,  in August, 
1863, Lincoln replied to a critic who demanded retraction 
of the Emancipation Proclamation by saying, "You say it is 
unconstitutional— I think differently. I think the con­
stitution invests its commander-in-chief with the law of 
war, in time of war."^ Finally, in an explicit statement 
on his concept of his role, Lincoln wrote:
I did understand . . . that my oath to preserve the 
constitution to the best of my ability, imposed upon 
me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable 
means, that government--that nation— of which that 
constitution was the organic law. . . .  I felt that 
measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become law­
ful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of 
the nation. Right or wrong, I assume this ground, and 
now avow it.57
-^William Archibald Dunning, Truth in History and 
Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 19371$ 165-66.
^Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, 
July i}., 1861, Basler (ed.), Collected Works of Lincoln, IV, 
i|.30; Fowler, War Powers of the President,' ITT"’
^Lincoln to James C. Conkling, August 26, 1863, 
Basler (ed.), Collected Works of Lincoln, VI, lf.08.
^Lincoln to Albert G. Hodges, April ij., lQ7k> ibid., 
VII, 281.
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The story of America’s brief involvement in war with 
Spain is a well-worn tale of gross Inefficiency in the 
command and logistical systems of the War Department, 
blundering victories and an anti-climax in the Philippines 
full of savage brutality. What is curious about this story 
is that William McKinley is not the central character. 
Whereas the history of the Civil War invariably revolves 
around the compelling, tragic figure in the White House, 
McKinley seems somehow a minor actor in the accounts of 
America’s experiment in imperialism.
The President did not lead the nation into war: 
McKinley yielded to jingoistic pressures generated by 
expansionists desirous of emulating England’s imperi­
alistic successes as well as a deep popular idealistic 
impulse to aid the Cuban people. Nor did he openly direct 
the military efforts of the country during the war. At 
the outset, McKinley " . . .  had only hazy notions of what 
kind of war he wanted to fight." The President was 
constantly urged to expand America's military effort, 
particularly by the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
However no clear-cut, overall strategy can be perceived at 
any point in the war. Instead, McKinley apparently worked 
from day-to-day, not neglecting his duty to make the
^®Ernest R. May, "McKinley," in May (ed.), Ultimate 
Decision, 95*
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ultimate decisions when need be, but not achieving any 
effective unity of command either. 7
In fairness to McKinley, he did choose to work 
behind the scenes; quite often, his major function was to 
act as a mediator and liaison between the War and Navy 
Departments. Since these sessions were confidential, 
little can be determined about the President's role. 
Additionally, McKinley was not given to making direct 
public statements about the war: "A captain who stayed on
duty at the helm, without a message to the frightened and
60indignant passengers." Perhaps the only reasonable
conclusion regarding this President as commander in chief
is that arrived at by Margaret Leech: "McKinley's actual
6lcontribution is impossible to evaluate."
Pew students of American history, asked to name a 
great national leader in time of war, would be likely to 
invoke the name of William McKinley, or the next wartime 
leader, Woodrow Wilson. The popular image of Wilson is 
not that of a great commander in chief, but of an 
impractical moralist who fumbled his country into war and 
bungled the peace that ended it. Quite soon after taking
^Ibid., 96-103, passim.
k°Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 19£9T7 232-33V
61Ibid., 233.
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office Wilson had ordered a mil itary expedition to attack 
and occupy Vera Cruz, Mexico, without requesting congres­
sional authorization. He later ordered a punitive military 
expedition into northern Mexico in a vain pursuit of Pancho 
Villa. In 1917» Wilson asked the nation to take up arms
in the most horrible war mankind had yet inflicted upon 
62itself. All of this caused Wilson a great deal of 
anguish, for of all American presidents, none was a more 
avowed pacifist.^
The decisions that Wilson made as commander in chief 
are few in number and can be briefly summarized: The first
was that the American Expeditionary Force was not to be 
amalgamated into the Allied armies, but was to maintain a 
separate identity. Thus, the United States became in 
World War I, not one of the Allied Powers, but an 
"Associated Belligerent." Another early decision was that 
the United States would concentrate its military contri­
bution in France, the major theater of the war. Neither of 
these decisions originated with Wilson. He simply approved
Richard F. Haynes, "Woodrow Wilson as Commander in 
Chief in World War I," Unpublished Master's Thesis, Louisiana 
State University (1963), 212-13. Hereinafter cited as 
Haynes, "Wilson as Commander in Chief."
^Richard Hofstadter, The American Political 
Tradition and the Men Who Made It (frew York: Vintage, 19$k)» 
260. Hereinafter cited' as Hofstadter, American Political 
Tradition.
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both of them after they had been recommended to him by the 
War Department General Staff and the Secretary of W a r . ^  
Wilson also approved of the Allied Supreme War Council's 
appointment of Ferdinand Foch as supreme commander of the 
Allied armies, thus subordinating the American commander, 
General John J. Pershing, to foreign authority. The only 
other command decision of any consequence made by Wilson 
was his decision to permit American troop participation in 
the military interventions at Vladivostok and Murmansk- 
Archangel in the Soviet Union. In this decision he ran 
counter to the advice of General Pershing and Secretary of 
War Newton Baker, but in almost every other instance he 
accepted their proposals, " . . .  deliberately evading the 
necessity for making military decisions."^
In sum, it must be said that Woodrow Wilson, while 
never completely abdicating his military functions, did 
avoid acting as commander in chief whenever it was possible 
for him to do so. One writer has suggested that perhaps 
Wilson "evaded duty as Commander-in-Chief in order to do
^%»ouis Smith, American Democracy and Military 
Power: A Study of the Military Power Tn IsHe United States
(Chicago: UniversTty of Chicago Press ,~~T951T, £l. H'erein- 
after cited as Smith, American Democracy and Military 
Power. See also, Haynes, "Wilson as Commander in Chief,"2nrr
^Ernest R. May, "Wilson," in May (ed.), Ultimate 
Decision, 129.
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„66his larger duty as President of the United States.
There is validity to this, for Wilson clearly considered
the direction of military forces to be a distasteful task
that could be safely delegated to his functionaries. He
had a messianic sense of mission in which he conceived his
chief responsibility to be the making of peace, not the
waging of war.
The next wartime commander in chief, Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, ’who had read about Lincoln and lived
with W i l s o n , w a s  the political heir of the Lincolnian
tradition of an autocratic commander in chief. It was
Roosevelt who " . . .  carried the wartime Presidency to
breathtaking heights of authority over the American economy
„68and social order. 1
A confluence of vast technological advancements and 
congressional acquiescence served to elevate FDR to these 
"breathtaking heights" of power. Even before the first of
66Ibid., 131.
^ R o s s i t e r ,  American Presidency, 18. Franklin 
Roosevelt had served as Wilson’s Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy in World War I. As President, he wrote to Joseph 
Tumulty, Wilson’s fommer secretary: "I wonder if you
realize how often I think of your Old Chief when I go about 
my daily tasks. Perhaps what we are doing will go a little 
way towards the fulfillment of his ideals." Quoted in 
Thomas H. Greer, What Roosevelt Thought; The Social and 
Political Ideas of Wanklin D .HRoo seveTt (teast“ Lansing, 
Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1958)» 105*
^®Roesiter, American Presidency, 18.
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the world wars the American industrial revolution had
created such refinements in military weaponry that domestic
industry itself became, according to Edward Corwin, " . . .
an industrial theater of war of immense p r o p o r t i o n s . " ^
Corwin goes on to explain, convincingly, that . . .
Great industry in the United States had . . • become 
part and parcel of the fighting forces not only of the 
United States but of its allies as well, and as such it 
had to be subjected to detailed regimentation by the 
government. . . .  To meet this requirement Congress 
was compelled to develop a new technique in legis­
lative practice, one capable of meeting the 
fluctuating demands of a fluid war situation. This it 
did by delegating vast unchanneled powers to the 
President, to be exercised by him through men of his 
own choosing. John Locke's ban on delegated legis­
lation simply went by the board, nor has it since 
been revived so far as concerns powers shared by thetwo departments.70
Wilson had employed this delegated legislation to 
create extremely powerful administrative agencies 
responsible only to him.?! Roosevelt, confronted with a 
far larger war, involving vast technological changes, 
built upon World War I precedents so that "the quasi­
legislative powers of Franklin Roosevelt as
AoyCorwin and Koenig, Presidency Today, 33*
?°Ibid.
?^Among these agencies were, U.S. Shipping Board, 
Council of National Defense, Committee on Public Informa­
tion, War Industries Board, Fuel Administration, Food 
Administration, Railroad Administration, National War 
Labor Board and the War finance Corporation.
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'Commander-in-chief in wartime,' to use his own favorite
formula, burgeoned correspondingly.”72
In his preparedness moves prior to American involve­
ment, Roosevelt expanded the historical definition of the 
commander in chief function. On September 8, 1939, the 
President issued a proclamation declaring the country to be 
in a state of "limited national emergency." Under the 
authority of this proclamation Roosevelt increased the 
National Guard by 35>000 and the Army by 17,000 over 
prior limits. This cautious early step was, Roosevelt 
felt, about all he could do in view of the prevailing 
isolationist sentiment.73 as this isolationist spirit 
withered in the face of Axis advances into Scandanavia 
and the Low Countries of Europe in early 19^0, Roosevelt 
was able to move more boldly. In an earlier budget message 
to Congress in January, the President had requested $1.8 
billion for national defense and asked for $1.18 billion 
in additional military appropriations. On May 31, 194°* 
he requested a supplementary appropriation of $1.27 billion
72corwin and Koenig, Presidency Today, 3l±,
73v/alter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study of American 
Military History (New York: New America*n L'ibrary," T9f&),' 
Hereinafter cited as Millis, Arms and Men.
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to accelerate old, and develop new, military programs.^
In June, 19i|.0, on Prime Minister Churchill's request, 
Roosevelt ordered the War Department to release to Great 
Britain "surplus or outdated" rifles, planes and other 
military hardware. In this busy summer of 19i}-0, FDR also 
dispatched American technicians and military advisers to 
England. He allowed British pilots to be trained and 
British warships to be repaired in the United States. And 
on September 2, 19l|0, the Administration concluded an 
executive agreement with England called the "Destroyer- 
Bases" deal. By its terms, fifty "outdated" (but recently 
reconditioned) naval warships were transfered to English 
control in return for the leasing to the United States of 
sites for military bases on British possessions.^ "The
deal was an abandonment of any pretense of neutrality. It
*76was an act of war. . . . "
Richard B. Morris, Encyclopedia of American 
History (rev. ed., New York: Harper and Row, 1961), "36I4.. 
Hereinafter cited as Morris, Encyclopedia of American 
History.
7^The naval and air bases provided by Great Britain 
on a ninety-nine year lease arrangement were located in 
Newfoundland, the Bahamas, Bermuda, Jamaica, St. Lucia, 
Antigua, Trinidad, and British Guiana. See John E. Wiltz, 
Prom Isolation to War, 1931-19lj.l (New York: Thomas Y. 
Crowell, 19&B) »"~Bi• Hereinafter cited as Wiltz, From 
Isolation to War.
7^Ibid., 82. See also, Corwin, The President, 202.
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Roosevelt further compromised the quasi-neutral 
posture of the United States in securing the enactment of 
H.R. 1776, the Lend-Lease Act of March, 19i|l» By terms 
the President could, whenever he believed "national 
defense" to be involved, authorize his administrators to 
procure and "sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend or 
otherwise dispose of the same to any government whose 
defense the President deemed vital" to United States 
security, on whatever terms he cared to s e t . The 
Commander in Chief now had power over and control of the 
dispersal of all arms and munitions manufactured in the 
United States as well as control over all its armed 
forces. He was the most powerful single human being in 
the world. Edward S. Corwin rightly states with respect 
to the Lend-Lease Act that "no more sweeping delegation of 
legislative power has ever been made to an American presi- 
dient. . . .”7®
A good case can be made that American participation 
in World War II was inevitable. But such an argument does 
not justify the propriety of the destroyer-bases deal and 
the Lend-Lease Act. The former was an executive caveat,
77corwin and Koenig, Presidency Today, 35* See also, 
Dahl, Pluralist Democracy, 96; Selig Adler, The Uncertain 
Giant; 1921-1941: American Foreign Policy Between the Wars 
(Toronto, Canada: Collier-Macmillan, 1^65), 249-51*
rjQ
Corwin, The President, 237»
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exercising the commander in chief powers to determine
future foreign relations and military alignments.^ The
latter represented a sweeping abdication of military
responsibility by the Congress, giving the commander in
chief extremely broad controls over an America still
80(technically) at peace. The opponents of Lend-Lease
recognized this and argued in vain that the act changed
and distorted the traditional commander in chief theory.
As Senator Burton Wheeler expressed it, "the proponents
of this bill . . . are proclaiming a new constitutional
theory which places the actual power to involve our
country in war at the uncontrolled discretion of the 
81Executive."
Roosevelt’s direct command of the military during 
World War II was affected by his issuance of a formal 
Military Order in July, 1939. The order removed from the 
service departments the Joint Array-Navy Board and a 
number of procurement agencies and placed them in the 
Executive Office of the President. Among other things,
James, Contemporary Presidency, llf.6,
flf)Corwin and Koenig, Presidency Today, 3^-35? 
Millis, Arms and Men, 2k9-51; Wiltz, From’ Isolation to 
War, 19 3 1 - W , '  85-87. See also, Powers of the President 
To Send Aimed Forces Outside the United sTates, 16.
^Senator Wheeler is quoted in an undated report, 
"Power of the President to Send Troops Abroad, (Appendix 
D)," Murphy Papers, White House Files, Truman Library.
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this order had the effect of placing the Chief of Naval 
Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, directly 
under the command and supervision of the commander in 
chief:
The immediate results of this new arrangement were 
modest but significant. The principal war agencies in 
both the strategic and the production fields were 
clearly established as presidential, not departmental, 
agencies. . . . The Military Order of 1939 had the 
effect of raising the Joint Board above the 
departmental level. By placing the chiefs in a 
special relationship to the President, it made them 
in some way independent of their immediate civilian 
superiors. . . • Increasingly after 1939 the Joint 
Board, under the control of the President, concerned 
itself with questions of national rather than service 
strategy. . . .
By this little-noticed Military Order of 1939, 
Franklin Roosevelt laid the institutional foundations 
of his powers as commander in chief. The new arrange­
ments were not a model of administrative symmetry. • . 
In particular the service secretaries were placed in 
an anomalous position; they retained control over, and 
responsibility for, their departments but not their 
military chieftains, who, with their advisers, 
operated directly beneath the President. If the 
service secretaries were indeed the principal agents 
of civilian control over the military, it would seem 
that in strategic matters the chiefs, as Admiral Leahy 
was to remark at the end of the war, were "under no 
civilian control whatever," apart, of course, from 
that exercised by the President himself.82
Despite FDR's own unsystematic and often haphazard 
style of leadership he found his command authority highly 
institutionalized by the very vastness of the military 
structure he had to command. Roosevelt discovered that 
even the commander in chief could have little direct effect
William R. Emerson, "Roosevelt," in May (ed.), 
Ultimate Decision, 136-37* Hereinafter cited as Emerson, 
'’Roosevelt.
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on the machinery of command in such a vast undertaking.
Nor was there much need to. He set the grand strategy of 
the war with his Joint Chiefs, with whom he maintained a 
personal, amiable relationship, and they implemented it 
throughout the command structure. Because the system 
worked, Roosevelt did not involve himself in operational 
planning, nor did he attempt to dictate tactics to the 
theater commanders. While for a time in the midst of the 
war FDR doubted the strategic advice of his Joint Chiefs, 
leaning more toward politically-oriented Allied proposals, 
he soon relented, relying generally upon his military 
planners to determine strategy.®-^ William R. Emerson, in 
an essay on Roosevelt as war leader, came to this fitting 
conclusion s
. • . he performed truly the function of the American 
commander in chief, which is to bind together the 
varied political and military strands which make up 
war, keeping each in its proper relation to the whole. 
If criticism must fall upon his war presidency it 
probably should fall upon the soundness and realism 
of his political motives rather than upon his military 
a c t i o n s 4
On April 12, 191+5, with victory in Europe a 
certainty, but the war in the Pacific still far from over, 
Franklin Roosevelt died of a massive cerebral hemorrhage.
% e w  York Times, April 13> 191+5; Maurice Matloff, 
"Roosevelt" as War Leader,,f in Abraham S. Eisenstadt (ed.), 
Ameri can History; Recent Interpretations, Book II, Since
1 2nd ed. (New York; Thomas Y. Crowell, l96^T, 1+25-26.
^•Emerson, "Roosevelt,1 176.
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And so, with a brutal suddenness, the Vice-President 
found himself in full command of the most powerful military 
apparatus the earth has ever known.
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CHAPTER II
FROM THE MISSOURI TO THE POTOMAC
One thing I am certain about, there's nothing in 
our history . . . that shows that a man can be trained 
to be President of the United States, or that we could 
ensure that he would ever become President even if 
trained for the job, because there are so many factors 
that enter into the making of a President.!
Harry S. Truman was b o m  in Lamar, Missouri, May 8,
1881].. His early years fit the American stereotype: Born
of solid, rural, middle-class, Midwestern, Protestant 
stock, his youth was spent on a six hundred-acre farm, and 
in Independence, an unexceptional small town near Kansas 
City. His early life was uneventful, full of those minor 
tribulations and small victories that characterize the back­
ground of most Americans. If Harry Truman was anything, he
was "average," showing no particular abilities or special
2promise.
Truman's family could not afford to send him to
college. He did apply for admission to the United States
lHarry S. Truman, Mr. Citizen (New York: Popular 
Library, 1961), 111. Hereinafter cited as Truman, Mr. 
Citizen.
2Luther Huston, New York Times, April 1$, 19k$>
Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions, Vol. I, Memoirs (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Incorporated, 1955)* 
112-25, passim. Hereinafter cited as Truman, Memoirs, I.
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Military Academy (West Point) and passed the entrance 
examinations, only to be rejected for his poor eyesight.^ 
Although his schooling ended with his high school gradu­
ation, Truman remained an avid, life-long student of 
history and government. However, he regretted his lack of 
formal training: "I've always been sorry I did not get a
university education. But I got it in the Army the hard
way— and it s t u c k . T r u m a n ’s first job after high school 
was as a timekeeper for a railroad construction crew. He 
went from that to bank clerking, and, in 1916, became a 
one-third partner in the Atlas-Okla Oil Lands Syndicate, a 
wildcat drilling company. Because of manpower shortages 
brought on by World War I, the company sold off all its
leases at the outset of the war.^
The future commander in chief got his first taste 
of the military life in 1905• As he wrote in his Memoirs, 
". . . having been something of a student of military
^John Hersey, "Profiles--Mr. President," Part 2,
"Ten O'clock Meeting," The New Yorker, XXVII (April lij.#
1951)> 38* Hereinafter cited as Kersey, "Profiles," Pt. 2.
^Alfred Steinberg, The Man From Missouri: The Life 
and Times of Harry £3. Truman (New Tories- 0. P. Putnam's 
Sons, 196277 5l. Hereinafter cited as Steinberg, Man From 
Missouri.
^Irving Brant, "Harry S. Truman-I," New Republic 
CXII (April 30, 191*5), 578. Hereinafter ciied as Brant, 
"Harry S. Truman-I." See also, Truman, Memoirs, I, 126-27« 
In March, 1917> Atlas-Okla was re-organized as Morgan Oil 
and Refining Company.
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history, I decided to join the ’militia1 referred to in 
Washington’s message of 1790." So he enlisted in Battery 
B of the National Guard at Kansas City in the year it was 
organized. In his first National Guard encampment at Cape 
Giradeau, Missouri, Truman was a private, acting as "No.
2 man" on a three-inch gun.7 He remained in the Guard 
until activated for federal service in 1917*
With American entry into the First World War the 
Kansas City-Independence National Guard batteries were 
expanded into a full regiment. In the fashion of the time, 
Guard officers were elected by the members of the regiment 
following this re-organization} and Truman found himself 
elected a first lieutenant of light artillery in Battery F 
of the 2nd Missouri Field Artillery. Three months later, 
in August, 1917* Truman’s unit was sworn into federal 
service as the 129th Field Artillery of the 35th Division. 
The unit was activated and ordered to Camp Doniphan, Fort
Q
Sill, Oklahoma on September 26, 1917*
^Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II,
Memoirs (Garden City, New York:*""!)outleday and Company,
1955), lf.6. Hereinafter cited as Truman, Memoirs, II.
7Ibid., I, 125.
®Ibid., 127-28} Steinberg, Man From Missouri, U2.
See also, Jonathan Daniels, The Man of independence 
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott,19557"* 90# Hereinafter 
cited as Daniels, Man of Independence.
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After training in Oklahoma, Truman was shipped to 
Prance in March, 1918. In Prance he received more training 
in Artillery schools at Montigny-sur-Aube and Coetiquidan. 
On July 11 Truman, by now a captain, was given command of 
Battery D, 129th Field Artillery, in the Vosges Mountains.
He fired his first combat barrage there on September 6, 
1918. Prom then until the Armistice in November, Captain 
Truman commanded his unit at St. Mihiel, the Meuse-Argonne,
QVarennes, Verdun and Metz.
Truman referred to these months of combat many times
during his later career, always with a mixture of pride
and nostalgia as, for example, in a radio address he
broadcast to all the Armed Forces following FDR's death:
I have done as you would do in the field when the 
Commander falls. My duties and responsibilities are 
clear. I have assumed them. These duties will be 
carried on in keeping with our American tradition.
As a veteran of the First World War, I have seen 
death on the battlefield. When I fought in France 
with the 35th Division, I saw good officers and men 
fall, and be replaced. • . .
I know the strain, the mud, the misery, the utter 
weariness of the soldier in the field. And I know
^New York Times, April 13, 19i|5; Truman, Memoirs, I, 
128-31. See also, Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency: 
The History of a Triumphant Succession (New York: The 
m!acmilla!n Company, I960), 1.3" Hereinafter cited as 
Phillips, Truman Presidency.
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to
too his courage, his stamina, his faith in his 
comrades, his country, and himself. 10
We are depending on every one of you. . . .
Following his return to Missouri after the war, 
Truman continued his interest in the military by reamining 
active in the Field Artillery Reserve, in which he 
attained the rank of major. In addition, he was 
instrumental in creating the first chapter in Missouri of 
the Reserve Officers Association, at Kansas City in 1921. 
Later, when the organization had spread across Missouri, 
he became the first president of the state-wide associ­
ation. ■L1
"My whole political career," Truman would say many
years later, "(was) . . . based upon my war service and
12war associates." This was certainly true of its 
beginnings: Truman had opened a haberdashery at Kansas
City in 1919 with a friend from the war days, ex-sergeant 
Eddie Jacobson. Following a successful initial year, the 
business went downhill, after— as Truman put it in his own 
partisan fashion— ". . . the Republicans took over the U.S.
^Address Broadcast to the Armed Forces, April 17* 
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 
Harry S. Truman: Containing tlhe Publicities sages, Speeches, 
and Statements of the' Prealdent (6 vols., Washington, t/sCPO, 
1961-66), l9to,“"Hl. Hereinafter cited as Public Papers
• . . Truman, (year). See also, Truman, Memoirs ,~I, £1-52.
•^Truman, Memoirs, I, 138-39.
12Phillips, Truman Presidency , 11±.
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13Government under the presidency of Warren G. Harding."
In the spring of 1922, with his business at the point of 
bankruptcy, Truman was urged by Jim Pendergast to seek 
election as county judge. Pendergast had served with 
Truman as an officer in the 129th and later commanded his 
own battery in the 130th Field Artillery. His father was 
Michael J. Pendergast, who, with his brother Tom, ruled 
the political machine that controlled Kansas City and 
Jackson County. In a meeting of the Pendergast organiza­
tion Truman won support for his candidacy. Mike 
Pendergast secured the endorsement for him, according to 
Truman, by arguing that he was a veteran and one of the 
few officers "whose men didn't want to shoot him."
Truman won the race for country judge in 1922, but 
lost his bid fcr re-election in 192lj., the only defeat in 
his political career. In 1926 he ran for "presiding 
judge" of Jackson County and won by the substantial margin 
of sixteen thousand votes.^ Four years later, by a far 
wider margin of fifty-eight thousand votes, Truman was
■^Truman, Memoirs, I, 133-3h*
^ I b i d ., 136; Daniels, Man of Independence, 113-11+* 
For a somewhat different version 6T ~these events', see 
Phillips, Truman Presidency, 15-16.
•^Truman, Memoirs, I, 139; Phillips, Truman 
Presidency, 17- In Missouri, County judges are actually 
administrators, performing a function similar to that of 
county boards of supervisors in other states.
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re-elected to his judgeship. His energetic program of 
road-building, hospital and courthouse construction had 
apparently won him the support of the voters as well as 
the Pendergast machine.^
In 193i|-> as his term came to an end, Truman 
considered running for county collector, governor or 
congressman from the newly-created Fourth Congressional 
District of eastern Jackson County. But ''Boss’1 Pender­
gast, for political reasons of his own, insisted that 
Truman m m  for the Senate. Although his chances were very 
slim, Truman agreed. It would have been an exercise in 
utter futility for a Democrat to seek any of the other
posts Truman had considered running for, without the
17blessings of the Kansas City machine.
In the Democratic primary Truman faced two 
experienced Congressmen, John Cochran of St. Louis and 
Jacob Milligan of Richmond. He won by a plurality of some 
forty-four thousand votes. In the general election,
Truman opposed the incumbent, Roscoe C. Patterson, a con­
servative Republican from Springfield. Despite the fact 
that he was running with the endoresement of Tom Pendergast,
■^Luther Huston, New York Times, April 1$, 19k5l 
Truman, Memoirs, I, llj.0;"T?KiIlTps, Truman Presidency, 17•
■^Truman, Memoirs, I, lip.. See also, Huston, New 
York Times, April If?, ItyUS; Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 
TTFlTf.  ------------------
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who was often anti-Roosevelt, Truman campaigned on a pro-
New Deal platform. He took the Senate seat from Patterson
1 flwith a 2$l± ,0 0 0 vote majority.
During his senatorial campaigns and in his first 
months in the Senate, Truman was villified as a "messenger 
boy" for Pendergast and, later, as "the Senator from 
Pendergast." The Pendergast machine had become nationally 
infamous for its brazen election frauds and use of 
brutality, intimidation, kidnapping and murder to achieve 
its ends. Yet Truman was able to shake the onus of this 
association for— to the amazement of his political 
opponents— he was absolutely honest in his personal and 
public conduct. Despite intensive digging by many, no 
shred of evidence has ever been unearthed to discredit 
Truman’s conduct in office.^ Cabell Phillips, a
"I was a New Dealer from the start," Truman wrote.
"In fact, had been a New Dealer back in Jackson County.' . . .
I believed in the program from the time it was first 
proposed." Memoirs, I, lip., llj.9. See also, Phillips,
Truman Presidency, 2I4.; Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 120.
•^Irving Brant, "Harry S. Truman-I," £77; Phillips, 
Truman Presidency, 18-19, 2J+-2£; Daniels, Man of Independence, 
l"6£-6”6. Nowhere is it more evident thatTrumanTs image was 
not permanently tarnished by his alliance with the Kansas 
City machine than in a Times editorial following his 
assumption of the Presidency: "There is no need to blink
at the one-time association with Pendergast," the editorial 
reads. The writer describes Truman as a "practical poli­
tician" who, like A1 Smith, was educated in ". . . the hard, 
tough schools of the ward machines • • „ whose experience 
in the practical ways of accomplishing sound public pur­
poses . . • (make) them particularly useful to their 
country in a time of crisis." New York Times, April Ilf., 19l|.£.
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biographer of Truman, sees this contradiction as political 
pragmatism:
One of the most fascinating anomalies of Harry 
Truman's career is that he, a man of such impeccable 
personal honesty and political integrity, could have 
maintained so close a relationship and dependence upon 
the Pendergast machine without being corrupted by 
it. . . . But Truman's political enemies, as well as 
more objective students, have combed through the 
records time after time and not found one substantial 
clue of Truman's complicity in any of its myriad 
misdeeds.
Moralists will find it difficult to exculpate 
Harry Truman while condemning the machine of which he 
was a part. To Truman himself there was no paradox in 
his relationship with the Pendergasts. He understood 
the nature of organization politics and the code of 
loyalty by which it survives. . • . So he did what 
many another smart political comer has done: He rode
the machine as far as it would take him but kept his 
hands clean along the way. That is a pragmatic rather 
than a moralistic philosophy, but under the rules of 
our political system it is what pays off.20
Though it would have been politically expedient to 
disavow his connections with Tom Pendergast once in the 
Senate, particularly after the machine was crushed in the 
late '30's, Truman remained loyal to the man who put him in 
office, while always voting his own way. As Truman him­
self put it, "Tom Pendergast never asked me to do a 
dishonest deed. . . .  He was always my friend. He was 
always honest with me, and when he made a promise he kept 
it."21
20Phillips, Truman Presidency, 18, 20.
^1Time, XLI, (March 8, 19^3i, 15* See also, Brant, 
"Harry S . tfruman-I," f>77-78; Phillips, Truman Presidency, 18.
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Truman's first term in the Senate was unmarked by 
any particular contribution. As a freshman senator he 
accepted the rules of the club, remaining quietly in the 
background, voting generally with the administration. 
Truman was a typical New Deal Democrat, "who combined the
party regularity of the older Democrats with the liberal
22fervor of the older progressives. . . . "
Truman's value to the Roosevelt Administration was 
not recognized. FDR ignored him, giving all of the 
patronage for Missouri to the senior Senator, Bennett
23Champ Clark, who often voted against New Deal measures. 
With the Pendergast machine destroyed and without the 
support of the President or any substantial power bloc 
back in Missouri, Truman's prospects for re-election in 
191+0 were extremely gloomy. His campaign was not made any 
easier by having to face two tough challengers for his 
seat, Governor Lloyd C. Stark, FDR's personal choice, and 
Maurice Milligan, the crusading United States District
22Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New 
Deal (Vol. II of The Age of Roosevelt. Boston: Houghton 
Mi’fflin Company, 19£7-o0), 55¥» Truman was assigned to the 
Interstate Commerce and Appropriations Committees. He 
regretted not being assigned to Military Affairs: "Ever
since World War I, I had maintained an active interest in 
the Army and its administration, and I would have welcomed 
an assignment to the Military AffairsCommittee." (He was 
in his second term.) Truman, Memoirs, I, li+7-1+8*
2^Brant, "Harry S. Truman-I," £78-79.
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Attorney for Kansas City, who had led the investigation
that exposed and destroyed the Pendergast machine.
Additionally, the only newspaper of any size in all of
Missouri to endorse the candidacy of Harry Truman was the
Kansas City Journal. ^
Despite the odds, Truman won the 191+0 Democratic
primary by a margin of less than eight thousand votes in a
triumph as surprising and unpredictable as his upset
presidential victory eight years later. In the general
election, Truman had a relatively easy time of it,
25defeating Manvelle Davis, the Republican nominee. Now 
he could return to the Senate free of any labels, for he 
had clearly won in his own right.
In January 191+1 > as Truman's second term began in 
the Senate, the Roosevelt Administration was pushing its 
military preparedness program in earnest. Through his 
membership on the Senate Appropriations Committee, Truman 
was intimately aware that billions of dollars were 
rapidly being expended -under contract to manufacturers for 
the production of war material. Besides these defense 
expenditures, the Administration requested an additional
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 159-61. See also, Brant,
"Harry S. Truman-17 579 J Phillips, Truman Presidency,
29-31.
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 160-2. See also, Time, XLI, 
(March 8, 191+3)» ll+; Daniels, Man of Independence, 210.
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four billion to expand the Army and seven billion dollars 
for aid to England. The total additional appropriations for
pithe first few months of 19*j.l exceeded $25 billion. During 
his campaign he had heard tales of gross inefficiency and 
mismanagement of government contracts. As the rumors of 
waste, corruption and favoritism continued to pile up,
Truman decided to conduct his own investigation. Trav­
eling in his car, he drove down the eastern seaboard from 
Maryland to Florida, across the Gulf Coast to Texas, north­
ward through Oklahoma and Nebraska to Wisconsin and 
Michigan, and back to Washington. In all, he covered about 
thirty thousand miles: "I visited war camps, defense
plants, and other establishments and projects which had
some connection with the total war effort of the country,
27and did not let any of them know who I was.” His 
personal odyssey confiiroed the rumors and convinced him 
of the need for a public watchdog over these vast 
expenditures.
On February 10, 19*f.l» Truman made a speech
26Truman, Memoirs, I, l61f.—65-
27Ibid., 165. See also, Steinberg, Man from 
Missouri, TdO-ol; Phillips, Truman Presidency, 33-3*1-. 
Commenting in a 1950 interview, Truman said: " . . .  I came
back and set up the Truman Committee. If I hadn't taken 
that drive, I'd still be just Senator Truman instead of 
being in all this fix.” John Hersey, "Profiles— M r . 
President," Part 1, "Quite a Head of Steam," The New 
Yorker, XXVII (April 7, 1951), *l-5« Hereinafter cTEed as 
Hersey, "Profiles," Pt. 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
denouncing the methods for awarding defense contracts, 
condemning the concentration of these awards among a few 
large manufacturers and citing several abuses by corpo­
rations, particularly in "cost-plus" contracts. Truman 
proposed Senate Resolution 71» calling for a five-member
committee to investigate the national defense program on
28a budget of twenty-five thousand dollars. Truman's 
timing was excellent: A similar resolution had just been
offered in the House by a Congressman bitterly hostile to 
the administration.^^ Roosevelt, with the encouragement 
of Senator James 1?. Byrnes, chairman of the committee to 
which Truman's resolution had been referred, decided to 
support the Senate investigation headed by a consistent 
loyalist. After considerable haggling and in-fighting, 
Truman was named chairman of the Special Committee to 
Investigate the National Defense Program. The bipartisan 
membership was raised to seven from the five Truman had 
proposed and the appropriation reduced from twenty-five to 
fifteen thousand. Both changes were forced on Truman by 
Byrnes, who wanted to prevent the committee from becoming 
powerful enough to hamper or embarrass the Administration.-^®
^®Truman, Memoirs, I, 165-66. See also, Phillips, 
Truman Presidency, 3k* Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 181-82.
^Eugene Cox of Georgia.
3°Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 182; Truman, Memoirs, 
I, 166. See also, Phillips, Truman Presidency, 3k>
Luther Huston, New York Times,' April 15/ l9lf-5.
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Truman was concerned about the role his committee 
was to play. He had been granted a broad franchise by the 
Senate to investigate every phase of military spending, but 
he was determined to avoid interfering in policy or strategy 
decisions, which he firmly believed were the sole province 
of the Chief Executive. "The Special committee never dis­
cussed military strategy, although we took testimony from 
many generals and admirals," Truman wrote in his Memoirs, 
adding, "the military policy of the United States was
entrusted to the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
31and not to any congressional committee." He recalled, 
too, that on several occasions other senators, usually 
Republicans like Robert Taft, Oren Brewster and Arthur 
Vandenberg, tried to convert the Truman Committee into 
something resembling the Committee on the Conduct of the 
War which bedeviled Abraham Lincoln in his exercise of the 
war p o w e r s . " T h a n k  goodness," Truman said, "I knew my 
history and I wouldn't do it."33
•^Truman, Memoirs, I, 189.
^2Ibid.; Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 181+. A few 
months prior to U.S. entry into World War II and shortly 
after entry, resolutions were offered in Congress to create 
a "joint committee on the conduct of national defense."
Both efforts were blocked by the Democrats, who argued that 
military policy matters must reside with the President. A. 
Russell Buchanan, The United States and World War II (2 Vols. 
New York: Harper and How, Publishers, 1 9 ,  11, 3T5-15* 
Hereinafter cited as Buchanan, United States and World War 
II.
^ S t e i n b e r g ,  Man from Missouri, l81j..
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The history of congressional/presidential relations 
during the Civil War was known to Truman long before he 
entered the Senate from his avid reading of military 
history. However, when he became head of the special 
committee, he borrowed the Reports of the Joint Committee 
on the Conduct of the War from the Library of Congress, 
studied them carefully, and came to this conclusion:
These historic records constitute a most interesting 
set of documents. That committee of the Union Congress 
was said by Douglas Southall Freeman, the biographer of 
Robert E. Lee, to have been of material assistance to 
the Confederacy. I became familiar with its mistakes 
and was determined to avoid the same errors in the con­
duct of ray special committee. Here, as in many other 
instances, I found the teachings of history to be 
valuable in my own approach to current problems.34
Cautioned by his knowledge of historical precedent, 
Truman established rigid guidelines within which his 
committee operated. Truman functioned as a "chief of 
staff," firmly guiding the committee, but freely 
delegating responsibility. He made the committee 
apolitical by insisting that all reports submitted to 
Congress by its bipartisan membership had to be unanimous.
3^Truman, Memoirs, I, 168, 188-89; Truman Speaks,
38. See also, Daniels,' Man of Independence, 2l?-lo;
Irving Brant, "Harry S. Truman-II, New kepublic, CXII 
(May 7, 19h$), 635. Hereinafter cited as Brant, "Harry S. 
Truman-II. William Hillman (ed.), Mr. President: The 
First Publication from the Personal Maries, Private 
Letters, Papers and Revealing Interviews of Harry S. Truman, 
ffhirty-Second President of Bhe"United Stages of America 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and' Young, 195>2), 9l£7 Herein- 
after cited as Hillman (ed.), Mr. President.
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No attempt at supervision of service conduct or military 
policy determination was allowed. The committee concerned 
itself with fact-finding in respect to military procure­
ment, construction, types and terms of gonverment contracts 
and the method of awarding such contracts. Through the 
committee, Truman also made certain that small manufac­
turers and suppliers got a fair percentage of the govern­
ment’s business, especially through sub-contracting with 
the principal contractual agents. The committee concerned 
itself with the practices of all manufacturing and labor 
units operating within the national defense program. "In 
other words," as Truman summed it up, "the committee was 
directed to examine every phase of the entire war 
program. "^5
In the four years it existed, the Truman Committee 
accomplished much with very little: Truman has estimated
that his committee saved the nation $15 billion while 
spending about $1+00 thousand for expenses. T h r o u g h  
tireless investigations, endless hearings, annual reports 
and thirty-two special reports to the Senate, the Special
•^Truman, Memoirs, I, 167. See also, Buchanan,
United States and World War II, II, 315; Brant, "Harry S. 
Truman-II," 635-36; Phillips, Truman Presidency, 35-37; 
Huston, New York Times, April l5, 1914-5; Steinberg, Man from 
MissouriT l8li-b5; Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign 
Tol'icy Tn the Nuclear Age: Principles, Problems', and Pros-fects (Svanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, i960), 17-18. Hereinafter cited as Crabb, American Foreign Policy.
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 186; Hersey, "Profiles," Pt. 1,
1*5.
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Committee generated a great deal of publicity that must
have had a strong deterrent effect on those who might
otherwise have been tempted to misuse government funds.
As the committee grew in stature, the Administration and
military services became more cooperative. Roosevelt,
once he became convinced Truman was not out to smear him,
37gave "wholehearted cooperation."
The Army and Navy were not always quick to cooperate 
with the Truman Committee. One example of this military 
opposition concerned industrial reconversion. As early as 
1914-3, Donald M. Nelson, head of the War Production Board, 
urged that planning begin for reconversion of industry to 
peacetime production. In February I9I4I4 Bernard Baruch 
made the same appeal. In March 191|ll- the Truman Committee 
reported that the "plans for reconversion should be started 
immediately."3® The War Department, desirous of preserving 
full strength, responded to this appeal with a forceful 
progaganda campaign that garnered public and Administration 
support by ringing all of the changes on patriotism and 
predicting that troops would be without guns or ammunition 
because of production lags. The result of this campaign 
was a failure on the part of the government to adequately
^^Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, 9I4..
38Richard N. Current, Secretary Stimson; A Study in 
Statecraft (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University 
Press',' 195k) * 20ij.. Hereinafter cited as Current, Secretary 
Stimson.
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prepare or initiate any substantive reconversion steps
39prior to Harry Truman's taking office.
In 191+6, in the midst of runaway inflation brought 
on--at least in part— by War Department hostility, Donald 
Nelson reflected on the role of the military. Nelson con­
cluded that the economic and social systems of the nation 
were endangered when military men could exercise power
l+oover civilian affairs. Truman, who through his 
struggles with the services in his Special Committee inves­
tigations had lost some of his overly-romantic views of the 
military, had expressed similar concern in an interview:
The function of generals and admirals is to fight 
battles. . . . They have no experience in business or 
industry, and the job of producing what they ask for 
should be left to businessmen under the direction of 
experienced civilians. I am firmly convinced that any 
attempt on the part of these ambitious generals and' 
admirals to take complete control over the nation's 
economy would not only place vital functions in 
inexperienced hands, but would present a definite 
threat to pur post war political and economic 
structure .4-1
Truman steadfastly maintained that his committee 
functioned only as an investigative body " . . .  trying to 
remove obstructions to the success of the production program
39ibid., 201+-205.
^°Ibid., 205.
^•Transcription of interview with Truman, "March of 
Time" radio broadcast, November 26, 191+2, Truman Papers, 
RG-1, Senatorial Piles, "National Defense Committee-General, 
Truman Library.
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and to prevent the repetition of costly errors."^ In 
fact, because of its prestige, it began to influence the 
way the services, defense agencies and the Roosevelt 
Administration conducted the military efforts of the 
nation. The "Doghouse," Truman's name for a small meeting 
room within his senatorial offices, was visited by a 
steady stream of military personnel, defense agency heads, 
private contractors and legislative liaison personnel from 
the White House. To these men Truman often pointed out 
irregularities in their conduct that caused them to 
change their method of operation.^
Roosevelt found himself confronted by a determined 
Senator Truman on several occasions. In January 19lj.2, 
for example, Truman told FDR that his committee was going 
to recommend that wartime production be concentrated under 
a single person for greater efficiency. The following 
day, the White House announced that Donald Nelson was to 
coordinate all defense production as director of the 
Office of Production Management. A short time later, when
^Truman to Joseph P. Smithers, April ij., 19i+2, 
"Special Senate Committee to Investigate the National 
Defense Program-General," Senatorial Files, Truman Papers, 
(Truman Library).
^Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 188; Buchanan, 
United States and World War II, 31&;' Brant, "Harry S. 
Truman--II, " 6^-3IT. For Truman's own explanation of the 
unique methods he employed in operating his committee, see 
his Memoirs, I, 187-90.
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the Truman Committee became critical of the OPM and called 
for a drastic reorganization, Roosevelt responded by 
establishing the War Production B o a r d . W h i l e  Truman 
greatly admired FDR, he was not intimidated by him. "Mr. 
President," Truman told him during one exchange, "the 
White House and Capitol are not connected by a one-way 
street.
With sincere humility but little accuracy, Truman 
characteristically understated the role he and his 
committee played in the war effort. Typical is this reply 
to a correspondent in 19^3 i "The Congress is only a 
legislative body. . . . There is not very much a Senator 
or Congressman can do but publicly discuss the shortcomings
^Wilfred E. Binkley, President and Congress. (3rd 
rev. ed., New York: Random House, 1962) ,""rjj'28. Hereinafter 
cited as Binkley, President and Congress. See also, 
Daniels, Man of In dependence',""221; Time', (March 8, 19i|-3)> 13 J 
Crabb, American Foreign Policy, 118.
^Brant, "Harry S. Truman-II," 638. President 
Roosevelt was able to use the Truman Committee to help 
keep his administrators in line. As Truman recalled in 
April 1959, FDR called him down to the White House 
frequently to make the same request: "I’d go down and talk
to him (Roosevelt), and he’d say, 'So-and-so over here, I 
can't do anything with him, and he's causing me trouble. I 
wish you'd give him a poke or two.' I'd do it and the 
thing would straighten out. That got me into a lot of 
trouble. He finally decided that maybe I'd make a good 
Vice-President." Truman Speaks, 38.
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of those who are supposed to administer the law."^* Irving 
Brant, in a profile he wrote on Truman in may have
come closer to the truth, if overstating his oase somewhat, 
when he wrote, "I believe, that aside from President 
Roosevelt, Senator Truman has contributed more than any 
other civilian to the winning of the war."^
The Truman Committee made mistakes, usually minor, 
often involving faulty data or the misuse of sweeping 
critical generalities, but it is very difficult to find 
criticism of their total effort during World War II. On 
the contrary, the reverse is true. It is easy to find 
praise of Truman and the committee from all quarters.
For example, James Forrestal, then Under Secretary of the 
Navy, wrote to Truman, M The Truman Committee has served 
a useful purpose in providing a medium for the explor­
ation of criticisms of the war effort. • • . The Navy 
. . . welcomes the kind of additional outside scrutiny
^Truman to Marion J. Bowles, March 13, 19^3* 
"Special Senate Committee to Investigate the National 
Defense Program-General," Senatorial Files, Truman Papers.
Vferant, "Harry S. Truman-I," f?77« Brant's 
sentiments were akin to those of most Washing corres­
pondents. They found Truman to be, "The one civilian 
member of the Government, who, next to the President him­
self, knew most about the war." See New York Times,
April llj., 1J?, 19^5. See also Binkley, President and 
Congress, 328.
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which your Committee provides."^® "I would like to 
express the appreciation of the War Department," Under 
Secretary of War Robert Patterson testified in 19i|2,
’’for the very constructive assistance that this Committee 
has rendered. . . • Some of the very best features of our 
war program have their origins from the investigations 
made by this Committee."^ In a similar vein, Donald 
Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board, wrote: ”1
wish to express the hope that your Special Committee. . . 
may continue to serve the same high purpose that it has 
comprehended so well since its creation. That purpose 
. . . has been to obtain the best possible results in our 
march toward total economic mobilization for war."
Most of the news media were equally impressed with 
the work of the Truman Committee. Luther Huston, in a 
profile of Truman for the New York Times, wrote that the 
Special Committee had probably averted numerous national 
scandals and saved the country billions of dollars.
An editorial in the same newspaper, following Truman’s
^■®Forrestal to Truman, January 6, 19b3> "Special 
Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense 
Program-General," Senatorial Files, Truman Papers.
k9^Transcript, Patterson testimony before Truman 
Committee, (undated), ibid.
^Nelson to Truman, January 9, 19k3> ibid.
^Huston, New York Times, April 15, 19i|-5«
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swearing-in at the death of FDR, found reassurance in
". • . the ability which Mr. Truman has shown, and of which
the work of the Truman Committee is sufficient proof, to
grow in stature with the assumption of increased responsi-
bility." The New Republic editorialized about the
"voluminous and excellent series of reports about the
conduct of the defense effort and the war economy . . . "
that were a product of the Truman C o m m i t t e e I n  a cover
story on Truman in 19k3* Time Magazine called the Special
Committee the most useful agency of the Government in
World War II. The article described the Committee as
"the closest thing yet to a domestic high command" and
went on to say:
Its members had no power to act or order. But, using 
Congress's old prerogative to look, criticize and 
recommend, they had focused the strength of public 
opinion on the men who had the power. . . . With 
battle-royal impartiality, they had given thick ears 
and red faces to Cabinet members, war agency heads, 
generals, admirals, big businessmen, little business­
men, labor leaders. . . . For a Congressional 
committee to be considered the first line of defense 
.. . .is encouraging to believers in democracy. So 
is the sudden emergence of Harry Truman, whose 
presence in the Senate is a queer accident of 
democracy. . . .^4
^% e w  York Times, April 15>> 19i|5*
^% e w  Republic (April 23, 19^5)* For a detailed
listing of the major accomplishments of the Truman Commit­
tee, see Brant, "Harry S. Truman-II," 636.
^ T i m e , XLI (March 8, 19lj.3), 13.
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There is little reason to doubt that the Truman 
Committee had served the nation well. It also served its 
chairman well. Harry Truman would most surely have 
remained an obscure Senator, a footnote in the political 
history of the nation, had he not chaired the Special 
Committee. His chairmanship brought him a large, deserved 
degree of favorable national recognition. It earned for 
Truman a reputation for dedication and incorruptibility 
which dispelled the shade of Tom Pendergast and the 
attendant fumes of rotten politics from automatic associa­
tion with his name. And while there is no office that can 
fully prepare a man for the singular office of the 
presidency, Truman's committee work had given him in­
valuable experience in leadership and administrative 
organization and a unique insight into the myriad
55complexities of commanding a nation involved in total war.
On August 3, i9i4.li-, Truman submitted a letter to the 
President of the Senate, resigning as chairman and member 
of the Special Committee. He was now the vice-presidential 
nominee of the Democratic Party. He feared that continued 
association with the Committee would lead to attacks on the
^Phillips, Truman Presidency, 37» Binkley, Presi­
dent and Congress, 327-20; Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 191}.. 
For a view somewhat contrary to that expressed here, see 
Wilber W. Hoare, Jr., "Truman," in May (ed.), Ultimate 
Decision, 181-82. Hereinafter cited as Hoare, "Truman•"
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bipartisan nature of its work.^ Members of the Special 
Committee urged him to stay but respected the reasons for 
his resignation. The members adopted the following reso­
lution on the occasion of his departure, which, of all the 
encomiums he received for his efforts on the Committee, 
must have pleased Truman most, for it represented the 
judgment of his peers:
WHEREAS Hon. Harry S. Truman, U.S.S., has submitted 
his resignation as Chairman of this Committee, and the 
members of this Committee with the greatest of 
reluctance have accepted his resignation,
THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that the Committee 
insert into its permanent records this unanimous 
expression of its sentiment.
Under the leadership of Hon. Harry S. Truman, the 
United States Senate, Special Committee Investigating 
the National Defense Program, which appropriately 
became known as the Truman Committee, has established 
a record which speaks for itself.
The Senator from Missouri conceived this Com­
mittee. . . . His work has been characterized by 
modesty, tact and diplomacy, and by his infinite capac­
ity for preserving harmony within the Committee. • • • 
His devotion to duty. . . , his good judgment, his 
patriotic love of his country, all are reflected in 
the Nation’s confidence in this Committee. . . .
The accomplishments of the Committee reflect these 
characteristics of its great Chairman, and its members 
say to their colleague from Missouri, Colonel Harry S. 
Truman, Field Artillery, Officers Reserve Corps,
"Well done, soldierI "57
Guessing about Roosevelt's possible running mates 
began in early 19ljij-» Henry Wallace, the incumbent
£6Truman to Henry Wallace, August 3, 19i|4» reprinted 
in Truman, Memoirs, I, 185-86.
^Resolution, (undated), ''Special Senate Committee 
to Investigate the National Defense Program-19i|lj.#" 
Senatorial Files, Truman Papers.
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Vice-President, had acquired numerous enemies because of
his strident liberalism, out-spoken belief in the occult
and undiplomatic candor. Late in the spring of 191^,
Edward Flynn, boss of the Democratic machine in New York
City, made an informal survey of key areas of the country
at FDR's request. Flynn reported back to Roosevelt that
Wallace would hurt the ticket more than any other nominee
58he could propose. The President gave no visible sign of
diminished confidence in Wallace as his running mate.
However, the rumors that Wallace was going to be dumped
persisted, and the conjecture in the press continued up
until the convention in July. The most prominent names
being touted in the Vice-presidential betting were those
of James Byrnes, Director of War Mobilization, Justice
William 0. Douglas, and two members of the Senate, Alben
Barkley and Harry Truman.
For reasons known only to him, Roosevelt refused to
end the guessing game by positively endorsing one man.
Throughout the year, he had allowed others to conclude
that he was endorsing one or the other among the aspirants,
or that he was sticking with Wallace. Even as the con-
cjgvention opened in July, FDR remained uncommitted.-77
^Phillips, Truman Presidency, 38-39; Steinberg,
Man from Missouri, 202.
^Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 203-206, passim.
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Truman can probably be believed in his contention that he 
did not want to leave the Senate for the Vice-Presidency. 
The best evidence for that is the commitment he made to 
nominate Jimmy Byrnes for the office just prior to leaving 
for the convention.^
At the Democratic convention in Chicago, Robert 
Hannegan, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, 
tried in vain for several days to convince Truman that he 
was the President’s choice. Truman refused to accept this 
and continued to promote Byrnes' candidacy. The intrigues, 
deals and maneuvers by the various factions ended after 
five days in a telephone conversation between Hannegan 
and FDR on July 2l±, Truman was in Hannegan's suite at the 
time, along with most of the major big city bosses of the 
party who were trying to convince him to allow his name to 
be placed in nomination. Truman heard both ends of the 
conversation, because of Roosevelt's habit of talking very 
loudly on the telephone. FDR asked Hannegan if Truman had 
accepted. When told he had not, Roosevelt said, "Well you 
tell him if he wants to break up the Democratic party in
60Truman has since decided that Byrnes knew FDR had 
indicated he wanted him (Truman) on the ticket when Byrnes 
asked him to make the nominating speech. Truman, Memoirs,
I, 190, 192. See also, Phillips, Truman Presidency,
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the middle of a war, that's his responsibility."^ Truman
has recorded his reactions in his Memoirs:
I was completely stunned. I sat for a minute or two 
and then got up and began walking around the room.
All the others were watching me and not saying a word.
"Well," I said finally, if that is the situation, 
I'll have to say yes, but why the hell didn’t he tell 
me in the first place?" . • . The following day I was 
chosen by the convention as its nominee for the vice­
presidency of the United States. ^
The Democratic ticket won easily, carrying thirty-six 
states, over the Republican slate of Thomas Dewey and John 
Bricker. Harry Truman’s apprenticeship lasted only 
eighty-two days. He saw the President on very few 
occasions, much less had he had as a Senator.^ The Vice- 
President found himself at loose ends with little to do
Truman, Memoirs, I, 192. See also Steinberg, Man 
from Missouri, 215; Phillips, Truman Presidency, 1*7; 
Buchanan, United States and World War II, 11,332-33i Dean 
Acheson, Present at the Ureation: My Years in the State 
Department (Hew York ; W.~~W." Norton and Company , 1969), 
l37. Hereinafter cited as Acheson, Present at the 
Creation. The party leaders present at this meeting, in 
addition to Truman and Hannegan, were Edward Flynn, Frank 
Hague, Edward Kelly, Edwin Pauley, and Frank Walker.
^2Truman, Memoirs, I, 192-93. The selection of 
Truman was described by"at least one newspaper as the 
"Second Missouri Compromise". New York Times, April 11*,
191*5.
^ I n  his capacity as Chairman of the Special 
Committee, Truman used to meet with the President, " . . .  
at least once a week, and more often if he (FDR) thought 
it necessary." During Truman's Vice-Presidency, Roosevelt 
was in Washington a total of about thirty days. See 
Truman, Memoirs, I, 56, 195* See also, Steinberg Man From 
Missouri, 230.
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aside from presiding over the Senate, a task more 
ceremonial than exacting. Truman anticipated this: "I
had spent a great deal of time reading the history of past 
administration. . . , when I became Vice-President, I was 
familiar with the incongruities and inadequacies of that 
office."^ It is an irony of history that Truman is 
related in his ancestral lines with John Tyler, the first 
Vice-President to succeed to the Presidency.^
Late in the afternoon of April 12, 19lj-5, Truman 
received a message at the Capitol asking that he come to 
the White House immediately. Upon his arrival he was 
taken to Eleanor Roosevelt's study where she met him with 
the words, "Harry, the President is dead." After a 
pause, he asked her if there was anything he could do. 
Truman recalls being quite moved by the grace and under­
standing of Jier reply: "Is there anything we can do for
you?" Mrs. Roosevelt asked. "For you are the one in 
trouble now."^
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 53.
65"Tyler's brother was the father of my great­
grandmother, and the whole Tyler family is mixed up with 
both sides." Truman, Memoirs, I, 53*
66Ibid., 5.
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CHAPTER III
WORLD WAR II STEWARDSHIP
I had hurried to the White House to see the 
President, and when I arrive, I found I was the 
President.!
Some two hours after being called to the White House, 
Harry Truman was sworn in as the thirty-second President 
by Chief Justice Harlan Stone. In the brisk but polite 
manner that became commonplace, Truman completed the oath- 
taking ceremony in little over a minute, made a few 
announcements and told reporters he was "going home, to 
bed.1,2
Before leaving the White House, Truman asked all 
of FDR’s cabinet^ to remain in their positions, at least 
temporarily. He tried to allay fears of any great changes
^-Harry S. Truman to Martha Truman, April 16, 19i|-5> 
reprinted in Truman, Memoirs, I, 1±3-i+4*
^Hew York Times, April 13> 19lj.5>»
3The Cabinet, as Truman took office, consisted of 
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State; Henry 
Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury; Henry L. 
Stimson, Secretary of War; Francis Biddle, Attorney-General; 
James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy; Frank C. Walker, 
Postmaster General; Claude R. Wickard, Secretary of 
Agriculture; Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior; 
Henry L. Wallace, Secretary of Commerce; and Frances 
Perkins, Secretary of Labor. Truman, Memoirs, I, 32I4..
68
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by stating that he intended to carry on as Roosevelt 
would have. He underscored this with an announcement that 
the organizational meeting of the United Nations, due to 
open in San Francisco on April 25, would convene as 
scheduled by FDR. Truman's final announcement on this 
fateful evening also struck a note of assurance, although 
it hardly seemed necessary under the circumstances: "The
world," he said, "may be sure that we will prosecute the 
war on both fronts, east and west, with all the vigor we 
possess to a successful conclusion."^
Reflecting back on these crowded days of April some 
four years later, Truman said: "No one, I think, in the
history of the country ever assumed a greater responsibility 
than I did."'* In the sense that Truman awoke on April 12, 
19lj.£>, comfortable in the impotent obscurity of the Vice- 
Presidency and went to bed that night commander in chief 
of the greatest military force ever assembled on earth, 
he is correct. He had no more knowledge of current 
military policy and strategy than any other citizen could 
obtain from the censored accounts appearing in the
^•Statement by the President, April 12, 19 
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19k5* 1; New York Times,
April 13 , l9l|5.
^Louis W. Koenig (ed.), The Truman Administration:
Its Principles and Practices (New York: New York Univer­
sity Press, 1956), 30• Hereinafter cited as Koenig (ed.), 
Truman Administration.
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newspapers. Roosevelt had not confided in his Immediate
successor. It was as if the understudy to the lead
character in a drama had not been allowed to see the
script. Truman later acknowledged that he was not
"adequately informed" on matters of foreign policy.^ He
had not been told of the atomic bomb, for example; nor had
he ever been invited inside the "Super Secret Map Room" of
the White House, which contained detailed maps of current
troop dispositions and battle situations throughout the 
7world. Given the condition of Roosevelt's health and the 
complexities of the massive war effort, PDR must be 
faulted for not keeping Truman apprised of major military 
developments. While such a procedure seems dictated by 
common sense, it was not required by law and would have 
been precedential.® The British Prime Minister, Winston 
Churchill, was amazed to discover that Truman had not been 
kept abreast of events. Truman had requested that 
Churchill meet with him for two or three days talk follow­
ing Roosevelt's funeral. Because of the press of affairs 
in England, Churchill decided not to attend the funeral and
^Truman Speaks, 66.
7Truman, Memolrs, I,
8Buchanan, United States and World War II, II, 
ij.99-500; Hoare, "afruman, " T 8T-62"
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Qsent Truman his regrets. Reflecting on his decision 
later, the Prime Minister felt he had made a mistake:
In the after-light I regret that I did not adopt 
the new President’s suggestion. I had never met 
him, and I feel that there were many points on which 
personal talks would have been of the greatest value, 
especially if they had been spread over several days 
and not hurried or formalised. It seemed to me 
extraordinary, especially during the last few months, 
that Roosevelt had not made his deputy and potential 
successor thoroughly acquainted with the whole story 
and brought him into the decisions which were being 
taken. This proved of grave disadvantage to our 
affairs. . . .  In these early months his position was 
one of extreme difficulty.10
While it is certain that Truman could be benefited 
from being taken into Roosevelt’s confidence, it appears 
equally certain that few men in the nation were better 
prepared to assume civilian direction of the military. It 
was a fortunate accident of fate that his work on the 
Truman Committee had provided the new President with an 
unparalleled knowledge of military affairs. This did not 
go unnoticed. An editorial in the New York Times on 
April llj., 191*5, noted: "No member of the Senate, no
elected official of the Government of the United States, 
has had a better and more intimate view of the whole war 
machine than the man who directed the activities of the
^Winston S. Churchill to Truman, April 13, 191*5, 
reprinted in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, Vol. VI,
The Second World War (6 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1953)> i+79- Hereinafter cited as Churchill, Triumph and 
Tragedy.
1QIbid., 1*79-80.
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Truman Committee. . . . To inform himself of current 
military and foreign policies, Truman summoned his military 
leaders and Secretary of State to meet with him on April 
13, 191+5, his first full day in the Presidency.
Truman's first official caller as President was 
Secretary of State Stettinius, who briefed him on all 
current diplomatic matters. Truman asked the Secretary to 
continue the practice begun under Roosevelt, whereby the 
State Department prepared a two-page summary of diplomatic 
developments for daily presentation to the President.
Truman found these summaries, along with the daily reports 
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "immensely helpful in 
filling gaps in my information” and "indispensable as aids 
in dealing with many issues. . . . Truman asked 
Stettinius to have a report for him before the day was out 
on the background and status of all international problems 
confronting the Administration. That part of the report 
analyzing relations with the Soviet Union contained a 
prophetic line: "Since the Yalta Conference the Soviet
Government has taken a firm and uncompromising position on
^ New York Times, April llj., 19kS»
•^Truman, Memoirs, I, llj.. The military intelligence 
reports were compiled by a central intelligence staff 
headed by Major General Hoyt S. Vandenberg. See Arthur 
Krock, Hew York Times, July 16, 192-J.6.
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nearly every major question that has arisen in our rela­
tions • m1^
The military leadership1 -̂ met with Truman at 11:00 
A.M. April 13» to acquaint the new Commander in Chief with 
the existing military situation and strategic planning.
At the time of their meeting, some units of the Ninth 
A m y  had crossed the Elbe River and were moving eastward. 
The '*Ruhr Pocket'*— last major German resistance west of 
the Elbe--was crumbling rapidly. In the East, the Soviet 
forces had crossed the Oder and were moving against Ber­
lin. It was obvious that Germany was beaten, that the 
tide was irreversible. The military chiefs told Truman 
that it would take at least more months to completely 
defeat Germany.^ This very pessimistic estimate (Ger­
many capitulated in less than a month) was based in part 
on Allied intelligence reports of a heavily-fortified 
**National Redoubt** in which the Germans planned to resist
■^State Department, Memorandum to the President, 
April 13, 1914-5* reprinted in Truman, Memoirs, I, lJLp—17•
"^General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, Army; 
Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations; Secre­
tary of War Stimson; Secretary of the Navy Forrestal; Lt. 
General Barney M. Giles, Army Air Force; General A.A. Van- 
dergrift, Marine Corps Commandant; Admiral William D. 
Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. Truman, 
Memoirs, I, 17. See also, New York Times, April lip, 1914-5.
•̂ New York Times, April 13* 1914-5J Truman, Memoirs,
I, 17. See also, Vincent J. Esposito (ed.), West Point 
Atlas of American Wars (2 vols., New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1559), II* Sect. 2, Map Plate No. 70. Herein­
after cited as Esposito (ed.), West Point Atlas.
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16to the last man. This redoubt did not exist.
As to the Pacific, the Chiefs were able to report 
to the President that Japan had now been driven out of most 
of the islands it had conquered, with the major fighting 
at the time being concentrated on Okinawa. The bitter 
fighting for Iwo Jima in March had provided the Army Air 
Force with airfields within fighter escort range from 
which to strike at mainland Japan using the B-29 "Super­
fortresses" based in the Marianas Islands. These massive 
bomber strikes at heavy industries, particularly aircraft 
plants, failed to substantially lower production. General 
Curtis LeMay, in charge of the XXth Bomber Command, 
received approval for a change in tactics to the use of 
incendiaries (fire-bombs) on urban population centers.
The new bombing targets, according to A. Russell Buchanan 
in his history of World War II, were "the congested 
inflammable cities and the people in them."^ Buchanan has 
described the first massive demonstration of the "fire- 
bombing " technique:
On March 8, counting on the surprise of low-altitude 
night attack, General LeMay ordered a mass fire bomb
■^Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 19ll5*
The Decision to Halt at the Elbe (New York: W. W. Norton and 
d'ompany, Incorporated, l96>7) ,Y3-79, passim. Hereinafter 
cited as Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin’. See also,
Cornelius Ryan, The Last Battre (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1966), 209-13. hereinafter cited as Ryan, The Last Battle.
^^Buchanan, United States and World War II, II, 575-76.
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raid on Tokyo. On the following day 33b bombers, 
carrying about two thousand tons of bombs, left 
bases in the Marianas. • . . The result was one of 
the worst holocausts of all time. The target was a 
part of Tokyo into which people were crammed on an 
average of 103,000 to the square mile. The con­
flagration gutted about a fourth of the city's build­
ings and rendered homeless more than a million 
persons. Casualty lists were terrific; 83,793 
persons died and q.0,918 were injured. People caught 
in the bombed area were helpless for there was no 
place to go, and the fire-fighting equipment was 
utterly inadequate. Water boiled in some of the 
smaller canals running through the flaming city.
Not excepting later raids, the Tokyo fire raid on 
March 9-10, X9if-5, was the most destructive air raid 
in history.1®
Truman accepted these new air tactics against the 
Japanese mainland, and on his authority the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff approved a list of thirty-three Japanese cities 
that the Army Air Force could attack with incendiary 
devices.1*̂ Although LeMay and the Air Force hoped that 
their air attacks would be a substitute for invasion, 
most of the military were convinced that only by invasion 
would the Japanese be conquered. Their estimated time for 
the final conquest of Japan was as conservative as it was 
for Germany: They told Truman it would take about a year
and a half.20
•̂ Ibid., 578-78. For detailed maps and a textual 
explanation of these bombings, see Esposito (ed.), West 
Point Atlas, II, Sect. 2, Map Plate No. 166.
■^Buchanan, United States and World War II, II, 578.
poTruman, Memoirs, I, 17.
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As the military chiefs were leaving his office,
Truman asked Admiral Leahy to remain. He asked Leahy to
continue in his unique post as chief of staff to the
Commander in Chief. FDR had created the post; it consisted
simply of meeting with the President each morning and
briefing him on all military events of the past twenty-
four hours, along with any other factors— political
events, economic or production problems, etc.--which might
have a bearing on the conduct of the war. Truman noted in
his Memoirs that he asked Leahy to stay on in the post
because he found in the Admiral a blunt and direct man who
21would not equivocate in his presentations.
Truman apparently decided on his first day in office
Ibid., 18. One scholar of the Cold War period, 
D(enna) F)rank) Fleming, sees the retention of Leahy as 
military adviser to Truman as a factor in the coming of the 
Cold War. Fleming says that Leahy, because of these daily 
briefings, was in a unique position to influence the Presi­
dent and that the Admiral had "a long time aversion to the 
Russians." Fleming perceives a Leahy-influenced anti- 
Soviet bias emerging in Truman some ten days after taking 
office. See, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960 (2 
vols., Garden C'i'ty,' toew York'f DouFleday and Company, 
Incorporated, 1961), I, 266. Hereinafter cited as Fleming, 
The Cold War. Cabell Phillips, in his study 6f Truman, 
disagrees with Fleming. He claims that Leahy, along with 
Stimson and Marshall, advocated "getting along with the 
Russians at all costs." Truman Presidency, 71. There can 
be little doubt of Leahy's bluntness, however. When informed 
by FDR that he wanted Truman as his Vice-President, Leahy 
asked, "Who the hell is Truman"? Steinberg, Man from 
Missouri, 13. Later, at a meeting where scientists 
explained the atomic bomb project to the new President,
Leahy observed: "That is the biggest fool thing we have
ever done. The bomb will never go off, and I speak as an 
expert in explosives." Truman, Memoirs, I, 11.
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that the nation and the allies needed pointed reassurance 
that the change of Executives did not mean a change in 
American policy. Accordingly, he asked the leaders in the 
House and Senate to convoke a joint session of Congress on 
Monday, April 16, 191+5 > that he might address them.*^ 
Underlining the concern of the allies toward changes in 
U.S. policy was a meeting between Truman and Anthony Eden, 
the British Foreign Secretary, the morning of the Presi­
dent's address to the Congress. During the course of their 
discussion Truman assured Eden that it was his intention 
11. . • to continue on exactly the same lines of foreign
popolicy as the late President had followed." J
In his address to Congress, which was broadcast 
live by the major radio networks, Truman began by 
eulogizing Roosevelt as " . . .  a great man who loved, and 
was beloved by, all humanity." He pledged himself to 
carry out the military plans and peace proposals of FDR.
The President warmly endorsed the existing military 
leadership and promised they would remain "unchanged and 
unhampered." In a warning to Germany and Japan, he said 
that they should not misunderstand, "that America will
2^Truman, Memoirs. I, 19. See also, New York 
Times, April llj., 191+5.
^Anthony Eden to Churchill (cable) , April 16, 191+5, 
reprinted in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 1+71+-85.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
78
continue the fight for freedom until no vestige of
resistance remains!" Truman said that anything short of
total victory would endanger a future peace. Thus, "Our
demand has been, and it remains— Unconditional Surrender!"
The remainder of the speech (about half) was devoted to an
earnest plea for all Americans to support the efforts
about to begin at San Francisco to foim the United Nations
2korganization as the one great hope for enduring peace.
It was quite clear after a few days in office that 
Truman's concept of his role as Chief Executive and his 
relationship with his war cabinet and the military chiefs 
was quite dissimilar to FDR's. For example, Roosevelt 
usually met with individual cabinet officers before 
cabinet meetings to discuss the problems of their depart­
ments. Seldom was there any contention or open discussion 
in FDR's cabinet meetings, which were largely cut-and-dried 
affairs. Truman felt that Roosevelt expended much time and 
energy going those things that should have been the 
delegated responsibility of cabinet members. Truman 
faulted Roosevelt for acting as his own Secretary of State, 
Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of the Navy and
^Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,
April 16, 19k£> Public Papers . . . Truman, 19kf>* 1-6, 
pas aim. Text is printed in Hew York Times, April 17 >
19l+f>. See also, Truman, Memoirs, IT
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25Secretary of War. The Truman style was quite different
and more direct: All matters were normally discussed in
open cabinet meetings. Personal leadership now gave way
to an institutional approach to administrative matters
that was more efficient and less colorful than the
26flamboyant style of the Roosevelt era.
The Joint Chiefs and the Service Secretaries found 
that they were dealing with a very different commander in 
chief. While Truman did have to be brought up to date on 
present operations, he was in no sense dependent upon the 
military for command decisions. The new Commander in 
Chief " . . .  acted as a full-fledged master of the guild 
from the day he took o f f i c e . I t  was Truman’s con­
viction that the President must be the "absolute commander" 
of the country's armed forces. He believed the President 
had to set policy guidelines for the military, approve 
their strategic and major tactical recommendations when
2^Truman, Memoirs, I, 328-29. Senator Vandenberg 
agreed with Truman, at least as far as the post of Secretary 
of State was concerned. On the day Truman took office he 
confided to his diary: "Stettinius is now Secretary of
State in fact. Up to now he has been only the presidential 
messenger. He does not have the background and experience 
for such a job at such a critical time. . . . Now we have 
both an inexperienced President and an inexperienced 
Secretary. . . ." Vandenberg, Private Papers, 167-68.
2^Roy Roberts, New York Times, April l£, 19^5* See 
also, Truman, Memoirs, I, 329.
2?Hoare, "Truman," 182.
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proper and see to it that they implemented the policies of
pO
the Administration. The mo3t obvious immediate change 
that Truman made with respect to the command function was 
that, unlike Roosevelt, he insisted that all military 
decisions above the very routine receive his approval 
prior to their implementation. He makes this clear in his 
Memoirs;
From the time I became President I made it plain, in 
my relations with the military, that I was interested 
in the details of actual administration as much as the 
larger objectives. . . .  I took the position that the 
President, as the Commander in Chief, had to know 
everything that was going on. I had had just enough 
experience to know that if you are not careful the 
military will hedge you in.29
Truman's relationship with his military chieftains
began well and, with few exceptions, continued harmoniously
throughout the five months remaining in World War II.
Stimson noted early that he was encouraged ". . . b y  the
calm, decisive demeanor of Harry S. Truman, the new
30Commander in Chief." All of them were impressed with 
his energy and ability to absorb and retain lengthy 
technical reports. The relationship was made easier by
pQ
Truman Speaks, 6.
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 88.
^°Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr.,
The New World, 1939-19i|.6 (Vol. I of A History of the United 
States Atomic Energy Commission. University Park: Pennsyl­
vania State University Press, 1962), 3k7» Hereinafter 
cited as Hewlett and Anderson, The New World.
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Truman’s great admiration for men like General Marshall and
Admiral Leahy. On their part, the military leadership were
grateful for Truman's frankness and acceptance of command
responsibility. When things went wrong, he sought
31solutions, not scapegoats. Because of these factors, 
Truman was able to write: "My meetings with the Chiefs of
Staff were always highly informative and productive." But 
he hastened to add the qualification that, " . . .  the 
policy of the government determines the policy of the 
military. The military is always subordinate to the 
government."^2 At a later date, in another war, this same 
Commander in Chief was compelled to make a very unpupular 
decision in defense of this principle.
In Europe, as April drew to an end, the German 
forces that remained found themselves pressed into an 
increasingly narrow and deadly corridor between the 
Russians advancing from the East and the Allied troops 
driving forward from the West. The latter halted their 
advance generally along the Elbe River line, where, in 
the first days of May, they were joined by advance units of 
the Soviet Army. As the jaws of this martial vise were 
drawing together, and European victory became a certainty,
^Hoare, "Truman," 182-83.
^2Truman, Memoirs, I, 210.
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a struggle went on within the Allied camp over military
'j'}objectives
The original plans for the conquest of Germany had 
called for the major push of the Allies to be directed 
against Berlin. But the unanticipated speed with which 
the advance proceeded on both fronts in March changed the 
strategic situation. Toward the end of March, the Allied 
Supreme Commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, determined 
that a concentration of these forces in movement against 
Berlin was no longer militarily worthwhile. The bulk of 
major German strength was south of Berlin. Eisenhower 
ordered a movement of his major forces southward, deciding 
that his proper objective was the destruction of enemy 
forces, not the capture of a geographic area of limited 
military significance.^ Eisenhower's decision is clearly 
consonant with one of the basic principles of warfare:
The object of military activity should be the destruction 
of enemy forces in the field, not the capture of places. 
Therefore, Eisenhower's decision to abandon a futile race 
with the Soviet armies for the capture of a place--Berlin~
^ B u c h a n a n ,  Uni ted States in World War II, II, 
Esposito (ed.), West PoinTT"Atlas , II, 'S’ect. 2, Map 
Plate No. 71.
^Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 60-62; Truman, 
Memoirs, I, 211-12; Buchanan, \Jnited States and World War 
II, II,
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was based primarily on military, not political consider­
ations.^
The American Joint Chiefs of Staff, President 
Roosevelt, just prior to his death, and President Truman, 
had all approved of Eisenhower's decision. However, the 
British Chiefs of Staff and Prime Minister Churchill took 
strong exception to this decision to leave the capture of 
Berlin to the Russians. On April 18, Churchill
sent a message to Truman asking that Eisenhower extend his 
advance as far eastward as possible and hold these 
"tactical zones" pending final settlement of the permanent 
zones of occupation with the Russians.3^ Churchill's 
arguments for the extension of the Allied advance, which 
he hoped would include Berlin, were based on political 
considerations. Truman indicated later that he recognized 
the request as such: "Churchill was worried over Russian
intentions and wanted all the territory we could get for 
bargaining purposes after the war. . . . For him, Berlin 
was not just a military matter but a matter of 
state. . . ."87
8^ln Eisenhower and Berlin, Ambrose disagreed, 
holding that Eisenhower’s-decis ion was "rooted in political 
considerations." (See pp. 28-29.)
8^Churchill to Truman, April 18, 19k5* printed in 
Truman, Memoirs, I, 61-2, 211, 213.
37ibid., 213.
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By the end of April the success of Eisenhower’s 
troops in southern Germany added a new dimension to the 
controversy over military and political objectives. [The 
British were urging Eisenhower to advance into 
Czechoslovakia at least as far as Prague, the capital. On 
April 28 Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall communi­
cated the British suggestion to Eisenhower, indicating that 
if military considerations were not involved he would be
TO
against the loss of lives to obtain political advantage. 
Eisenhower replied that he agreed with Marshall and that he 
considered his primary mission to be the capture of Linz 
(Austria) and the "National R e d o u b t . C h u r c h i l l  appealed 
this decision of the generals to their Commander in Chief 
on April 30. The Prime Minister told Truman that Allied 
liberation of Prague and western Czechoslovakia could well 
determine the postwar political environment of that 
country as well as many neighboring nations. Although 
this movement toward Prague must be secondary to 
Eisenhower’s movement against remaining organized 
resistance in Germany, Churchill concluded, " . . .  the 
highly important political consideration mentioned above
3®Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 83-81]..
39Ibid., 84.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
85
should be brought to his attention."^0
While Truman worried over what response to make to 
the British, he received a memorandum from the Acting 
Secretary of State,^ indicating that the State Department 
felt the proposal had merit. The note argued that an 
American occupation to the Moldau River line (Prague) 
would significantly enhance the bargaining relationship 
vis a vis the Russians. Truman was urged to ask the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to give the proposal serious con­
sideration.^
Truman did submit the proposal to the JCS, and he
also cabled Eisenhower asking for his views. The
President's military advisers were agreed. On May 1,
19i|.5> Truman, after noting that the proposal would
necessitate high casualties for questionable gains, sent
the following unusually curt reply to Churchill:
General Eisenhower's present attitude, in regard to 
operations in Czechoslovakia, which meets with my 
approval, is as follows:
QUOTE. The Soviet General Staff now contemplates 
operations into tho Vltava Valley. My intention, as 
soon as current operations permit, is to proceed and 
destroy any remaining organized German forces.
If a. move into Czechoslovakia is then desirable, and 
if conditions here permit, our logical initial move
^Churchill to Truman, April 30, 1 9 printed in 
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 506. See also, Truman, 
Memoirs, I, 216.
^"Joseph C. Grew.
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 216.
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would be on Pilsen and Karlsbad. I shall not attempt 
any move which I deem militarily unwise. UNQUOTE. 43
The controversy between Truman and Churchill hinged 
upon a prior agreement between the Allied Powers respecting 
eventual zones of occupation to be established following 
the defeat of Germany. The operational lines of the 
Western Allies had already passed these boundaries by 
late April, and they were fighting for land they would 
eventually have to surrender to the U.S.S.R. The American 
Army had continued on into these areas for military 
reasons; they were pursuing a force in retreat in hopes of 
eliminating all armed resistance. Churchill encouraged 
3till deeper penetrations (toward Berlin and Prague) to 
capture geographic trophies of psychological and political 
importance in postwar negotiations. Truman and his 
military leadership demurred because the price in 
casualties would be too high. Truman further disagreed 
because he felt committed to the zonal agreements 
Roosevelt had made. Also, he was not inclined to dictate 
a change in strategy to a general who was carrying out 
an eminently successful military operation. "The only
^Truman to Churchill, May 1, 1945 > printed in 
Truman, Memoirs, I, 216-17. See also, Churchill, Triumph 
and Tragedy, 5o6-507; Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 65» 
The Piisen-Karlsbad line noted by Eisenhower would have 
been some forty to fifty miles short of Prague. The war 
ended before Eisenhower's forces attained that line.
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practical thing to do," Truman recalled in his Memoirs, 
"was to stick carefully to our agreement and to try our 
best to make the Russians carry out their agreements.
The zonal agreements on Germany to which Truman 
felt committed, were drafted by FDR and Churchill at the 
Quebec Conference in September of 19 ^ . ^  In the Crimean 
(Yalta) Conference of February, 1 9 t*1® Quebec Plan was 
accepted by Stalin.^ In a message to Truman on April 18, 
Churchill admitted, with obvious regret, that these zones 
were decided upon ". . . rather hastily at Quebec . . . 
when it was not foreseen that General Eisenhower's armies 
would make such a mighty inroad into Germany."^
The "mighty inroad" made by Eisenhower's forces 
had a telling effect by the last week in April. On the 
twenty-fifth Truman received a "scrambler" telephone call
^■Truman, Memoirs, I, 21ij.. See also, Phillips, 
Truman Presidency, 72-73.
^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, £08-£l0j Truman, 
Memoirs, I, 213.
^ A  map describing the original agreement at 
Quebec appears in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 509.
^Churchill to Truman, April 18, 19i|-5, printed in 
Truman, Memoirs. I, 62. From the security of his nonin­
volvement, Truman has written with respect to the military 
boundaries: "This shows conclusively that heads of state
should be very careful about horseback agreements, because 
there is no way of foretelling the final result." See 
ibid., 213.
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from Churchill.^ The Swedish government had informed 
Churchill that they had been contacted by Heinrich Eflinmler, 
head of the Gestapo, proposing to surrender all German 
troops on the Western Front. The Germans would continue 
to fight the Russian advance on the Eastern Front. Truman 
agreed with Churchill that the offer, even if valid, was 
unacceptable. The Allies had previously agreed to an un- 
conditional surrender on all fronts, simultaneously.^-7
Truman immediately informed Premier Stalin of the offer and
<0his response. Apparently the President clung to 
insistence on unconditional surrender because of the Yalta 
Pact. In defense of the doctrine he acknowledged it had 
no moral or educational value, but it was of value in 
facilitating the take-over and control of a defeated 
nation.^
On April 27 Eisenhower's headquarters informed 
Truman that American and British forces had met a Russian 
force advancing from the east at Torgau, south of Berlin.
^•®The "scrambler" telephone is a security device 
that garbles the voice into unintelligible patterns until 
the signal is rearranged by a properly-encoded receiving 
device.
^Himmler falsely claimed that Hitler had suffered 
serious brain damage and that he was in effective command 
and able to make a legitimate surrender offer. Truman, 
Memoirs, I, 88-91.
£°Truman to Stalin (Cable), April 2£, 19k$> printed 
in Truman, Memoirs, I, 91+ •
^Ibid., 208-209.
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The remaining German forces were bisected and crumbling. 
Truman issued a statement praising the cooperative spirit 
of the Allies, the troops and the courageous leadership of 
Roosevelt. He also used the occasion to endorse the 
efforts to create the United Nations, a theme that 
recurred often in his messages during this period: "Nations 
which can plan and fight together shoulder to shoulder in 
the face of such obstacles . . . can live together and 
can work together in the common labor of the organization 
of the world for peace.
Events in Europe were moving swiftly. The German 
forces in Italy, along with their Fascist divisions, 
ended their resistance on May 2. Truman sent a message of 
congratulations to General Mark Clark, the American 
commander in Italy and issued a statement on the surrender 
heavy with the leaden phrases he resorted to at such 
moments:
The Allied Armies in Italy have won the unconditional 
surrender of German forces on the first European soil 
to which, from -the West, we carried our arms and our 
determination. Let Japan as well as Germany under­
stand the meaning of these events. Unless they are 
lost in fanaticism or determined upon suicide, they 
must recognize the meaning of the increasing,
^Press Release, April 27* 19lj-5> Public Papers 
. . . Truman, 19ij.f?» 2f>-26. See also, Truman, Memoirs, I, 106. —
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
swifter-moving power now ready for the capitulation 
or the destruction of the so-recently arrogant 
enemies of mankind.53
The last few days of the fighting in Europe were 
characterized by desperate movements of German troops away 
from the Russian front toward the American and British 
lines, where they hoped to surrender to more forgiving 
enemies. Accepting the inevitable, on May 5, Admiral 
Karl Doenitz^*- ordered Admiral Hans von Friedeburg to go 
to Eisenhower’s headquarters (SHAEP), then located at 
Rheims, to attempt to surrender on just the Western 
Front. Backed by Truman’s express position that only a 
total capitulation on both fronts was acceptable, 
Eisenhower rejected the offer. The following day, 
Friedeburg was joined by General Alfred Jodi, apparently 
with orders from Doenitz to stall the negotiations as 
long as possible, thus permitting more troops to move
^Truman to Clark, May 2, 19k$ (Cable), Public 
Papers . . . Truman, 19U5, 32; Statement by the weal dent 
on the Surrender of German Forces in Italy, May 2, 19ij-5>> 
ibid., 31; Truman, Memoirs, I, 201.
^Hitler apparently took his own life on April 30 
Prior to this, on April 28, he had denied any authority 
to Himmler or Hermann Goering, his Luftwaffe chief. Both 
had attempted to take command in the last weeks of the 
fixating. As head of the government and the military, 
Hitler named Admiral Doenitz, who assumed command on 
May 1, 19b%» Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command in 
Kent Roberts Greenfield (ed.), Tbe~tfnTted States Army in 
World War II (Washington: USGPO,' 195b)> HereTnaflier
cited as Pogue, Supreme Command. See also, Buchanan, 
United States in World*-War II, II, 2j.6l.
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westward and surrender to some force other than the 
Russians. Eisenhower ordered the negotiations ended unless 
the Germans ended their delaying tactics. Informed of 
this, Doenitz allowed Jodi to sign a temporary surrender 
document, subject to formal ratification in forty-eight 
hours. The lethal machines fell silent in Europe with the 
formal acceptance of surrender at 11 :l\.$ P.M., May 8,
191tS.55
"In recognition of the unconditional and abject 
surrender of the Nazi barbarians," the President cabled 
Eisenhower, "please accept the fervent congratulations 
and appreciation of myself and of the American 
people. . . . Responding in kind, the General said, 
"Permit me to assure you of my personal gratification that 
my Commander-in-Chief has found my efforts worthy of
tinspecial commendation."^' A friendship was developing 
between the General and the President that would endure 
until the campaign of 195>2. Truman did, in fact, greatly
^Pogue, Supreme Command, 2+86; Buchanan, United 
States in World War 11," II, lj.62-63.
■^Truman to Eisenhower, May 8, 19lj.5 (Cable), Eisen­
hower Papers, Personal Piles 1'08, "Truman, Harry S. (1)," 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. Hereinafter 
cited as Eisenhower Library. Text of message to Eisenhower 
also appears in Public Papers . . . Truman, 19k5* 51-52.
^Eisenhower to Truman, May 10, 1945 (Cable), 
Eisenhower Papers, Personal Piles 108, "Truman, Harry S. 
(1)," Eisenhower Library.
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admire many of the military men that commanded in World War 
II. On various occasions, in addition to Eisenhower, he 
noted his admiration for General Omar Bradley and Admirals 
Chester Nimitz and Ernest King. He always reserved his 
most lavish praise for General Marshall. He has said that 
Marshall was the "brains" that made the military organi­
zation function properly: "General Marshall . . . was in
every sense the chief architect of the grand strategy of 
the war for the Allies. . . .
When the fighting ceased, Western armies occupied 
Germany to the Elbe River line, a small portion of western 
Czechoslovakia and most of Austria. Churchill, whose 
distrust of the Soviet Union seemed to him vindicated by 
Russian activities in the liberated eastern European 
nations, attempted once again on May 6 to get Truman to 
hold the furthest line of advance rather than retiring 
some one hundred miles westward to the prearranged zones. 
Churchill's desire to use the occupied territory to force 
Russian concessions met with Truman's intransigence. As 
for immediate withdrawal, the President was willing to 
allow the field commanders to decide whether or not they
^®Truman, Mr. Citizen, 181, 185-86. "I have said 
it many a time . . . f  think General Marshall is the out­
standing man of that war period." Truman, Press Conference, 
January 7, 19ij.9, Public Papers . . . Truman, 19i|-9, 9. For 
a similar tribute, see Truman, Memoirs, I, 235.
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could vacate a zone safely. As for eventual retirement to 
the Quebec Plan zones, he intended to keep Roosevelt’s 
promises, as he understood them. Churchill, probably 
anticipating Truman’s attitude, called for a meeting of 
the Big Three to settle the postwar status of Europe and 
the final plans for the defeat of Japan. Truman accepted 
this call, for what became the Potsdam Conference, but in 
his reply to Churchill he emphasized that "in the meantime 
it is my present intention to adhere to our interpretation 
of the Yalta agreements, and to stand firmly on our 
present announced attitude. . .
On May 11 Churchill repeated his request of the 
sixth, asking Truman not to order his troops out of the 
Russian zones. In fact, Churchill asked Truman to issue 
a freeze order on all troops in the European theater of 
operations. Truman rejected Churchill’s requests after 
consultation with his own military leadership, while 
acknowledging that he, too* was concerned about Russian 
intentions in Europe. u This seems a fairly clear instance 
of Truman’s being inclined to allow military factors to 
dominate his thinking. He had sound reasons for pulling
^Churchill to Truman, May 6, 19l|5, quoted in 
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 501; Truman to Churchill, 
May 9j 19k5> reprinted in Truman, Memoirs, I, 218-19.
^°Truman, Memoirs, I, 298.
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troops back: His interpretation of the Quebec and Yalta
agreements; a desirous redeployment of forces into the war
in the Pacific; an unwillingness to antagonize the Soviet
Union, whose promised aid against Japan appeared necessary 
6Xat the time. In retrospect, it seems that Churchill's 
urgent pleadings— although on purely political grounds—  
deserved a more through hearing than the record would 
indicate they received. Truman's chief advisers, General 
Marshall and Secretary Stimson, while not unaware of the 
English objections to withdrawal, had their minds fixed on 
concentrating maximum force against the Japanese.^ Their 
advice quite naturally reflected their orientation and 
their primary objective, victory in the Pacific. Given 
these factors, it is reasonable to conclude— with 
Churchill— that, "Mr. Truman was of course only newly 
aware at second hand of all the complications that faced 
us, and had to lean heavily on his advisers. The purely
^Ibid., 298-99. In commenting on Churchill's fear 
that redeployment meant leaving Europe "prostrate and at 
the mercy of the Red Army," Truman said that he would pull 
out of Europe only those troops that could be spared: "We
were committed to the rehabilitation of Europe, and there 
was to be no abandonment this time." Ibid., 262.
62Walt W. Rostow, The United States in the World 
Arena: An Essay in Recent~HTstory (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, PublisEers, I960), 116. Hereinafter cited as 
Rostow, United States in the World Arena. See also, Truman, 
Memoirs, I, 79.
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military view therefore received an emphasis beyond its 
proper proportion."^
Despite Churchill’s numerous pleas,^ Truman 
remained adamant. On June 3 he had the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff inform Eisenhower that the removal of his forces 
from the Russian zones was essentially a military 
matter.^ Five days later Truman met with Harry Hopkins, 
a presidential adviser, who had just returned from 
separate talks with Premier Stalin and General Eisenhower. 
Hopkins advised Truman to set a positive date for with­
drawal from the Russian zones. The President set the 
date for June 21, advising Churchill, "In consideration of 
the tripartite agreement . . . approved by President 
Roosevelt after long consideration and detailed discussion 
with you, I am unable to delay the withdrawal . . .  in order 
to use pressure in the settlement of other problems.
^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 513-lh*
^Churchill repeated his request that Truman not 
withdraw troops from Europe on several occasions. See, 
for example, Churchill to Truman, May 12, June k, 9, 19k5i 
in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 572-7h> 603-oOlj-J 
Truman, Memoirs, I, 30k-3Qg!T
65>Truman, Memoirs, I, 301*
^Truman to Churchill, June 12, 19lj.5» quoted in 
Truman, Memoirs, I, 303J Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 
60lj.-605» John Lukacs, among other scholars of the period, 
believes that Truman, in accepting the Yalta zonal 
boundaries against Churchill’s pleas, set ". . . the 
geographical conditions of the Cold War." A History of the 
Cold War (rev. ed., Garden City, New York: DouSleday and 
Company, Incorporated, 1962), 53*
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Because of a Soviet-requested delay, the actual removals 
did not begin until July 1, 19lj-5.^
At a Columbia University symposium in 1959 a 
student asked Truman what his role as Commander in Chief 
had been with respect to the diversion from Berlin and 
subsequent events. Truman1s reply was that an agreement 
had been reached at Yalta " . . .  that certain lines would 
be drawn in Germany. . . .  I simply carried out the agree­
ment, by ordering the troops to the lines which had been
68agreed upon. That's all there was to it."
The agreement to which Truman alone seemed totally 
committed had been worked out at a conference at Yalta, in 
the Crimea, between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in 
February, 19Aj-5« The Big Three agreed to convoke a con­
ference at San Francisco on April 25 to establish the 
United Nations. The Yalta Protocol also prescribed the 
voting fomula for the Security Council of the U.N. The 
signatories reaffirmed the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter: "the right of all peoples to choose the form of
government under which they will live— the restoration of 
sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 30l|-305.
^ Truman Speaks, 22-23. Truman had earlier noted 
the same conviction in his memoirs when he wrote: "My
intention was always to carry out to the letter all agree­
ments entered into by Roosevelt with our allies." Memoirs, 
I, 305-306.
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have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor 
n a t i o n s . A t  Yalta the U.S.S.R. also agreed to enter the 
war against Japan within two or three months following the 
surrender of Germany. The tripartite administrative 
division of Germany was accepted, with the details to be 
decided upon by the Allied Control Council for Germany. 
Several territorial concessions were made to the Soviet 
Union in Eastern Europe and the Par East. These latter 
were in return for Stalin’s agreement to bring his nation 
into the war with Japan.
AQ7Document 10, Agreements of the Yalta Conference, 
February, 19h5>» in William Appleman Williams, The Shaping 
of American Diplomacy; Readings and Documents inAmerican 
Foreign Relations, 1750-1955 (Chicago: Rand McNally and 
Company, 1955)> 930^31. Hereinafter cited as Williams 
(ed.), Shaping of American Diplomacy.
7°Ibid., 931-5* passim. See also, draft statement, 
W. AverelI Harriman to Senate Armed Services and Foreign 
Relations Committees, August (?), 1951* Papers of Theodore 
Tannenwald, "MacArthur— Copies of Memorandums re Hearings," 
Truman Library. Hereinafter cited as Tannenwald Papers. 
Harriman's statement is reprinted in U.S., Congress,
Senate, Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Rela- 
tions, Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings . . . 
to Conduct an Inquiry Into~"£he Military Situation in the 
Far teast amT"the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of 
the Army Douglas MacArthur From His Assignments In ThatT* 
Area, 5 Parts, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951* Pt. "57 
Appendix NN, 3328—1+2. Hereinafter cited as Far East Hear­
ings . For full description and text of the Yalta Agree­
ments, see U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of 
the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at 
Malta and Yalta, 19h5 (Washington: USGPO, 1955)• See 
also, "The Crimean (Yalta) Conference, February h~ll>
19h5* ” Far East Hearings, Pt. 5* Appendix I, 3607-612. As 
with other security matters, Truman did not learn of the 
secret portions of the Yalta Pact until he became
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
98
Truman has recorded that the most pressing reason 
for his meeting Stalin and Churchill at Potsdam was to 
secure the immediate involvement of the Soviet Union in 
the war with Japan. The service chiefs’ plan for the 
defeat of Japan was based on the assumption that the 
Russians would enter the Par Eastern conflict as Stalin 
had promised. The planners in the Pentagon were urging 
the President to secure a specific date from the 
Russians.*^ The meaning of Russian entry had been
President. See memorandum, (unsigned) to Theodore 
Tannenwald, June 12, 1951* Tannenwald Papers, "MacArthur—  
Copies of Memorandums re Hearings," Truman Library.
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 3l4”l5* 322-23, I4.ll;
Phillips, Truman Presidency, 96-97} Walter Millis (ed.), 
The Forrestal BTaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951)» 
78-7̂  Hereinafter cited as Millis (ed.), Forrestal 
Diaries. Stalin had first agreed to declare war on 
Japan— following the defeat of Germany— in October, 1943* 
at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. At the 
Teheran Conference the following month, the Soviet 
Premier personally re-affirmed this commitment to 
Roosevelt and Churchill. At Yalta, in February, 1945* 
Stalin agreed to a general date of "two or three months" 
after Germany's surrender for Russian entry into the 
Pacific fighting. In May, in talks at Moscow with 
Harriman and Harry Hopkins, Stalin said he would be ready 
to strike by August 8, with the actual date of Russian 
entry dependent upon Chinese acceptance of the terms of 
the Yalta Agreement on the Far East. Cable, Hopkins to 
Truman, May 28, 1945* quoted in Truman, Memoirs, I, 264. 
See also, Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 351-52.
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stressed by the Joint Chiefs in a memorandum to Roosevelt 
early in 1945 s
Russia's entry at as early a date as possible 
consistent with her ability to engage in offensive 
operations is necessary to provide maximum 
assistance to our Pacific operations. . . .
The objective of Russian’s military effort 
against Japan in the Par East should be the defeat of 
the Japanese forces in Manchuria, air operations 
against Japan proper in collaboration with United 
States air forces based in eastern Siberia, and 
maximum interference with Japanese sea traffic 
between Japan and the mainland of Asia.72
Like Roosevelt before him, Truman accepted the 
military arguments for the desirability of involving the 
Soviet Union in the war against J a p a n .  However, in
Memorandum, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to 
Pranklin Roosevelt, January 23, 1945, quoted in Draft 
Statement, Harriman to Senate Armed Services and Foreign 
Relations Committees, August (?), 1951* Tannenwald Papers, 
"MacArthur— Copies of Memorandums re Hearings," Truman 
Library. This document is reprinted in Par East Hearings, 
Pt. 5, Appendix NN, 3332. Some six years after the fact, 
during the hearings cited above, Republican Senator Styles 
Bridges (N.H.), introduced a document which he claimed was 
the recommendation of the senior officers of'the War 
Department. Dated April 12, 1945, the report was very 
strongly opposed to Russian entry into the war with Japan. 
The twelve reasons given are much more political than 
military in nature. The Department of the Army was unable 
to locate the original, indicating that it may have been 
one of several staff studies on the subject which were 
later destroyed, since no action was taken on them. Par 
East Hearings, Pt. 4, 2915-17*
^William L. Neumann, After Victory: Churchill, 
Roosevelt, Stalin and the Making of the Peace (New York: 
Harper and Row, 195?)* 165 • ftereTnafter cited as Neumann, 
After Victory. The chief military reason was, of course, 
that the Red Army could hold or destroy Japanese forces in 
Manchuria, thus facilitating the planned American invasion 
of the Japanese home islands. Truman, Memoirs, I, 265, 
314-15• The Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in
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doing so, he again had to reject political objections to 
Russian involvement. Churchill saw no genuine need to 
involve the Russians. In fact, at some time prior to the 
Potsdam meeting, he had become convinced that the United 
States did not desire Soviet participation at all.7̂ - 
Averell Harriman, wartime ambassador to Russia, was 
generally distrustful of Soviet intentions in all their 
diplomatic dealings and felt that they had compelling 
reasons to enter the war without American encouragement. 
Harriman had acquainted the President with his doubts on 
numerous o c c a s i o n s G e o r g e  P. Kennan, then Minister- 
Counselor of the Moscow Embassy, cabled a message to 
Harriman (in April, 19l|j?) that eventually reached Truman's 
desk. Kennan warned that the Soviet Union would undoubt­
edly use intervention to secure "maximum power with
earnestly desiring Soviet entry, as General Marshall later 
testified in the Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, £62-63. See 
also, Dean G. Acheson testimony, ibid.. Pt. 3, 1989.
General Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General, Pacific 
Theater, was in complete agreement. Memorandum, George A. 
Lincoln to Marshall, March 8, 19i+£, quoted in Barton J. 
Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow (eds.), The Truman Adminis­
tration: A Documentary History (New York': Harper and Row, 
T9'66) , 3l£-l?. Hereinafter cited as Bernstein and Matusow 
(eds.), Truman Administration.
^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 639.
7£̂Phillips, Truman Presidency, 97; Truman, Memoirs,
I> 77-79; Draft Statement, Harriman to Senate Armed Services 
and Foreign Relations Committees, August (?), 19£l, Tannen­
wald Papers, "MacArthur— Copies of Memorandums re Hearings," 
Truman Library.
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minimum responsibility" in areas of Asia beyond their own 
borders. "It would be tragic, Kennan believed, "if our 
natural anxiety for the support of the Soviet Union at
this juncture . . . were to lead us into an undue reliance
76on Soviet aid. . . . Truman concluded that military
considerations outweighed the possible political dis­
advantages that might accrue with Russian entry. His 
decision was not altered when, just before the Pot3dam 
Conference, code intercepts indicated that the Japanese
were actively seeking to end the fighting, although some-
77what short of total unconditional surrender.
The Potsdam Conference opened on July 17 and lasted 
for two weeks. Stalin reaffirmed at the very outset his 
promise that the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan.
In a meeting of the American, British and Russian Chiefs 
of Staff, the Russians indicated they were concentrating 
forces along the Manchurian border as rapidly as possible. 
They anticipated their initial attack would come in the 
latter part of August. The exact date of their entry 
would be dependent upon concurrence of the government of
^Cable, George P. Kennan to Harriman, April 2ij., 
19i|5> quoted in George P. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 
(Boston: Little Brown and Company, 19^7)7 238. Hereinafter 
cited as Kennan, Memoirs. See also, Truman, Memoirs, I,
81̂ -85.
^Buchanan, United States and World War II, II,
589.
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China with the Yalta concessions.^®
In all of this concern over involving Russia against
Japan nobody on the American side seemed to appreciate
Harriman's belief that Stalin had to involve his nation in
the war. The important concessions made at Yalta could
only be had by the Russians fighting the Japanese. The
military operations would not be costly, since Japan was
already beaten to the point of making peaceful over- 
79tures. The rewards in glory and opportunity for 
hegemony to the liberators of the Par East would have been 
inducement enough. Truman would have found it far more 
difficult to convince Stalin that he should remain 
neutral.
After agreeing at Potsdam to enter the war, the 
Russians then questioned the method of their entry. They 
felt it would be best for all of the Allies actively 
engaged in the Par East to make a formal public request of
7®Truman, Memoirs, I, 382. The Sino-Soviet Agree­
ment was signed at Moscow on August li|. The Soviet Union 
had declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria on August 8, 
six days earlier. The Soviet timetable may have been 
changed by the atomic destruction of Hiroshima on the 6th. 
For an excellent account of the Potsdam Conference see 
Herbert Peis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference 
(Princeton, New Jerseyf'Tffrince''bon University Pres¥, I960) . 
Hereinafter cited as Peis, Between War and Peace.
^Buchanan, United States and World War II, II,
£89; Phillips, Truman Presidency, '97*
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flothe Soviet Union. At this, Truman drew the line. In 
explaining his refusal in his Memoirs, Truman effectively 
summarizes his own thinking on the entire question:
I did not like this proposal for one important 
reason. I saw in it a cynical diplomatic move to make 
Russia’s entry at this time appear to be the decisive 
factor to bring about victory. At Yalta, Russia had 
agreed, and here at Potsdam she reaffirmed her 
commitment, to enter the war against Japan three 
months after V-E Day, provided that Russia and China 
had previously concluded a treaty of mutual assistance. 
There were no other conditions. . . . Our military 
advisers had strongly urged that Russia should be 
brought into the war in order to neutralize the large 
Japanese forces on the China mainland and thus save 
thousands of American and Allied lives. But I was 
not willing to let Russia reap the fruits of a long 
and gallant effort in which she had no part.ol
At the beginning of the Potsdam meetings, Stalin 
had confirmed what Truman already knew from American 
intelligence activities: The Japanese were seeking terns
Opof peace through Moscow.0 In discussing the matter 
privately with Churchill on July 18, Truman balked at the 
Prime Minister’s suggestion that they might consider 
accepting a Japanese offer short of unconditional surrender. 
"I had in mind saving their military honour and giving them 
some assurance of their national existence. . . ,"
Churchill recalled telling Truman. Truman's response, 
as Churchill remembered it, was to the effect that "the
O a
Truman, Memoirs, I, if.01.
8lIbid., if.02-ij.03.
®2jbid., 396. See also, Hewlett and Anderson, The 
New World, 387*
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Japs had no longer any military honour after Pearl 
Harbour."®® Truman had insisted upon it in the case of 
Germany and— when announcing the German surrender--he 
called for the Japanese to lay down their arms uncon­
ditionally, promising only that they would not be enslaved 
or exterminated.®^-
Just prior to the opening of the July 28 meeting at 
Potsdam, Stalin announced that his government had received 
another peace overture from Japan. The gist of the message 
was that the Emperor wished to send Prince Konoye to 
Moscow to present the Japanese position on ending the war
Q O
^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , 6/j.l-i|.2. See also, 
Lord Moran's diary entry™^r"^Juiy~io7T945> in which he 
quotes from Churchill's dictated notes on his meeting with 
Truman in Charles Wilson (Lord Moran), Churchill, Taken 
From the Diaries of Lord Moran: The Struggle for Survival 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968), 293-9'I£• Herein­
after cited as Wilson, Churchill. In their first personal 
contacts at Potsdam, Truman and Churchill formed very 
favorable impressions of one another. Truman recalls: "I
had an instant liking for this man. . . . There was some­
thing very open and genuine about the way he greeted me. 
Churchill and I never had a serious disagreement about any­
thing." Truman, Memoirs, I, For h*3 part, Churchill
recalled being impressed with Truman's, ". . . gay, precise, 
sparkling manner and obvious power of decision.
Churchill, Triumiiiand Tragedy, 630. He was delighted by 
Truman's bluntness and high resolve in his talks with 
Stalin: "Winston," Lord Moran wrote, "has fallen for the
President." Wilson, Churchill, 293-9^, 306.
®^Ttem No. 28, Statement by the President Calling 
for the Unconditional Surrender of Japan, May 8, 19l|5,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 1914-5, 50. See also, Truman, 
Memoirs, I, 206-207; Buchanan, United States and World War 
II, II, 598.
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and obtain the services of the Soviet Union as mediator.
Stalin told Truman that he intended to send a negative
reply to the message. Truman thanked him and the matter 
85was dropped. The Japanese efforts to obtain a 
negotiated settlement were futile for two reasons. First, 
their request to have the Soviet government act as 
mediator was in vain, for, as one student of the war has 
noted, ”. . .  the leaders in the Kremlin had secured 
advantages at Yalta which they could insure only by 
entering the war against Japan, not by interceding on the 
latter’s behalf to terminate the war."®6 Second, two 
days prior to this last request the governments of Great 
Britain, the United States and China had jointly issued 
an ultimatum that precluded Japanese efforts to obtain 
an end to the hostilities short of an abject surrender.
The ultimatum to Japan (called the Potsdam Declara­
tion) had its genesis in late May 191+5* Acting Secretary 
of State Grew, a former Ambassador to Japan, suggested to 
Truman that he consider issuing a proclamation calling on 
the Japanese to surrender, with the express assurance that
® ■'’Truman, Memoirs, I, 396-97> Hewlett and Anderson, 
The New World, 397^ See also, James F. Byrnes, Speaking 
Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19^7)* 2b 5 • Here­
inafter cited as Byrnes, Speaking Frankly.
®^Buchanan, United States and World War II, II,£Q9<
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the Emperor could be retained as head of state. Truman
asked Grew to forward his proposal through the State-War-
Navy Co-ordinating Committee (SWNCC) and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff for their views. The President felt the idea
had m e r i t . G r e w  reported back to Truman on June 1$ that
all involved were agreed that such a statement should be
made, but while Grew favored immediate issuance, the
majority favored delaying publication until a more
appropriate time. The military chiefs wanted to wait
until such time as they could answer a refusal of the
88surrender demand with invasion of Japan.
The President accepted the idea of the proclamation 
but rejected the proposed timing of both Grew and the 
military. He decided to issue the surrender ultimatum 
during the Potsdam Conference, which was then a month away. 
Truman's reasoning was that such a statement, coming from
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 1^16-17; Millis (ed.),
Forrestal Diaries, 66; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 
3^2; Louis Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic komb," 
in Kent R. Greenfield (ed.), Command Decisions (Washington: 
OCMH, I960), 507. Hereinafter cited as Morton, "Decision 
to Use the Atomic Bomb." The SWN3C was a group composed 
of the Assistant Secretaries of the State, War and Navy 
Departments. It was established in 19l|lf- to assist these 
three agencies in integrating their policy recommendations 
to the Administration. It had separate subcommittees for 
Gennany and Japan. Current, Secretary Stlmson, 223-2lj..
O O Truman, Memoirs, I, J4.17. See also, Hewlett and 
Anderson, The New World. 352, 3&3; Peis, Between War and 
Peace, 115•
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Potsdam, would demonstrate allied unity. He also would
know by then the Soviet intentions on entering the war and
whether the atomic bomb had been tested successfully; two
factors that could change the military strategy and effect
8bthe terms of surrender. 7
Secretary of War Stimson, who, at Truman’s request, 
had been working on a memorandum concerning the ultimatum 
to Japan, submitted his efforts to the President on July 2, 
and discussed it with him at Potsdam on July 16. Truman 
and the new Secretary of State, James P. Byrnes, reviewed 
Stimson’s memorandum. The Secretary of War advocated 
immediate notification to the Japanese of the unconditional 
surrender demand, guaranteeing their internal polity, not 
excluding "a constitutional monarchy under her present
8qTruman, Memoirs, I, Ip-7. Frazier Hunt, an un- 
scholarly biographer of MacArthur, claims that the delay 
in issuing the surrender demand was to allow the Soviet 
Union time to enter the war: " . . .  with all the deadly
consequences of that act." He indicts "a leftist crowd 
calling themselves liberals," claiming that Dean Acheson, 
George Marshall, Archibald MacLeish, Owen Lattimore,
Elmer Davis, e_t. al., were deliberately causing the delay. 
See his, The UntoTd Story of Douglas MacArthur (New York: 
Devin-Adair Company,” ! , 392-9l|. Hereinafter cited 
as Hunt, Untold Story of MacArthur.
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9 0dynasty.” On July 17, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent 
the President a memorandum giving their views on the draft 
warning. They indicated their objection to the lines 
which told the Japanese that following the restoration of 
peace a new government could be established that would 
". . . include a constitutional monarchy under the 
present dynasty."^1 Truman’s military advisers recommended 
that a more general statement on a postwar government, 
designed to appeal to all elements in Japan, would be 
more likely to achieve the desired result. Stimson told 
Truman that he accepted the reasoning of the Joint Chiefs,
^Current, Secretary Stimson, 232; Byrnes, Speaking 
Frankly, 206; Hewlett and Jhiderson, The New World, 371-727 383. See also, Bernstein and Matusow, (eds.), The Truman 
Administration, 33-36; Lansing Lamont, Day of Tr'ininty 
(New York: Atheneum, 1965), 1J+5* Hereinafter cited as 
Lamont, Day of Trinity. Urs Schwarz, American Strategy? 
The GrowtK oT~Politico-Military Thinking in t5e~United 
States (Garcfen City, New York": Doubleday and Company, In­
corporated, 1967), 57. Hereinafter cited as Schwarz, 
American Strategy. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy,
On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 194-7), 6^0-'2I^ Hereinafter cited as Stimson and 
Bundy, On Active Service. President Truman gave his 
"generaT”approval" to Stimson’s memorandum. For text of 
the July 2 memorandum, see Stimson, "The Decision to Use 
the Atom Bomb," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 28, 1947•
^"Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 384-85*
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9 2with which Byrnes also concurred.7
The Potsdam Declaration was drafted without any 
mention of the fate of Emperor Hirohito or the monarchical 
institution, the very factors.that had impelled Grew to 
initiate the discussions that led to this document.
Truman accepted a purposely-ambiguous statement that did 
not improve the possibilities for a prompt surrender, but 
he did so on the advice of his Secretaries of War and 
State, and his Chiefs of Staff. In the light of sub­
sequent events— preservation of the imperial order being 
the condition that the Japanese would make and that Truman 
would accept— the decision was unfortunate. However, to 
fault Truman is to accuse him of lack of prescience and to 
assume that the Japanese government would have surrendered 
prior to the atomic-bombings had they been reassured with
Ibid., 38^, 389; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 206.
The JCS position is in conflict with an A m y  G-2 (Intelli- 
gence Division) report dated June 30, which indicated 
Japan might accept a modified surrender demand that 
assured retention of the imperial system. Report is 
quoted in Morton, "Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,"50̂ -505.
93Neumann, After Victory, 176; Hewlett and Anderson, 
The New World. 385"! Afl^the" text of the declaration 
eventually said was that the conquerors would restore the 
government to Japanese control as soon as, ". . • there 
has been established in accordance with the freely- 
expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully- 
inclined and responsible government." Truman, Memoirs, I, 
391-92.
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9Ilrespect to the Emperor. ^
Truman did not comment substantively in his
Memoirs on the decision to exclude mention of the Emperor.
However, in 1959* he was asked, "Would it have been better
to have made it clear in the Potsdam Declaration that the
Japanese would be permitted to retain the Emperor?"
Truman's reply is couched in phrases typical of his
response to controversial questions; earthy and direct:
How could you do it? When we asked them to surrender 
at Potsdam, they gave us a very snotty answer. That 
is what I got. They didn't ask about the Emperor. I 
said, if they don't surrender, they would be 
completely, totally destroyed. They told me to go to 
hell, words to that effect.95
Churchill approved the draft of the declaration
that Truman showed him at Potsdam. Both agreed that China
should be invited to become a signatory to the ultimatum.
The text was transmitted to Chiang Kai-shek by radio, and
he sent Truman his approval. The U.S.S.R., still
technically at peace with Japan, was not invited to sign.
^The Secretary of War had, by the 2l\.th, returned 
to his original position on including an assurance to the 
Japanese that the imperial dynasty would be preserved. He 
told Truman he hoped that he would at least keep his mind 
open on the subject and if the Japanese made this a con­
dition of surrender he would grant it to them. Truman 
said he would if those circumstances arose. Hewlett and 
Anderson, The New World, 392-93; Truman, Memoirs, I, 1|.29; 
Herbert Peis', Japan SuFdued: The Atomic Bomb ancT the End of 
the War in the Pacific (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 196T), 78-79. Hereinafter cited as Peis, 
Japan Subdued.
95Truman Speaks, 7^.
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The President issued the Potsdam Declaration at Berlin on 
July 26.
After issuing the proclamation Truman sent orders
to the Office of War Information to inform the Japanese
people as fully and rapidly as possible of its pro- 
97visions. Immediately, strong radio transmitters 
located on Saipan began beaming a continuous broadcast 
to the Japanese home islands. On July 28 American bombers 
dropped about twenty-seven million leaflets over Japan.
The leaflets summarized the terms of the Potsdam ulti­
matum. They also contained a list of eleven cities, 
indicating that soon four of them would be totally 
destroyed from the air. What the leaflets did not 
mention and what the Potsdam Declaration did not note, 
was that plans called for these cities to be destroyed
not by the massive fire bombings which were becoming
98commonplace, but by individual nuclear devices.
96Truman, Memoirs, I, 387> 390; Lamont, Day of 
Trinity, 263; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 395«
For a copy of the text of the Potsdam declaration see 
Truman, Memoirs, I, 390-9^. For a full account of the 
Potsdam Conference see U.S., Department of State, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The
Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), l9Ij.5 (2 vols., Washington, I960).
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 390.
q Q
Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 259. See also, 
Phillips, Truman Presidency, 39i Fleming, The Cold War,
I, 30î .
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The reaction within the Japanese government to the 
Potsdam ultimatum was divided; the pivotal issue in the 
Supreme War Direction Council concerned the fate of the 
imperial house. The military members offered a strong 
argument that the absence of any mention of the Emperor 
was proof that their enemies wanted to destroy the 
Japanese nation. They must fight on through an invasion 
if necessary and win concessions from the Allies that 
would assure national existence and the imperial order.
The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were able to 
moderate the views of the military chiefs only slightly.
On the afternoon of July 28, Prime Minister Kantara 
Suzuki told a press conference that his government found 
little that was new or of any value in the Potsdam 
Declaration. He concluded with the fateful phrase 
". . . there is no other recourse but to ignore it 
entirely and resolutely fight for the successful conclu­
sion of this war."^ This statement set in motion the 
events that would bring the war to a swift and dramatic 
end.
The Potsdam Conference ended officially on August 2,
Most of the discussions and decisions were
qq7 Feis, Japan Subdued, 97* See also, Current, 
Secretary Stimson, 232-33; Hewlett and Anderson, The New 
World, 39^-96; Phillips, Truman Presidency, 59.
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political and diplomatic in nature. The Big Three powers 
agreed, for example, on the establishment of a Council of 
Foreign Ministers, the divisions and government of 
Germany, reparations payments, the government of Poland, 
admission requirements to the United Nations, the trial of 
war criminals and similar matters The "Joint Report"
of the decisions made at Potsdam is very loosely-worded in 
many instances, representing compromises that were quite 
transitory in nature. George F. Kennan, the distinguished 
authority on the U.S.S.R., has made it clear in his 
Memoirs that he felt Truman had shown a great deal of 
naivete in dealing with the Russians: "I cannot recall
any political document . . . which filled me with a greater
°®Item No. 91> Joint Report with the Allied 
Leaders on the Potsdam Conference, August H, 19l}.5, Public 
Papers . . . Truman, 19^5* 179-95* passim. Winston 
Churchill was adamantly opposed to the trials of Germany's 
leaders as war criminals . He felt that this was a 
dangerous principle, since it would encourage leaders 
facing defeat to fight on after all hope was gone, need­
lessly sacrificing lives. But Churchill, having lost his 
parliamentary majority, was replaced in the midst of the 
conference by Clement Atlee. Churchill, Triumph and 
Tragedy, 631. The former Prime Minister offered the same 
views three years later in a conversation with then 
Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, concerning the 
Japanese "war crimes" trials then in session. Millis (ed.), 
Forrestal Diaries, 52l|.«. George F. Kennan opposed the Nazi 
t'rialsi as well, but for an entirely different reason:
"These men had placed themselves in a position where a 
further personal existence on this earth could have no 
positive meaning for them or anyone else. I personally 
considered . . . that if any of these men fell into the 
hands of Allied forces they should . . .  be executed forth­
with." Kennan, Memoirs, 2o0.
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sense of depression than the communique to which President
Truman set his name at the conclusion of these confused
and unreal discussions.
By the time the Potsdam Conference ended, so had
most of the ground fighting in the Pacific theater, except
on the Asian mainland. The last major land battle of the
war had been won in late June, with the capture of
Okinawa, largest island of the Ryukyus group. Located
only 350 miles from Kyushu, one of the four main islands
of Japan, Okinawa was considered an essential target by
American strategists. The island would provide air bases
within medium bomber range of Japan and was to serve as a
major staging area for the planned invasion of the
102Japanese home islands.
|The aerial bombardment of Japanese cities had been 
gradually intensified. By mid-June the destruction
The "communique" referred to is the Joint Report 
cited in the preceding footnote. Kennan, Memoirs, 258ff. 
See also, Neumann, After Victory, 173» 177-78J Buchanan, 
United States in World War II, II, 5o5> 507-508. Kennan's 
view of Truman7!? diplomacy Ts substantially that of D. P. 
Fleming, who wrote: "Truman's narrative (in his memoirs),
makes it clear he was not a negotiator." The Cold War, I, 
292. As for Truman's view of Potsdam, he s a i d " Y o u  never 
saw such pig-headed people as are the Russians. I hope I 
never have to hold another conference with them." Quoted 
in Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 259.
102ggpOsjL-bo (ed.), West Point Atlas, II, Sect. 2,
Map Plates Nos. 161, 165.
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planned for the five principal cities of Japan^°3 had been 
achieved. In Tokyo an estimated 3,100,000 persons had 
lost their homes to the fires generated by the incendiary 
bombs. The bombers were ordered to attack other cities of 
J a p a n . B y  late July-early August, the Strategic Air 
Force B-29's based in the Marianas were meeting only 
limited resistance from enemy fighter planes and were 
sending several hundred bombers to strike Japan nightly. 
For example, on the night prior to the atomic bombing of 
Hiroshima, six hundred B-29's attacked Japan with the 
pilots reporting results from "good to excellent."-1-0^
As the fighting in Europe had drawn to an end, 
Truman had consulted several times with his military 
chiefs and the cabinet as to the best method of concen­
trating military efforts against Japan. The President 
implemented their suggestion that there be a rapid
103The cities were Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe and 
Yokohama.
■**°̂ Tn all, American aircraft will deliver incendiary 
attacks against sixty-six Japanese cities, destroying 
about 169 square miles of these urban areas,killing 260,000 
and leaving 9*200,000 homeless. Esposito (ed.), West 
Point Atlas, II, Sect. 2, Map Plate No. 166. For other 
accounts' of the effectiveness of these fire raids, see 
Buchanan, United States and World War II, II, 579-80J 
Fleming, The Cold War, I, 297-98.
10^Carl Spaatz (Commanding General, Army Strategic 
Air Forces) to Henry H. Arnold (Commanding General, Army 
Air Forces), August 6, 19i|5* RG18, Army Air Force (AAF), 
312.1-Operations Letters-1945> National Archives.
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redeployment of troops to the Pacific, with those military 
units having seen the least combat being the first to go. 
American force levels in Europe were to be reduced to a 
number sufficient for occupational duty only.
Most of the land, sea and air combat in the Pacific 
Theater had been undertaken by the United States, with some 
assistance from Britain and the Commonwealth Nations 
Exclusive supreme command of these forces was exercised 
through the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, as 
opposed to Europe, where Eisenhower was under the 
authority of the Combined (British and American)Chiefs of 
Staff. Truman went along with his Joint Chiefs, in July 
of 19l|-5, in rejecting a British suggestion that a 
Combined Chiefs arrangement be adopted in the Pacific. 
However, he overrode the Joint Chiefs' recommendation that 
all military Lend-Lease to Britain's occupation forces in 
Europe be t e r m i n a t e d . T r u m a n ' s  general policy toward 
further expenditure of Lend Lease military and naval 
equipment was that it be limited to that which would be
■^^Truman, Memoirs, I, 222.
"^Memorandum, Brehon Somervell to George C. 
Marshall, RG18, AAF, Judge Advocate General (JAG), 
i+OO.336-Lend Lease, National Archives; Telegram, Truman to 
Clement Atlee, August 15, 191*5, ibid. See also, Buchanan, 
United States in World War II, II, 50lj-505,* Truman,
Memoirs, 1, 23^33, 3&2.
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^ a Qused directly against Japan.
Commenting on his struggles with Congress over Lend- 
Lease appropriations, Truman revealed that— like many 
another commander in chief before him— he believed the 
President's war powers should not be limited by the 
Congress :
A great many of the war powers that are delegated 
to the President when a war is actually going on are 
made for the duration of the war. But Congress is 
very jealous of its authority to keep the purse 
strings tight, as in the case of appropriations for 
Lend-Lease. That is all right in a republic when the 
republic is not in danger, but it always seemed to 
me that matters such as Lend-Lease should have been 
authorized for the duration of hostilities. . • •
I made a fundamental distinction between powers 
that I requested during wartime and those that I 
expected during peacetime. . . .  in connection with 
Lend-Lease appropriations, I felt all along that 
Congress should have given the President authority 
there for the duration of hostilities instead of 
renewing the legislation periodically.
When a nation is at war, its leader, who has the 
responsibility of winning the war, ought‘~To‘ have all 
the tools available for that purpose.109
Presidential Directive, July 6, 19k$f quoted in 
memorandum, Thomas Goodman (Acting Air Judge Advocate) to 
General Hood, August 29, 19ljSt RG18, AAF, JAG, lf.00.336- 
Lend Lease, National Archives. A change in lend-lease 
policy which he approved was recommended to Truman in 
August. See memorandum, (unsigned) Foreign Economic Admin­
istration to Truman, August 13» 19k-5> ibid. A full state­
ment of Truman's interim policy respecting lend-lease can 
be found in a directive, Secretary of War, "Presidential 
Policy on Military Lend-Lease," August 15, 19l|5, ibid. See 
also, Truman, Memoirs, I, 227-28, 231. In a directive 
dated August 21, 19^5> the President cancelled all lend- 
lease operations. For text of the directive, see Public 
Papers . . . Truman, 19lf5, 232.
l°9Truman, Memoirs, I, 232, 23̂ 4-• Emphasis supplied.
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In their planning for the conquest of Japan, the 
President’s military advisers were generally agreed that 
this could only be accomplished by a massive amphibious 
invasion of the Japanese home islands. The strategic use 
of atomic weaponry was never a major factor in their 
deliberations since less than a month elapsed between the 
successful testing of the nuclear bomb and its operational
At the Quebec Conference in September 19̂ i}., PT)R and 
Churchill, on the advice of their military staffs, agreed 
in principle that the unconditional surrender of Japan 
necessitated an invasion of the home islands. The first 
strategic proposal for this invasion was presented to 
Roosevelt by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum 
dated January 22, 1914-5;
1. The agreed over-all objective in the war against 
Japan has been expressed as follows:
To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by—
(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist 
by establishing sea and air blockades, con­
ducting intensive air bombardment, and 
destroying Japanese air and naval strength.
(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the 
industrial heart of Japan.
2. The United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the 
following as a basis for planning the war against 
Japan:
The concept of operations for the main effort in 
the Pacific—
The development of the atomic bomb, Truman's 
decision to employ it and the postwar policies he established 
for nuclear weaponry are the subjects of the following 
chapter.
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(a) Following the Okinawa operation to seize 
additional positions to intensify the 
blockade and air bombardment of Japan in 
order to create a situation favorable to:
(b) An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of 
further reducing Japanese capabilities by 
containing and destroying major enemy forces 
and further intensifying the blockade and 
air bombardment in order to establish a 
tactical condition favorable to:
(c) The decisive invasion of the industrial 
heart of Japan through the Tokyo 
Plain. . . . m
With the success of operations by April of 19l|-5, 
the Navy was arguing that the JCS plans should be amended. 
Admirals Leahy and King were now convinced that an 
expanded naval blockade and an intensified bombardment by 
air would force Japan to surrender. General Marshall took 
the lead in opposing this idea. The Army Chief of Staff 
argued that an invasion would be faster and less costly.
He also noted that massive aerial bombardments had failed 
to bring about Germany's surrender. In his position, 
Marshall had the support of Admiral Chester Nimitz and—  
most importantly— of General MacArthur, the Far Eastern 
Commander.112
Quoted in Far East Hearings, Pt. 5, Appendix NN, 
3332. See also, draft statement, Harriman to Senate Armed 
Services and Foreign Relations Committees, August 1951t 
Tannenwald Papers, "MacArthur— Copies of Memorandums re 
Hearings," Truman Library.
112Schwarz, American Strategy, 56 j Hewlett and 
Anderson, The New World, 3h8-U9. Reports from intelligence 
experts supported the Army's view that bombings and block­
ades would not likely force surrender prior to an in­
vasion. Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,"
50lj..
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MacArthur disagreed with the Joint Chiefs’ plan in 
respect to the operation against Kyushu. He thought the 
major initial landing should be directed against the Tokyo 
Plain in concert with a Russian move against Manchuria. 
However, MacArthur felt there was little possibility of a 
blockade and bombardment strategy being effective in 
bringing about s u r r e n d e r B o l s t e r e d  by such argu­
ments, the plan to force unconditional surrender by 
invading Japan remained unchanged.
In May Truman was approached by T. V. Soong,
China's Foreign Minister, who said that his government 
hoped that the showdown battle against Japan would be 
fought by the United States on the Asian mainland. 
Secretary of War Stimson was opposed to this strategy, 
believing— with Marshall— that a direct invasion of Japan 
would be the least costly plan in the long run. Meeting 
with the President on May 16, shortly after Soong’s visit,
^Paul Freeman, Jr. to George C. Marshall, Feb­
ruary 13, 19i|-5, quoted in Bernstein and Matusow (eds.),
The Truman Administration, 315-16? Cable, MacArthur to 
Marshall, April 20, 19l}-5> quoted in Morton, "The Decision 
to Use the Atomic Bomb," 501? Marshall testimony, Far East 
Hearings, Pt. 1, £63-614.. It is difficult to reconcTTe 
MacArthur's views at the time with his subsequent statements 
during the hearings on his dismissal six years later. He 
told the Senators that the American naval blockade 
established after the capture of the Philippines and 
Okinawa blocked supplies from the armed forces within 
Japan. "The minute we applied that blockade," MacArthur 
testified, "the defeat of Japan was a certainty." Far East 
Hearings, Pt. 1, 57-58.
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Stimson argued against the Chinese proposal and outlined 
the grand strategy advocated by the military planners 
Stimson told Truman that the War Department favored 
attacking Japan itself, and not involving American ground 
forces in China. While deferring an immediate decision, 
Truman noted that ,!the plans for the campaign being 
worked out by the Joint Chiefs would, in their opinion, 
be adequate for the defeat of Japan without such a 
sacrifice of American lives as would be involved in a 
major engagement in China.
Truman postponed any decision on the invasion plan 
because there was no immediate need to decide. He was 
probably hoping that the two unknown factors at the time, 
Russian entry into the war in the Far East and a workable 
atomic bomb, would be settled before he had to decide.
The Joint Chiefs continued to refine their plans and, 
increasingly, what they proposed was an exclusively 
American action. They did not want the proferred British 
assistance, and more and more they were coming to feel 
that the Russian invasion of Manchuria, while desirable, 
was probably not essential. In a meeting on May 25, the 
JCS issued a directive setting the date for the invasion 
by the Sixth Army of Kyushu (Operation Olympic) as
l-^Hewlett and Anerson, The New World, 350-51•
^■^Truman, Memoirs, I, 236.
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1 1 6November 1, 19k-Z* The invasion plans for the attack on
Honshu (Operation Coronet) , the major island of the 
Japanese group, set the assault onto the Kanto (Tokyo) 
Plain for about March 1, 1946.^^
These were the plans formally presented to Truman 
for his approval by the Joint Chiefs and the Service 
Secretaries on June 18, 1945* In defending the plan 
General Marshall told the President that he was certain 
that the Japanese would not surrender until they had 
actually been invaded. This, he said, combined with a 
Russian attack in Manchuria and the havoc being inflicted 
by aerial bombardment of the cities and naval blockade of 
its sea lanes, should bring about Japan's capitulation.
The General estimated the first month of fighting on 
Kyushu would entail some thirty-one thousand casualties. 
Truman asked each of the others present for their views on 
the proposed invasion. No one d i s a g r e e d . W h e n  he had
•^^Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 351» Hunt, 
Untold Story of MacArthur, 391*
■^■^Marshall testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 
£63; Esposito (ed.), West PoinF"Atlas, II, Sect. 2, Map 
Plate No. 167j MortoriT "The Decision to Use the Atomic 
Bomb," 502.
H^Truman, Memoirs, I, ij.16. While no one disagreed 
with the plans, several offered related views. For 
example, Stimson hoped to find some approach to the 
Japanese that would bring about their surrender short of 
actual invasion. He was doubtlessly thinking of the up­
coming Potsdam Declaration and the availability of the 
atomic bomb. Admiral Eeahy denounced the unconditional
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heard everyone out, Truman ordered the War Council to 
proceed with preparations for the invasion of Kyushu. As 
for Coronet, the operation against the heavily- 
industrialized central plain of Honshu, Truman told the 
military to continue its preparations, but that he was 
withholding final approval until it was essential for him 
to decide.
At Potsdam, on July 17» 1 9 Truman called
together his advisers to re-examine military planning in
view of the successful testing of the atomic bomb the 
120previous day. The advice given the President was to 
continue with the invasion plans as drafted. Truman 
recalls in his Memoirs:
surrender formula adopted at Casablanca as making the 
invasion necessary. Admiral King told Truman that entry 
of the Soviet Union was still desirable, but was no longer 
considered indispensable to victory. Hewlett and Anderson, 
The New World, 363—6I4.• For a detailed description of 
Marshall^s presentation to Truman of the JCS strategy 
recommendations, see U.S., Department of State, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: 
Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), 5 (2 vols., Washington, 
I960), I, 9^-9.' An abridged version of the same can be 
found in Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The Truman Adminis­
tration, 5-8.
H^Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," 
501-502; Schwarz, American Strategy, 56-57*
•^^In addition to Truman, those present were 
Secretaries Byrnes and Stimson, Generals Marshall and 
Arnold, and Admirals Leahy and King.
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We reviewed our military strategy in the light of 
this revolutionary development. We were not (sic., 
"now”) ready to make use of this weapon againsTThe 
Japanese, although we did not know as yet what effect 
the weapon might have, physically or psychologically, 
when used against the enemy. For that reason the 
military advised that we go ahead with the existing 
military plans for the invasion of the Japanese home 
islands.121
A few days after this meeting with his War Council, 
the Commander in Chief decided to use the new weapon, and, 
suddenly, the invasion plans, along with most contemporary 
military strategy, became obsolete. Truman's decision 
inaugurated an entirely new age in the history of man.
12lrpruman  ̂ Memoirs, I, ijJLf?. In a subsequent meeting 
on July 2kt Churchill and Truman received the final report 
of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. They both approved of 
this document, whose recommendations showed little change 
from the original JCS memorandum to Roosevelt on January 22, 
19i|.5. For text of the latter, see ibid., 381-82. For 
text of the Combined Chiefs memorandum of July 2k, see 
Far East Hearings, Pt. $, Appendix NN, 3338-39* As Louis 
Morton commented: ”. . .  the question of the bomb was
divorced entirely from military plans and the final report 
of the conference accepted as the main effort the 
invasion of the Japan.ese home islands. See, "The Decision 
to Use the Atomic Bomb,” $12.
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CHAPTER IV
TRUMAN AND THE ATOMIC BOMB
"To me, it was a weapon of war, an artillery 
weapon. We faced half a million casualties trying 
to take Japan by land. It was either that or the 
atom bomb, and I didn't hesitate a minute, and I've 
never lost any sleep over it since.
Secretary of War Stimson had his last meeting with 
Franklin Roosevelt on March 15> 19i|.5« They discussed the 
Manhattan Project to develop an atomic weapon. Roosevelt 
was concerned about criticism he had received from a man 
Stimson identifies as "a distinguished public servant" 
who maintained that the project was a multi-billion dollar
  p"lemon" that scientists had sold to FDR. Stimson calmed 
Roosevelt's fears by pointing out that every physicist of 
note, including four Nobel Prize winners, was working on 
the bomb. The remainder of their conversation dealt with 
future control of atomic secrets, postwar policy and a
^■Quoted in Cabell Phillips, "Truman at 75*" New 
York Times Magazine (May 3> 1959), 107* Hereinafter cited 
as Phillips, "Truman at 75*n
Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 615. The 
"distinguished public servant" alluded to was probably 
Admiral Leahy. He was one of the few people who knew of 
the project and was certain it would fail. See Chapter 
III, footnote no. 21, supra.
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statement to be issued following the first use of the bomb. 
Implied throughout the conversation, but never explicitly- 
stated, was that Roosevelt would use the bomb against 
Japan once it was ready.^ His death left the decision to 
Harry Truman.
Following the swearing-in ceremony on April 12,
19kS> Stimson told Truman only that an immense project 
was underway to perfect a new explosive "of almost un­
believable destructive p o w e r . T h i s  was the second time 
that Stimson had discussed the subject with Truman. In 
June 19i|-3 the Truman Committee had become curious about 
several secret military plants (notably one at Pasco, 
Washington) and the budgetary masking of vast expenditures 
for these installations. Stimson called Truman and 
explained to him that the project was of the utmost
^Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 6ljj>-l6;
Stimson, "Decision to Use tKe Atom Bomb," St. Louis Post- 
Dispatch, January 28, 19l±7 • See also, Morton, "The tfe'cision 
to Use the Atomic Bomb," li96. Most writers on the subject 
seem agreed that the decision by Roosevelt to make the 
bomb was the decision to use it. See, for example,
Buchanan, United States and World War II, II, 582; Stimson 
and Bundy, On Active Service, 613; jMatToff, "Roosevelt as 
War Leader,
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 10. Stimson, in whom Truman 
had total confidence, was a pivotal figure in the atom bomb 
decision. As Secretary of War, he was charged with overall 
supervision of the Manhattan Project, and he was senior 
adviser to the President on the military applications of 
atomic energy. Current, Secretary Stimson, 229. See also, 
Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 3k7 •
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secrecy and asked him to call off his investigation.
Truman had complied immediately, without demanding further 
explanation.
On April 2l± Stimson wrote to the President requesting 
a meeting at the earliest possible time. The Secretary 
wanted to fully brief the President on atomic develop­
ments and determine what Truman's policy would be.̂ * The 
meeting was scheduled for the next day, the 2£th. as 
Stimson recalls it. . . .
I went to explain the nature of the problem to a man 
whose only previous knowledge of our activities was 
that of a Senator who had loyally accepted our 
assurances that the matter must be kept a secret from 
him. Now he was President and Commander in Chief, and 
the final responsibility in this as in so many other 
matters must be his. . . .7
^Elting E. Morison, Turmoil and Tradition: A Study
^he Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, I960), 616. iov Truman's account, which varies 
somewhat in details, see Memoirs, I, 10-11. See also, 
Buchanan, United States and.World War II, II, 318-19; 
Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, 21+7-1+8Y “This is not the only 
instance of Truman respecting military security. In May, 
19l+2> Julius H. Amberg, Special Assistant to Stimson, 
asked the then Senator Truman to quash an investigation by 
his committee counsel, Hugh Pulton, into an experimental 
project on target-seeking bombs. Again, Truman agreed 
without complaint or question. See Amberg to Truman,
May 7* 191+2 and reply, May 16, 191+2, Truman Papers, 
Senatorial Piles, National Defense Committee-General," 
Truman Library.
^Stimson to Truman, April 2l+, quoted in
Truman, Memoirs, I, 8£.
^Stimson, "Decision to Use the Atom Bomb," St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, January 28, 191+7•
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Stimson began the briefing by telling the President 
he felt it imperative that Truman know that this new 
weapon--which he was certain would work--would not only 
affect our future foreign relations, but would also 
revolutionize military thinking. If used, the bomb would 
undoubtedly shorten the war; but the question of using 
such an awesome device remained for Truman to decide. 
Stimson also told Truman that he must consider the postwar 
implications of American possession of the secrets of 
atomic energy. Scientists involved in the project were 
convinced that the United States could not maintain 
exclusive knowledge of the atomic process indefinitely. 
Perhaps, Stimson suggested, international control through 
the then-forming United Nations might be the best course 
to follow.® The Secretary of War, in his presentation to 
Truman, was clearly looking beyond the immediate military 
applications of the new weapon. Truman later observed: 
"Stimson . . . seemed at least as much concerned with the
®Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 63ij.-36;
Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 3k3 » See also, Morton, 
"Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," 1+96; Truman, Memoirs, I, 
87; Phillips, Truman Presidency, Strangely enough,
almost a month after this briefing Budget Director Harold 
Smith, in a conversation with Truman, mentioned the "Man­
hattan Project." Truman asked him what it was. Apparently 
no one had mentioned the project’s overall code name to 
the President. Diary entry, May 21, 19k$> Papers of 
Harold D. Smith, Diary (April 18, 19^5 “ June 19, 19^6), 
Truman Library. Hereinafter cited as Smith Diary.
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role of the atomic bomb in the shaping of history as in 
its capacity to shorten the war."^
General Leslie Groves, chief administrative officer 
of the Manhattan District, had accompanied Stimson to this 
meeting with the President. Groves brought Truman up to 
date on the entire project, indicated its current status 
and offered approximate completion dates on the bombs.
The general anticipated a test of the bomb in mid-July at 
the proving grounds near Los Alamos, New Mexico. If the 
test proved successful, an operational bomb could be 
ready some time in August. A special air group was already 
in training to deliver the bomb.^®
Before the meeting ended, Stimson suggested to 
Truman that a committee be created to advise the President 
on all of the ramifications of the new weapon, particu­
larly, whether it should be used against Japan or not.
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 87.
l°Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 3i]-3j Phillips, 
Truman Presidency, 52̂ . General' Groves had made sub­
stantially the same report to Roosevelt just prior to the 
Yalta Conference. Bourke Hickenlooper to Groves and 
reply, June 2£, 19^1, printed in Par East Hearings, Pt. it, 
3119-20, 3132.
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Truman agreed and the Interim Committee was established.^
Later various panels were created to advise the Interim
Committee on particular aspects (scientific, military,
12political) of their problems. The members of the Interim 
Committee met together for the first time in the Pentagon 
on May 9, 191+5• The discussion dealt mainly with defining 
the major problem areas. The group dwelt at length on what 
the President should tell the nation about the bomb test, 
what other nations should be told about the process, and 
how long it would take the Soviet Union to develop their 
own bomb (estimates varying from three to twenty years).
The other question explored by this meeting had been 
raised by several scientists working on the bomb's
•^Truman, Memoirs , I, 1+19• See also, Stimson and 
Bundy, On Active Service, 616-17. The membership of the 
committee was as Tollows": Stimson, Chairman; George L.
Harrison, Adviser to Stimson and President, New York Life 
Insurance Co., Co-Chairman; James P. Byrnes, Personal 
Representative of the President; Ralph A. Bard, Under 
Secretary of the Navy; William L. Clayton, Assistant 
Secretary of State; Vannevar Bush, Director, Office of 
Scientific Research and Development and President, Car­
negie Institute; Karl L. Compton, Chief, Office of Field 
Services in OSRD and President, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology; James B. Conant, Chairman, National 
Defense Research Committee and President, Harvard Univer­
sity. List taken from Stimson and Bundy, On Active 
Service, footnote, 616.
12Among those advising the Interim Committee were 
Generals Marshall and Groves and distinguished nuclear 
scientists, such as Enrico Fermi, Arthur Compton and J. 
Robert Oppenheimer. Truman, Memoirs, I, i+19. See also, 
Morton, "Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," i+97j Hewlett 
and Anderson, The New World, 3i+l+“l+5»
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development: Should the atomic bomb be used at all,
especially considering that Japan*s defeat was now
certain? On that same day, in another room of the Penta­
gon, General Groves, who had already answered that 
question in his own mind, met with another committee to 
select the Japanese city that would be the target of the 
first bomb.^
The decisive meetings of the Interim Committee 
occurred on May 31 and June 1, 19lj-5- Their recommenda­
tions to the President can be stated briefly: (1) The
atomic bomb should be used directly against Japan as soon 
as it becomes operational. (2) The target should be a 
war plant or military installation surrounded by build­
ings of light construction. (3) No advance warning as 
to the nature of the weapon should be given to the 
Japanese
James Byrnes informed Truman of the report soon 
after the second meeting ended. It is his recollection 
that Truman said ". . . regrettable as it might be, so far 
as he could see, the only reasonable conclusion was to use
■^Lamont, pay Qf Trinity, 103-101;; Morison, Turmoil 
and Tradition, 62l^2^T~
% r u m a n ,  Memoirs;~~I~r4rI9. See also, Morton, 
"Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," 1+975 Stimson and Bundy, 
On Active Service, 617; Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The 
Truman Adminis tration, 10.
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the bomb."^ The reasoning behind the Committee's
recommendations to Truman are obscured by conflicting
accounts of the participants and security restrictions on
the records of the Interim Committee. However, it is
possible to make some general observations: There was
only limited discussion of whether or not the bomb should
1be used at all. The question of a nonmilitary demon­
stration of the weapon— upon a deserted island, for 
example--was considered. Objections were made that such a 
test might not be a strong enough argument to convince the 
militarists in control of Japan. It was also proposed that 
an uninhabited area of Japan be destroyed. The consensus 
view seemed to be that, like the island test, such a 
demonstration might not be convincing, would be a waste of 
fissionable materials; American prisoners might be moved
^B y m e s ,  Speaking Frankly, 261-62. See also, Peis, 
Japan Subdued, 39.
•^Urs Schwarz believes that no serious consideration 
was given to not using the bomb. American Strategy, 65. 
Interim Committee member Ralph Bard! does not recall 
discussion of the subject, nor does physicist J. Robert 
Oppenheimer. Arthur Compton, on the other hand, recalls 
that "fullest consideration" was given to using the bomb, 
but that it was his impression that the Committee viewed 
it as a "foregone conclusion that the bomb would be used." 
Morison, Turmoil and Tradition, 625-27.
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to the site, and it could be costly, should the bomb fail 
to detonate.1?
The Interim Committee did not absolutely reject the
idea of a demonstration to the Japanese of the power of
the atom. Instead, they asked the Scientific Advisory
Panel to consider the subject and make recommendations.
The scientists submitted their report on June 16. The key
statement of their report read: "We can propose no
technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the
war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military 
1 ftuse." It should be noted that the Interim Committee did 
not wait for this study, which confirmed their judgments. 
The Committee recommendation to the President that a 
Japanese city be bombed was submitted two weeks earlier.
"The committee's function was, of course, 
entirely advisory," Stimson wrote some years later. He 
continued,
The ultimate responsibility for the recommendation to 
the President rested upon me, and I have no desire to 
veil it. The conclusions of the committee were 
similar to my own, although I reached mine independ­
ently. I felt that to extract a genuine surrender 
from the Emperor and his military advisers, there 
must be administered a tremendous shock which would
?Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 261-62; Schwarz, 
American Strategy, 66. See also, Morison, Turmoil and 
Tradition, 626; Lamont, Day of Trinity, 110.
1®Truman, Memoirs, I, i|19. For full text of the 
report, see Feis, Japan Subdued, ij.2-l|3 •
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carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the 
Empire. Such an effective shock would save many 
times the number of lives, both American and 
Japanese, that it would cost.19
Truman called a meeting of the War Council to discuss
Of)strategy against Japan on June 18, 19l±$. Present were
the Joint Chiefs, Navy Secretary Porrestal, Stimson and
John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War. Most of the
meeting was taken up with Marshall’s presentation to
Truman of the invasion plans, with which the Joint Chiefs,
Porrestal and Stimson agreed, when queried by Truman.
McCloy was the only person present not to offer an
opinion, since Stimson, his superior, was present. Just
as the meeting broke up, Truman turned to McCloy and said
that no one was going to leave without expressing his 
P iviews.
McCloy had been surprised by the entire meeting.
All present were familiar with the Interim Committee 
report and yet no one had proposed to the President the 
use of the atomic bomb. McCloy suggested to Truman that
•^Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 617. In a 
19^1 hearing, General MarshaTT testified to the same 
effect, the opinion of the Joint Chiefs being that,
". . . nothing less than a terrific shock would produce a 
surrender." Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, $62. There is some 
sketchy evidence in SltTmson's diaries that he had assumed 
for some time that the bomb would be used. Morison, 
Turmoil and Tradition, 628-29.
20This meeting was discussed at length in the 
preceding chapter.
^Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 117.
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some consideration should be given to the bomb's ability
to bring about unconditional surrender. He favored, as he
told Truman in the discussion that followed, telling the
Japanese that the United States had the bomb and would use
22it unless they surrendered. Truman was interested in 
the idea of including this warning in the ultimatum to be 
issued at Potsdam. However, as McCloy later reported,
"not one of the Chiefs nor the Secretary thought well of a 
bomb warning, an effective argument being that no one 
could be certain . . . that the thing would go off."2-̂ 
Because of this, McCloy's proposal was put aside, only to 
be reconsidered and rejected at Potsdam.2^
It is worth recording here that in the weeks just 
prior to the testing and use of the bomb, many atomic 
scientists— the only group aside from Truman's military 
advisers who knew of the atomic project— tried to persuade 
the Administration not to use the bomb against Japan.
Having heard and reacted against the recommendations of the 
Interim Committee, a seven-man group was formed at the 
Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory, calling itself the
22Ibid., 361)..
^Quoted in Morton, "Decision to Use the Atomic 
Bomb," 502.
^Morison, Turmoil and Tradition, 630-31. See 
also, Hewlett and Anderson, Qftie Hew World, 3>̂ b* Lamont,
Day of Trinity, 132-33*
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25"Committee on Social and Political Implications." Their 
report, drafted for submission to Secretary Stimson, 
argued against the use of the bomb without warning. Such 
use, the report contended, would shock allied and neutral 
nations, undermine confidence in subsequent American 
attempts at obtaining an international agreement to ban 
atomic warfare, and probably would not be supported by 
American public opinion which would be hostile to this 
nation ". . . being the first to introduce such an indis­
criminate method of wholesale destruction of civilian 
life."26
The basic recommendation of the Committee was that 
a test demonstration of -the bomb be performed before 
representatives of all the United Nations in some deserted
area. If after such a demonstration the Japanese
rejected an ultimatum specifically warning that the bomb 
would be used, then perhaps the bomb should be employed 
(after obtaining the sanction of the American public and
^The committee was chaired by James 0. Franck, a
Nobel Laureate. Among the membership were famous atomic
scientists such as Glen Seaborg and Leo Szilard. Feis, 
Japan Subdued, 1̂.0.
Of.Feis, Japan Subdued, 1|1. For text of this 
report, see ibid., "Franck Committee Report,"
printed in Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The Truman 
Administration, 12-13; Current, Secretary Stimson,
230-31.
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the United Nations) The report was brought to Washing­
ton by Janies Franck, the Committee Chairman. On June 12, 
unable to see Stimson, or George Harrison, alternate 
chairman of the Interim Committee, Franck left the report
powith an aide in Harrison’s office.
The report of the Scientific Advisory Panel to the
Interim Committee on June 16 (discussed earlier) took note
of the Franck Committee report: "The opinions of our
scientific colleagues on the initial use of these weapons
are not unanimous. . . ," the Panel reported. They
described the alternatives suggested as ranging from a
technical demonstration to direct military application.
The Panel rejected a demonstration as unlikely to bring
about surrender and offered no alternative to direct use
29of the bomb against Japan.
In late June Ralph Bard, a member of the Interim 
Committee, reversed his opinion with respect to bombing 
Japan without warning. In a memorandum on June 27 Bard
^Feis, Japan Subdued, See also, Fleming,
The • Cold War, I, 299; "Franck Committee Report," printed in 
Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The Truman Administration, 
12-13; Current, Secretary Stimson, ~23b-31.
pQ
Editor's Note, "Franck Committee Report," in 
Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The Truman Administration, 10.
^"Scientific Advisory Committee Report," reprinted 
in ibid., 15.
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said that Japan should be given a few days’ notice, 
ascribing his new views to a consideration of America's 
spirit of fair play and humanitarianism. Bard also felt 
that Japan was seeking an opportunity to surrender that 
such a warning could provide, especially if accompanied by 
assurances from the President with respect to the treat­
ment of the Emperor and the Japanese nation following 
surrender
These early dissenters from atomic policy recom­
mendations were joined by a substantial number of atomic 
scientists in July. Leo Szilard, one of the members of 
the Franck Committee, drafted and circulated a petition 
addressed to Truman directly. On July 17 Szilard sub­
mitted the petit ion— bearing the signatures of sixty-nine 
of his colleagues at the University of Chicago's Metal­
lurgical Laboratory— to Washington. The petition argued 
the moral and political implications of using the bomb; 
it began and ended with pleas to Truman to use his powers 
as Commander in Chief with prudence and in consideration 
of the future, as the following excerpts indicate:
Discoveries of which the people of the United States 
are not aware may affect the welfare of this nation in 
the near future. The liberation of atomic power which 
has been achieved places atomic bombs in the hands of 
the Army. It places in your hands, as Commander-in- 
Chief, the fateful decision whether or not to sanction
^°Bard Memorandum, June 27, 19k$» ibid., l£-l6. See 
also, Fleming, The Cold War, I, 300.
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the use of such bombs in the present phase of the 
war against Japan. . . .
In view of the foregoing, we, the undersigned, 
respectfully petition: first, that you exercise your
power as Commander-in-Chief to rule that the United 
States shall not resort to the use of atomic bombs in 
this war unless the terms which will be imposed upon 
Japan have been made public in detail and Japan, 
knowing these terms, has refused to surrender; second, 
that in such an event, the question of whether or not 
to use atomic bombs be decided by you in the light of 
the considerations presented in this petition as well 
as the other moral responsibilities which are 
involved.31
Other atomic scientists were becoming aroused over 
the bomb question during July. For example, on July 12 a 
poll of one hundred and fifty scientists at the Metal­
lurgical Laboratory revealed that forty percent favored
32options other than the bombing of Japan without warning.
^Petition, Leo Szilard, et. al. to the President of 
the United States, July 17, 194.£7""in Bernstein and Matusow 
(eds.), The Truman Administration, 16-17. See also,
Fleming, TEe Cold War, I, 300-301. Szilard had perhaps a 
greater feeling of responsibility for the bomb than most 
other scientists. He had helped convince Albert Einstein 
to write the fateful letter to Roosevelt that brought about 
the creation of the Manhattan Project. Feis, Japan 
Subdued, footnote, J4.O.
32Poll of 1^0 Chicago Scientists, July 12, 19l4-5> 
printed in Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The Truman Admin­
istration, 19-20. See also, Hewlett and Anderson, The New 
World, 399-̂ 4-00. The figures given are confusing, since 
numerically, only fifty-eight chose the poll options that 
called for some action short of bombing without warning. 
However, seventy names appear on the Szilard petition 
completed in the next few days, calling for just such 
action. Either the poll was in error, or many did not 
participate. Louis Morton claims that the poll results, 
along with the Szilard petition were given to the Scientific 
Advisory Panel for consideration prior to their June 16 
report. See, "Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," I4.98—99.
This could not have been possible since the poll was taken 
on July 12 and the petition completed on July 17.
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In this period, a petition from Chicago bearing eighteen 
names, and another from the atomic plant at Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee, carrying sixty-eight names, were submitted 
through channels, indicating varied reservations about 
military use of the b o m b . 33
Prom all indications, few, if any, of these 
dissenting views ever reached Truman. At least one 
petition was held up on a decision apparently made by 
General Groves. A memorandum attached to the petition 
explained that since the scientists had an opportunity to 
express themselves through the Scientific Advisory Panel, 
"no useful purpose would be served by transmitting . . . 
(the petition) to the White House, particularly since the
3>kPresident was not in the country." Truman was, in fact, 
at the Potsdam Conference, having left the United States 
on July 6. The momentous decision Truman made to use the 
bomb was based on military advisories and the Interim
33Editor's Note, Bernstein and Matusow (eds.),
The Truman Administration, 18.
3^-ibid., 16-17. See also, Lamont, Day of Trinity, 
llp6; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 399-IjSo. The 
Szilard petition could havebeen forwarded to the Presi­
dent, for he received White House mail pouches which were 
flown in daily to him at Potsdam. See Truman to Martha 
Truman, July 3, 1 9 quoted in Truman, Memoirs, I,
330-31* Herbert Feis, Japan Subdued (p. 63), feels it was 
"improbable"that the Szilard petition was forwarded to 
Truman. Steinberg claims, without offering any documen­
tation, that Truman was aware of the Chicago poll. Man 
From Missouri, 25>9.
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Committee recommendations. Much of the information that 
there existed a substantial number of objections to this 
line of reasoning was not made known to the President.
At 7:30 P.M., July 16, the day following Truman’s 
arrival at Potsdam, a cable was received with the infor­
mation that an implosion-type atomic fission bomb had been 
successfully detonated at the Alamogordo test site in New 
Mexico. Subsequent messages indicated the force of the 
bomb exceeded expectations.^^ The blast yielded a force 
equivalent to 20,000 tons of TNT; its light could be seen 
for 250 miles and the shock wave broke a window 125 miles 
from the epicenter of the explosion.^ This was the news 
Truman had been waiting for. The bomb strengthened his
position, for it meant that the Soviet Union was no longer
17needed in the Par Eastern War.
^Harrison to Stimson, July 16, 17, 191*5 (Cables), 
Poreign Relations of the United States: Potsdam Papers, II, 
1360-61;' Groves "to Stimson, July lb, 191*5, ibid.,- 136I-8. 
See also, Lamont, Day of Trinity, 255* David Rees, The Age 
of Containment: The CoTS War, 191*5-1965 (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1‘96'7), 13• Hereinafter cited as Rees,
Age of Containment.
-^Groves to Stimson, July 18, 191*5 (Cable),
Poreign Relations of the United States: Potsdam Papers,
II, 1361-68, passim.
3"^Truman probably pushed back the Potsdam date to 
await the test results. He did have the estimated test 
date (mid-July), when he asked for the postponement from 
July 1. Lamont, Day of Trinity, 108-109. The scientists 
at Alamogrodo were definitely pushed to test around 
July 16. Oppenheimer recalled (in 1951*) that both Stimson 
and Vannevar Bush had told him it was very important that
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At a Pentagon meeting on July ij., 19kS» the British
■a q
had agreed that the bomb should be used against Japan. 
However, they noted that one problem existed in that Russia 
was officially ignorant of the bomb. If Truman said 
nothing about the weapon to Stalin at Potsdam, relations 
between the Big Three would be jeopardized when the bomb 
was used a short time later. The general feeling was that 
Truman should inform Stalin of the bomb sometime during 
the c o n f e r e n c e T h e  recommendation of the Interim 
Committee, made to Truman a few days earlier, was in 
agreement with this position. The Committee had also
he test before the Potsdam meeting. Oppenheimer testimony, 
quoted in Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The Truman Admin­
istration, 20-21. See also, Lamont, Day of Trini'ty, li|7. 
Truman had said that "preparations were beTng rushed for 
the test . . .  at the time I had to leave for Europe 
(July 6), and on the voyage over I had been anxiously 
awaiting word on the results." Memoirs, I, ij. 15« At 
Potsdam, prior to receiving the test results, Truman 
reportedly remarked, with respect to the test and negotia­
tions with the Russians : "If it explodes as I think it
will, I'll certainly have a hammer on those boys." Lamont, 
Day of Trinity, 228. Hewlett and Anderson claim that 
Truman, with the atomic test date in mind, told Stimson in 
a meeting on June 6 that he had postponed the Potsdam Con­
ference until July 1 The New World, 360.
3®Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 639. Senator 
Vandenberg, Chairman ofthe Senate Poreign Relations 
Committee, discovered in the summer of 19lj.7 that Great 
Britain's consent was required for any use of the atomic 
bomb by a secret executive agreement made by PDR and 
Churchill at the Quebec Conference. In January, 19kB> the 
British agreed to rescind this requirement. Vandenberg, 
Private Papers, 359-61.
39Lamont, Day of Trinity, lij.6.
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suggested to the President that he might invite further 
talks with the Soviet Union relative to a postwar policy 
on atomic energy, but they did not think Truman, if asked, 
should divulge any particulars yet.^®
At lunch with Churchill on July 18, Truman dis­
cussed with the Prime Minister what Stalin should be told 
about the bomb. Churchill had been informed on the 
previous day of the successful test of what he would 
later refer to as "the Second Coming in Wrath. Since 
it was settled that Stalin had to be informed, the dis­
cussion dealt only with how much he should be told and 
when to tell him. Truman said he would simply disclose 
to the Soviet Premier the fact of the weapon without going 
into any detail. "I think," Churchill recalls Truman 
saying, "I had best just tell him after one of our meetings 
that we have an entirely novel form of bomb. . . , which 
we think will have decisive effects upon the Japanese 
will to continue the war." Churchill agreed.̂-2
As the evening session ended at Potsdam on July 21±, 
Truman approached the Soviet Premier privately: "I
casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of
fy°Ibid., 136-37.
^■Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 637-38.
^ I b i d ., 6ij.0-lp.. See also, Truman, Mr. Citizen,
201; Hewle'tt' and Anderson, The Hew World, 385.
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unusual destructiveness.” The President was quite 
surprised by the reaction he received: "The Russian
Premier showed no special interest. All he said was that 
he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make "good use 
of it against the Japanese I Churchill, watching the 
scene from a few yards away, but out of earshot, remembers 
that Stalin’s face remained "gay and genial" and that "he 
seemed to be delighted."^ As they waited together for 
their cars a few moments later, Churchill asked the 
President, "How did it go?"
"He never asked a question," Truman replied.^
^Truman, Memoirs, I, lj.16. See also, Neumann, After 
Victory, 175>J Peis, Between War and Peace, 177-
^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 670.
^ I b i d . Secretary of State Byrnes, who was also 
present, corroborates both Truman and Churchill’s accounts 
of the brief encounter with Stalin. Speaking Prankly,
263. All three men were clearly surprised by Stalin's 
mild reaction to Truman's information about the atomic 
bomb. In their accounts, Truman and Byrnes did not note 
the possibility that Stalin already knew much more than 
Truman told him. Churchill stated emphatically that 
Stalin's response was proof that the Soviet Union had not 
penetrated the project’s security prior to this meeting. 
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 669-70. Cabell Phillips, 
in his biography of ̂Truman, says Stalin and other Soviet 
officials, " . . .  had enjoyed for more than a year fairly 
accurate and up-to-date intelligence. . . ," on the Man­
hattan Project. See his, Truman Presidency, 53. Lansing 
Lamont, Day of Trinity (passim.) makes frequent detailed 
references to Soviet espionage activities at Alomogordo. 
Herbert Peis believes that Stalin knew the weapon was 
being developed and that it was close to success, but that 
he was not yet aware of its full power. Japan Subdued,
90.
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There was no further discussion with the Soviet Union at 
Potsdam with regard to atomic energy.
Once the reports were in confirming the success of
the bomb test, Truman met with his chief military advisers
I16on July 17p All present were conversant with the mid- 
July status reports prepared by the intelligence branch 
of the War Department General Staff. The reports 
estimated Japanese strength in the home islands at
2.000.000, on the Asian mainland and Formosa, another
2.000.000, and 600,000 more scattered about in small
groupings for a total of just under 5,000,000.^ The
intelligence reports, while taking cognizance of the
Japanese mediation feelers to Russia, indicated that they
discerned no real weakening in Japanese determination to
continue the war. As Stimson put it • • .
As we undex-stood it in July, there was a very strong 
possibility that the Japanese Government might 
determine upon resistance to the end, in all the 
areas of the Far East under its control. In such an 
event the Allies would be faced with the enormous 
task of destroying an armed force of five million men 
and five thousand suicide aircraft, belonging to a 
race which had already amply demonstrated its ability 
to fight literally to the death.m-8
^Those present were Stimson, Byrnes, Leahy, 
Marshall, Arnold and King. Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, 
2ij.8. ~  -----------------
^Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 618.
^8Ibid. There is no clear agreement on Japanese 
determination to fight on. One who has taken exception to 
Stimson's interpretation of these reports is Alexander H. 
Leighton, who was Co-Director, Foreign Morale Analysis
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The invasion plans Truman had approved in June
called for a combined American military and naval force
Kgestimated at £>000,000 men. The President asked each of 
his advisers present for their opinions on using the bomb. 
General Marshall opposed a surprise attack, but he told 
Truman that if the bomb brought about surrender without an 
invasion, it would mean saving a quarter of a million 
American lives along with the lives of millions of 
Japanese.^ There was apparently little or no discussion
Division, Bureau of Overseas Intelligence. Leighton holds 
that Japan would have surrendered without the atomic bomb 
or Russian intervention and prior to the planned invasion 
of the home islands. See Leighton, "Was Atoraic-Bombing of 
Japan Necessary?," Richmond (Va.) Times-Pispatch, April 20, 
19i|.7« Leighton was a member of a survey team that in­
spected Japan at the end of the war. What he says is quite 
similar to the conclusion reached by the United States 
Strategic Bombing Survey Report, reprinted in Bernstein and 
Matusow (eds.), The Truman .Administration, \\$. D. P. 
Fleming believes""that Soviet interventioh alone would have 
been sufficient to force Japanese surrender. The Cold War,
I, 30£.
^Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 619.
^°Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, 2ij.8. Truman’s fig­
ures on the estimate of ITves that" would be lost by in­
vasion vary. In his Memoirs (I, ljl7) he said it would cost 
one half million American lives. Earlier (p. 31 lj-) > he 
recorded the JCS casualty estimates as just, "grim." 
Steinberg, in Man from Missouri(p. 2£9) quotes Truman as 
saying the bomb saved half a million Americans and as many 
Japanese. In a 196£ television broadcast, Truman referred 
to "saving hundreds of thousands of American lives."
Quoted in Lamont, Day of Trinity, 303* In a speech to 
newly-elected congressmen at ‘t!he Carlton Hotel in Washing­
ton on April 6, 191̂ 9, the President spoke of saving two 
hundred thousand American lives and about three or four 
hundred thousand of the enemy. Item No. 70, Public 
Papers . . . Truman, 191+9, 200.
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about the possibility of a specific warning to the 
Japanese that this new weapon was to be used against 
them.^ "The consensus of opinion," Truman said in 
summarizing this meeting, "was that the bomb should be 
used."^2
The last two weeks of July must have been exhausting 
to the President. He was engaged in daily complex 
negotiations over the conference table with Great Britain 
and the Soviet Union, determining the structure of the 
postwar world; he was meeting often with Stimson, Byrnes 
and Churchill with regard to the language of the Potsdam 
Ultimatum; he was pressed from the seventeenth to the 
twenty-fourth to make a decision respecting the issuance 
of orders for the atomic-bombing of Japan. He had been
^ "Marshall . . . was deeply disturbed at the idea 
of a surprise atomic attack on Japan," according to 
Lamont, Day of Trinity, 261+. Louis Morton says that, "No 
one at this TTTme, or later in the conference, raised the 
question of whether the Japanese should be informed of the
existence of the bomb." Morton, "Decision to Use the
Atomic Bomb," 511. Interviewed in I960, General Eisenhower 
said that when informed by Stimson of the bomb he said he
hoped that American would not be the first to use such a
weapon, especially against an almost-defeated nation.
Peis, Japan Subdued, footnote, 178.
^Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, 21+8. It may be 
recalled that while the participants in this meeting 
agreed that the bomb should be used, the decision was also 
made to continue with preparations for the invasion of 
Japan. The military advisers to the President were by no 
means convinced that the bomb would end the war.
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informed that the bomb could be used on or after August 1, 
but the preparations required that his authorization to
C'.iproceed be given prior to July 25.
As he moved toward a decision on the bomb, Truman
continued to consult with his military and civilian
advisers: "I gave careful thought to what my advisers
had counseled. I wanted to weigh all the possibilities
and implications."-^ The President also talked about it
with Churchill, with Leahy and Marshall present. "There
never was," Churchill recalls, "a moment's discussion as
to whether the atomic bomb should be used or not."^
Churchill was very emphatic on this point, as his further
discussion of this session with Truman indicates:
The final decision now lay in the main with President 
Truman, who had the weapon; but I never doubted what 
it would be, nor have I ever doubted since that he was 
right. . . . the decision whether or not to use the 
atomic bomb to compel the surrender of Japan was never 
even an issue. There was unanimous, automatic,
5^Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 389-90.
^Raymond G-. O ’Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New 
Dimensions of Power," in Edgar E. Robinson, et. al.,
Powers of the President in Foreign Affairs, T9U^-T965 
(San FrancTsco: The Commonwealth Club of dal ifornia,
1966), 29. Hereinafter cited as O ’Connor, "Harry S. Truman: 
New Dimensions of Power."
-^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 638-39. " . . .
when I talked to Churchill he unhesitatingly told me that 
he favored the use of the atomic bomb if it might aid to 
end the war." Truman, Memoirs, I, Ijl9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11+9
unquestioned agreement around our table; nor did I 
ever hear the slightest suggestion that we should dootherwise.
The President had not only to worry out the final 
decision to bomb Japan, he had also to pick which cities 
to use as targets. He wanted to be sure, he said, that 
the bomb was used against a military target. That way, 
Truman reasoned, he would be employing ". . . a  weapon of 
war in the manner prescribed by the laws of war."^ He 
had earlier instructed Stimson to tell the War Department 
Target Committee to propose only cities of "prime military 
importance." Essentially, this meant a city with 
industrial plants producing military equipment. All of 
this was in conformance with the Interim Committee’s 
recommendations with which the JCS had concurred.
Stimson brought the target recommendations to Truman, 
and, along with Marshall and Arnold, a list of four cities 
was compiled. Listed in order of their military 
importance, they were Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and 
Nagasaki.
In the preface to his Memoirs, Truman commented
^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 639.
^Truman, Memoirs, I, i+20.
£8Ibid. See also, Hillman (ed.), Mr. President,
21+8'; Lamont, Day of Trinity, 261+-65; Current, Secretary 
Stimson, 233. Current errs in placing Truman in Washington 
during this period.
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from his own experience on the times a president is con­
fronted by crucial decisions: "No one can make decisions
for him. No one can know all the processes and stages of 
his thinking."^ He concluded his thoughts on this subject 
with the following insightful line: "To be President of
the United States is to be lonely, very lonely at times 
of great decisions."^0 Although surrounded by his 
advisers as they chose the target cities in Japan, Harry 
Truman must have felt very lonely. The President recalls 
that after the target selection was completed, "I then 
agreed to the use of the atomic bomb. . . .
With the Commander in Chief’s authorization, orders 
dated July 2ij., 1 9 were dispatched by the War Department 
to General Carl Spaatz, Commanding General of the A m y  
Strategic Air Force. The orders authorized the 509 
Composite Group of the 20th Air Force— a special unit 
trained for this task— to " . . .  deliver its first
59Truman, Memoirs, I, Preface, ix.
^Ibid. In a similar vein Truman said: "The
Presidential chair is the loneliest place a man can be." 
See, "Harry S. Truman— The Government Story," Group W 
television network telecast, July 19, 1969.
6lHillman (ed.), Mr. President, 2l|8. The date of 
Truman's decision was proHabXy July 23. A cable from 
Stimson to George Harrison of the Interim Committee, dated 
the 23rd, indicated that the bombing decision had now 
"been confirmed by highest authority." Quoted in 
Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The Truman Administration,
25.
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special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing
after about 3 August 19l{.5 on one of the targets: Hiro-
62shima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki.” The orders also 
stated that additional bombs were to be dropped on the 
designated targets as soon as they were constructed.
Copies of Spaatz's orders were also to be personally 
delivered by him to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz 
for their information.63
Since the order to use the atomic bomb was given 
prior to the promulgation of the Potsdam Declaration on 
July 26, it could be assumed that the document was a 
cynical gesture. The assumption is unwarranted. If the 
bomb was to be used as soon as it was operational, as 
advocated by the Interim Committee, then technical 
necessity required that Truman initiate the orders when 
he did. The order was not irrevocable, but no further
62Truman, Memoirs, I, ij.20.
^3puii text of orders appear in ibid., J|20-21j 
Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The Truman Administration, 25-26. See also, Peis, Japan Subdued, 9l~ A copy of the 
orders was sent to General MacArthur and this was probably 
his first knowledge of the new weapon. MacArthur said he 
first learned of tha bomb ”jua.t prior” to its use on 
Hiroshima. See Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences r General 
of the Army Douglas MacArthur (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
"Company, I96I4.) , 262. Hereinafter cited as MacArthur, 
Remini sconces. See also, Charles A. Willoughby and John 
Chamberlain,' MaoArthur, 191+1-1951 (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 195h) > 286. Hereinafter cited as Willoughby 
and Chamberlain, MacArthur.
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commands were required from the Commander in Chief or any­
one else in the military hierarchy for the bomb to be used 
on or after August 3 .̂ J- Truman's instructions to Stimson 
were clear: " . . .  the order would stand unless I
notified him that the Japanese reply to our ultimatum 
was acceptable."^
The Potsdam Ultimatum, which said nothing about the 
Emperor and nothing about the atomic bomb, was not 
rejected by the Japanese. Premier Suzuki told the press 
he would ignore it, and this, to Truman, was unacceptable.
C.LHe felt that there was no longer an alternative course. 
While the Japanese still vainly placed their hopes for a 
negotiated surrender on the Russians, American technicians 
were assembling an atomic weapon on Tinian Island in the 
Marianas. Since the Japanese response gave him no cause
^Schwarz, American Strategy. 58-59J Morton, "Decision 
to Use the Atomic
^Truman, Memoirs, I, If.21.
^Ibid. Secretary Stimson felt that Suzuki had 
rejected the ultimatum: "In the face of this rejection we
could only proceed to demonstrate that the ultimatum had 
meant exactly what it said . . . destruction of Japanese 
forces and devastation of the homeland." Stimson and 
Bundy, On Active Service, 625. Morton errs in saying that 
following the Suzuki statement: "Truman held off orders
on the use of the bomb for a few days." See "Decision to 
Use the Atomic Bomb," 513* As indicated textually, no 
orders had to be given after the order to General Spaatz, 
and none were given as far as can be determined from 
available sources.
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to, Truman did not countermand his decision, a decision he 
said he reached after long and careful study: "It was not
an easy decision to make. I did not like the weapon. But
I had no qualms if in the long run millions of lives
67could be saved. The rest is history."
History records that sixty percent of the city of
Hiroshima, Japan, was destroyed at 8:15 A.M., August 6,
19l|5» The B-29 crewmen returning to their base reported
that the results exceeded expectations.®® The results did,
indeed, exceed expectations. The predicted twenty
thousand that would be killed by the bomb became, in
fact, seventy-eight thousand men, women, and children.
Thirty-seven thousand others were injured; thirteen
thousand were missing. One single bomb in one apocalyptic
minute had transfored Hiroshima from the eighth largest
69city in Japan into a village. Receiving the news 
aboard the U.S.S. Augusta on route back from the Potsdam 
Conference, Truman told a group of sailors around him
^^Hillman (ed.), Mr. President. 2I4.8—1|.9.
®®General Spaatz to General Arnold, August 6, 19k$t 
RG18, AAP, 312.1— Operations Letters— 19i|.5» Vol. 3>
National Archives. The time noted is for Japan. It was 
7:15 P.M., August 5* in Washington.
697Lamont, Day of Trinity, 265. In a research study 
in progress at Hiroshima's Institute of Nuclear Medicine 
and Biology, sociologist Minoru Yuzaki offers "highly 
tentative projections" placing the city's death toll at
200,000. Time, XCVI (August 10, 1970), 31.
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"this is the greatest thing in history."^0
In a prepared statement released in Washington the 
same day, the President told the nation of the bomb and 
warned the Japanese that more would follow:
Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one 
bomb on Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base. 
That bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of 
T.N.T. . . .
The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl 
Harbor. They have been repaid many fold. And the 
end is not yet. . . .
We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and 
completely every productive enterprise the Japanese 
have above ground in any city. . . . Let their be no 
mistakej we shall completely destroy Japan's power to 
amek war.
It was to spare the Japanese people from utter 
destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued 
at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that 
ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they 
may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of 
which has never been seen on this earth.71
On August 9, seventy-five hours after the attack on 
Hiroshima, the seaport of Nagasaki was atom-bombed. The 
casualties numbered above 100,000. A one square-mile area 
was instantaneously cratered by the force of the blast
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 1+21; Byrnes, Speaking 
Frankly, 261+.
7^ Item No. 93, Statement by the President Announcing 
the Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima, August 6, 191+5*
Public Papers . . . Truman. 191+5* 197-200. Full text is 
reprinted as Document No. 1315, in Richard L. Watson, Jr., 
(ed.), The United States in the Contemporary World, 191+5- 
1962 (VoT. ilx! of George H. Knoles (ed.;, Sources in 
American History, 9 vols., New York: The P’ree Press, 196£), 
1+2-1+5* Hereinafter cited as Watson (ed.), United States 
in the Contemporary World. An abridged version of the 
statement appears in Truman, Memoirs, I, 1+22-23*
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which detonated some two thousand feet above the city.
The bomb, much more powerful than the device used on 
Hiroshima, left a pall of radioactive dust over Nagasaki 
that did not dissipate for several days.?2
Questions must inevitably arise about the time span 
between the dropping of the bombs. Some believe Truman 
should have waited longer; Nagasaki was destroyed before 
the Japanese government could react to the reports from 
Hi roshima.Truman, of course, thinks the time was 
sufficient. He gave them three days to surrender, he 
said, and would have given them two more were it not for 
unfavorable weather forecasts.?^-
The idea of dropping two bombs, rather than 
dropping one and waiting a substantial interval for 
Japanese reaction had been developed by military planners 
in December of 192f!|. The reasoning was that the first 
bomb would demonstrate the magnitude of the weapon; the 
second use of the weapon would be proof to the Japanese 
the first was not an experimental fluke and that the
?^Truman, Memoirs, I, 2+26. See also, Lamont, Day 
of Trinity, 266; Buchanan, United States and World War II,
II, 5B5.
Schwarz, American Strategy, 59.
7^-Truman, Memoirs, I, 1+26. The original date for 
the second bomb drop was August 11, but meteorologists 
indicated that the targets would not be visible by then. 
Peis, Japan Subdued, footnote, 116. See also, Schwarz, 
American Strategy, 59.
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United States had the capacity to continue these attacks.'^ 
General Groves liked the second-bomb strategy and 
described the concept to Truman, who neither accepted nor 
rejected it. a s  Groves said: "There was never any
definite approval of this conclusion and there was no
limitation placed in our plans on the number or bombs to
76be used." When the Commander in Chief approved the 
orders to General Spaatz to use the atom bomb on Japan—  
which Groves had drafted— he tacitly accepted a 
multiple-bomb strategy. The order is clear on this: 
"Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets 
as soon as made ready by the project s t a f f . H e r b e r t  
Peis has written that Generals Groves and Spaatz, " . . .  
and all their colleagues, military and civil, were eager 
to strike the second blow as quickly as possible to get 
the most impressive effect and hasten surrender."7®
Truman did have an order sent to Spaatz, probably on 
August 7> telling him to continue the bombing as ordered
75>Lamont, Day of Trinity, 30l{.-305>- The idea 
originated with Admiral William R. Purnell of the Military 
Policy Committee.
76Ibid., 305.
f^Truman, Memoirs, I, i|20.
78peis, Japan Subdued, footnote, 116.
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unless advised to the contrary by the President.
As Truman had ordered the situation, the atomic 
attacks were to continue unabated, with the frequency of 
the attacks to be determined by field commanders, subject 
only to the availability of fissionable material and 
weather conditions over Japan. The process would continue 
until Japan accepted unconditional surrender.
In the course of discussions with Columbia Univer­
sity students in 1959> Truman provided some interesting 
insights into his thinking on the use of the bomb:
Student: How about the decision on dropping the
atomic bomb?
President Truman: That was not any decision that
you had to worry about. It was just the same as 
getting a bigger gun than the other fellow had to win 
a war and that's what it was used for. Nothing else 
but an artillery weapon. . . .
The atom bomb was no "great decision". . . .  It 
was merely another powerful weapon in the arsenal of 
righteousness. The dropping of the bombs stopped the 
war, saved millions of lives. It is just the same as 
artillery on our side. Napoleon said that victory is 
always on the side of the artillery. It was a purely 
military decision to end the war.°0
In another portion of his session with the students, 
Truman was asked about the timing of the second bomb. He
^Truman, Memoirs, I, i+23• Groves' deputy on 
Tinian, General Thomas’ F. Farrell, was in direct field 
command of the bombings. He believed that it was Groves' 
wish that a second atom bomb should follow the first as 
rapidly as possible. With this in mind, Farrell "decided 
to rfcsh and risk the attack on the 9th rather than wait 
out the forecasted worse weather." Feis, Japan Subdued, 
footnote, 116.
Truman Speaks, 67* 93*
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does not actually answer the question in the dialogue 
quoted below, preferring instead to attack his critics. 
But that he did endorse the second (or, multiple)-bomb 
strategy can be reasonably inferred from his remarks:
Student: Mr. President, would you be willing to
explain to us what led you to believe that the first 
atomic bomb had failed to achieve peace with Japan 
and made it necessary to drop the second one?
President Truman: It was a military procedure,
under which the armed forces decided that it would be 
necessary to destroy both towns . . . and the 
objective was, as nearly as we possibly could 
determine, to shut off the supplies to the 
Japanese. . . .
Student: The reason I asked this was that it 
seemed to me the second bomb came pretty soon after 
the first one, two or three days.
President Truman: That is right. We were
destroying the centers, the factories that were 
making munitions. Just a military maneuver, that 
is all.
All this uproar about what we did and what could 
have been stopped— should we take these wonderful 
Monday morning quarterbacks, the experts who are 
supposed to be right? They don’t know what they are 
talking about. I was there. I did it. I would to 
it again.8l
If history is to be any more than reportage of 
significant past events, then those who write 6f> a 
nation's past must— of necessity— offer critical 
judgments; they must assess the wisdom of decisions made 
and judge the men who made them in the process. By the 
nature of the craft itself then, historians become the 
"Monday morning quarterbacks" of Truman's prosaic phrase. 
In one of his own works, Mr. Citizen, Truman criticized
8lIbid., 73.
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historians in general for their "astonishing" inaccuracy 
and "deliberate distortions." As a specific example of 
what he meant, Truman wrote: "The speculations and
assumptions • . . about my feelings on the use of the 
atomic bomb on Nagasaki and Hiroshima were as contra­
dictory as the varying stories written on the subject,
ftPand most of them had no foundation in fact." Even with 
this caution, the speculations and assumptions, as with 
this study, shall continue for many generations yet to 
come, for Truman opened the door of the nuclear age, and 
the world does not yet perceive what lies beyond— the 
lady or the tiger.
Certain questions naturally occur in consideration 
of the use of nuclear weapons. Was the atomic bomb
^Truman, Mr. Citizen, 183-81;. Given his refreshing 
pugnacity, Truman would never have fully agreed with any 
view of his decision, but given his knowledge of history, 
he would understand the reasons such judgments must be made. 
In his autobiography he devoted ten pages to passing 
judgment on his predecessors in the presidential office 
(with Andrew Jackson— predictably— emerging as his favor­
ite). Truman, Memoirs, II, 193-202. Truman had quite an 
amazing grasp of historical data, with which he dazzled 
everyone from his secretary to Winston Churchill, himself 
a reknowned amateur historian. Truman’s own historical 
allusions and the impressions of others on his talent in 
the field are numerous. See, for example, his Memoirs, I, 
2;60; II, 172-72;; Truman, Mr. Citizen, 125-26, 162, 167-68, 
19)4.-95; Churchill, TriumpIT~and Tragedy, 2|8l; Koenig (ed.), 
Truman Administration, 88-89; 0’Connor, "Harry S. Truman:
New Dimensions of Power," 2l;-25; Phillips, Truman Presi­
dency, 13kt Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, ld-lll 81-82; 
Steinberg, Man from MissourTT 355-561 Diary Entry,
November 9,1914-5/ Smith Papers, Truman Library.
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necessary to defeat Japan without a costly invasion? If 
the first was necessary, was the second bomb also required? 
Was the time span between the bombs sufficient? Can all 
of "Truman's command decisions on the employment of the 
bomb be justified? It would be easy to answer "no” to 
all these questions. While the maimed, disfigured 
children of Hiroshima live and a new generation of children 
breathe air polluted by the radioactive fallout from the 
testing of bombs over one thousand times more powerful 
than those which scarred Japan, the urge to damn those who 
advocated and initiated atomic warfare is strong. But 
any reasonable inquiry into the complex of circumstances 
involved in the atomic decision reveals that no abso­
lutely affirmative or negative judgment is valid without 
qualification.
That Japan would have conditionally surrendered 
without the atomic bomb being used and prior to the 
invasion of Kyushu in November has been we11-demonstrated, 
particularly by postwar research into the Japanese 
records.®-^ Some high-ranking military officials have
®^An excellent study of the subject is Peis, Japan 
Subdued. The distinguished diplomatic historian, Richard 
W. Leopold said in a 1970 interview: "I do not think there
is any doubt that if those who made the decision knew what 
we know now, the bomb would not have been dropped."
Leopold, "The United States in World Affairs, 19l|.l-1968," 
in John A. Garraty (ed.), Interpreting American History: 
Conversations with Historians (2 volsT, New York:
Mactalllan, 19J0)» II> 230. Hereinafter cited as Leopold,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
161
said, after the fact, that there was no military need to 
drop the bomb--among them, Generals Arnold and MacArthur 
and Admirals Halsey and L e a h y . E i s e n h o w e r  was opposed 
before the bomb’s use and Marshall had serious reserva­
tions, as previously noted.®-’
Truman and all his military and civil advisers were 
fully aware through intelligence reports that Japan was 
actively seeking to end the war for some time prior to the 
decision at Potsdam. That there was little effort made, 
aside from the ambiguously-worded Potsdam Declaration, to 
follow up on the possibility of a political settlement is
Q /
quite clear. Perhaps the President did not wish such a 
conclusion to the war.
"United States in World Affairs." Norman Cousins and 
Thomas K. Pinletter have written: "The first error was 
the atomic bombing of Hiroshima." See, "A Beginning for 
Sanity," Saturday Review of Literature, XXXIX, No. 2I4. 
(June If?, 19^6), 6“ hereinafter cited as Cousins and 
Pinletter, "A Beginning for Sanity."
®^Pleming, The Cold War, I, 297* Admiral Leahy 
wrote that the atomic bomb, ". . . was of no material 
assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were 
already defeated and ready to surrender." Leahy, I Was 
There (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), lji+1. HereinaTter 
cited as Leahy, I Was The re.
®^See footnote number 51, supra.
®®Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 628. 
Schwarz believes that these "Japanese peace overtures were 
"never even considered" by Truman and his advisers. 
American Strategy, 58•
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If the first bomb was unnecessary, then it follows 
that the second was doubly so, particularly in the brief 
interim between them. Even accepting the need for the 
Hiroshima bomb, it is difficult to understand the haste 
with which the second bomb was dropped. Had the Japanese 
been told after the first bomb that the attacks were to be 
suspended temporarily, but would be resumed at some 
specific date if they had not by then surrendered uncon­
ditionally, there seems little reason to doubt that they 
would have submitted. The second-bomb strategy may have 
been valid when proposed in 191+1+* but in August 19b$> 
Nagasaki was not needed to convince the Japanese their 
cause was doomed. "It was my responsibility as Presi­
dent," Truman has said, "to force the Japanese warlords to 
come to terms as quickly as possible with the minimum loss 
of l i v e s . A n d  again, in a radio message to the nation, 
the President said, "We have used it (the atomic bomb) in
OO
order to shorten the agony of war. . . . "  It was
®^Truman, Mr. Citizen, 202.
®®Item No. 97# Radio Report to the American People 
on the Potsdam Conference, August 9* 191+5* Public Papers 
. . . Truman, 191+5* 212. The line cited was' actually 
written by Archibald MacLeish, then an assistant Secretary 
of State, in some suggestions to Samuel Rosenman, a White 
House adviser, who wrote the speech for Truman. MacLeish 
to Rosenman, August, 191+5* Papers of Samuel I. Rosenman, 
Subject Pile, Report to the Nation on Potsdam Conference, 
Truman Library. Hereinafter cited as Rosenman Papers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
163
excessive haste in employing the second bomb that brought 
great agony to the people of Nagasaki.
The distinction between military and civilian 
targets disappeared on both sides at some point in the 
midst of World War II. American fire-bombing of Japanese 
cities had already killed over one-quarter of a million
Qqcivilians and left over nine million more homeless. ' In 
the sense that the atomic bombs were just bigger, more 
economical and efficient devices for destroying enemy 
cities, no justification for their use was warranted by 
either historical experience or prevailing international 
practice. The belligerent nations were all engaged in 
research and development of more efficient and sophis­
ticated war machines; the prevailing view being that 
nations could use any weapon not explicitly barred by 
international agreements. Thus, although the Truman 
Administration showed no particular concern over this 
subject, the legal and historical precedents did exist for 
using the bomb.^0 The only genuinely effective deterrent 
to the use of insidious weapons has been the fear of
®^In recommending the fire bombings of Japan and 
the Use of the atomic bomb, Stimson was, according to 
Bundy: " . . .  implicitly confessing that there could be
no significant limits to the horrors of modern war."
Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 632-33.
^Peis, Japan Subdued, 179.
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retaliation in kind, as the absence of poison gas in the
91Second World War demonstrates.
When the horrendous effects of the atomic bombs 
became public knowledge, Truman was subjected to extreme 
criticism from many nations. As the years passed and the 
nuclear arms race accelerated, many have looked back rue­
fully to the initial act and bitterly condemned the
92Commander in Chief who ordered the bombings. Truman's 
public posture never wavered; he did not attempt to deny 
his responsibility: "The final decision of where and
when to use the atomic bomb was up to me," Truman wrote 
in his Memoirs. "Let there be no mistake about it. I
^The insidious factor in atomic weapons is, of 
course, the radioactive fallout. As Leahy said: "It
(the bomb) is a poisonous thing that kills people by its 
deadly radioactive reaction, more than by the explosive 
force it develops." I Was There, ljlj.1. It has not been 
possible to deteimine^iow mucii information on radioactivity 
had been made available to Truman prior to the use of this 
weapon.
92James MacGregor Burns, Presidential Government:
The Crucible of Leadership (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1966T7 215-16• Hereinafter cited as Burns, 
Presidential Government. Criticism of use of the bomb 
within the United States was minimal in the early postwar 
period. For example, a poll taken in October, 19l4-5> 
showed only four percent indicating the bomb should not 
have been used. Fourteen percent favored a test on an un­
populated area first. Fifty-four percent accepted the 
two-bomb tactic used and twenty-three percent felt Truman 
should have " . . .  quickly used many more of them before 
Japan had a chance to surrender." Elmo Roper, You and 
Your Leaders: Their Actions and Your Reactions, 1936-1956
(New York: William Morrow, 195>77> l2i+. Hereinafter cited 
as Roper, You and Your Leaders.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
165
regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any 
doubt that it should be used."^
While the American system does accord ultimate 
authority to the Commander in Chief, in this instance, 
there is ample reason to believe that it would have been 
very difficult for Truman to have decided otherwise. He 
was new to command, overawed by the reputations of 
Stimson and Marshall, and untutored in international 
politics. The flow of information about the extant con­
ditions which would determine how he would decide 
demonstrated a type of tunnel vision which admitted no 
feasible alternative. The military intelligence he 
received created a false syllogism, by providing the 
President with almost exclusively-military premises that 
led him to an inevitable acceptance of a military con­
clusion: use the bomb.
Urs Schwarz, in his incisive study of American 
politico-military thinking has described this decision­
making process:
The events of July and August 19lf5» preceding the 
decision to use the bomb and its actual dropping, are 
further instances of by now well-known strategic 
thinking and procedure. The decision-makers
^Truman, Memoirs, I, i|19. Truman repeatedly 
avowed that it was his decision alone, often in almost 
exactly the same language. See, for example, Truman, Mr. 
Citizen, 202; Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, 2i|.8-ij.9; 
Phillips, "Truman at 75>*" New York Times, May 3, 1959; 
Truman Speaks, 73*
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concentrate, since they are engaged in war, on 
military aspects, almost to the exclusion of any 
considerations of policy. And the military aspects 
are dominated by two viewpoints: end the war by
destroying the enemy's power to resist; end the war 
quickly by a display of overwhelming power, so that 
American casualties may be reduced.
Political means, even when suggested, even when 
within easy reach, are neglected. Once the military 
decision is taken, it remains for the military 
commander on the spot to put it into effect. His is
the final word. Even decisions that finally may turn
out to be of the utmost political importance are
left to him: the political authority has abdicated in
his favor.94
Harry Truman did not so much decide to use the 
atomic bomb as he decided to acquiesce in a vast project 
that had cost billions of dollars and hundreds of 
thousands of man-hours and that promised a speedy, life- 
saving, dramatic finale to the most costly struggle in 
the history of international warfare. The atom bomb 
project had developed an irresistible momentum of its own, 
with the implication always clear that once the bomb was 
perfected, it would be used against America's enemies.
Had Truman desired to stop this process, he would have had 
to justify his decision to the bomb-makers and the 
generals. He would have had to argue for the uncertain 
ground of future implications of the bomb's use; arguments 
that James MacGregor Burns said "posed such huge
~^Schwarz, American Strategy, 59-60. Schwarz's 
attack on such thinking is substantially the same as that 
used by Bundy in defense of Stimson. Stimson and Bundy, 
On Active Service, 629-30.
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imponderables and contingencies that they defied easy 
calculation. The proposed military solution, on the 
other hand, offering an immediate, direct, readily- 
calculable result, was bound to have appeal to the Presi­
dent. Truman was a practical politician, used to direct
96action and not given to abstract reasoning. And so, 
taken together, the system, circumstances and his own 
predisposition led Truman to accept a military conclusion. 
After the President discussed with the Secretary of War 
and others the cities to be marked as targets, he recalls,
"I then agreed to the use of the atomic bomb. . . ."97
The decision to make the atomic bomb was, indeed, the 
decision to use it.
It would be unreasonable to fault Truman for not 
having the vision to see what the passage of decades has 
revealed. Nor is it at all probable that any other 
decision he made on the bomb would have prevented the sub­
sequent nuclear arms race. But his acceptance of the 
specious arguments against a test demonstration and 
against a specific warning in the Potsdam Declaration can 
be greatly regretted, if not condemned. The wisdom of his
95>Burns, Presidential Government, 216.
96Ibid., 2l£-l6.
97Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, 2lj.8. Emphasis 
supplied.
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open-ended order to General Spaatz to continue the bombing
until otherwise informed may also be questioned. What
cannot be questioned was that when he did act, Truman was
convinced his was the correct course: "I could not worry
about what history would say about my personal morality,
I made the only decision I ever knew how to make. I did
98what I thought was right."
One last factor must be added in assessing the in­
fluences on Truman's thinking in his use of this extra­
ordinary weapon of war. So far as can be determined, in 
all of his public utterances regarding his decision, he 
never varied from the position that he had no regrets over 
using this "purely military weapon" against what were essen­
tially military targets. But he may have had private 
doubts: David Lilienthal, Director of the Atomic Energy
Commission, recorded in his journal a White House meeting 
in mid-summer, 19i+8. During the meeting, Secretary of the 
Air Force Stuart Symington was recounting for the President 
a conversation he had with a scientist at the Los Alamos 
laboratory. Symington was amused when the physicist told 
him that he did not think the United States should ever use 
the nuclear weapons being developed at the laboratory.
"I don't either," Truman said. Lilienthal's memory of the 
President's elaboration on this statement follows:
9®Quoted in Lamont, Day of Trinity, 303•
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I don't think we ought to use this thing unless we 
absolutely have to. It is a terrible thing to order 
the use of something that (here he looked down at 
his desk, rather reflectively) that is so terribly 
destructive, destructive beyond anything we have ever 
had. You have got to understand that this isn't a 
military weapon. (I shall never forget this 
particular expression.) It is used to wipe out 
women and children and unarmed people, and not for 
military uses. So we have got to treat this 
differently from rifles and cannon and ordinary 
things like that.99
^^David E. Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years, 
19115-1950* Vol. II of The Journals of David eT Lilienthal 
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1961+), 391. Here'- 
inafter cited as Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years. (The 
parenthetical interpolations are by Lilienthal.) In dis­
cussing military problems with Truman just after World 
War II, Budget Director Smith reminded the President that 
he now had the atomic bomb to fall back on. Truman 
replied: "Yes, but I am not sure it can ever be used."
Diary Entry, October 5* 191+5* Smith Papers, Smith Diary, 
copy in Truman Library of original in Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Library. Or again, when talking of the bomb in private 
(in 191+9), the President mentioned a book by a British 
author which contended that the bomb was just another 
weapon of war. Truman said that was "a very serious mis­
take," and added: "this isn't just another weapon, not
just another bomb." Journal Entry, February ll+, 191+9, 
Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 1+71+• When Admiral 
William S. Parsons wrote an article for the Saturday Evening 
Post to the same effect— that the atomic bomb was jusl; 
another weapon— President Truman, acting through his 
Special Counsel, Clark Clifford, ordered that the article 
not be published as it was contrary to the national 
interests. Memoranda, Lilienthal to Clifford, December ll+, 
191+8; Clifford to the President, December 29, 191+8;
Clifford to Forrestal, December 31* 191+8, all in Papers of 
Clark M. Clifford, Atomic Energy, Truman Library. Herein­
after cited as Clifford Papers. When asked in a November, 
1950> press conference if the bomb was being considered 
for use in Korea, Truman said: "There has always been
active consideration of its use. I don't want to see it 
used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used 
on innocent men, women, and children who have nothing what­
ever to do with this military aggression. That happens 
when it is used." Item No. 295* Press Conference, November 
30, 1950, Public Papers . . . Truman. 1950* 727•
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On August 10, 191+5> Radio Tokyo broadcast a message 
accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, 11. • . 
with the understanding that said declaration does not 
comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of 
His Majesty as a sovereign ruler."100 Truman called a 
meeting that morning with Admiral Leahy and Secretaries 
Byrnes, Forrestal and Stimson to discuss a response.
The discussion centered around the reservation expressed 
by the Japanese with regard to the Emperor. The Secretary 
of War, who had long advocated retention of the Emperor, 
told the President that allowing the Emperor to govern 
under American supervision, would greatly facilitate both 
the surrender of all Japanese forces and the postwar 
administration of the country.101 Admiral Leahy agreed 
with Stimson, but Secretary Byrnes was against such a 
suggestion. He wanted to hold to the unconditional 
surrender formula. He also pointed out that many major 
American officials had condemned the Japanese imperial 
system and the Emperor during the war and that to accept 
this condition now would appear to be a sharp reversal of 
policy. Truman was inclined to agree with Byrnes. Navy 
Secretary Forrestal settled the dilemma by suggesting that 
the reply be drafted so as to reaffirm the Potsdam
lOOciuoted in Truman, Memoirs, I, l\27.
103-Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 627*
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Declaration but reassure the Japanese that the Emperor
would be retained. Forrestal was proposing that the
response contradict itself by accepting the Japanese
condition while demanding unconditional surrender. Truman
liked the suggestion and ordered Byrnes to prepare a draft
102statement along these lines. Truman further ordered 
that the war effort against Japan was to continue at 
current levels until further notice, except that no 
atomic bombs were to be employed without his express
permission."*^
The Secretary of State’s draft response to Japan, 
since referred to as the Byrnes Note, was ready for a 
cabinet meeting on the afternoon of August 10, its apt 
phrases walking the thin line of Forrestal’s suggestion. 
Truman approved the note, and its text was radioed to the 
Allied capitals of London, Moscow and Chunking for 
a p p r o v a l . T h e  Soviet Union, having declared war on
^ B y m e s ,  Speaking Frankly, 209; Truman, Memoirs,
I, 1̂ 28. See also, Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 
626-27; Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, TS’EfI
-l-O^Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 1|05»
lO^Bymes, Speaking Frankly, 209-10; Arnold A. Rogow, 
Victim of Duty: A Study or James fflorrestal (London: Rupert 
Hart-DavTs, 1966*7, llj.̂-ij.'ST Hereinafter cited as Rogow, 
Victim of Duty. See also’, Truman, Memoirs, I, J+28-29; 
Buchanan, United States and World War II, II, 592-93; Stim­
son and Bundy, On Aotive Service, 62?. Full text of the 
"Byrnes Note" is printed in Herbert Feis, Contest Oyer 
Japan (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967)* l62-6”3 ̂ Hereinafter 
cTted" as Feis, Contest Over Japan.
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10f?Japan on August 8, accepted the text of the Byrnes 
Note after some half-hearted struggling with Ambassador 
Harriman over the Soviet desire to share military control 
of Japan with the United States.-1-0^ England and China 
readily agreed to the text of the Byrnes Note which was 
then forwarded to the Japanese by the Swiss Charge on 
August 11, 19i|3>.10^ On the fourteenth, having received 
Japan's acceptance of the Allied terms, the President told 
a news conference: "I deem this reply a full acceptance
of the Potsdam Declaration which specifies the undondi-
100tional surrender of Japan." While Truman spoke, his 
message ordering a cease fire was being transmitted to all
logoperational forces in the Pacific. 7
For the next two weeks, Truman remained preoccupied 
with preparing for peace and beginning the complex demobi­
lization process. His very first act after announcing
105>Averill Harriman to Truman, August 9, 19if5> 
quoted in Truman, Memoirs, I, lj.25-26; Item No. 9l\.t Press 
Conference, August*™81TT9Zi5> Public Papers . . . Truman, 
19lpjp, 200. The Russian declaration was effective as of the 
following day, August 9.
^■°^Harriman to Truman, August 11, 19if-5>> quoted in 
Truman, Memoirs, I, ij.30-31, If.32.
•^^Truman, Memoirs, I, ij.29-30, ij.32.
1 oftItem No. 100, Press Conference, August llj., 19k$*
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19k$> 216. For text of Japa­
nese surrender message, see ibid., 217-18. See also,
Truman, Memoirs, I, ij.35-37» Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 210.
109Truman, Memoirs, I, i|38.
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Japanese acceptance of the surrender terms was to order 
Selective Service to cut the draft call by 30,000 per month. 
In the same message he promised to release up to five and 
one-half million men from military duty within eighteen 
months. The pressure to accelerate troop demobilization 
was one of the first of many postwar military problems
110with political complications facing the Aministration.
The President ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 
give maximum publicity to the surrender ceremonies, which, 
with obvious personal pleasure, he directed take place 
aboard the battleship, U.S.S. Missouri.^^^ Another obvious 
choice for Truman, although one that would not remain a 
constant source of pleasure, was the designation of General 
Mac Arthur as Supreme Commander in Japan. Through the terms 
of the surrender document and the various directives 
Truman caused to be issued to MacArthur, the General became 
the virtual ruler of the Japanese nation, as well as 
Supreme Commander of all American military forces in the 
Par East.-1-1-2
H°Itera No. 101, Statement by the President 
Announcing a Reduction in the Draft, August llj., 19J+5,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 218-19. See also,
Truman, Memoirs, I,
lllTruman to Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 13,
19lj5> quoted in Truman, Memoirs, I, 1-52.
112Marshall to MacArthur, August 13, 19lj.5j Marshall 
to MacArthur (undated, apx. August lij., 19lj.5)» JCS to 
MacArthur, September 6, 19lj.5, all quoted in ibid., li.38-39f 
U53, 1|57.
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Late in August Truman released to the press the 
Army and Navy fact-finding reports on the Pearl Harbor 
attack. The President told the press that "there is 
nothing there that needs to be covered up. . . but 
it seems he also hoped to end widespread speculation on the 
subject which was then c u r r e n t w h e n  Congress created 
a Joint Committee to investigate Pearl Harbor, Truman 
proved his sincerity by ordering the heads of the State,
War and Navy departments, the Joint Chiefs, and others 
involved, to make full disclosure of information to the 
committee Conversely, Truman muzzled the same
military advisers concerning information on the atomic 
bomb, telling them that nothing regarding the design, 
production or use of nuclear weapons in warfare was to be
^•^Item No. 116, Press Conference, August 29, 191+5, 
Public Papers . • . Truman, 191+5, 21+3-1+5*
lllj-Truman to Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) , 
et. al., October 23, 19l|.5, A17-21+ (1), Historical Records 
IJTvisTon, Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Yard, Washington, 
D.C. Hereinafter cited as CNO, Navy Yard. Alben Barkley, 
Chairman of the Joint Committee, finding many reluctant to 
testify despite the President’s memorandum, asked the White 
House for a more forceful statement. Over Judge Rosenman's 
objections, Truman will issue such a statement. See 
Barkley to Matthew J. Connelly, November 2, 191+5, Rosenman 
Papers, Subject File, 191̂ -5, Pearl Harbor Investigation, 
Truman Library; Rosenman to Truman, November 9, 191j.5, 
ibid.; Truman to Joint Chiefs of Staff, et. al., November 
7, l'9l+5» ibid.; summary, Presidential Actions in re Pearl 
Harbor Hearings, Murphy Papers, White House Files, Presi­
dential Powers folder, Truman Library.
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115released without his specific authorization. ^ The Presi­
dent defended this silencing directive by explaining that 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were "lesson enough" to him that 
the world could not afford atomic warfare; and until 
effective international control could be implemented, the 
bomb secrets were to be p r e s e r v e d . B u t  a world hungry 
for news of this "doomsday" weapon could not be completely 
denied; Truman relented to the extent of allowing release
of "general interest" information which, in the opinion of
117the War Department, would not endanger national security.
The full,.fateful days of August finally ended, and 
September began with the formal surrender ceremonies held
•I t  Qin Tokyo Harbor on the first. The war was over, or at 
least, the fighting had stopped; but a peace treaty with 
Japan would wait another decade. In order to retain 
several of the war powers granted to the President as 
Commander in Chief, Truman did not declare an official end
■^'’Directive, Truman to Secretary of War (Stimson), 
et. al., August 15, 19i|5, RG-107* Office of the Secretary of 
War"n)SW), /4.7I • 6--Atomic Bomb, 031.1, National Archives.
11 ATruman, Memoirs, I, 52ij..
^Memorandum, Truman to Secretary of War (Stimson), 
et. al., August 30, 1945> RG-107* OSW, 1+71 • 6— Atomic Bomb, 
TT31.T7 National Archives.
liftSeptember 2, Tokyo time, thirteen hours later 
than Washington.
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1 1 9to hostilities until December 31, 19^6. Legal techni­
calities to the side, peace had come by mid-August, 19k%» 
The survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have 
bitterly reflected that the peace they knew was like
that the Romans visited on the Britons as described by
IPOTacitus: "They make a desert, they call it peace."
Columnist Walter Lippmann, writing shortly after 
Roosevelt's death, said that "the genius of a good leader 
is to leave behind him a situation which common sense,
,,121without the grace of genius, can deal with successfully. 
Truman, untouched by genius, but with a full measure of 
common sense, had done precisely as Lippmann had hoped; 
he managed to deal with the situation--total war—  
successfully. For Truman was not trully Commander in
■^Presidential Proclamation 271ij.* December 31*
191+6, Federal Register, XII, No. 1, (January 1, 19̂ 4-7) • In 
a speech to Congress on September 6, 19l|5, Truman had ex­
plained the need for continuing the war powers granted to 
the President. Basically, he said, they would facilitate 
demobilization and reconversion. Item No. 128, Public 
Papers . . . Truman, 19U5* 276-77. By the DeceraBerjHT 
proclamation, Truman terminated fifty-three statutes 
granting him various war powers. However, the declared 
"state of military emergency" was not terminated, so he 
retained numerous extraordinary powers. Col. Robert Wood 
to all Army Commands, December 31* 19i+6, RGl6£, War Depart­
ment, Plans and Operations, 387*k— (OH* Case 62), National 
Archives.
120See "Agricola," Seot. 30.
^2^Walter Lippmann, "Roosevelt Has Gone," New York 
Heral d-Tribune, April li+, 19k$»
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Chief during the final months of the war, but a steward 
implementing a pre-determined program. Not even employ­
ment of the atomic bomb had been his choice, he merely 
agreed to complete a process initiated by his predeces­
sor. ̂ 22 Truman expressed this view in a letter to the 
Secretary of the Navy: "I deserve no credit for the
victory except the little I contributed as United States
Senator. It was already won when I became President and
123all I had to do was carry out the program. . . . ” In 
his Memoirs, Truman said that September 6, ". . .is
the date that symbolizes for me my assumption of the 
office of President in my own right.
Whatever Truman’s role was in the closing scenes 
of the Second World War, postwar nuclear weapons policy 
was his alone to determine. Three developments of the 
postwar era in this field stand out as worthy of further 
consideration. First, as the only national leader with 
control over atomic energy, Truman made a sincere effort
122wiiber Hoare, in his essay on Truman as Com­
mander in Chief, would disagree:. ". . .if the ghost of 
FDR stood at Truman's elbow in Potsdam, at least no dead 
hand drafted the order that sent the atomic bomb to 
Hiroshima." See "Truman," 182.
^^Memorandum, Truman to Forrestal, September 7> 
19l|£» Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, ij.9.
12i|-Truman, Memoirs, I, l|.8l. It was on September 6 
that Truman sent Congress a message calling for the "Fair 
Deal," a twenty-one point program of domestic reform 
legislation.
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to turn over this control to the United Nations, but on 
his terms. Second, as the first Commander in Chief to 
have control over atomic bombs, he denied to the military 
services any direct authority over the very weapon that 
became the bulwark of American military policy. Last, 
Truman ordered continued testing and development of 
nuclear weapons and, when the Soviet Union detonated 
their first test bomb, he ordered a massive program which 
led to a device far more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb.
The possibilities and problems contemplated in
international control of atomic energy were first broached
to the President by Secretary of War Stimson in his dis-
12<cuss ion with Truman on April 25, 191*5. One of the 
reasons for the creation of the Interim Committee (at this 
meeting) was to advise the President on postwar atomic 
control policy. Truman says that the "frightful impli­
cations" of Hiroshima made him aware ". . . that this 
revolutionary scientific creation could destroy civiliza­
tion unless put under control and placed at the service 
of mankind." In a statement on August 6, announcing 
the Hiroshima attack and a radio address three days 
later, the President made his first public appeals for 
international control and Congressional cooperation. In
^■^Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 635-36.
•^^Truman, Memoirs, I, 523•
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
179
the August 6 statement Truman said that it was the usual 
policy of the Government to release new scientific infor­
mation to the public:
But under present circumstances it is not intended 
to divulge the technical processes of production or 
all the military applications, pending further examin­
ation of possible methods of protecting us and the 
rest of the world from the danger of sudden 
destruction.
I shall recommend that the Congress of the United 
States consider promptly the establishment of an 
appropriate commission to control the production and 
use of atomic power within the United States. I 
shall . . . make further recommendations to the 
Congress as to how atomic power can become a powerful 
and forceful influence towards the maintenance of 
world peace.^27
In his radio report on the Potsdam Conference
Truman told the nation that the new weapon was "too
dangerous to be loose in a lawless world," and because
of that, atomic technology would remain secret. . . ,
. . . until means have been found to control the 
bomb so as to protect ourselves and the rest of 
the world from the danger of total destruction.
As far back as last May, Secretary of War Stimson 
. . . appointed a committee . . .  to prepare plans 
for the future control of this bomb. I shall ask 
the Congress to cooperate to the end that its pro­
duction and use be controlled, and that its power 
be made an overwhelming influence towards world 
peace•
We must constitute ourselves trustees of this new 
force--to prevent its misuse . . .  2
It is an awful responsibility which has come to us.
■^^Item No. 93, Statement by the President Announc­
ing the Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima, August 6,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19lj-5>, 199-200.
12®Item No. 97, Radio Report to the American People 
on the Potsdam Conference, August 9, 19lj-j?» ibid., 212-13*
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The Secretary of War, charged with making recommen­
dations to the President on future policy, spent a great 
deal of time going over the Interim Committee reports and 
reconsidering his own views toward atomic control. The 
problem was multi-faceted, but every recourse led back 
to the Soviet Union, the reason being that all the other 
major nations of the world either knew the secrets of 
atomic fission, or were in no position to capitalize on 
such information. Great Britain, Canada and the United 
States had cooperated in producing the weapon; France and 
China were too fragmented by the war to organize the 
massive effort needed to produce the weapon in the fore­
seeable future; Germany and Japan were under Allied 
military control and could be prevented from attempting 
such experiments. The Soviet Union was the only nation 
with the resources, technological capability and the 
opportunity to make immediate use of the information. The 
crux of the problem of international control then, as 
Stimson viewed it, was whether the Russians could be 
trusted and if they should be approached directly, or 
through the offices of the United Nations, which was still 
in the formative stages. Stimson*s recommendations were 
presented to President Truman in a memorandum dated 
September 11, 19k$»
This memorandum began with an accurate anticipation 
of Cold War developments. The Secretary pointed out to
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the President that the bomb clearly gave the United States 
an effective, temporary counter to Soviet influence and 
expansionism. However, the Russians realized this too, 
and " . . .  unless the Soviets are voluntarily invited 
into the (nuclear) partnership upon a basis of co-opera­
tion and trust," Stimson warned, they would certainly be 
impelled to "feverish activity . . . toward the develop­
ment of this bomb in what will in effect be a secret 
armament race of a rather desperate c h a r a c t e r . T w o  
pivotal passages in this lengthy document merit 
quotation:
. . .  I consider the problem of our satisfactory 
relations with Russia as not mefrely connected with 
but as virtually dominated by the problem of the 
atomic bomb. . . . Those relations may be perhaps 
irretrievably embittered by the way in which we 
approach the solution of the bomb with Russia. For 
if we fail to approach them now and merely continue 
to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather 
ostentatiously on our hip, their suspicions and 
their distrust of our purposes and motives will 
increase. . . .
I emphasize perhaps beyond all other considera­
tions the importance of taking this action with 
Russia as a proposal of the United States. . . .
Action of any international group of nations, 
including many small nations who have not demon­
strated their potential power or responsibility in 
this war would not, in my opinion, be taken 
seriously by the Soviets.130
Meeting with Truman on September 12, Stimson went over the
129por full text of Stimson*s memorandum to the 
President, September 11, 191\£, see Stimson and Bundy, On 
Active Service, 61̂ .2-lj.6.
13°Ibld., 61|4-if5.
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memorandum with him, line by line. What he was
proposing, the Secretary explained, was direct negotiations
with the U.S.S.R. by the United States (with England's
assent) looking toward an agreement by which this nation
would impound its present weapons and agree to end further
development and ban their use in war, if the British and
Russians agreed to do l i k e w i s e . S t i m s o n  did not propose
giving the Soviet Union the technological data necessary
for manufacturing the weapon, for the President had
132already determined that this would not be done. But he
did suggest that Truman offer to exchange knowledge with
the Russians leading to the further development of atomic
energy for peaceful applications. Truman agreed with
Stimson's approach and asked the Secretary, who had already
resigned, to remain until the cabinet meeting on
September 21, at which his memorandum would be the sole
133topic of discussion.
■^•^Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, ijl9»
l^Truman, Memoirs, I, 52l|.-25. See also, Item No. 
161|., President's News Conference at Tiptonville, Tennessee, 
October 8, 19hS> Public Papers • . . Truman, 19l+i?> 381-82.
133Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 2+19; Acheson, 
Present at the Creation, 123. Stimson resigned for reasons 
of (healtE“and-age. (Che last cabinet meeting he attended 
was held on his seventy-eighth birthday. See Item No. 139* 
Letter Accepting Resignation of Henry L. Stimson as Secre­
tary of War, September 20, 19k£> Public Papers . • . Truman, 
19ljJ>, 329; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 65>6-£7• 
Truman will appoint Robert P. Tat ter son, the Under Secre­
tary of War, to replace Stimson.
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The cabinet meeting began with Truman asking 
Stimson to summarize the position stated in his memorandum. 
In brief, he told them that maintenance of secrecy on the 
basic principles of atomic energy was impossible. He 
advocated a scientific exchange and collaboration with the 
Soviet Union looking toward development of atomic power 
and a properly safeguarded mutual renunciation of atomic 
weapons development. The discussion that followed, to use 
Dean Acheson's phrase, " . . .  was unworthy of the sub­
ject. Truman confessed to enjoying the heated
exchange but apparently got little from it, since he asked
13*3those present to submit memoranda stating their views.
The memoranda to the President, while varying 
widely in detail, generally favored either maintaining an 
American monopoly on all facets of atomic energy or taking 
an approach similar to Stimson’s. The Joint Chiefs and 
Robert Patterson, the new Secretary of War, along with 
Acheson, who represented the State Department, advocated 
following Stimson’s recommendations. The only major 
Presidential adviser on military policy to oppose this 
proposition was Secretary of the Navy Forrestal. The 
Secretary of Treasury and Attorney General agreed with
- ^ A c h e s o n ,  Present at the Creation, 123. Acheson, 
as Acting Secretary of State, represented Byrnes at this 
meeting.
•^^Truman, Memoirs, I, £26-27.
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Forrestal, while the Postmaster General and Commerce 
Secretary generally followed Stimson’s r e a s o n i n g . H o w ­
ever, given the divisions and qualifications made, no clear 
consensus emerged among the President’s advisers. Truman 
was only recognizing a simple truth when he told a
reporter a few days later that whatever decision was made
137on the subject, he, alone, would make the decision.
In a special message to the Congress on October 3,
19k£y th© President revealed his initial decision on 
control. He told the Congress that the fate of civiliza­
tion might well be determined by the success or failure 
of an international ban on the use and development of 
atomic weapons. Echoing Stimson's memorandum, Truman 
said that, although there were great difficulties involved 
in such a ban, the alternative was a disastrous arms race. 
The President assured the Congress that the secrets of 
the manufacturing process to produce bombs would not be 
divulged. His proposal was to initiate discussions,
136lbid., 526-28. See also, Rogow, Victim of Duty, 
15>[|.-55; Acheson, Present at the Creation, l2i{.; hewle’ttr and 
Anderson, The New WorldT Tl?0-£T; C. Joseph Bernardo and 
Eugene H. Bacon, American Military Policy; Its Development 
Since 1775 (2nd ed.; Harrisburg, PennsylvanTaT "The Stack-’ 
pole Company, 1961), lj.62• Hereinafter cited as Bernardo 
and Bacon, American Military Policy. See also, Arthur 
Krock, Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line (New York: 
Funk and Wagnalls, 1968), 2l$F=L$.' Hereinafter cited as 
Krock, Memoirs.
3-37Truman, Memoirs, I, 529*
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first with Canada and Great Britain, ”. . .  our associ­
ates in this discovery . . . and then with other nations, 
in an effort to effect agreement on the conditions under 
which cooperation might replace rivalry in the field of 
atomic power.
The initial step in atomic control discussions was 
taken in November when Prime Minister Atlee and W. L. 
Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, met with 
Truman in Washington. Their talks concluded on November 
15 with a joint statement from the White House. The 
sense of the statement was that the three nations 
possessing the knowledge necessary to generate atomic 
energy had decided that the most effective means of con­
trolling atomic power so that it might not be used 
destructively was through the United Nations Organization. 
They recommended that a Commission be established on 
Atomic Energy that would submit recommendations to the 
United Nations on means to ban military use and facilitate 
the exchange of scientific information on peaceful uses of
4- 4 1 3 9atomic power.
On the following day, Truman asked his cabinet for
■^^Item No. 156, Special Message to the Congress on 
Atomic Energy, October 3> 19k£> Public Papers . . . Truman, 
19k5i 362-66. See also, Acheson, Present at the Creation, 
T25-25; Truman, Memoirs, I, 530-33J Bernardo and Bacon, 
American Military Policy, I|.63 •
■^^Text of statement is in Truman, Memoirs, I, 542"^*
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their comments on the agreement. Secretary Wallace 
expressed some reservations about the effectiveness of a 
commission. However, "All agreed," as Truman recalls, 
" . . .  that to refer the problem of atomic energy to the 
United Nations would give that organization a chance to 
prove i t s e l f . W h a t  many of those present at this 
meeting, including Truman, had apparently forgotten, was 
that they had agreed to exactly the opposite approach less 
than two months earlier. Stimson had emphasized in his 
memorandum "beyond all other considerations" that the 
United States must approach Russia on the controls ques­
tion singly and directly, not through the United Nations, 
since such action would not be taken seriously by the 
Soviet Government. On January 2lj., 191+6, the United 
Nations Atomic Energy Commission was created.
The President charged the State Department with 
responsibility for drafting a plan for international 
control of atomic energy. Secretary Byrnes delegated the 
task to a committee chaired by Under Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson, which, assisted by a Board of Consultants 
led by David Lilienthal, submitted a proposal to Byrnes 
and Truman on March 16, 19ij.6. This working-paper, since
^ I b i d . ,  I, 51|4*
■^^Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 6i|5; 
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 12f?.
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known as the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, had, as the heart
of its recommendations, a proposal that an international
authority be created with a monopoly over all destructive
uses of atomic energy.1^2 On Byrnes' recommendation,
Truman appointed Bernard M. Baruch as American representa-
lk3tive on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.
Following some controversy with Acheson and Truman, Baruch
received the latter's permission to revise the original
recommendations. The President approved these changes and
gave the revision to Baruch as his official policy
directive on June
The American proposal for international control was
lkf>submitted to the Commission by Baruch on June lij., 19lj.6.
■̂ Acheson, Present at the Creation, l£2-£ij.. See 
also, Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 
19kf>~1966 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, l‘967)> 3^* Here­
inafter cited as LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War.
^•^Baruch, then seventy-six years old, was a multi­
millionaire and self-styled "adviser to Presidents." The 
Senate confirmed his nomination on April £, 19lj.6.
■^^-Bernard m. Baruch, The Public Years (Vol. II of 
My Own Story, 2 vols., New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
T W J V  366-03. Hereinafter cited as Baruch, Public Years. 
For Acheson's version of his dispute with Baruch, see 
Present at the Creation, 1 For Truman's account,
see his Memoirs, II, 7-10. See also, Byrnes, Speaking 
Frankly, 270; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World,
55k-£o; LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 3k“35«
l^Text of this document can be found in U.S., 
Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A Decade 
of Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 19kl-19k9> Slslf dong., 
2nd Sess., 19^0,1079-87• Hereinafter cited as A Decade of 
Foreign Policy. Abridged text of this document can be 
found in Baruch, Public Years, 369-72.
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The chief points of the plan are fully summarized in the
following newspaper account:
As soon as a satisfactory international agency can be 
set up; as soon as other powers have joined with us 
to guarantee that agency and give it the scope and 
authority it needs; as soon as we are assured that no 
other nation will or can use atomic bombs against us, 
the United States will cease the manufacture of atomic 
weapons, will destroy the bombs now in its possession, 
will give to the new agency, by stages as required, all 
pertinent information, and finally will turn over to 
this agency control of its own uranium and thorium 
deposits, its own primary production plants and the 
output of these plants. -̂46
The plan, while sincere in its intent, contained
three provisions that proved unacceptable to the Soviet
Union: Surrender of the veto power on all matters
respecting control of atomic energy; a thorough system of
inspection and control; and, by implication, a partial
subjugation of national sovereignty to an international 
12/7body. The Soviet counter-proposal was submitted five
days later. It agreed on banning the production and use
of atomic weapons, but called upon the United States first
to cease bomb production and destroy existing weapons
lk8before any discussion of inspection and controls.
Truman found the Soviet proposals equally unacceptable.
•*~̂ e w  York Times, June 15, 1946.
■'■^Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy,
i+65.
^®LaPeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 35* 
Editor’s Note, Koenig (ed.), Truman"Administration, 336.
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He told Baruch, "It is my opinion that we should stand pat
,.1*1-9on our program."
During the years which followed, both the United
States and the Soviet Union "stood pat" on their basic
proposals, making only minor concessions to the other’s
views. The welter of proposals, counter-proposals, and
rephrasings of essentially the same posture continued for
y e a r s . T r u m a n ’s belief that there must be effective
international inspection and control as a first step
remained unchanged. He emphasized this in a campaign
speech in October of 19*1-8, at Milwaukee. After restating
his position on controls, Truman went on to tell his
audience that the United States was willing to sacrifice
some of its national sovereignty and destroy its bombs
as originally proposed in the Baruch Plan. "There has
been no change in the American position," Truman said.
"But the Soviet Union rejected such a plan as an intrusion
151upon its national sovereignty." And there the matter
l^Trtaman to Baruch, July 10, 19*1-6, quoted in 
Baruch, Public Years, 37*1--
•*£°An illustration of this can be seen in two sep­
arate newspaper headlines in March, 191+75 "U.S. Stand on
Atom in U.N. Unchanged," New York Times, March 7# 19*1-7; 
"U.S. Proposes Plan to Break Atom Deadlock," New York 
Herald-Tribune, March 28, 19*+7- The commission (AEC) 
adjourned sine die in May, 19*1-8# resumed hearings in 
February of 19*1-$ and gave up again in July. Bernardo and 
Bacon, American Military Policy, ij.66.
•*£-*Item No. 239, Address in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
October 11+, 19*1-8, Public Papers . . . Truman, 19*4-8, 789.
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of international control has since stood, made more 
complex and urgent by Soviet acquisition of atomic weapons 
in 191̂ -9.1^2
One by-product of the early stages of weapons 
control discussion was that it precipitated a conflict 
within the Administration, centering around the policy 
views of the Secretary of Commerce, Henry Wallace, On 
July 23» 19lj.6, Wallace had written a twelve-page single­
spaced letter to Truman in which he condemned the military 
build-up, atomic policy and the Administration’s attitude 
toward international control. Truman thanked Wallace for 
the letter and promptly forgot it. On September 12 
Wallace spoke in New York, delivering "an all-out attack" 
on American foreign policy, according to Truman, who 
publicly disavowed the Secretary's statements. Five days 
later, convinced, evidently, that he would rather be 
right than Secretary of Commerce, Wallace gave a copy of
153his letter of July 23 to the newspapers.
The Wallace letter generated a great deal of 
comment in the American and Internationa] press. The
■^2At this writing, almost a quarter-century later, 
no significant progress has been made, although strategic 
arms limitation talks (SALT) are presently in progress.
^Wallace to Truman, July 23, 19i|6, and reply, 
August 8, 19l|.6, Clifford Papers, Subject Pile, Unifica­
tion (Pt. 3)> Truman Library.
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State Department received numerous queries from ambassadors 
asking if the ex-Vice President’s statements represented a 
change of policy. Secretary of State Byrnes wired from a 
Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris that 
Wallace's comments were making his position difficult. 
Truman's first reaction was to order the Secretaries of 
War and Navy to write him a letter, which was immediately 
released by the White House, repudiating Wallace's con­
tentions about military policy. In the letter, the 
Secretaries denied that anyone in their departments was 
advocating a preventive war against the Soviet Union 
before they acquired the atomic bomb, as Wallace had 
c h a r g e d . B a r u c h  also joined the group besieging 
Wallace with a lengthy memorandum to the President con­
taining a detailed refutation of Wallace's statements
respecting the American position on atomic energy 
156controls. Truman was left with no choice, a s  he wrote 
to his mother on September 20: "Well I had to fire Henry
l5i|rruman, Memoirs, I, 559.
•^•^Patterson and Forrestal to Truman, September 
18, 19i+6, RG107* OSA, RPP/White House, National Archives.
l^Baruch to Truman, September 2lj., 19i|6, Clifford 
Papers, Atomic Energy folder, Truman Library.
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1^7today, and of course I hated to do it."
In Truman's message to the Congress of October 3,
19k-5, cited earlier, by which he called for international
control of atomic energy, the President also told the
Congress that there was need for legislation providing
for domestic control. He asked the Congress to establish
an Atomic Energy Commission, its members appointed by the
President, with authority to regulate all activities
1related to atomic energy.
The President's message did not detail the structure 
and operational policy of the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) but merely suggested its functions in broad tenns. 
However, shortly after the message was sent up, the leader­
ship of both House and Senate acquired twenty-one page 
drafts detailing the proposed legislation. Unable to
determine the origin of these draft recommendations, the
159New York Times ascribed them to "other sources." The
l^Truman to Martha Truman, September 20, 19lf6, 
quoted in Truman, Memoirs, I, 560. The original draft of 
Truman's public statement of September 20, 19i|.6, firing 
Wallace is in Clifford Papers, Subject Eile, "Wallace, 
Henry," Truman Library. Wallace's account of these events 
is quoted in Williams (ed.) Shaping of American Diplomacy, 
997-99. See also, Phillips, Truman Tresidency, li4.o-51l.
1^8Item No. 156, Special Message to the Congress on 
Atomic Energy, October 3, 19k$, Public Papers . . . Truman. 
19)4-5, 361|.. See also, Truman, Memoirs*, I, 531.
l£9Quoted in Editor's Note, Koenig (ed.), Truman 
Administration, 126.
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source was undoubtedly the Secretary of War. A letter in 
Patterson's files, addressed to the Speaker of the House, 
dated the same day as Truman's message, reads in part:
There is inclosed herewith a draft of a bill "For 
the development and control of atomic energy.” This 
bill is offered pursuant to the President's message 
to Congress today and is consistent with this 
message and with the policies announced by the Presi­
dent therein. The bill was prepared by the Interim 
Committee appointed by the Secretary of War with the 
approval of the President. . . .160
The following day, October ij., the May-Johns on bill 
was introduced. It received strong backing from the 
Pentagon, with Secretary Patterson continually referring 
to the proposed legislation as "representing the views of 
the Administration as well as of the War Department.
While Truman knew that Patterson was submitting draft
i AnPatterson to the Speaker of the House of Repre­
sentatives (Sam Rayburn), October 3, 19l|5> RG-107* OSW, 
Ij.71.6— Atomic Bomb, National Archives. A copy of the 
draft is not in the files, but it is outlined in the body 
of the letter. An earlier letter to Truman's counsel,
Judge Rosenman, from the War Department reads: "An interim
committee has completed the recommendations for (atomic 
bomb) legislation which are now in Mr. Byrnes' hands 
together with War Department comments." Col. H. M. Pasco 
to Rosenman, September 1, 19i|.£, Rosenman Papers, Subject 
File, 19ij.£» Truman Library. A memorandum to the President 
from the Secretary of War notes that the Under Secretary of 
War "worked with the House Military Affairs Committee" on 
the May-Johnson Bill. Patterson to Truman, December 27* 
191*5, RG107, OSW, 1*.71.6— Atomic Bomb, National Archives.
•^■^Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, ij-38. Asked 
about the May-Johnson Bill at a press conference on 
October 18, 19ll5> Truman said it seemed "satisfactory," but 
added, "I don't know, because I haven't studied it care­
fully." Item No. 172, Public Papers . . . Truman, 191*5»
1*03.
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legislation, it is doubtful that he was aware of the
specific nature of these proposals until they emerged as
the May-Johnson bill. He later described the bill as
having a military approach: "Its aim was to set up a kind
of permanent ’Manhattan District1 under military
control. "162 TJlQ president explained that his message to
Congress emphasized the peaceful use of the power of the
163atom and that he was opposed to military control.
With the War Department earnestly urging adoption of a 
bill to which Truman became increasingly opposed, a 
struggle evolved between the Commander in Chief and the 
nation’s military leadership over control of the most 
powerful instrument of destruction ever known.
During October and November, Truman had become 
aware of the deficiencies in the proposed AEC legislation 
through memoranda received from several individuals in the 
Administration and criticism from outside the government, 
notably from nuclear scientists.'*'^' He was also aware of 
the military endorsement of May-Johnson, as he commented 
in his Memoirs: "The military services felt very strongly
l62Truman, Memoirs, II, 2. 
l63Ibid.
■*"^Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, i|_36-39.
See also, Diary Entries, October 5>, 30", "£9k£, Smith Papers, 
Diary, copy in Truman Library of original in the Franklin 
D. Roosevelt Library.
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that the control of atomic development should be under 
their auspices, if not under their immediate jurisdiction, 
and they were making strong representations to that effect 
to the Congress .
The President wrote a memorandum to the Secretaries 
of War and Navy late in November to indicate his dissatis­
faction with their bill. Truman told his military chiefs 
that he had received numerous objections to the bill and 
so had re-examined it in detail. He found the bill had
several "undesirable features" and felt it would require
166extensive amendment. Truman then listed ten specific
amendments to the bill which he considered essential.
Among the ten were several having direct bearing on 
Presidential authority over atomic energy policy. Truman 
also told the Secretaries that the specific provision of 
the bill allowing members of the Commission or its 
administrator to be military officers would have to be 
eliminated before the bill would be acceptable to him. 
Truman concluded by asking that the Interim Committee be 
reconvened for their views on these "necessary amendments" 
and that the May-Johnson Bill be recommitted in the House
■^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 3.
•^^Truman to Secretary of War (Patterson) and Secre­
tary of the Navy (Porrestal), November 28, 19l+5> RG-107*
OSW, I4.71.6— Atomic Bomb, National Archives.
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1 6 7for the purpose of making these amendments. '
The War Department did not reply to Truman’s memo­
randum until late in December. In the meantime, the 
military continued to press for Congressional approval of 
the May-Johnson Bill. The President decided to air the 
controversy in a White House meeting he called for 
December if.. Among those present at this meeting were 
Porrestal, Patterson and Groves, all of whom were publicly 
on record as demanding military control of atomic energy,
1 / O
and Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut. Following
his usual practice on controversial questions, Truman
asked each man present to state his views. Then Truman
gave his opinion, which was that " . . .  the entire program
169and operation should be tinder civilian control. . . . "
Senator McMahon, taking his cue from Truman’s 
remarks, introduced legislation in the Senate December 20,
■*-67lbid. Truman dates this memorandum "November 30" 
in his autobiography. But the copy in the Secretary of 
War’s files bears the date of November 28. Memoirs, II, 3»
■^^Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 270; Rogow, Victim 
of Duty, li|.8j Truman, jyfemoirs', II, 2-3* McMahon was chair- 
man or the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy. He 
had agreed to seek the amendments Truman desired in the 
May-Johnson Bill. Apparently recognizing that the military 
lobby was at cross-purposes to the President, he had sug­
gested this meeting. In addition to Forrestal, Patterson, 
and Groves, Admiral Leahy, Truman’s chief military adviser 
also objected to the lack of military authority proposed in 
the McMahon Bill. Diary Entry, February 13, 19lf6, in 
Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 133»
169Truman, Memoirs, II, 3»
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incorporating the President’s concepts of total civilian
control. A week later, the Secretary of War sent a long
memorandum to Truman that replied to his ten-point
critique, while ignoring the McMahon Bill. In this memo,
Patterson rejected six of the ten Presidential proposals.
His strongest objections were, of course, to Truman’s
insistance that no member of the military could serve on
the Atomic Energy Commission. "It is felt," Patterson
argued, "that in time of war or national emergency the
interest of the Armed Forces in the control and use of
170atomic energy might be paramount. . . . "  The Secretary 
further argued that preventing military men from holding 
positions pivotal to determining the development, storage 
and use of atomic weapons was " . . .  contrary to the 
philosophy of unified military direction."*^ Patterson 
closed by telling Truman that it would be difficult to get 
May-Johnson recommitted and that it might be better to try 
to amend the bill on the floor of the House or in the
a 4. ^Senate.
^■^Patterson to Truman, December 27, 19i+5>, RG107, 
OSW, Ij.71.6— Atomic Bomb, National Archives. A note of 
transmittal attached to the memorandum indicates that it 
was written by Under Secretary of War Kenneth Royall, with 
the advice of Secretary Patterson, General Groves and some 
members of the Interim Committee. See Royall to Patterson, 
December 28, 19^5, ibid.
171ibia.
^Ibid.
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Truman terminated further Pentagon opposition to 
civilian control of atomic weaponry on January 23, his 
language leaving no doubt that he considered the matter 
settled:
After careful consideration, it is my judgment 
that the recommendations contained in my memorandum 
of November 30th should be adhered to without modi­
fication.
. . .  I deem adherence to all the recommendations 
in that memorandum to be essential.
The Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee of 
the House and the leaders in the House should be 
advised that the Administration desires recommitment 
of the May-Johnson bill for purposes of amendment or, 
failing this, that no steps be taken to alter the 
present status of the bill in the House.
It is my wish, furthermore, that in appearing 
before Congressional committees or in discussions 
with Members of Congress relative to atomic energy 
legislation officials of the Administration present 
views not inconsistent with the points given in my 
memorandum of November 30th and reaffirmed herein.
While the memorandum did end military advocacy of 
the May-Johnson Bill, the concept of military control of 
the atom had strong congressional support, as Senator 
McMahon reported to the President. To help encourage 
support for McMahon's bill, Truman wrote the Senator a
^•^Truman to Secretaries of War and Navy, January 
23, 191̂ .6, quoted in Truman, Memoirs, 3-i;» See also, 
Hewlett and Anderson, The New WorTd, 489. (As noted 
earlier, Truman dates tEe prior memorandum "November 30," 
whereas the Secretary of War’s copy was dated November 28.) 
The importance of the last paragraph of this January 23 
memorandum can be seen in that on the date it was written, 
Navy Secretary Forrestal testified to the Senate Special 
Committee on Atomic Energy in opposition to the Truman 
proposal for a five-member AEC serving "at the pleasure of 
the President." Rogow, Victim of Duty, lf?0.
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long letter of endorsement which was released to the 
press, February 1, 1 9 ^ . 6 , With open White House support 
the McMahon Bill began attracting more backers, but lost 
one final skirmish to the supporters of military control.
In March 19^6 Senator Arthur Vandenberg introduced 
an amendment to the McMahon Bill, calling for the estab­
lishment of a Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic 
Energy Commission, the committee to be made up of repre­
sentatives of the War and Navy departments. The committee 
proposed by Vandenberg would be empowered to advise and 
consult with the AEC on all military applications of atomic 
energy. The Military Liaison Committee would also be 
able to appeal any action or proposal of the AEC directly 
to the Secretaries of War and Navy, and if either agreed, 
the matter would be referred to the President for a final 
decision. Vandenberg, who endorsed a civilian AEC, said
that the resolution was his alone, that he had not con-
172suited with the military at all.
In his Memoirs, Truman attacked the Vandenberg 
Amendment as being destructive of the civil supremacy 
principle; he described it as representing a military veto
^T^Truman, Memoirs, II, Ij.-5« See also, Hewlett and 
Anderson, The New World, h90-91.
■^^Diary Entry, March llj., 19ij.6, in Vandenberg, 
Private Papers, 256-57. Rogow asserts that Forrestal was 
behind Vandenberg's amendment. See Victim of Duty, 152.
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1 7 6of Atomic Energy Commission actions. ' Asked about the 
proposal at a press conference following its introduction, 
Truman invoked his role as Commander in Chief to argue 
against the amendment:
I don't think there is a clear understanding . . .
on what is meant by civilian control of that
board. . . . The idea is that the military, of course,
has an important part to play and should be con­
sulted, but it is a mistake to believe that only the 
military can guard the national security. . . . Now 
the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces of the United States, and the civilian board 
under him would in no way hamper the military in 
their proper function.1??
The McMahon Bill, after considerable give-and-take 
in the Congress, became law as the Atomic Energy Act on 
August 1, 191+6. The result was a compromise; civilian 
control predominated through the five-member Atomic 
Energy Commission. But the Vandenberg Amendment remained 
in the final version without substantive changes, meaning 
that the Military Liaison Committee remained in a strong 
advisory position. The act also established a Division 
of Military Application within the commission, stipulating
^ "^Truman, Memoirs, II, 7*
1??Item No. 61, President's Press Conference, 
March ll+, 191+6. Public Papers . . . Truman, 191+6, 157; 
Truman, Memoirs, II, 6-7.
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that its director must be a military officer
Despite Truman’s hyperbole and the concessions 
finally made to military influence on the Atomic Energy 
Commission, Truman had prevailed. For what was perma- 
mently established in the course of this struggle was the 
principle that the authority over the most destructive 
weapon of war still rested with civilians, acting under a 
mandate from another civilian, the Commander in Chief.^79 
The Atomic Energy Act not only excluded the Armed Services 
from exercising direct control over nuclear weaponry, it 
also strengthened the President's military powers at the 
expense of the Congress. As Dorothy James wrote in her
(S.1717) Public Law £85, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess.
See also, Brief of S.1717* Clifford Papers, Subject File, 
Atomic Energy folder, Truman Library. For text of the 
original draft of the McMahon Bill, see Hewlett and Ander­
son, The New World, Appendix 1, 7l4“22. See also, Rogow, 
Victim of Duty, i£2-53; Truman, Memoirs, II, 15* 29lf-95»
^79wh,iie Truman had clearly established the 
principle of civilian control of nuclear weaponry, he did 
not provide a clear-cut policy as to whether the bomb would 
ever be used and under what conditions such use would be 
authorized. This will present an obvious difficulty to 
military policy planners. One writer has said: "The
services, it must be remembered, did not even have physical 
possession of the weapon that bulked so large in their 
disputes. It was in the hands of a civilian agency subject 
to the authority of the President, but not the military, 
and the only clear national policy was that, under proper 
conditions, it would be given up." Warner R. Schilling, 
"The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in 
Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond and Glenn H. Synder, Strategy, 
Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York and London:
Columbia University Press, 1962), 173* Hereinafter cited 
as Schilling, "Politics of National Defense."
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study of the modern presidency concerning the Atomic 
Energy Actj "(it) . . . gives a dimension to the Presi­
dent's function as Commander-in-Chief that it never had in 
peacetime, providing a further means for erosion of 
Congressional power in matters of defense.
The War Department did not give up its efforts to 
secure direct authority over the bomb, the intermittent 
struggles continued through the remainder of Truman's 
administration. He had, in fact, anticipated this. The 
President told the members of the Commission just prior 
to their taking control that, "The Army will never give 
up without a fight, and they will fight you on this from 
here on out, and be working at it in all sorts of places. 
But you can count on it, I am your advocate.
The Atomic Energy Act provided that the new 
Commission would take complete control of all facets of 
atomic energy on January 1, 19l|7- Until that time, 
responsibility for maintaining atomic secrecy for research 
and development and for the first postwar testing of 
nuclear weaponj rested with the War Department
James, Contemporary Presidency, 89-
Journal Entry, December 11, 19^6, Lilienthal, 
Atomic Energy Years, 118.
•̂®2(3iarifica-ti0n of those functions relative to 
security and exercise of other atomic project powers was 
discussed in messages from Secretary of War-Patterson to 
the President: Patterson to Truman, February 27, 19i)-6,
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In a news conference just after the Japanese 
surrender, a reporter asked the President what was to be 
done with the Manhattan Project facilities since the war 
was over. Truman replied that, Congress willing, the 
project would continue with experiments in the peaceful 
use of the atom.'L®^ At another meeting with the press two 
months later, a reporter asked the President if the United 
States was still manufacturing atomic bombs. Truman 
replied affirmatively. When asked why, he said they were 
for "experimental purposes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
had requested, and Truman had granted, authority to test 
atomic bombs. The Joint Chiefs told the President that 
they needed the tests to determine the effect of a bomb 
against naval vessels and to determine ". . . the conse­
quence of this powerful aerial weapon with respect to the 
size, composition and employment of the armed
RGij.07» The Adjutant General-(WDCSa ) , lj-71.6— Atomic, National 
Archives; Patterson to the President, September 23, 19^6, 
Clifford Papers, Subject Pile, Atomic Energy folder, Truman 
Library.
■^^Item No. 106, Press Conference, August 16, 19 
Public Papers . . . Truman, 1 9 22ij..
■^^Item No. 193» Press Conference, November 20,
19b$> ibid., Ij.95* Truman's statement apparently generated 
a good deal of speculation in the press, for on December 7> 
Patterson asked the President for permission to issue a 
joint public statement with Forrestal to the effect that 
tests were to be conducted. Patterson to Truman, December 
7, 19k$> RG107, OSW, I4.71 • 6— Atomic Bomb (031.1), National 
Arohives•
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,,3.85forces. . . .  In authorizing the first of these tests,
Truman launched a program of research, development, testing 
and stockpiling of increasingly-powerful weapons which has
since continued.
The first of the Pacific bomb tests was performed 
upon a fleet of seventy-three surplus ships off Bikini 
Atoll on July 1, 19^6. The bomb, dropped from a B-29, 
sank only five ships and damaged fifty-four others. A 
second test, detonated underwater, proved more successful, 
sinking twelve ships. However, the bomb created a severe 
problem with radioactivity: "Five days after the bomb
exploded," according to one official report, "vessels near 
the center of the target area were so hot with continuing
l8^The JCS request to the President is cited in a 
memorandum informing Truman of progress made subsequent to 
his approval of the tests. Kenneth G. Royall (Acting 
Secretary of War) and Forrestal to the President, January 
7, 19ij-6, RG1071 OSW, ij.71.6, National Archives. See also, 
Royall to Forrestal, January 7> 19i|6, ibid.
3-86Truman’s decision to begin the project was 
probably influenced by intelligence estimates which held 
that the Soviet Union had begun a crash program to produce 
their own atomic weapons. He may also have been swayed by 
the Soviet refusal to accept the American proposals for 
banning atomic weapons. Acheson, Present jat the Creation, 
125, 15£» Representative of the military viewpoint being 
conveyed to Truman at the time is a statement by General 
Thomas F. Farrell, Deputy Director of the Manhattan 
Project, who said: "There is no conceivable defense at
present against the atomic bomb, except to have more than 
your enemy or to stop him from using them against you by 
hitting him first." New York Times, September 21, 19i+5*
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radioactivity that even damage control parties were not 
permitted to board them. in May 19̂ 4-8 the White House
announced that a second series of nuclear tests had been 
performed on Eniwetok Atoll in mid-April. Three different 
devices of an improved design had been tested with 
results, according to one press source, " . . .  that 
transcended all other developments in nuclear energy since 
the dawn of the atomic age."'*-®®
Another development of the atomic age followed in 
the next year. In February 191+9 Truman met with Lilienthal 
on Atomic Energy Commission matters. Lilienthal pro­
jected for the President U.S. nuclear weapons capacity as 
of January 1, 1951* Whatever the figure was, Truman's
eyes widened and he said, "Boy, we could blow a hole
189clean through the earth!" The discussion continued in 
a more serious vein about the terrible power of the bomb, 
and the President assured Lilienthal that he would never
■^^William W. Carpenter (Chief, Office of Legisla­
tive Services) to W. Stuart Symington (Asst. Secretary of 
War for Air), August 2, 19i|.6, RG3ij.O, Secretary of the Air 
Force, Office of Administrative Assistant, General Files, 
Special Interest File i|A, National Archives.
^ ^New York Times, May 18, 19^8. See also, Truman 
to Forrestal’,” May 17, l9l(.8, RGl|07, AG201.22, National 
Archives; New York Herald-Tribune, May 18, 191+8; Journal 
Entry, May 17, 19lf.8, Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years,
3ij.0-4l.
■'■^Journal Entry, February llj., 19i+9, Lilienthal, 
Atomic Energy Years, lf.73•
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order use of the bomb again if he could avoid it; "But I 
know the Russians would use it on us if they had it."^90 
Less than seven months later, on September 3, 19^9, an 
Air Force B-29 collected a radioactive air sample over the 
North Pacific. Truman’s intelligence advisers, who had 
been estimating a Soviet nuclear test no earlier than 
19^2, now had to inform the President that an atomic 
device had been exploded on the Asiatic mainland in the 
last week of August.
The most significant result of the Russian atomic 
test news was to accelerate hydrogen bomb research in the 
United States, and to give a sense of urgency to the 
decision on whether or not to proceed with a crash program 
to speed development of the thermonuclear "super-bomb."
The question of beginning an intensive effort to produce a 
hydrogen bomb was submitted to the General Advisory 
Committee, the major scientific advisory body of the Atomic 
Energy Commission. The committee reported back to the AEC 
on October 30, indicating unanimous opposition from a 
scientific standpoint, but acknowledging that the question
19°Ibid., k73-7k-
^•^Truman, Memoirs, II, 306-307- See also, Lamont, 
Day of Trinity, 287T! Truman used the occasion of publicly 
announcing the Soviet bomb test to call again for a ". . . 
trully effective enforceable international control of 
atomic energy." Item No. 216, Statement by the President, 
September 23, 19i|.9, Public Papers . . . Truman, 19ii9« Jj-85.
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involved decisions on foreign and defense policy not with­
in their purview. The Atomic Energy Commission reported 
to the President on November 9 in substantially the same 
vein; the question of a crash program could not be 
decided ". . . without reference to political and military 
as well as technical considerations."3-92
To resolve the question, on November 10, Truman 
turned it over to a Special Committee composed of the 
Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the 
Atomic Energy C o m m i s s i o n . o n  January 31 s 1950, the 
Special Committee submitted the following recommendations 
to President Truman:
(a) That the President direct the Atomic Energy 
Commission to proceed to determine the technical 
feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon, the scale and 
rate of effort to be determined jointly by the Atomic 
Energy Commission and the Department of Defense; and 
that the necessary ordnance developments and carrier
^Warner R. Schilling, "The H-Bomb Decision: How
to Decide Without Actually Choosing," Political Science 
Quarterly, LXXVI, No. 1 (March, 196l)>"*29. Hereinafter 
cited as Schilling, "H-Bomb Decision." This article is an 
excellent, detailed analysis of the decision-making 
process. For other effects of the Soviet atomic test on 
American politico-military thinking, see Millis, Arms and 
Men, 291; Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The
Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1957)» l'57-55• Hereinafter cited as Osgood, Limited War. See also, Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC-68: Prologue 
to Rearmament," in Warner Schilling, Hammond, and Glenn 
H. Synder, Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New 
York and London: Columbia University Press, 19o2), 285-86. 
Hereinafter cited as Hammond, "NSC-68."
193Dean Acheson, Louis Johnson and David Lilienthal, 
respectively.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
208
program be undertaken concurrently;
(b) That the President defer decision pending the 
reexamination referred to in (c) as to whether 
thermonuclear weapons should be produced beyond the 
number required for a test of feasibility;
(c) That the President direct the Secretary of 
State and the Secretary of Defense to undertake a 
reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and 
of the effect of these objectives on our strategic 
plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb 
capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability 
of the Soviet Union.
(d) That the President indicate publicly the inten­
tion of this Government to continue work to determine 
the feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon, and that 
no further official information on it be made public 
without the approval of the President .19i|.
When Truman was handed these proposals of the 
Special Committee, Lilienthal began a statement in which he 
hoped to indicate to the President that he had serious 
reservations about the recommendations made. However,
^Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 62l±. Lilienthal, 
who was against the crash program, offersd a compelling 
argument for his position, but ended up signing the recom­
mendation to Truman for want of an alternative. Ibid., 
627-32. In March, 1969, Lilienthal said he had tcTTTght the 
H-Bomb proposals in secret meetings because of security 
regulations. He felt the decision should have been openly 
and publicly debated, as the Nixon Administration’s 
proposal for an anti-ballistic missle system was then being 
publicly aired, ”. . .  because it involved the fate of 
practically every human being." Monroe Morning World,
March 17, 1969. Recommendation (clj was necessitated by 
Senator Edwin C. Johnson (Democrat, Colo.), who revealed 
on a television program that the United States was 
developing a "super bomb" with one thousand times the 
destructive power of the Nagasaki bomb. This disclosure 
caused a great deal of public speculation. Schwarz,
American Strategy, 76; Acheson, Present at the Creation,
• The Secretary of Defense objected to recommenda­
tion (b), and with the backing of the Joint Chiefs, was 
able to get Truman to direct the AEC to plan full hydrogen 
bomb production. Truman, Memoirs, II, 311.
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Truman cut the AEG chairman off, saying that with all 
the talk in Congress and the press about a "super-bomb, he 
had no alternative but to approve the crash program.
There was, the President said, no time left for quiet 
re-examination of the proposals. At home that evening, 
Lilienthal confided in his journal that it was his 
impression that Truman was " . . .  clearly set on what he 
was going to do before we set foot inside the door."^95 
The whole meeting lasted about seven minutes. Later in the 
day, the White House released a Presidential statement to 
the press:
It is part of my responsibility as Commander in Chief 
of the Armed Forces to see to it that our country is 
able to defend itself against any possible aggressor. 
Accordingly, I have directed the Atomic Energy 
Commission to continue its work on all forms of 
atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen orsuperbomb.•‘•96
The first hydrogen bomb was successfully tested on 
November 1, 1952, just days before the election to determine 
Truman’s successor.
As the first Commander in Chief to bear responsi­
bility for nuclear weapons policy, Truman established
195Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 632-33* See 
also Acheson, Present at the Crearion, 3h8-U9; Schilling, 
"H-Bomb Deci s ion," 36fT7
1962t;em 26, Statement by the President on the
Hydrogen Bomb, January 31» 1950, Public Papers . . . Truman, 
1950, 138. See also, Truman, Memoi'rsT~Jl> 309-10»
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precedents and policies whose eventual consequences cannot
yet be estimated. As chief of the military, he directed
them to employ atomic bombs against strategic, non-
military targets; in form, if not quite in fact, he took
away from the military the control of the production and
use of these weapons; he made sincere, if uncompromising
attempts at achieving an international ban on nuclear
weaponry; and, failing in this, spent the remainder of
his administration stockpiling ever more strategic bombs
and super-bombs and developing an arsenal of new tactical
weapons employing nuclear warheads.
John Hersey once asked the President what books a
man should read to prepare himself for life in the Atomic
Age. Truman replied, "Nothing but the lives of great 
197menI" The end result of Truman's nuclear policies may 
well determine whether future generations spend their 
hours reading of his greatness or learning to fashion 
crude implements out of stone.
197Hersey, "Profiles," Pt. 1, I*.9.
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CHAPTER V
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AS REFORMER
You know, what we are trying to do— what I am 
trying to do is set up an organization on the 
experience that we have had in the greatest war in 
history, so that organization will be ready to 
operate in case of an emergency--which we hope will 
never come. . .
In his struggle to create the Atomic Energy 
Commission under complete civilian control, President 
Truman had to contend with opposition from the War Depart­
ment and a large bloc in the Congress. His limited success 
in establishing AEC was but one of several of Truman's 
proposed reforms within the military and in the civil- 
military relationship. Briefly stated, the reforms 
attempted during Truman's tenure were: (1) The establish­
ment of a universal military training system, which 
failed, leading to permanent peacetime conscription;
(2) A massive restructuring of military organizational and 
command relationships to bring about unification of the 
Armed Forces; (3) An end to racial segregation in the 
military services. As with civilian control of the AEC,
•^Item No. 86, President's Special Conference With 
the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 18, 19 
Public Papers . . . Truman, 1911-6, 207•
211
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these reform efforts were not clear-cut victories for the 
Administration, nor did they bring about the best of all 
possible military organizations. However, it can be 
reasonably argued that Truman’s reforms left the services 
more efficient, less biased and more powerful than in all 
their prior history.
Preceding the Second World War there were two basic 
concepts for peacetime military organization: a large
standing army, commanded by an elite class of professional 
soldiers, its ranks stocked by ordinary citizens con­
scripted for varying lengths of service; and secondly, a 
minimal peacetime force of professional volunteers (in all 
ranks) which depended upon the creation of massive armies 
of citizen soldiers to meet any military emergency. Non- 
totalitarian governments, such as the United States, 
depended upon the latter form of organization.
Toward the end of World War II, military planners, 
anticipating the postwar period, envisioned a concept of 
the "citizen army" that would require far less mobilization 
and training in the event of war. These planners were, of 
course, anticipating a total war similar to the one the 
nation was then engaged in fighting. They neither could, 
nor did, anticipate an American policy of containment of 
Communist expansionism which necessitated fighting limited 
wars by conventional means with small armies. The 
governing assumption in postwar planning was that Congress
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would enact legislation requiring that every young, able-
bodied citizen receive military training and be made a
member of a ready reserve following such training. The
War Department rationale behind this proposal for a massive
peacetime reserve force was that it was " . . .  merely a
proposal for perfecting a traditional national institution
to meet modern requirements which no longer permit
2
extemporization after the outbreak of war." This concept 
is commonly called universal military training.
When a "citizen soldier" entered the White House-- 
in the person of Captain Harry, formerly of the 2nd 
Missouri Field Artillery--the advocates of universal 
military training had acquired a powerful ally. Truman's 
pride in his own service in World War I and in that of 
his fellow Guardsmen rings clearly throughout the volumes 
of his Memoirs. In the first volume of that work Truman 
said that ever since the First World War he believed the 
only recourse to America's distaste for a large standing
^U.S., War Department, "General Principles of 
National Military Policy to Govern Preparation of Post- 
War Plans: Extracts from Directives by General George C.
Marshall, Chief of Staff," Circular No. 3ij.7 (August 2f?, 
19I4J4-) 5 O'Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of 
Power," 32. For an interesting historical background on 
UMT, see Millis, Arms and Men, 271+-76.
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army was a trained soldier-citizenry.^ During his years in 
the Senate Truman recalls supporting, in vain, a bill to 
make permanent the Civilian Conservation Corps. He hoped 
that the CCC could eventually be converted into a universal 
training program.^- Truman's first Chief of Staff of the 
Army was General George C. Marshall, the leading military 
advocate of UMT and a man for whom the President had a 
very deep respect. Given these factors, it was natural 
for Truman to publicly back such a training program from 
the very outset of his Presidency.^
Truman's first public statement on universal 
training occurred in a press conference on June 1, 19l|5.
The President told reporters that he had already con­
ferred with members of the House and Senate, and that he 
did not want to comment further on the subject. However, 
he did add: "And I have got a few views on universal
military training of my own, which don't agree with the
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 510. Asked in 19^7 if he still 
advocated universal military training, Truman replied:
"Yes, indeed. I have always been for it ever since 1905» 
and that's a long time. I demonstrated that I was for it 
because I immediately went into (National Guard) training 
when I was 21 years old." Item No. 36, Press Conference, 
February 20, , Public Papers . . . Truman, 19̂ 4-7» lk-7 •
^•Truman, Memoirs, I, 153*
^Ibid., 510. See also, Russell F. Weigley, Towards 
an American Army: Military Thought from Washington Iso 
Marshall (New ’York and London: Columbia University Press, 
1962), 2i|.7. Hereinafter cited as Weigley, Towards an 
American Army.
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Army, and don’t agree with the Navy, and don’t agree with
the House or Senate. . . ."
On June 1+ the House Postwar Military Policy
Committee began hearings on universal military training
legislation. The military leadership was convinced that
their best hope for a satisfactory compulsory training
bill was to obtain passage prior to the end of the war.
They were fearful that postwar apathy would set in
quickly so they presented to the committee ". . . a
glittering array of military witnesses in favor of the 
7proposal." The array which testified included Secretary 
of War Stimson, Navy Secretary Forrestal, Admiral Ernest
Item No. 1+1+, Press Conference, June 1, 191+5 >
Public Papers . . . Truman, 191+5* 78. See also, Washing­
ton Post, June 2, 191+5* One major difference between 
Truman and the services was over the timing of the training 
period. The President, in an unused plan developed in 
June, 19l+5> hoped to split the year of active service into 
several periods over a four year span, to be followed by 
three years of inactive reserve service. The Army and 
Navy, on the other hand, wanted the trainee for one 
unbroken year of active service. Draft, "Plan for Univer­
sal Military Training under Postwar Conditions," June 23,
191+5* Rosenman Papers, Subject File, 191+5> Universal 
Military Training, Truman Library. See also, "The War and 
Navy Department Views on Universal Military Training," 
(undated, 38 Pg« printed pamphlet; cover bears handwritten 
notation: "publd. about 10 May 191+5”)» copy in ibid.
^Washington Post, June 11, 191+5* No signs of public 
apathy can be found in the Gallup polls taken on the 
question in May and July. They recorded about seventy 
percent in favor of UMT. See ibid., May 8, July 18, 191+5*
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OJ. King and General Marshall. General Eisenhower and 
Admirals Nimitz and Halsey, all of whom were unable to 
attend the hearings, sent statements endorsing universal 
military training.9 The gist of their statements, taken 
collectively, was that the concept of a large standing 
army was repugnant to American tradition and prevailing 
public opinion, in addition to being very expensive. 
Universal military training, they argued, was much less 
expensive, would provide the nation with a deterrent to 
possible aggressors, provide peace through strength and, 
besides, would be "good for the boys." In their report of 
the hearings to the House, the Postwar Military Policy 
Committee recommended immediate legislative action on 
such a program of universal military training.
New York Times, June 16, 1914-5; New York Herald- 
Tribune, June 16, 19ll5; Baltimore Sun, June 16, 1914-5• See 
also, 'Stirason and Bundy, On Active Service, 596-99. The 
New York Times reported (October 28, 1914-5) that General 
Marshall, 'Tr. 7 . has made a virtual crusade for UMT."
^Baltimore Sun, June 16, 191+5• Eisenhower's state­
ment was contained in a letter to Clifton Woodrum, chair­
man of the committee. Text of the letter appears in the 
New York Times, June 16, 1914-5* A summary of the principal 
arguments against UMT can be found in a memorandum, George 
M. Elsey to James K. Vardaman, August 18, 19l4-5> Rosenman 
Papers, Subject Pile, 1914-5, Universal Military Training, 
Truman Library.
•^U.S., Congress, House, Universal Military Train­
ing, Report No. 857 > 79 Cong., 1 Sess., July 5, 191+5.
Pull text of report is also printed in New York Times,
July 6, 1914-5• See also, Lauris Norstad to Commanding 
General, Continental Air Forces, August 8, I9I4-5> RG18,
Army Air Force (AAF), AF353-UMT, 1914-5 > National Archives.
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The Policy Committee report sparked increased 
comment— both for and against compulsory postwar training—  
in the news media during the next several months.^
Truman kept his own views on UMT planning to himself. In 
mid-August he told a reporter: "I am going to make
recommendations to Congress on a universal military program
1 Pwhich is not peacetime conscription. He refused to
elaborate as to details and timing. The President
presented a preliminary draft of his training plan to a
Cabinet meeting on August 31, and found their overall
response to be favorable. He told the Cabinet that this
was the beginning of a "new military policy" that was
required if the United States was to continue international 
13leadership. J
One point in Truman’s twenty-one point message to 
the Congress on September 6 called for legislation 
extending conscription into the postwar period. The 
President explained that this was only a stopgap measure 
for the immediate war-to-peace transitional period. Con­
versant with his statement to the cabinet a week earlier,
■^See, for example, Joseph Loftus, "Military Train­
ing Issue Quiescent But Not Dead," New York Times, July 22, 
1955; (by "militaris"), "Conscription or ̂ Enlistment?,"
The Nation, CLXI, No. 2 (July llj., 195-5), 32-35-.
■^Item No. 106, Press Conference, August 16, 195-5, 
Public Papers . . . Truman, 195-5, 227. See also,
Washington Post, August 17, T91p.
•^Truman, Memoirs, I, 510.
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Truman told the Congress that he would soon send them 
recommendations for ". . . a  comprehensive and continuous 
program of national security, including a universal 
training program, unification of the armed forces, and the 
use and control of atomic energy."^ The President had 
already put his chief speechwriters, Judge Rosenman and 
Clark Clifford, to work drafting an address on universal 
training. On October 9, Rosenman sent a memorandum to 
the President in which he urged him to accept the Army 
position on one continuous year of training, rather than 
breaking the training into four periods totaling one 
year, which Truman favored. Rosenman also urged the 
President to give the plan to Congress as soon as he 
approved it: "The longer we get away from the war • • .
the smaller are the chances of favorable reception in the
■^Item No. 128, Special Message to the Congress 
Presenting a 21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period, 
September 6, 19k£t Public Papers . . . Truman, 19k5 3 127- 
28. In a letter to the Secretary of War, Truman restated 
the passage cited here and told the Secretary he wanted 
the War Department to, " . . .  make the necessary studies, 
prepare material, assist in drafting, present testimony 
to Congress, and in general, follow the progress of the 
legislation in Congress." The Secretary was further 
instructed to send progress reports to the White House on 
the first and fifteenth of each month. Truman to Patterson, 
October 1|, 19ij-5> RGi|.07» OSW, AG011 (!}. Oct. ’lj.5), National 
Archives. According to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, 
in a Cabinet meeting on August 17 the majority of the 
members told the President that there was little possi­
bility that Congress would permit an extension of Selective 
Service. Millis (ed.), Porrestal Diaries, 89-90.
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Congress. Truman apparently accepted both suggestions.
The President presented his universal military 
training plan to a joint session of Congress on October 23, 
19^5. In it, he outlined what he considered to be the 
prime elements of a modem military structure:
I recommend that we create a postwar military 
organization which will contain the following basic 
elements:
First— A comparatively small regular Army, Navy 
and Marine Corps;
Second— A greatly strengthened National Guard and 
Organized Reserve for the Army, Navy and Marine 
Corps;
Third— A General Reserve composed of all the male 
citizens of the United States who have received 
training.
The General Reserve would be available for rapid 
mobilization in time of emergency, but it would have 
no obligation to serve . . . unless and until called 
to the service by an Act of the Congress.
In order to provide this General Reserve, I 
recommend to the Congress the adoption of a plan for 
Universal Military Training.
In explaining the plan to Congress, Truman said 
that critics erred in calling this type of training con­
scription. He defined conscription as compulsory member­
ship in a branch of the armed forces, whereas those 
involved in a UMT program would simply be civilians 
receiving training. The President emphasized this by
•^Rosenman to Truman, October 9, 19ij-5> Rosenman 
Papers, Subject File, Universal Military Training,
Truman Library.
•^Item No. 17kf Address Before a Joint Session of 
the Congress on Universal Military Training, October 23, 
19k$» Public Papers . . . Truman, 19\\6» I4-O7• Text of 
speech is also in Koenig (ed.), Truman Administration, 222-30.
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saying that the program would not replace Selective Service, 
which would continue in its function of furnishing re­
placements for the services.^7 This part of the President’s 
argument seems strained, since the training would be 
compulsory and under the tutelage of the military.
The specifics of Truman’s proposal called for one 
continuous year of training to be commenced at age 
eighteen or upon completion of high school, whichever was 
later. All the normal Selective Service exemptions and 
deferments, such as for dependents, occupations, 
illiteracy and medical disabilities, aside from the most 
grievous physical impairments, would be disallowed. The 
year of training would be followed by six years of General 
Reserve membership, then transfer to a secondary reserve 
status
The President acknowledged that the fundamental 
reason for universal training was to provide full military 
preparedness for any potential aggression against the 
United States. But he also believed that numerous 
"useful by-products" of great benefit to the individual 
could also be derived from his UMT proposal. The training 
would, he believed, lower the national illiteracy rate,
•^Item No. 17k* Address Before a Joint Session of 
the Congress on Universal Military Training, October 23>
19ijSt Public Papers . . . Truman, 19iif>, ij.07-i|-08.
l8Ibid., ij.O6-i4.O9.
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improve the general physical condition and remove minor
medical disabilities. Truman also assured Congress that
the trainees would receive ample opportunity for self-
perfection, instruction in useful civilian skills and
proper care for their moral and spiritual w e l l - b e i n g . ^
There were several bills regarding UMT in the
Congress at the time of Truman's speech, none of which
quite matched the Administration proposal. Congress,
which was generally unsympathetic to the idea, took no
. ^ 20action on Universal Military Training in 19q5« Truman
reminded the Congress of its inactivity— on what he now
preferred to call "universal Training"— in his State of
. ✓ 21the Union Message released January 21, 194.0. In a con­
ference with Budget Director Harold Smith on the material 
to be included in this message to Congress, the President 
had explained his preference for the phrase "universal
i^ibid., l|08. In his autobiography, Truman said he 
sent the UMT' message up to Congress on the 22nd. See 
Memoirs, I, J?10. However, the official edition of his public 
papers says he delivered his UMT speech personally to a 
Joint Session of Congress in the House chamber at 12:31 
PM, October 23. See Public Papers . . . Truman, 191i5, 1|13« 
See also, Sidney Shalett, 'New York Times, 'October 28,
Truman's plan did have the backing of the Secretary 
of War and the Army Chief of Staff. See, Patterson to 
Truman, October 18, 19i|5» Rosenman Papers, Subject File,
1 9 Universal Military Training, Truman Library.
Of)Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy,
Sidney Shalett, New York Times, October 28, 19L&1
O'!Item No. 18, Message to the Congress on the State 
of the Union and on the Budget for 19^7 > January 21, 19h&, 
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19il6, 52.
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training." He told Smith that he did not want a military 
program as such, but one which emphasized physical and 
educational improvement. Truman said he chose the Army 
to run the program simply because it alone had sufficient 
resources. He also believed that the program would 
democratize the Army and "overthrow the West Point and 
Annapolis cliques" of the services by "recruiting com-
ppmissioned officers from the rank and file." The Com­
mander in Chief— who, as a young man, was rejected in his 
application to West Point, and who, entering as a "rank- 
and-filer," rose to a captaincy in World War I— may not 
have been entirely motivated by pure, democratic consid­
erations •
The one UMT proposal receiving Congressional 
attention early in 19i|.6 was H.R. i|.77a bill "To Provide 
for Military Training of Youths in Peacetime." But the 
Administration and the military would not support the bill 
because it varied sharply in its particulars from their 
proposals. Secretary of War Patterson made this clear to
22Diary Entry, January ij., 19̂ 4-6, Smith Papers, Diary 
(April 18, 19l|-5-Ju*ie 19, 191+6), copy in the Harry S.
Truman Library of original in the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Library. Forrestal's diary entry for July 30, 1945> cor­
roborates this recollection by Smith. Forrestal says 
Truman had talked "a good deal" about citizen soldiers and 
of destroying the "political cliques that run the Army and 
Navy." In the same conversation Forrestal recalls Truman 
describing West Point and Annapolis as "finishing schools." 
Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 88-89.
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the chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee late 
in February. "This bill," Patterson wrote, "which is 
not in accord with the President's message and War Depart­
ment policy with reference to universal military training, 
cannot be favorably looked upon by the War Department."23 
A week later Truman told a reporter that he had done all 
he could to get a UMT bill through Congress.2 -̂ Except 
for a brief reference in a speech in April,2£ Truman 
seemed reconciled to letting universal training languish 
in the Congress until later in the year.
On October 2, 19i+6, the War Department issued a 
new plan of universal military training. The basic 
principle remained unchanged— one continuous, compulsory 
year of training for all male citizens, eighteen to twenty 
years old. The difference was an emphasis now placed on a 
civilian board that would control the non-military phases 
of the training program.^ in a memorandum to Patterson a 
few days after the new UMT plan was made public, Truman 
enclosed copies of two letters written by Thomas Jefferson,
23patterson to Andrew J. May, February 28, 19^6, 
RGJ4.O7, AG353 (10 Dec. 19i+5>), National Archives.
2 -̂Itera No. £3* Press Conference, March 8, 19i+6,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19^6, lif-5.
25ltem No. 76, President's Army Day speech in
Chicago, April 6, 19&6, ibid., 187-88.
2^Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy,
14*8-1*9.
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which spoke of a need for a prepared citizenry. "It 
seems to me," Truman wrote, "that these letters . . . 
could be used effectively in our proposed campaign for 
Universal Military Training, as these letters show 
Jefferson was not quite the pacifist he was supposed to
be."27
One phase of the "proposed campaign" mentioned in
the note to Patterson was undoubtedly Truman’s announcement
on December 19 that he had created a nine-member,
"President’s Advisory Commission on Universal Training."
Although the group was obstensibly an impartial body
created to examine objectively the question of universal
military training, it was, in fact, composed of nine
28persons presold on the UMT concept. The suggestion that 
such a committee be created had been made by Patterson to
^The letters enclosed were Jefferson to Thaddeus 
Kosciusko, February 26, 1810; Jefferson to James Madison, 
June 18, 1813. Truman had inadvertently referred to the 
program as Universal Military Training. He had come to 
avoid the term, "military," ordinarily preferring to 
speak of it as his "Universal Training" program. Truman 
to the Secretary of War, October 9, 19if-6, RG107* OSW, 
RPP/White House, National Archives.
28Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Civilian and the 
Military: A History of the American AntimiTitarist~
Tradition (New York: Oxford Univers'ity Press, l9$b),
261. Hereinafter cited as Ekirch, Civilian and the 
Military.
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pothe President in November, 1945* Truman liked the idea
and told the Secretary of War to choose prospective
members, in conjunction with the Navy and Coast Guard.
Following his approval and the appointees’ acceptances,
Truman said he would announce the new commission from the
White House, thus drawing the attention of the country to
the civilian aspects of the program.-*0
The President brought the Advisory Commission to
the White House the day following the announcement of its
appointment. In remarks to the commissioners, later
released to the press, Truman made it clear that he
conceived the true purpose of such training to be the
molding in young men of a sense of obligation to serve the
state. He told the Commission Members that he did not
think of it as universal military training: "I want that
word military left out. The military phase is incidental
31to what I have in mind." While the President consist­
ently held that there was no relationship between UMT and
^Patterson to the President, November 5, 19h£> 
RGlj07, AG353> National Archives.
3°Truman to the Secretary of War, November 13,
19ij.5> Rosenman Papers, Subject File, Universal
Military Training, Truman Library.
^Item No. 268, Remarks to the President's Advisory 
Commission on Universal Training, December 20, 19^6,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19l|.o, £09; New York Times, 
December 21, 19^6. See also, Ernest Lindley, Washington 
Post, December 23, 19^-6J Truman, Memoirs, II, 53^.
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the draft, the War Department did not agree. When queried
for reaction to the new Commission, a War Department
spokesman said that the Army would not request further
continuation of Selective Service, which was due to expire
in March, 191J-7, until congressional intentions on universal
training were clear. The spokesman added that if the UMT
program was not forthcoming, then a continuation of the
32draft would be inevitable.
The Advisory Commission on Universal Training did 
not submit its recommendations to the President until the 
end of May 192+7- However, on March 3 Truman asked 
Congress to allow Selective Service to lapse on March 31.
He said that after consulting with Secretaries Forrestal 
and Patterson, he had decided to take the gamble on an 
all-volunteer force. He did not mention that Selective 
Service Director Lewis Hershey and the Army’s Chief of 
Personnel, General W. S. Paul, were adamantly opposed.33 
Congress did allow the draft to expire, and the nation was 
without peacetime conscription for fifteen months.
3 % e w  York Herald-Tribune, December 21, 191+6.
^Lewis B. Hershey to Truman, December 192+65
Patterson to Truman, February 2+, 192+7i Marshall to Truman, 
February 6, 192+7, all in Clifford Papers, Subject File, 
National Military Establishment: Selective Service,
Truman Library. See also, New York Times, March 1+, 192+75 
Washington Post, March If?, 191+7• Text of Truman's special 
message to the Congress is in Public Papers . . . Truman, 
1914-7, 163-61+.
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The report of Truman’s Advisory Commission, J4J4.5 
pages long, was submitted May 29, 19)+7.-^ The report was 
unique only in its length and the explicitness of its pro­
cedural recommendations. In general principles it 
differed little from the Truman-War Department proposals. 
Historian Arthur Ekirch has offered an intelligent critique 
of the report and the philosophy governing the nature of 
its recommendations:
. . . the idea of universal service to the state, which 
the President urged his Advisory Commission to 
recommend, was also a totalitarian concept that had 
been much used by fascist and communist regimes. The 
Advisory Commission in its report denied the charge 
of totalitarianism and contended that universal 
training was no more un-American, militaristic, or 
compulsory than public education. But the commission’s 
emphasis upon the responsibility of the individual to 
the state, though fully in accord with European 
practice, represented a relatively new idea in the 
United States. Whatever the mutual obligations of the 
citizen and his government, the American tradition had 
always been one in which the state was considered 
the servant, and not the master of the people. The 
universal service advocated by the Presidential 
Commission not only contradicted this tradition, but 
it also envisaged a type of service that, no matter 
how disguised, was basically for military purposes.35
The impact of the Advisory Commission report was 
nugatory. A Republican Congress was not receptive to an 
Administration measure with an estimated cost of two 
billion dollars annually which many described as
^Summary of report is in New York Times, June 2, 
191̂ 7. See also, Bernardo and Bacon, American Military 
Policy, j.9-50; Truman, Memoirs, II, 5>I|.-J?5•
35>Ekirch, Civilian and the Military, 281-82.
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militaristic and totalitarian. Truman continued urging
UMT legislative action throughout 191+7* hut with only
occasional allusions to the stillborn report of his
Advisory Commission on Universal Training.^ The report
had at least one staunch advocate in James Forrestal,
then Secretary of Defense, who, in December of 191+7» sent
a memorandum to the Army, Navy and Air Force Secretaries
strongly endorsing the study. Forrestal suggested that
every officer in the military should read the complete
report and have a thorough knowledge of its content, which
he should then disseminate to all Armed Services enlisted 
'inpersonnel. '
The President began 191+8 as he had begun the two 
preceding years, offering up his— by now--traditional plea 
to the Gongress for enactment of universal military
36]3ernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, l+£0. 
Truman pubicly urged UMT passage regularly. For example, 
in his second "State of the Union" message, January 6,
191+7* see Public Papers . . . Truman, 191+7> 11-12. In 
June, speaking at Princeton’s Bicentennial, the President 
made the need for universal training the subject of an 
address which was not too warmly received, according to 
Alfred Friendly in the Washington Post, June 18, 191+7*
For text of Truman’s P r in c e t on Ad dr e s s, see New York 
Herald-Tribune, June 18, 191+7* Ten days later, Truman told 
reporters that UMT was essential for national security.
New York Times, June 27* 191+7* The same theme was repeated 
by the 'President in statements made in August and October. 
See New York Times, August 29. 191+7; Washington Post, 
October - Z 5 T l W r r  ------ ---------
37Forrestal to Secretary of the Air Force, et. al., 
December 18, 191+7> RG31+0, Office of the Secretary o? tEe 
Air Force (SAF), AF381 (18 Dec. ’1+7)* National Archives.
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training. Congress was now ready to consider such 
legislation, motivated by a growing tension in inter­
national affairs. The House Armed Services Committee 
favorably reported out a Universal Training Bill, desig­
nated H.R. lj.278, which was in general accord with 
Administration desires. For three weeks in March the 
Senate Armed Services Committee held extensive hearings 
on UMT and Selective Service.^
On March 17, 19lj.8, the President spoke to a Joint 
Session on the threat to world peace and the independence 
of European states, caused by expansionist activities of 
the Soviet Union. Truman recommended to Congress three 
measures which he felt were needed to improve the nation's 
strength and maintain the free, democratic character of 
the nations of Europe. The three measures Truman 
described were passage of the program for economic 
assistance for Europe, enactment of universal training 
legislation, and temporary re-enactment of selective
3®Item No. 5, Annual Budget Message to Congress, 
Fiscal Year 191+9, January 12, 191+8, Public Papers . . . 
Truman, 191+8, 26.
^Forrestal to Walter Andrews, April 2, 191+8,
RG330, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
CD9-1-1{., National Archives.
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service legislation.^-0
The Administration's draft of a bill that would 
have provided both renewal of Selective Service (Title I) 
and establishment of UMT (Title II) was submitted to the 
House by Secretary "Forrestal early in April.^ After much 
struggle Congress passed the Selective Service Act in June, 
providing for its termination in two years. However, the 
universal training proposal failed again. It failed for 
the same reasons it had in the past, and also, because 
19l}.8 was an election year. It may have failed as well 
because many agreed with the editorialist who wrote: "UMT 
as outlined by the Army’s own program is nothing but a
The JCS had advised the President that voluntary 
enlistment had failed and that they considered restoration 
of the draft essential. Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 
393-91}., 397-98. See also, Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers 
and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy and Politics,"
in Harold Stein (ed.), American Civil-Military Decisions:
A Book of Case Studies (University, Alabama: University of 
Alabama Press, 1963), 1+73—76. Hereinafter cited as 
Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers." For text of 
Truman’s special message to the Congress, see Item No. 52, 
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19l|-8, 182-86. Truman 
emphasized the urgency of his requests in New York City 
the same day (March 17) in an address before the Society 
of the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick. Truman, Memoirs,
II, 224.2—14.3* Text of this address appears in New York 
Herald-Tribune, March 18, 1948.
^Forrestal to Walter Andrews, April 2, 191+8,
RG330, OSD, CD9-1-1}., National Archives.
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J±2gigantic boondoggle, a glorified CCC camp."^
Truman’s and the Pentagon’s faith in the value of 
universal military training never flagged in the years 
that followed.^ Efforts to obtain legislation eventually 
ceased, only to be revived during the Korean War. On 
August 29, 1950, Truman found himself in the peculiar 
position of asking the Congress not to take action creating 
a UMT program. His reason, as he explained in identical 
letters to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Armed 
Services Committees, was that the demands of the Korean 
conflict would make it impossible for the military to 
provide the installations and personnel necessary to 
implement the program. Truman asked that action on UMT 
be deferred until 195>1.^
^ Indianpolis Star, March 18, 19l|8. See also, 
Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, i+50. Truman 
signed the Selective Service Act into law on June 2lj., 19^8, 
less than a day after passage. See New York Times,
June 25, 19i}-8.
^-3por example, in October of 19lj.8, Omar Bradley, then 
Army Chief of Staff, was still strongly urging that the 
services should try to obtain enabling legislation on UMT 
in the next Congressional session. Bradley to Secretary 
of the Army (Royall) , October I4., 19U8, RG330, OSD, 0D9-2-1]., 
National Archives. Secretary of Defense Forrestal, while 
believing in the UMT idea, had given up hope of getting 
it through Congress by the summer of 19i+8- See, for 
example, diary entries for April 2ij., 30, 19l|8, in Millis 
(ed.), Forrestal Diaries, lj.25-28.
Wj-Item No. 225, Letter to Committee Chairmen on 
Universal Military Training, August 29, 1950, Public 
Papers . . . Truman, 1950, 601-602. See also, item No.
272, Remarks to members of the National Guard Association, 
October 25, 1950, ibid., 687-89.
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The Secretary of Defense, on January 17, 1951, 
transmitted to Lyndon B. Johnson, then Chairman of the 
Senate Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee, a draft 
of legislation authorizing "Universal Military Service 
and Training."^* The bill finally passed in altered form 
on June 19, 1951, as an amendment redesignating the 
Selective Service Act of 19i+8 as the "Universal Military 
Training and Service Act." As amended, the act extended 
the life of the Selective Service System until 1955 and 
authorized the establishment of a universal military 
training system at some time in the future. But UMT could 
not be implemented until it received further specific 
approval from the C o n g r e s s . S u c h  approval has never 
been forthcoming; the United States remains the only major 
power without a system of UMT. The Spartan concent of 
universal military training and service has died.
There should be no mourners at the bier of UMT.
The concept is antithetical to democratic principles. 
Truman's resort to peacetime conscription as a means of 
replenishing the military, while not as undesirable, did
Jj-^Marshall to Johnson, January 17, 1951, RG3ij-0, 
AP353, UMT, National Archives.
^Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy,
2+51J Robert Payne, The Marshall Story’: A Biography of
General George _C. Marshall* (New York: Prentice-Hall,
19^l), 314-10* Hereinafter cited as Payne, Marshall 
Story.
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result in a disproportionate obligation for service 
falling on certain socio-economic groups. General 
Marshall recognized this when he wrote that "in fairness 
it must be stated that the Selective Service system has 
imposed on too few the entire burden of military 
service."^ Truman erred in his belief that universal 
military training was the answer to the obvious inequali­
ties in Selective Service. He erred, not out of any 
meanness of heart, but from an oversimplified view which 
failed to recognize that a sense of dedication to public 
service must come from within, as his had; it cannot be 
compelled by governmental ordinances.
James Forrestal once confided to his diary a belief 
that President Truman urged unification of the armed 
services not so much for the greater economy and efficiency 
that would result but more as a means of selling universal 
military training to the Congress as part of the unifica­
tion "package."^ The Navy Secretary compounded the slur 
by adding that the President's thinking on both subjects 
was clearly based on his World War I and National Guard
^"Recommendations of the Secretary of Defense of 
Materials for Inclusion in the State of the Union Message," 
draft attached to a letter of transmittal, John G. Adams 
to Charles A. Coolidge, November 26, 1951» RG330, OSD,
031.1, National Archives.
^•®Diary Entry, July 30> Millis (ed.),
Forrestal Diaries, 88.
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experiences. By way of a compliment, Forrestal added that 
his impression was that Truman ". . .is not close-minded 
nor will he hold rigidly to his own views."^9 This account, 
written in mid-19l+]?> serves as an apt paradigm of the 
attitude encountered by Truman in his long struggle to 
unify the military services.
Harry Truman was not the father of the unification 
concept, but the present-day military command structure in 
the United States is uniquely his progeny. In the early 
years of World War II Truman served as a member of the 
Military Affairs and Appropriations Committees of the 
Senate, as well as chairman of the Special Committee to 
Investigate the National Defense Program. These functions 
afforded him a sweeping view of the waste, inefficiency 
and duplication that redounded from having two separate 
military departments
Truman became an active civilian proponent of 
service unification when an article appeared under his 
name in Collier1s in the midst of his vice-presidential 
campaign. The Senator wrote that he had not just lately
^9Ibid., 89.
^Truman, Memoirs, II, ij.6-lj.7; Truman, "Our Armed 
Forces Must Be Unified,'" Collier^ CXIV ^August 26, 19iUf.) > 63. Hereinafter cited as Truman, "Our Armed Forces Must 
Be Unified." See also, Buchanan, United States and World 
War II, II, 315.
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embraced the issue, but had helped draft an American 
Legion policy that had been advocating integration of 
forces for years. Truman’s basic thesis was that the 
Pearl Harbor disaster and subsequent "bitter lessons" of 
the war years had ". . . revealed the danger that lies in 
a division of responsibilities."-^ The future commander 
in chief felt that the services should be coordinated 
under a single civilian secretary, administratively 
assisted by three undersecretaries for the ground, sea 
and air forces. Truman’s plan as described in the 
Collier’s article envisioned a General Staff replacing the 
extant Joint Chiefs of Staff (which expended its energies 
trying to conciliate independent commands). His General 
Staff would be concerned solely with tactical and 
strategic control of all forces, rather than interservice 
rivalries.^ Less than nine months after the publication 
of this article, its author found himself in a position
to implement his beliefs:
^-Truman, "Our Armed Forces Must Be Unified, " 16.
^2Ibid., 16, 63-61}.. See also, Hoare, "Truman," 
l8i}.-85« Truman’s own summation of his article appears in
his' Memoirs, II, IJ.7-I4.8. Questioned about this article in
a press conference (August 30, 1945) > the President admitted 
his statements about a lack of cooperation between commands 
at Pearl Harbor were incorrect, but that he still believed, 
as he always had, in unity of command. Item No. 118,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19)4-5>
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One of the strongest convictions which I brought 
to the office of President was that the antiquated 
defense setup of the United States had to be 
reorganized quickly as a step toward insuring our 
future safety and preserving world peace. Prom the 
beginning of my administration I began to push hard 
for unification of the military establishment. . . .
It was my opinion that the Commander in Chief 
ought to have a co-ordinated and co-operative 
defense department that would work in peace and in 
war.53
Just as American conduct of the Spanish-American 
War had made obvious the need for the Root Reforms which 
followed and World War One experience brought passage of 
the National Defense Act of 1920, so, too, did the Second 
World War reveal flaws in the military structure that 
generated planning for a unified command structure. This 
planning had begun more than a year before Truman took 
office.^ In April 191+14- the House Select Committee on
-^Truman, Memoirs, II, i+6—1+7• See also, Elmer E. 
Cornwell, Jr., "The Truman Presidency," in Richard S. Kirk- 
endall (ed.), The Truman Period as a. Research Field 
(Columbia, Missouri: University oT Missouri Press, 1967), 
221-22. Hereinafter cited as Cornwell, "The Truman 
Presidency."
51+Por a description of the National Defense Act of 
1920, which was a re-organization of the U.S. Army's command 
system only, see American Military History, 1+07—1+09• While 
there was some thought given to unification prior to the 
Second World War, the results of such activity were incon­
sequential. The Morrow Board (1925) and the Baker Board 
(1931+)f while principally concerned with national aviation 
policies, did comment on the feasibility of integration of 
the armed services. The former concluded that unification 
would create too complex and unwieldly a structure. The 
latter made some passing allusions to a need for greater
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Postwar Military Policy opened hearings on a War Depart-
55ment plan of unification. The Army proposed the
establishment of an Armed Forces Department administered
by a Secretary, who would be designated as the principal
adviser to the Congress and President on all defense
subjects relevant to politics and administration. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff would advise the President on funds
56allocation and other budgetary matters.-'
The Navy Department, represented by Secretary 
Forrestal,-^ opposed the merger plans. Forrestal argued 
that such a unitary system might be too cumbersome for 
efficient management and that duplication was not always 
undesirable. The Navy was also against the proposed
coordination between the armed services. Excerpts from 
both the Morrow and Baker Board Reports can be found in 
Walter Millis (ed.), American Military Thought (New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966), 387-^17# passim. Hereinafter 
cited as Millis (ed.), American Military Thought.
^Usually called the "McNarney Plan," after Lt. 
General Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, who 
presented the plan. Representatives from the House Naval 
Affairs and Military Affairs Committees made up the member­
ship of the Select Committee, chaired by Clifton Woodrum.
-^Rogow, Victim of Duty, 187-88• See also, U.S. 
Congress, Senate, CommiTEee on Armed Services, National 
Defense Establishment: Unification of the Armed“*Services, 
Hearings on S. 75b, 8*0 Cong., 1 Sess. ,“T^.7, P't. 1, 7-ti. 
Hereinafter cited as Hearings, National Defense Establish­
ment .
57When the hearings began Forrestal was Under Secre­
tary of the Navy. But the Secretary, Frank Knox, resigned 
in April, 19i|lj.> for reasons of health and FDR named 
Forrestal to replace him.
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establishment of a separate Air Force and felt, in 
general, that the time was not opportune for reorganiza­
tion. Forrestal felt that "further study" was necessary.
The Secretary also told the committee, in what became a 
recurrent theme for him, that the job of administering 
such an organization would be too much for any one man: 
"There is no single human being capable, in my judgment, 
of sitting on all that. . . . "  (Forrestal became the 
first Secretary of Defense and the pressures of the job 
apparently brought on a general breakdown in his mental 
condition which caused him to leave the post.)'5 The 
Select Committee report to the House (June 15>» 19i|ij-) 
agreed with the Navy argument that the time was not right 
for legislation and urged the armed forces to make further 
studies into the means for implementing unification.'5̂
In a meeting with the President, June 13» 1914-5, 
Forrestal asked for his opinion on the proposals to con­
solidate the War and Navy Departments. Truman told him 
that he had some definite views on the subject and 
intended to work with his staff on a legislative proposal
-^Rogow, Victim of Duty, 188-89. Forrestal committed 
suicide by defenestrat'ion shortly after resigning as 
Secretary of Defense.
-̂ Hearings, National Defense Establishment, Pt. 1,
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as soon as he was finished with the Potsdam Conference .^0 
Six days later Forrestal created a committee, headed by a 
trusted adviser, Ferdinand Eberstadt, to consider the 
various means of achieving interservice coordination and 
to recommend the most effective postwar structure. 
Forrestal intended that the Navy should have its own plan 
for unification as a counter to the Army proposal as well 
as Truman’s, apparently. Forrestal was wary of what the 
President's stand would be, since he knew his pre- 
Presidential views on unification and knew, too, that
Truman's latest comments had been similar to those being
6 2advanced in the Army proposal.
The Eberstadt Committee submitted its report to the 
Secretary of the Navy on September 25>, 19i|-5>» The report 
discounted the value of an Army-Navy merger and proposed 
instead that there be three separate departments of War, 
Navy and Air. Each department would have a civilian 
secretary with cabinet rank, aided by an under secretary 
and an assistant secretary. The three departments would 
be coordinated by numerous interdepartmental committees 
and agencies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, then existing
^°Diary Entry, June 13» 19l|.5, Millis (ed.), 
Forrestal Diaries, 62.
^Forrestal to Eberstadt, June 19, 1 9 quoted in
ibid., 63.
62R0gow, Victim of Duty, 191.
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only by executive order, would be made permanent on a 
statutory basis and would have principal responsibility 
for coordinating the activities of the three armed 
services. Recognizing the need for a closer conjunction 
of military with foreign policy, the Eberstadt Report 
recommended the establishment of a "National Security 
Council." This council was to be presided over by the 
President as chairman with the membership comprised of 
the Secretaries of State, War, Navy and Air, the Joint 
Chiefs and the heads of the Central Intelligence Agency
/L Oand the National Security Resources Board.
Forrestal was pleased with Eberstadt*s efforts 
since it emphasized coordination and cooperation rather 
than unification, which the Navy saw as a threat to its 
position. The Senate Military Affairs Committee convoked 
unification hearings beginning on October 17, 19h£. 
Forrestal immediately presented the Eberstadt Report-- 
slightly modified— as the Navy plan for unification. Not 
to be outdone, General J. Lawton Collins presented
^ " E x c e r p t s  from the Eberstadt Report," in Henry 
M. Jackson (ed.), The National Security Council: Jackson 
Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential 
Level (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955)5 29l-94» 
Hereinafter cited as Jackson (ed.), National Security 
Council. See also, Bernardo and Bacon, American Military 
Policy, 455; Rogow, Victim of Duty, 193-9U; Hearings, 
National Defense Establishment, Pt. 1, 6, d-Tl
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another, more detailed, War Department merger plan.^
The widely-divergent proposals provided the casus
belli and the Senate hearings provided the arena for what
reporters were soon calling "The Battle of the Potomac."^
Secretary of War Patterson had opened the hearings on
October 17 by asserting his conviction that a single
department of armed forces would enhance future national
s e c u r i t y . ^6 General Marshall followed Patterson in the
hearings and went a step further in holding that without
•unification . . there can be little hope that we will
be able to maintain through the years a military posture
67that will secure for us a lasting peace." The Army Air
61+St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 22, For
a summary of Forrestalrs testimony in favor of the 
Eberstadt Plan and against the Army's proposals, see Rogow, 
Victim of Duty, 193-91+. For the principal proposals of 
the War Department, see Hearings, National Defense 
Establisbment, Pt. 1, 6,~9 • A transcript of General 
Coll ins 1 s’tatemen t to the committee is in Clifford Papers, 
Subject File, Unification, Truman Library.
^Newsweek (November 19> 19h£)> quoted in 
Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy,
^%ew York Times, October 18, 19lj.5>« A transcript 
of Patterson's testimony is in Rosenman Papers, Subject 
File-19h5> Unification of the Armed Services, Truman 
Library.
^Marshall's testimony, October 18, 19k$ (Trans­
cript), Clifford Papers, Subject File, Unification, Truman 
Library. General Eisenhower was in full agreement with 
Marshall on all points. He warned the committee that 
failure to unify would invite another Pearl Harbor. See 
W. H. Lawrence, New York Times, November 17, 1945•
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Force (AAF) was particularly enthusiastic over the War 
Department plan, since it proposed establishing the Air 
Force as a separate military department. General officers 
of the AAF in the Pentagon were asked to write personal 
letters to key field commanders, keeping them "briefed" 
on the status of unification legislation. The Generals 
(Anderson, Norstad, Powers, Vandenburg) were even given 
a model letter written by General Everest and also a list 
of the commanders with whom they should correspond. The 
"individual touch" was emphasized, ". . .in order to 
prevent an inference that there is a concerted effort in 
Hq AAF to force field commanders to hew to the party 
line."^ The Air Force's "party line," as presented in 
the hearings, endorsed the Army unification plan. General 
Arnold, in making his case, acknowledged that historically, 
the armed services had confronted each crisis, 11. . . far 
from effectively, efficiently or economically organized," 
and that unification could solve this problem.
W. Bowman to Hoyt S. Vandenberg, October 2,
1 9 RG18, AAF, 312.1— Operations— 191+$, National Archives. 
See also, F. F. Everest to Nathan F. Twining, October 5, 
19^5, ibid.; Hanson Baldwin, "The Military Move In,"
Harper1s Magazine, CXCV, No. 1171 (December, 19^7)> It88.
Hereinafter cited as Baldwin, "The Military Move In."
^statement by General of the Army H. H. Arnold 
(Transcript), Rosenman Papers, Subject File-19U5> Unifi­
cation of the Armed Services, Truman Library.
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The Navy was not reticent in opposition to the A m y  
plan. Admiral King, Chief of Naval Operations, told the 
Senate Committee that the Army plan was revolutionary.
King also offered the observation that "any step that is 
not good for the Navy is not good for the country."^ One 
of the basic contentions of Admirals Sherman and Leahy in 
their testimony was that there was no real need for unifi­
cation since a unified command already existed under the
71President, functioning as Commander in Chief. Just as 
the Air Force supported the Army for its own reasons, the 
Marine Corps defended the Navy plan, fearful that any 
subordination of the Navy would ultimately affect the 
Corps. Marine Commandant Alexander Vandergrift accused 
the proponents of unification of having a "blind faith" 
in something they did not understand.^2 Forrestal, who 
knew he was fighting a delaying-action against unifi­
cation, wrote to the President and Secretary of War early 
in November, suggesting further study of unification by a 
presidential commission and an end to the "injurious
^Chicago Tribune, October 26, 19l|5i Rostow, United 
States in the World Arena, 175*
71"Unification of the Armed Services: Analytical 
Digest of Testimony Before the Senate Military Affairs 
Committee, 17 October to 17 December, 1 9 (no author, 
no date, mimeographed), 105>. Copy in RG330, OSD, Office 
of the Director of Administration, National Archives.
"^Baltimore Evening Sun, October 2 1 9 ^ 5 •
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acrimony" of the interservice b i c k e r i n g . 73 Porrestal 
described in his diary a meeting with Truman on November 
21, in which the merger was discussed: "I told the Presi­
dent I had no brief in behalf of the Navy, that what I 
wanted was the best answer for the country. "7̂1- However, 
since it was Porrestal who had also proposed "further Study" 
of unification over a year and a half earlier to the Wood- 
rum Committee, his self-proclaimed objectivity is suspect.
With each service adamantly holding to its original, 
uncompromising position, the rhetoric became repetitious 
and the dialogue embittered, throughout the fall of 19lj-5*
A wise editorial writer suggested in late November that 
it was time for this unseemly dispute to end:
The case for and against the proposed unification 
of the armed services of the United States in a single 
Department of National Defense, or National Security, 
now has been largely presented to the Congress and to 
the American people. The Secretaries of War and-Navy, 
the Army and Air Force’s Chiefs of Staff, the Navy 
Chief of Naval Operations and most of the high echelon 
. . . have presented their views before the Senate 
Military Affairs Committees. . . .
The principle of unity of command is sound. It has 
been proven in war. No valid arguments have been pre­
sented against it. It should be adopted 
promptly. . . .75
73p0rrestal to Truman, November 8, 19i|5> RG107> 
Office of the Secretary of the Army (OSA), Single Depart­
ment-National Defense, National Archives. See also, 
Porrestal to Patterson, November 9> 19l|.5> ibid.
7ijMillis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 115-16.
7 %ew York Times, November 20, 19i+5.
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Until mid-December Truman remained an interested 
observer of the Army-Navy struggle, not interfering 
publicly or privately, although by the end of October he 
realized that Porrestal and the Navy had "double-crossed" 
him on unification.^ The President was concerned, not 
about the dispute, but about the timing of his own 
message. At a news conference on November 20 a reporter 
asked if Truman had a view on military reorganization.
He replied, "Yes, the Commander in Chief has a point of 
view, and he will express it at the proper time."*^ 
Earlier, the President had told Budget Director Smith 
that he wanted to wait until early in 19i|i>, when the 
Congress had cleared up other legislative matters. He 
planned, Truman told Smith, to tie in unification with 
universal military training, which he had already 
proposed.
Truman was compelled to change his timing on the 
unification message by circumstances: His UMT proposal
was not being well received in Congressj the struggle 
between the services had reached extremes and was
"^Diary Entry, October 30, 19i|5» Smith Papers,
Diary, copy in Truman Library of original in Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Library.
^^Item No. 193> Press Conference, November 20, 19i|£> 
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19k5» i+-96.
?®Diary Entry, October 30, 19k5> Smith Papers,
Diary, copy in Truman Library of original in Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Library.
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generating unfavorable press commentary; and the Military 
Affairs Committee adjourned December 17 with the Army and 
Navy no closer to agreement. It was at this juncture that 
Truman recalls "seeing the need for presidential inter­
vention. . . ."79
Truman's chief speechwriter, Samuel Rosenman, had 
begun working on a tonification message in mid-November,
based on preliminary drafts submitted by the Army and the
finBureau of the Budget. After several revisions, Rosenman 
followed the usual practice during Truman's administra­
tion, of sending the proposed presidential message around 
to all concerned agency and department heads, asking for 
their suggestions and criticism. In this instance, he 
probably wished he had not asked. For example, Admiral 
Leahy, who was against the merger in the first place, told 
Rosenman that he was particularly opposed to the proposed 
Chief of Staff of the Department of National Defense: "It
^Truman, Memoirs, II, I4.9• While there is no real 
evidence, a suspicion 1ingers that Truman deliberately 
allowed the services to pick at each other in public. 
Whether or not he did, the effect of their internecine 
skirmishing was to strengthen the President's case for 
unification of the services.
®^"I assume you wish to adopt the Army view," Rosen­
man wrote to the President. Rosenman to Truman, November 
13, Rosenman Papers, Subject File-19ij.5# Unification
of the Armed Services, Truman Library. See also, Diary 
Entry, December 13, 19k$> wherein the Budget Director 
received the same impression, Smith Papers, Diary, copy in 
Truman Library of the original in the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Library.
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is wrong and dangerous in that it effectively takes away 
from the President his constitutional responsibility as
Q1Commander in Chief.” The War Department and the Air 
Force expressed concern about the implications that the
Q p
Joint Chiefs of Staff were to be discontinued. Although 
the Budget Director disapproved, Truman insisted there be 
a civilian secretary in control of each of the component 
parts of the military establishment,®^ The frankest 
comments came from Secretary Forrestals ". . . as the 
President knows, I am so opposed to the fundamental concept 
expressed in the message that I do not believe there is 
any very helpful observation that I could make on the 
draft you referred to me."®^ Forrestal did think that the 
President should not send the message up to Congress and 
that he should take no position on unification until more 
hearings had been held.®£
®^Leahy to Rosenman, December 17f 19l|5> Rosenman 
Papers, Subject File-19lj.f>, Unification of the Armed Services, 
Truman Library.
A pH. H. Arnold to Rosenman, December 18, 19i|5> 
ibid. See also, Howard C. Peterson to Rosenman, December
T87“l9ll.5, ibid.
®^Rosenman to Harold Smith, December 17> 1914-5> ibid.
®^Rosenman to Forrestal, December 17> 19lj.f>» ibid.
See also, Forrestal to Rosenman, December 18, 19k$>T 5 T d .
S^Forrestal to Rosenman, December 18, 19l+5» ibid.
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Despite Forrestal's advice, Truman sent the
military reorganization message to Congress on December
19, 19^5* Truman laid down broad guidelines that he
hoped would be followed, detailed nine reasons why he
felt unification was necessary, stressing greater
efficiency and economy and a more effective civilian
control over the military. His one major break with the
War Department proposals involved the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, which he suggested replacing with a Chief of Staff
for the Defense Department, who, along with the military
commanders of each service, would form an-advisory body to
the Secretary of Defense and the President. He said that
the Joint Chiefs and the other agencies that sought to
coordinate the services during the war had not provided
the necessary unity of command and been just slightly
86better than no coordination at all.
Upon delivery of the President’s message to 
Congress, the conjecture over what his position on the 
various aspects of reorganization would be ended for the 
services. They now had fixed points to rally around or
®^Full text is in Public Papers . . . Truman, 19 
£ij.6-60. See also, Truman, Memoirs, it, J+9-50; Cornwell, 
’’The Truman Presidency," 222-23. For a description of 
the differences and areas of agreement between Truman's 
proposal and the Navy (Forrestal) Plan, see Millis (ed.), 
Forrestal Diaries, 119-20. For a summary of the Truman 
Plan, see Hearings, National Defense Establishment, Pt. 1, 
9-10.
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to develop arguments against. Truman also made it clear 
to Porrestal that the Navy was still free to discuss and 
attempt to amend the plan and that it was not his intention 
to "muzzle" anyone. The day following this conversation, 
December 19, the Secretary called Clark Clifford at the 
White House to get a clarification. Clifford explained 
that the President felt that civilian and naval personnel 
of the Navy Department should no longer publicly attack 
unification, since it was Administration policy. However, 
if called to testify before Congress, these individuals 
should feel free to express their opinions, after first 
explaining to the committee that they were expressing 
personal views under leave to do so granted by the 
Commander in Chief.®? On the same day the Navy released 
to the press a memorandum to all Navy and Marine officers 
ordering them to refrain from all public criticism of 
unification except when testifying before Congress.®® At 
a press conference on December 20 Truman had to explain 
to reporters that it was not his intention to prevent 
further discussion of unification, as long as those dis­
cussing the subject made it clear they were expressing
®^Diary Entries, December 18, 19, 191+5, Millis 
(ed.) Forrestal Diaries, 118-19.
®®Ibid. See also, New York Mirror, December 20,
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only their personal v i e w s .
With few exceptions, the public controversy
a b a t e d . I n  the next few months, sincere efforts were
made to reconcile differences. As an example, late in
January, 191+6, General Eisenhower, who had replaced
Marshall as Army Chief of Staff in November, 191+5,
reported to Patterson on the progress being made toward
coordination of activities with the Navy. Eisenhower
said that he had discussed the reorganization of several
joint boards and committees with Forrestal on at least 
91two occasions. In March 19i+6 the protagonists of the 
interservice controversy, Forrestal and Patterson, met 
together in another effort to reach an accommodation 
consonant with Truman’s guidelines. The Navy Secretary 
said he would accept a Secretary of Defense with 
authority to coordinate the services, but with no authority
®^Item No. 221, Press Conference, December 20,
19l+5> Public Papers . . . Truman, 19l+5« 565*
^The President learned, for instance, that Admiral 
Nimitz, who had replaced Admiral King as Chief of Naval 
Operations in November 191+5 in comments at the British 
Embassy had said he would fight UMT and unification "to 
the last ditch." Truman said: ". . . 1  think it is
pretty bad business for an Admiral in his position." 
Quoted in Diary Entry, February 28, 191+6, Smith Papers, 
Diary, copy in Truman Library of the original in the 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
^Memorandum, Eisenhower to the Secretary of War 
(Patterson), January 28, 191+6, Eisenhower Papers, Personal 
File/Dwight D. Eisenhower (PF/DDE), Patterson folder, 
Eisenhower Library.
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over administration, which was to reside exclusively in 
the Army, Navy and Air secretaries.*̂2 The Navy seemed 
willing, apparently, to accept the form, while rejecting 
the substance of unification. In a subsequent meeting 
with Eberstadt (Porrestal*s deputy) Patterson made it 
clear that the Army would not accept the Navy's scheme. 
Patterson personally favored a complete consolidation 
into one military department, presided over by a single 
secretary.*^
Porrestal had come around closer to Truman's view 
in his new willingness to accept a "Super-Secretary," 
albeit one without administrative functions. The polarity 
of the Army-Navy views, which could be characterized as 
consolidation versus coordination, was diminished somewhat 
by Porrestal's concession in the direction of unification. 
In the White House on March 18 Porrestal talked at length 
with Truman about their differences. The conversation
92Eberstadt, "Memorandum of Discussions Between 
Judge Patterson, Mr. Porrestal, and Myself," March llj.,
19i{-6, RG107, OSA (Patterson), Single Department-Mi sc., 
National Archives. Porrestal made the same proposal to 
Senator Elbert D. Thomas, chairman of a subcommittee to 
draft a unification bill, in a telephone conversation on 
March II4.• Porrestal found Thomas to be hostile and gained 
the impression he was, " . . .  acting under orders from the 
President." Diary Entry, March lij., 19i|.6, Millis (ed.), 
Porrestal Diaries, Hj.7-48.
^Eberstadt, "Memorandum of Discussions Between 
Judge Patterson, Mr. Porrestal, and Myself, " March 1 if., 
I9I4.0, RG1071 OSA (Patterson), Single Department-Misc., 
National Archives.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2^2
revealed that they were not too far apart on many points. 
Several of Eberstadt's original recommendations on the 
method for civil-military coordination were attractive to 
the President. In this meeting, Porrestal records having 
explained at length to Truman the Navy concept of the 
duties of the Secretary of Defense, adding, rather 
patronizingly, ". . .1  think at the ^nd he began to grasp
o[iwhat I was talking about." ^
Following the President’s message on unification in 
December of 1945? the Senate Military Affairs Committee had 
created a special subcommittee to draft legislation
Qdresponsive to Truman's message. In the first three 
months of 191+6 the subcommittee drafted eight separate 
bills that were rejected. Finally, on April 9> 191+6, the 
subcommittee reported out a ninth bill, S. 20l|i+, the 
Thomas-Hill-Austin bill, which received a favorable vote 
in the Military Affairs Committee. The Thomas bill was an 
Administration measure, closely following Truman's recom­
mendations.^^ Although most of those involved considered 
the proposed legislation a compromise, the Navy did not.
^Diary Entry, March 18, 1945* Millis (ed.), 
Forrestal Diaries, 11+8—1+9.
^The subcommittee consisted of Elbert D. Thomas 
(Chairman, Utah)j Warren Austin (Vt.) and Lister Hill 
(Ala.), see ibid., li+6.
^Hearings, National Defense Establishment, Pt. 1,6, 10.
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In the subsequent hearings on S. 20l\l±, all Navy witnesses
97were unanimous in their opposition.
While Porrestal had come around to taking a much 
more conciliatory tack, naval officers were still 
adamantly opposed. They were convinced that, given the 
greater size of the Army and the greater glamour of the 
Air Force, the Navy would be submerged and subordinated 
in any reorganization such as that proposed in the Thomas 
bill. They sincerely believed that this unification would 
mean loss of the Marine Corps to the Army and Naval 
Aviation to the Air Force as a first step. The admirals’ 
reactions to the Thomas bill caused a sharp counter­
reaction from Truman at a press conference on April 11.
A reporter asked if the Navy was justified in still 
fighting unification. The President said he did not think 
the Navy should continue to fight unification now that it 
was his announced policy. A follow-up question elicited a 
much more explicit response:
Q. Mr. President, didn't you authorize Navy 
officers to speak against that?
THE PRESIDENT. I did not. I authorized Navy 
officers to express their honest opinions. They are 
still authorized to express an honest opinion, but 
when the President of the United States, the Commander 
in Chief of the Army and Navy, sets out a policy, that 
policy should be supported by the Army--and War 
Department— and by the Navy Department. That doesn't
97Truman, Memoirs, II, 50.
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mean that individuals are muzzled on their honest 
opinions. . . .
We are trying to get the facts as they are, and 
facts are not in propaganda and lobbying, which has 
been going on to a very vast extent.98
Truman called in the Secretary of the Navy on 
April 17 for another conference on reorganization. The 
meeting was quite friendly, despite Truman’s chagrin at 
the admirals. In fact, both Porrestal and the President 
agreed that all such activity should cease.99 jn the 
course of his talk with Truman, Porrestal expanded on 
his views of the single Secretary of Defense, seeing such 
an officer as judging all moot questions, prescribing 
procurement policies, planning the budget and ensuring 
the coordination of all services on the military and 
civilian levels. Porrestal came away from the meeting 
satisfied that Truman had not closed his mind to the Navy 
plan and confided to his diary, ’’Speaking personally, I 
am for unification. porrestal believed he had moved
9®Item No. 78» Press Conference, April 11, 191+6, 
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19U6, 194-95. In another press 
conference held on thfe"T7th, Truman repeated his charge 
that the admirals were still actively lobbying and speaking 
against unification. Item No. 81+, ibid., 20l+,
99̂ Forrestal recorded in his diary that he had 
suggested that Truman order a halt to all such lobbying 
and other activities in a meeting on March 18. Millis 
(ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 11+9.
■^^Rogow, Victim of Duty, 197-98; Millis (ed.), 
Porrestal Diaries, lj?l-1?2:«
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Truman closer to his position on unification, but 
Eisenhower met with the President ten days later and came 
away with the impression that Truman ". . . was not 
weakening in the slightest degree in his stand on the 
matter. Truman, an accomplished poker player, was 
clearly keeping his next move to himself.
On the day (May 13) that the Military Affairs 
Committee favorably reported the Thomas bill out to the 
Senate, Truman summoned Patterson and Forrestal to a 
conference in the White House. At this meeting the 
President reminded the Secretaries of War and Navy of the 
necessity for them to reconcile their areas of dispute on 
unification. The President told Patterson that the idea 
for a single Chief of Staff recommended in the Army plan 
was "dangerous" and that he had decided against it. Truman 
then asked the two Secretaries to meet together and— by 
May 31— submit to him a list of the areas of agreement 
and disagreement between th e m .2
■^■^Eisenhower to Patterson, April 27, 19^6, Eisen­
hower Papers, PF/DDE, Patterson folder, Eisenhower Library.
^O^Truman, Memoirs, II, 50» See also, Rogow,
Victim of Duty, 201; Diary Entry, May 13» 194&* Millis (ed.), Torrestal Diaries, 160-62. In an editorial note, 
Millis (p. 162) holds that this meeting was a "decisive 
victory" for Forrestal, since he had long argued against 
a single chief of staff. This is probably true. However, 
as Rogow has stated in Victim of Duty (p. 201), Millis
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Porrestal and Patterson worked studiously on unifi­
cation, but were unable to report full agreement in their 
letter submitted on the deadline, May, 31> 19i|6.^3 The 
Secretaries were able to list eight major points of agree­
ment: (1) establishment of a Council of Common Defense
(eventually called the National Security Council);
(2) establishment of a National Security Resources Board;
(3) continuation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (ij.) no 
Single Military Chief of Staff; (5) a Central Intelligence 
Agency (under National Security Council); (6) coordination 
of military procurement and supply; (7) establishment of
an agency to coordinate scientific research and development 
of the services; (8) establishment of an agency to review 
and adjust all military education and training. The areas 
of disagreement were also listed: (1) single military
department; (2) three coordinate branches; (3) aviation;
(I}.) future functions of Marine Corps.
goes much further, implying that the Army plan, unlike 
Eberstadtfs, was not based on "careful study and analysis," 
nor could it stand the "test of time". In fact, neither 
plan survived the decade intact.
103yor a detailed account of these deliberations, 
see Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 163-66.
10^-Patterson and Porrestal to Truman, May 31 > 19ij.6, 
Clifford Papers, Subject Pile, Unification: Correspondence-
General, Truman Library. A copy is also in RG330, OSD, 
Unification of the Armed Forces, National Archives. Text 
is reprinted in Hearings, National Defense Establishment,
Pt. 1, 180-83.
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nI was deeply disappointed," Truman wrote in his
Memoirs, "that no substantial progress had been made
105toward resolving this traditional conflict. . . . "
Although he may have been disappointed, Truman was not 
surprised. Nine days earlier he told the Budget Director 
privately that he really did not expect Patterson and 
Porrestal to come up with a satisfactory plan. The Presi­
dent agreed with Smith's observation that there was little
possibility of getting the unification measure through
i n ACongress before adjournment, in any event. u Truman had
determined that whatever proposals the Army and Navy
submitted, he was not going to compromise very much with
the fundamentals of his own unification plan. Since the
joint letter of May 31 acknowledged the impasse existing
between the military departments, Truman elected to
107"settle personally" the differences between them.
105Truman, Memoirs, II, 50.
lO^Diary Entry, May 22, 191̂ 6, Smith Papers, Diary, 
copy in Truman Library of original in the Franklin D. Rosse-
velt Library. On May l5» Porrestal received a joint letter
from Senator David Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Naval 
Affairs Committee and Representative Carl Vinson, Chairman 
of the House Naval Affairs Committee, stating their belief 
that any unification measure could get through Congress if 
it proposed a single department of the armed forces. Walsh's 
committee opened hearings on S.20ljlj. on April 30 and closed 
them July 11, 19i|6. The bill was not reported out of com­
mittee. Hearings, National Defense Establishment, Pt. 1, 
6-7.
■̂ -̂ D̂iary Entry, May 22, 19l|.6» Smith Papers, Diary, 
copy in Truman Library of original in the Franklin D. Roose­
velt Library. See also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 50.
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Resolution of the interservice dispute came with the 
announcement of the Commander in Chief's decisions, which 
were contained in letters dated June l5> 19if-6, addressed 
to Porrestal, Patterson, and the chairmen of the House and 
Senate committees dealing with military and naval affairs. 
Truman's identical letters to the Army and Navy secre­
taries described his solutions to the four areas of 
controversy:
1. Single Military Department.
There should be one Department of National Defense. 
It would be under the control of a civilian who would 
be a member of the cabinet. Each of the services 
would be headed by a civilian with the title of 
"Secretary.1 . . . They would not be members of the 
cabinet. Each service would retain its autonomy, 
subject of course to the authority and overall 
control by the Secretary of National Defense. . . .
2. Three coordinated services.
There should be three coordinate services— the 
Army, Navy and Air Force. The three services should 
be on a parity. . . .
3. Aviation.
The Air Force shall have the responsibility for the 
development, procurement, maintenance and operation of 
the military air resources of the United States with 
the following exceptions, in which responsibility must 
be vested in the Navy:
(1) Ship, carrier and water-based aircraft 
essential to Naval operations, and aircraft of the 
United States Marine Corps.
(2) Land-type aircraft necessary for essential 
internal administration and for air transport over 
routes of sole interest to Naval forces. . . .
(3) Land-type aircraft necessary for the training 
of personnel for the afore-mentioned purposes.
(if.) United States Marine Corps.
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There shall he maintained as a constituent part of 
the Naval service a balanced Fleet Marine Force 
including its supporting air component. . . .108
Prior to making his decisions, the President had
secured a solemn promise from Eisenhower, Patterson,
Nimitz and Forrestal that they would support these
109decisions loyally before the Congress. In his identical 
letters to the key congressional chairmen on June 15,
Truman listed the twelve elements for a plan of unifi­
cation that had his "unqualified endorsement." The 
twelve were made up, of course, from the eight areas of 
agreement between the services and the four areas that: 
Truman decided for them. He concluded his message to the 
Congressmen with a futile plea: "It is my hope that the
Congress will pass legislation as soon as possible 
effecting a unification based upon these twelve 
principles. (The Congress adjourned August 3* without
having taken action.)
108Truman to Patterson and Forrestal, June 15, 19lj.6, 
RG330, OSD, Hoover Commission Report, Unification of the 
Armed Forces, National Archives. Text is also printed in 
Hearings, National Defense Establishment, Pt. 1, 183-85.
See also, Item No. 138, Letter to Secretaries of War and 
Navy on Unification of the Armed Forces, June 15> 19i|6, 
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19ljG> 306-307.
109These Promises were made in a White House meeting 
on June if., 19if-6. See Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 166.
110Truman to Andrew J. May, June l5> 19̂ 4-6, Clifford 
Papers, Subject File, Unification: Correspondence-General, 
Truman Library. The President sent identical letters to 
Senators Thomas and Walsh and Representative Vinson. Text
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With the basis of reorganization now defined,
Truman left the working out of the details mainly to 
Porrestal, Patterson and their staffs. The Secretary of 
War had replied to Truman’s letter of June 15 immediately, 
promising his wholehearted support, and that of the War 
Department, toward implementation of the new military 
command structure. The President summoned Porrestal 
on the nineteenth to inquire why he had not responded in 
kind. The Secretary explained that he was waiting to 
discuss a response with Admiral Nimitz. Porrestal and 
Nimitz still had several pronounced reservations, a point 
which the Secretary made clear in talking with the Presi­
dent. He also obliquely suggested to Truman that he was 
ready to resign if it would facilitate unification.
Truman ignored the offer, but apparently insisted that 
Porrestal reply to his letter before departing to observe 
the atomic bomb tests at Bikini. The letter to Truman was 
dated June 24, the day of Porrestal's departure. In it, 
he accepted the President’s decisions of the fifteenth,
of the letter is printed as Item No. 137> Public Papers 
. . . Truman, 1946# 303-305. A copy of the President's 
letter also appears in RG330, OSD, Hoover Commission 
Report, Unification of the Armed Forces, National Archives. 
Senator Thomas amended S.2044 to conform with the recom­
mendations in Truman’s letter. See, U.S., Congress,
Senate, S.2044# Committee Print (as amended), 79th Cong., 
2nd Sess., June 26, 1946.
■^^Patterson to Truman, June 17# 1946# RG407# 0SW, 
AG381, National Archives.
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noting that there were difficulties ahead in drafting
IIPlegislation, but that he felt they were surmountable.
That there was little War Department faith in Forrestal's 
reassurances is evidenced in a memorandum to Stuart 
Symington, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, from a 
legislative liaison officer in the Pentagon. The note 
indicates that the press commentary on the lack of a Navy 
Department response to Truman's letter forced Forrestal 
to reply. But Forrestal's "carefully worded letter to the 
President" left no doubt ". . . that he was still not 
enthusiastic for the program." Symington was also informed 
that the War Department's publicity campaign for the 
Thomas-Hill-Austin bill would continue throughout the 
Congressional recess.'*''1'̂
The War Department continued to campaign and so did 
Forrestal. On September 7 he wrote to Clark Clifford 
describing a meeting he had with A m y  Secretary Patterson 
in late August for the purpose of implementing the unifi­
cation agreements, as ordered by the President. Forrestal
^■■^Forrestal to Truman, June 2l|., 191+6, RG3I4.O, AF, 
Special Interest File 1+A, National Archives.
■^-^William e . Carpenter to Sturart Symington,
August 2, 191+6, ibid. Symington was specifically charged 
by the Secretary of-War with responsibility for all matters 
relating to unifications. See Patterson to Symington,
April 11, 19l|-6, RG18, AF381, Unification, National 
Archives.
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charged that the A m y  still held to a single military 
establishment headed by a secretary with total administra­
tive control. Despite Truman's orders, Porrestal believed 
the A m y  was still out to curtail the Marine Corps. 
According to .Porrestal, the A m y  felt that by drawing 
charts that detailed straight lines of command authority 
they could solve the problems of implementing unifica­
tion.'̂ "*'̂ ' Truman talked with the unhappy Secretary of the 
Navy on September 9. Porrestal told the President that he 
intended to introduce his own unification bill into the 
new Congressional session. The bill, Porrestal explained, 
would create a Secretary of Common Defense with a small 
executive staff. The Secretary would act as the Commander 
in Chief's deputy to the military departments. The 
functions of the President's deputy would be severely 
delineated by the bill, allowing him coordinate authority, 
while the three secretaries maintained administrative 
autonomy within their military services. Truman was no 
doubt surprised. Porrestal, ordinarily a meticulous 
diarist, did not record the President's reaction.
Truman must have realized by now that his directive of
H^Porrestal to Clifford, September 7> 19̂ 4-6,
Clifford Papers, Subject Pile, Unification: Correspondence- 
General, Truman Library.
ll^Millis (ed.), Porrestal Diaries, Editor's Note,
203.
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June 15 had not had the desired effect. He ordered all of 
his top-level military advisers to meet with him at the 
White House the next day, September 10.
Truman opened the meeting by saying its purpose 
was to consider what legislative proposals were to be 
submitted to the upcoming session of Congress. He told 
those assembled that he was going to have Clark Clifford 
and Admiral Leahy draft a new unification bill. After 
all of them had had a chance to mull over the new bill, 
it would become administration doctrine and he would 
expect complete support for it in Congress. Truman then 
followed his practice of asking everyone present to 
express his views c a n d i d l y . P a t t e r s o n  said he was in 
full accord with the President's views. Eisenhower was 
generally noncommittal, repeating his belief that once 
the Secretary of Defense concept was accepted in principle, 
the details could be worked out later. Porrestal repeated 
his concept of this Secretary as he had expressed it to 
Truman earlier. He added that if a bill was introduced 
contrary to those principles, rather than support it by 
testimony before Congress, he would give the President his 
resignation. Truman said that he did not expect such a
H 6ln addition to Truman, present were Patterson, 
Leahy, Porrestal, Eisenhower, Nimitz, and Clifford.
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1 1 7necessity to arise. 1 The meeting adjourned and there
the matter rested, unresolved, until early in 19i+7•
With White House pressure clearly on them to agree,
Patterson and Porrestal finally produced a mutually-
acceptable formula for unification, which they transmitted
to the President on January 16, 191+7. Truman replied to
them on the same date, expressing his pleasure at the
plan and his recognition that all services had made some
concessions to achieve this "thoroughly practical and
„ll8workable plan of unification. . . .  The New York
Times headlined the White House announcement as, "A 
Truman Victory— Patterson and Porrestal Compromise at 
Last on Unification Idea. It was less a victory than
■'■̂ ■̂ Diary Entry, September 10, 191+6, Millis (ed.), 
Forrestal Diaries, 203-205.
ll8porrestal and Patterson to Truman, January 16, 
19k7t Clifford Papers, Subject Pile, Unification (Part 2), 
Truman Library. Text of this letter is reprinted in Hear­
ings , National Defense Es tablishment, Pt. 1, 103 * Truman 
to Patterson and Porrestal, January 16, 19i+7̂  RG330, OSD, 
Hoover Commission Report, Unification of the Armed Forces, 
National Archives. Text of this letter is reprinted as 
Item No. 10, Public Papers . . . Truman, 19lj-7» 99. Both 
letters are printed Tn full in U.S., Congress, House,
Basic Elements of the Unification of the War and Navy 
Departments, OOTong., 1 Sess., t>o c. No 7 $6~~ ("January 20, 
191+7) V
H ^ New York Times, January 17, 191+7; New York 
Herald-Tribune, January 17, 1947* No attempt has been made 
to describe the struggles between the War and Navy Depart­
ments between the September meeting and this agreement, 
since it would be largely repetitious. The participants 
took the same stands detailed earlier and agreed only when 
they had to. The New York Times article cited above
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it was a long-delayed step that Truman should have forced
through sooner; there was no reason to allow protracted
debate after his directive of June 15* 191+6, But Truman
had no intention of delaying any longer; he released the
Secretaries’ joint letter and his reply immediately, and
the following day sent communications to the Speaker of
the House and the President of the Senate pro tempore.
The letter to the Congressional leaders transmitted
copies of the Forrestal-Patterson letter of January 16 and
Truman’s reply, by way of announcing that an agreement had
been reached. Truman also assured the two Congressional
leaders that members of his staff and the military were
drafting the bill, which the President would submit to
120Congress for consideration as soon as possible.
The military leadership, having taken almost a year 
and a half to agree on the principles of unification, 
now found it difficult to agree on the text of the unifica­
tion bill. The chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee wrote to Secretary Patterson on February 21 
asking why the bill was not ready. The Senator complained
recounts much of the substance of these meetings, as does 
Admiral Forrest Sherman in his testimony on the bill.
See Hearings, National Defense Establishment, Pt. 1,
120Truman to Joseph W. Martin, January 17, 191+7, 
printed in Basic Elements of the Unification of the War and 
Navy Departments, 102. See also, Item No. 12, Public 
Papers . . . Truman, 19l;7, 101-102.
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that he was being hounded daily by his colleagues and
reporters wanting to know why the Army and Navy could not
agree on a bill. The Secretary of War was apparently not
the cause of the delay, since he forwarded Senator Gurney's
letter to Clark Clifford the same day, asking if he could
help in any way to expedite submission of the bill to the 
121Congres s.
Truman, tired of the bickering over details of the 
bill, ordered Clifford to expedite it. The following 
memorandum from Clifford to the Secretaries of War and 
Navy gives some indication of the President's mood:
Enclosed herewith find three copies of the 8th 
draft of the bill entitled "National Security Act of 
1947»n The President asks that you kindly initial 
one copy indicating your approval and return the copy 
to him.
Because of the urgency of this matter, it is hoped 
that you will be able to approve this draft today.
If this is not feasible, you are requested to return 
a copy at the very latest by noon t o m o r r o w . 122
Both Porrestal and Patterson sent pledges of their 
full support of the draft on February 2 the President 
transmitted the bill to Congress the following
121chan Gurney to Patterson, February 21, 19I4.71 
Clifford Papers, Subject File, Correapondence-Unification 
Bill, Truman Library. See also, Patterson to Clifford, 
February 21, 19lj.7> ibid. (The Armed Services Committee 
was established by a congressional reorganization at the 
end of 19if.6. It replaced the Military Affairs and Naval 
Affairs Committees.)
■^^Clifford to Secretaries of the War and Navy, 
February 21+, 19^7> Clifford Papers, Subject File, Corres- 
pondence-Unification Bill, Truman Library.
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IP'iday. J Hearings on the unification bill, designated 
S. 758, were held before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee from March 18 to May 9, 19i|7 • As anticipated, 
in light of Truman's express order, the testimony given 
by the hierarchy of the military departments was strong 
in endorsement of the draft bill.^2 -̂ The Secretary of War 
began his testimony by saying, "I give unqualified support 
to the bill to unify the armed forces. . . ," and went on 
at great length to explain why.^2^ Forrestal's testimony 
was characterized by a cautious optimism. He restated his 
fear that the Secretary of Defense post was too much of a 
job for any one man. The Navy Secretary also warned the 
Senators that, "If any single item were withdrawn or
-*-23patterson to Truman, February 25# 19^7# ibid.; 
Forrestal to Truman, February 25# 19̂ 4-7# ibid. The Presi­
dent's letter of transmittal and the text of the draft 
bill are published as U.S., Congress, House, National 
Security Act of 19k7i Communication from the President 
Transmitting a. Draft of a Proposed Bill Entitled National 
Security Act of "l9l4-Y#~H0 Cong., 1 Sess./“(February 26,
19l+7) • The"'biTl' 'is fully summarized in Hearings, National 
Defense Establishment, Pt. 1, 11-12. Text of bill^also 
appears in full in New York Times, February 28, 1914-7-
121f.»3eforQ the bill was sent to Capital Hill • . . 
Mr. Truman sent orders to members of the armed services to 
support the measure." Washington Post, February 27# 19i|-7» 
No such order has been located. The reference may be to 
Truman's remark in the meeting of September 10, 19l|.6, that 
once the bill went up to Congress he expected everyone to 
support it.
•^^Hearings, National Defense Establishment, Pt. 1,
53ff.
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modified to the advantage of any one service the mutual 
accommodation would be thrown out of balance.,r̂ 2® with 
minor qualifications, those who followed— Generals Eisen­
hower, Norstad, Vandenberg and Spaatz; Admirals Nimitz and 
Sherman— gave their full support to the proposed bill.
Even ex-Secretary of War Henry Stimson sent a long letter 
to Senator Gurney strongly supporting S. 758
After some small modifications in the Congress, the 
National Security Act of 19lj-7 passed on July 25 and was 
signed into law by Truman the next day.-1-2® As finally 
passed, the act established the Army, Navy and Air Force 
as equal departments, each with its own civilian adminis­
trator, under the supervision and control of a single, 
civilian Secretary of Defense. The act provided for a 
major re-organization of the military, as well as for a 
more effective coordination of all the agencies and
^2®Ibid., 22; Rogow, Victim of Duty, 20lf-205» See 
also, Washington Post, March" 19, i9ljT•
127stimson to Gurney, April 21, 19l|-7, printed in 
Hearings, National Defense Establishment, Pt. 2, 1+57-60;
Pt. 3, 709-7lO. Among the few who took issue with the bill 
were Marine Commandant Vandegrift, who wanted statutory 
protection for the traditional functions of the Marine 
Corps, and Admiral King, who opposed establishing the office 
of Secretary of Defense. See ibid., Pt. 2, ij.12; Pt. 3,
561; New York Times, May 8, 191̂ 7.
128Public Law 253, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 191+7.
For a description of the several changes made in the act 
by the House, see Clifford to Truman, July 22, 191+7,
Clifford Papers, Subject File, Correspondence-Unification 
Bill, Truman Library.
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departments of the national government--both civilian 
and military— that were concerned with national security.
Title I of the National Security Act established 
three bodies divorced from the military establishment:
(1) The National Security Council; (2) The Central 
Intelligence Agency; (3) The National Security Resources 
Board.
The National Security Council (NSC) was composed
of the President, the Secretaries of Defense, State, Army,
Navy and Air Force, the Chairman of the National Security
Resources Board and other officers of the government as
the President might choose to designate. The Council
was specifically charged with the function of advising
the President M. . . with respect to the integration of
domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the
130national security.” NSC was a lineal descendant of 
the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) of 
World War II. The establishment of the National Security 
Council was a statutory recognition that the foreign and 
military policies of the nation are inextricably involved
-1- h .  Baumer, "National Security Organiza­
tion," The Military Engineer, XL, No. 269 (March, 19lj.8)>
5. Hereinafter ci'ted as Baumer, "National Security 
Organization."
130"Staff Report of the Subcommittee on National 
Policy Machinery," December 12, I960, in Jackson (ed.), 
National Security Council, 30.
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and must be coordinated.-^l Although Marshall declared
that the Council is the most significant policy-making
body in the United States, the group has since served
only in an advisory capacity to the Commander in Chief,
who alone can make national policy, which, in turn, is
eventually subject to, ". . . the support and substantia-
132tion of Congress and public opinion.”
In operation under Truman, the National Security
Council functioned, to use Forrestal's description,
". . . not as a place to make policies, but certainly as
a place to identify for the President those things upon
133which policy needs to be made.” Up until the time of 
the Korean War, Truman did not attend NSC meetings
•̂•31xbid. See also, Cornwell, ”The Truman 
Presidency,” 22lj.-25; Hoare, ’’Truman," 188-89; Ernest R.
May, "The Development of Political Military Consultation in 
the United States," Political Science Quarterly, LXX,
No. 2, (June, 1955), 175* Hereinafter cited as May, 
"Development of Political Military Consultation.” See 
also, John Fischer, "Mr. Truman’s Politburo," Harper *s 
Magazine, CCII, No. 1213 (June, 1951), 30. Hereinafter 
clued as Fischer, "Mr. Truman’s Politburo."
132Hans on Baldwin, quoted in May, "Development of 
Political Military Consultation," 180; Marshall testimony, 
Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 5$^; Raymond P. Brandt, St.
Louis Post-bispatch, February 29, 19^8. John Fischer 
wrote (In 1951), that Truman had delegated his authority 
over national policy to the NSC "to the uttermost limit," 
relying heavily, "almost pathetically," on his expert 
advisers. "Mr. Truman's Politburo," 31•
\
L33Diary Entry, September 17, 19î 7, Millis (ed.), 
Forrestal Diaries, 316.
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regularly, because his presence tended to inhibit debate. 
When he did attend Council sessions, he followed his 
customary practice of asking each person present to state 
his views; Truman seldom offered his opinion or accepted 
or rejected a recommendation during the course of a 
meeting.
Title I of the National Security Act also 
established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under 
the National Security Council. The Administrative 
structure of this agency already existed as the "Central 
Intelligence Group" which Truman had created by a 
presidential directive in January, 1946.^^ The CIA was
134lbid., 320; Cornwell, "The Truman Presidency," 
225. See also the testimony of Sidney Souers, Executive 
Secretary, NSC, to Senate Subcommittee on National Policy 
Machinery, May 10, I960, excerpted in Jackson (ed.), 
National Security Council, 100, 108-109. For a fuller 
description of 4ow Truman wanted the NSC to operate see a 
draft memorandum, Truman to Souers, (undated), Clifford 
Papers, Subject Pile, National Military Establishment—  
Security Council, Truman Library.
-^Truman to Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 
January 22, 19i|.6, Clifford Papers, Subject Pile, National 
Intelligence Authority, Truman Library. The text of this 
directive is printed in Hearings, National Defense Estab­
lishment , Pt. 3, 495* See also, Truman, Memoirs, I, 96-99, 
226; li, 55-58? Acheson, Present at the Creation, 1^7-61. 
The President was originally against 'changing the Central 
Intelligence Group (CIG) into a full-fledged agency, but 
was apparently persuaded to do so by Clark Clifford and 
members of the CIG, who found it ineffective in operation. 
Memorandum for file, George M. Elsey, July 17* 1946* 
Clifford Papers, Subject Pile, National Intelligence 
Authority, Truman Library.
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assigned the task of coordinating the intelligence- 
gathering activities of numerous government departments, 
evaluating the infomnation received and distributing this 
material to government officials with a need to know.*-̂
The director of the agency was normally the President's 
first appointment each morning, briefing him on intelli­
gence developments in the past twenty-four hours: "This
centralization of the gathering and reporting of data 
simplified the President's search for knowledge and added 
significantly to his powers in directing foreign 
policy.
The third coordination body established by the 
National Security Act was the National Security Resources 
Board (NSRB). The Board was to be directed by a civilian 
chairman, with the membership to come from various 
departments and agencies of the federal government, as 
designated by the President. The NSRB was designed to 
coordinate all civilian, military and industrial factors
■l-^Baumer, "National Security Organization," 5> 
Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, 1|59.
•*■370'Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of 
Power," ij.6; Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, llj.; John Hersey, 
"Profiles— Mr. President," Pt. 37 ^Forty-Eight Hours,"
The New Yorker (April 21, 1951)» 36. Hereinafter cited 
as HerseyT Profiles," Pt. 3« For a critical view of the 
disadvantages of the CIA to a President, see James, 
Contemporary Presidency, 150-51•
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necessary for an emergency mobilization.^®
Title II, the other major section of the National 
Security Act, created the National Military Establishment 
(NME), headed by a civilian designated the Secretary of 
Defense. The new structure was to consist of the Depart­
ments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, each headed by a 
civilian secretary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), a 
Joint Staff under the JCS, the War Council, Munitions 
Board and the Research and Development Board.
Under the direction of the Commander in Chief, the 
Secretary of Defense was charged by the bill with the 
following duties:
(1) Establish general policies and programs for 
the National Military Establishment and for all of the 
departments and agencies therein;
(2) Exercise general direction, authority, and 
control over such departments and agencies;
(3) Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary 
duplication or overlapping in the fields of procure­
ment, supply, transportation, storage, health, and 
research;
(if.) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of 
the budget estimates of the departments and agencies -ĵ g 
comprising the National Military Establishment. . . .
^ Charles Fairman, "The President as Commander-in- 
Chief," Journal of Politics, XI (February, 19if-9), 150. 
Hereinafter ci^teT“as Fairman, "President as Commander-in- 
Chief." See also, Baumer, "National Security Organization," 
£; Cornwell, "The Truman Presidency," 22if.; St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch, November Ilf., 191+7 •
-^Public Law 253, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., (61 Stat. 
1+95) J Report, "Six Months of Unification," RG330, OSD, 
D67-1-32, National Archives.
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The most important body under the new military 
organization was the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The 
Joint Chiefs were made responsible for formulating 
strategic plans and issuing military directives to the 
field commanders. Thus, the JCS both recommended military 
policy— as advisers to the Secretary of Defense, National 
Security Council and the President— and executed military 
policy through its directives to the unified field 
commands. In operation under Truman, all JCS directives, 
except for the most routine of matters, were cleared by 
the Secretary of Defense and had to receive final approval 
from the President before being dispatched to the field 
commands. The organizational structure of the NME removed 
the Chiefs of Staff from direct contact with the 
Commander in Chief, but Truman made it clear to all 
members of the JCS that they were to have direct, individual 
access to him, bypassing all the civilian hierarchal 
structure above them, whenever they felt it necessary.
Truman was once asked if the existence of the Joint Chiefs 
caused the Commander in Chief to rely less upon his own 
judgment and more on the advice of his generals. "Those 
professional military men are supposed to know the military
l^OjPar East Hearings, Pt. 1, lj?0-5lJ Pt. 2, 90lj.,
12^6, li+75, 1606, 1622. See also, May (ed.), Ultimate 
Decision, Intro., xii-xv; Fairman, "The President as 
Commander-in-Chief," 151-52.
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situation as it is in the world," Truman replied, "and 
they’re supposed to inform the President, so that he can
make up his mind on what he ought to do in case of an
!f l i l l  emergency. ^
On the day he signed the National Security Act into 
law, July 26, 1947 > Truman also issued Executive Order 
9877» defining the specific functions of each branch of 
the armed forces. This was made necessary by the new 
structure which separated the Air Force from the Army and 
transferred certain powers to the Secretary of Defense.
The changes made in the military departments also 
necessitated that Truman make several new appointments.
He asked Robert Patterson, then Secretary of War, to 
become Secretary of Defense. Patterson, explaining that 
his strained financial condition would not permit his 
staying in government, refused the post and insisted upon 
resigning as Secretary of War (Army). The President asked
l^P-Truman Speaks, 23 .
l̂ -2por text of order see Clifford Papers, Subject 
File, Unification, Truman Library. Text is also in 
RG3^0> Secretary of the Air Force (s/AF), Special Interest 
File 4A, National Archives. See also, Item No. 159,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 1947> 359-61; New York 
Herald-Trlbune, July 27, 1947*
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Forrestal to take the post and he a c c e p t e d . T h u s  the 
man who had consistently believed that the job was too 
much of a burden for any man to bear, became Secretary of 
Defense, his suicide two years later marking the tragic 
end of a self-fulfilling prophecy. With Forrestal's con­
currence, Truman appointed Undersecretary of War Kenneth 
C. Royall, Secretary of the Army; Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy John L. Sullivan, Secretary of the Navy and 
Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Stuart Symington, as 
the first Secretary of the Air F o r c e . W i t h  the swear­
ing-in of Forrestal as Secretary of Defense on September 
17, 19i}-7, the new military establishment became operational 
the following day.^^
The organization which Truman had created through 
patience, persistance and compromise eventually revealed
l^-3Forrestal to Truman, July 28, 19lj.7, Truman 
Papers, Official File (OF), 1285, Truman Library. Patter­
son's determination to resign and Royall's endorsement of 
Forrestal as Secretary of Defense is in a memorandum of a 
telephone conversation, Clifford (to Royall), July 2 
19k7> Clifford Papers, Subject File, Unification, Truman 
Library. See also, Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 
295-96, 298-99; Washington Post, July 19* 191+7•
•^^Ttem No. 182, Press Conference, August 21, 191+7, 
Public Papers . • . Truman, 19lf7, k̂ .0, A month earlier, 
Hanson Baldwin had correctly picked each one of these 
appointments, including Forrestal's, in the New York 
Times, July 20, 191̂ 7*
•^^Washington Post, September 19, 192+7J New York 
Times, September 18, 192+7•
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major flaws that required reform legislation. But since 
it did centralize, streamline and clarify some of the 
command system, it served to aid the President in formu­
lating military policy and getting that policy implemented. 
Truman was usually sure of what he wanted to do in a 
given situation; the NME told him how best to accomplish 
his objective. The new agencies established, particularly 
the National Security Council, performed a valuable 
function in recognizing that the formulation of military 
and foreign policies had to be considered as an integral 
process, particularly in the ,fCold War" environment of the 
postwar period. The removal of the Joint Chiefs from 
direct access to the President, while not practical during 
time of war, provided a desirable dilution of strictly 
military viewpoints before they reached the Commander in 
Chief's desk. The National Security Act also, as one 
writer said, " . . .  sharpened the weapons at the Presi­
dent's disposal and added a new dimension to his command 
of American foreign policy.
Pull unification was not achieved in 19^-7- This is 
true largely because of compromises and accommodations 
made to zealots concerned more with preserving the 
traditional powers of a particular service than with the
Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of 
Power," lj.7-1+8.
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requirements of an effective national defense structure. 
As one critical Republican newspaper put it:
President Truman has produced what he calls a 
merger plan for the army and navy. It is not a 
merger plan, it is in most respects a sham, and in 
some respects will contribute to the disintegration 
rather than the integration of our defense forces.
The question of unification of the forces is a 
difficult one. It requires the most serious consid­
eration. . . . Instead of a solution, Mr. Truman 
offers an evasion. . . .
The attempt to relieve the President of the 
responsibility for conduct of national defense, by 
creating a secretary charged with that task . . .  is 
futile because the President constitutionally is the 
commander in chief of the army and navy. He can 
delegate authority but he cannot delegate ultimate 
responsibility.ll+f
While the editorial cited wrongly assumed that 
Truman intended to divest himself of decision-making 
responsibility, it correctly identified the act as some­
thing less than what the President said it was. For 
example, the Administration had often emphasized the 
economy that would be realized by unification when, in 
fact, the merger act was not designed to save money, nor 
did it, if mounting defense expenditures are a valid 
measure. Also, in its aim (as summarized by Walter 
Millis) ”. . .to provide the United States with a 
coherent and self-consistent system of military-political 
direction, fully informed by the best intelligence
1̂ -7Chicago Tribune, January 29, 191+7•
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available," the unification act failed.
The Office of Secretary of Defense proved to be 
too weak under the 19ij.7 statute. Although the Defense 
Secretary was nominally the immediate superior of the 
three departmental secretaries, all four served equally 
on the National Security Council. In addition, the 
three secretaries were permitted to bypass their superior 
and bring their concerns directly to the President. As 
constituted, the office of Defense Secretary suffered 
from divided responsibility and a severe lack of 
authority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while obliged to 
advise the Secretary of Defense, were not controlled by 
him to any appreciable e x t e n t . 1 ^
The National Security Council was too vaguely 
defined to be effective. The NSC was supposed to advise 
the President on the coordination of all factors 
affecting the security of the nation, but it was not 
made clear whether the Council should initiate the con­
sideration of policies or deliberate only when told to
■^^Millis, Arms and Men, 280.
l̂ -9iphe Hoover Commission Report on Organization of 
the Executlve' Branch of the Government' TNew York: McGraw- 
Hill Book Company, 19"W)"» l87> 190-91’. Hereinafter cited 
as Hoover Commission Report. See also, Rostow, United 
States in the World Arena, 176. Hanson Baldwin ifelt that 
the JoinE Staff under the JCS was a "potentially dangerous" 
body, resembling the Greater German General Staff idea.
"The Military Move In," ij.87-88.
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consider a subject by the President. The NSC would be 
of value in working out long-range policy recommendations, 
but proved of little worth for the resolution of emergency 
situations. Also, a disproportionate number of NSC 
members (four), although civilians themselves, represented 
military departments. In operation under Truman, a repre­
sentative of the JCS also attended each meeting and was 
heard, so that five of the seven or eight usually present
at Security Council meetings approached each problem with
1^0a military orientation. ^
That the Navy-Forrestal struggle against unification
was justified is a moot question. The editor of Forrestal’s
papers, Walter Millis, thinks it was. Millis also holds
that all the key participants were equally responsible and
maintains that their actions M. . . delayed the nation
for a year or two in grappling with the already dire state
1^1of world affairs." The military leadership of the 
country spent over two years absorbed in what was often 
petty haggling over bureaucratic politics. In the end, 
Truman had accepted a poor structure that was not at all 
consonant with his own ideas on unification, primarily
1*>0 'Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of 
Power," I1.7-I4.8j Baldwin, "The Military Move In," J4.8I4.; Hammond, 
"NSC-68, 273-75, 277-79.
■®-5lMillis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, Editor’s Note,
153.
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because the struggle had intensified to a point where
imposition of a thorough unification would have been
destructive of military morale and politically 
152explosive.
In the final analysis, Forrestal had prevailed. The 
National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency and 
National Resources Board were all originally proposed in 
the plan that Eberstadt's committee had drafted for 
Forrestal. He had lost out with the establishment of the 
Air Force as a co-equal to the Army and Navy Departments. 
But Forrestal succeeded in blocking the Army proposal for 
a single Chief of Staff for all the services. He had 
preserved the Marine Corps intact and kept most of Naval 
Aviation against the wishes of War Department planners.
Most important of all, from Forrestal's point of view, he 
had managed to have the authority of the Secretary of 
Defense limited to coordination and an over-all, generally 
powerless supervision of the three service departments.
The irony, of course, is that Forrestal, the first Secre­
tary of Defense, had unknowingly performed an act of 
self-emasculation.
As Forrestal attempted to make a functioning office 
from the rigid statutory edifice he had fashioned, he 
became increasingly aware that changes would be necessary;
■^^Rostow, United States in the World Arena, 175*
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hence the Secretary asked for major revisions in both the 
National Security Act and the accompanying executive order 
defining the roles and missions of the services. Forrestal 
took action on the executive order first, in January 1948 
by asking the service secretaries and the JCS to send him 
recommendations on a redraft of the order. The Defense
Secretary received the service secretaries' recommendations 
and finding them so diverse as to make coordination 
impossible, postponed any immediate proposal to the
154President.
Late in February 1948 Forrestal told the President 
that he had not yet been able to get any agreement from 
the Joint Chiefs on the definition of functions of the 
services, but had instructed them to inform him on March 8 
on the areas of disagreement between them, on which he 
would then make his own decisions. The problem required 
decision because Forrestal had to have a definition of the 
specific roles and missions of each service before he could
^-^Forrestal to Secretaries of Army, Navy, Air 
Force, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 20, 1948,
RG330, OSD, D70-l-£, National Archives.
l54Forrestal to Secretaries of Army, Navy, Air 
Force, February 3» 1948, RG34°> S/aF, Reorganization of 
NME, Special File î A, DG520A53-307, National Archives. See 
also, Leahy to Forrestal, February 6, 1948» Clifford 
Papers, Subject File, National Military Establishment—  
Misc., Truman Library.
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1 99make budgetary allocations for carrying them out. ^
Whether the participants appreciated it at the time is 
unknown, but Forrestal was precisely in the same position 
he and Patterson had placed the President in May of 19l|-6, 
of pressuring his subordinates for an agreement by 
threatening to decide the matter arbitrarily.
The Joint Chiefs reported their disagreements over
service functions to the Secretary of Defense on March 8.
To settle the matter, Forrestal assembled a conference
with the JCS at Key West, Florida, from the eleventh to
the fourteenth. The agreement finally reached was that
each service would be assigned both primary and collateral
functions. The primary functions were those for which a
service would have clear-cut responsibility. Collateral
functions were defined as instances where a service force
acted to support or supplement another service in carrying
196out a primary function. The Secretary of Defense sub­
mitted the new draft of armed services functions to the
15>5>Forrestal to Truman, February 27, 19i+8, RG330,
OSD, D70-1-5* National Archives. See also, Truman,
Memoirs, II, j?2.
19%ME Press Release No. 38-ij-8* OSD, "Secretary 
Forrestal Announces Results of Key West Conference,"
March 26, 19i|8, Clifford Papers, Subject File, National 
Military Establishment— Misc., Truman Library. See also, 
Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-3& Bombers," If.7̂ -75*
Present at Key West were Admirals Leahy and Denfield, 
Generals Bradley and Spaatz, their aides, and Secretary 
Forrestal.
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President, asking that it be approved and requesting that
Executive Order 9877 be recinded.^-̂
Truman turned the draft over to Clark Clifford for
study. Clifford recommended to him after consultation
with Admiral Leahy, General Vaughan, the Bureau of the
Budget, and others, that Forrestal1s proposals be approved,
subject to the addition of a phrase making it clear that
Forrestal was issuing the statement "by direction of the 
198President." On April 21, 191+8, the President revoked 
Executive Order 9877 and informed the Secretary of Defense 
of his approval of the new statement on roles and missions 
of the s e r v i c e s . O n  the same day Forrestal issued the
■^^Forrestal to Truman, March 27, 19i|8, RG330, OSD, 
D70-1-5, National Archives.
ci if ford to Truman, April 13 , 19i|-8, Truman 
Papers, OF, 1289, Truman Library. Clifford sent a memo­
randum to the Secretary of Defense, informing him that the 
President approved, but wanted the phrase, "by direction 
of the President" added. Forrestal replied that such a 
phrase would have appeared in the original draft statement, 
". . . but for the fact that we wished to refrain from 
using the President's name in the document prior to the 
time you and he had an opportunity to go over it." See 
Clifford to Forrestal, April 19, 191+8, Clifford Papers, 
Subject File, National Military Establishment— Misc.,
Truman Libraryj Forrestal to Clifford, April 16, 191+8, 
RG330, OSD, D70-1-9, National Archives.
l59Truman to Forrestal, April 21, 191+8, RG330, OSD, 
D70-1-9, National Archives. See also, Executive Order 
9990, April 21, 19l;8 (13 P.R. 2191), which revoked the 
previous order. Truman incorrectly dates this order,
"March 2711 in his Memoirs, II, 9^«
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new statement to the Joint Chiefs and the service secre­
taries, formally completing the first revisions in the
160military reorganization of 19^7.
During the first year of operation of the National 
Military Establishment it became apparent to me that 
the Secretary of defense needed additional authority 
to meet his responsibilities. It was clear that the 
act should be amended to define and strengthen the 
authority of the Secretary; to authorize an Under 
Secretary of Defense; to provide the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff with a chairman; to remove the service Secre­
taries from the National Security Council, leaving 
the Secretary of Defense the sole representative of 
the military; and to correct numerous administrative , 
inefficiencies that a year’s experience had revealed.
What was clear to President Truman was also clear
to Secretary Forrestal; the National Security Act had to
be amended. In June 191+8 Forrestal had ordered all of the
leadership within the National Military Establishment to
cooperate with the Committee of the Hoover Commission that
162was studying the organizational problems of the NME.
Forrestal to Symington, April 21, 19i+8, RG3ij.O, 
S/AF, Special Interest File IjA, Reorganization of NME, 
National Archives. Text of statement of service functions 
is in ibid. See also, Joint Army and Air Force Bulletin, 
No. 13, May 13, 19lj.8. For text of original' draft, see 
New York Times, March 28, I9I4.8.
l^Truman, Memoirs, II, 5>2-53.
l62Eberstadt to Forrestal, May 31» 19^8, RG3ij.O,
S/AF, Special File 1]JB, Hoover Commission— Reorganiz at ion of 
the NME, National Archives. Forrestal to Secretary of the 
Air Force, et. al., June 2, 19lf.8, ibid. The Commission on 
Organization ofThe Executive Branch of the Government, 
directed by Herbert Hoover, was established by Congress at 
Truman's request, in December, 19^5* Forrestal's old 
friend and associate, Ferdinand Eberstadt, was chairman of 
the Committee on the National Security Organization of the 
Hoover Commission. Truman, Memoirs, I, if.86.
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The Defense Secretary also sought recommendations from the 
departmental secretaries and the military chiefs, asking 
that they report to him by September 1.^^
The reports submitted to Forrestal showed the usual 
divergence of views existing between the services. For 
example, Secretary of the Navy Sullivan advised "that no 
amendments to the National Security Act of '19i+7 be made 
at this time."^^' An opposite view was expressed by Air 
Force Secretary Symington. He proposed strengthening the 
Office of Secretary of Defense by changing the language 
of the unification act to eliminate divided responsibility 
and centralize authority with the Defense Secretary. 
Symington also proposed the appointment of an Under Secre­
tary to assist Forrestal along with a single Chief of Staff 
of the Armed Forces, responsible only to the Secretary of 
Defense. He also recommended that the law be changed to 
eliminate the Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force from 
membership in the National Security Council, leaving the 
Secretary of Defense as the sole representative of the
■^^Forrestal to Secretaries of Army, Navy, Air 
Force, August 1̂., 19i4-8, RG330, OSD, D70-1-5, National 
Archives.
1 ̂ Sullivan to Forrestal, September 1,
RG330, OSD, D70-1-5, National Archives.
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165National Military Establishment. Symington’s views, 
which were consonant with those held by both Forrestal and 
Truman, eventually became part of the amended act.
Forrestal, as he received these reports, was also 
cognizant of a report to the President on the status of 
national preparedness made by the National Security 
Council. The report informed Truman that the country was 
not internally secure nor was it ready in the event of a 
conflict with other large nations, a declaration of war
by or upon this nation, or a normal or unconventional
l66surprise attack. It was with these several reports on
his mind that Forrestal drafted a long memorandum to
Truman on September 16, 19l|8. The Secretary reviewed the
subject of national defense , which was his immediate
responsibility under the President, and urged upon Truman
his conviction that little could be done until the
authority and responsibility were centralized in one
office of the government. Forrestal had in Truman a
16 vsympathetic audience.
The Secretary of Defense sent his first draft of
l6f?Symington to Forrestal, September llj., 19^8,
RG3J4.O, S/AF, Special File 1+B, Hoover Commission—  
Reorganization of the NME, National Archives.
1 66The Security Council advisory is quoted in a 
memorandum, Forrestal to Truman, September 16, 19l]-8,
RG330, OSD, CD22-1-5, National Archives.
•^^Ibid. See also, Rogow, Victim of Duty, 270.
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revisions in the National Security Act to the White House
l68early in December. Truman apparently asked Forrestal 
to revise his recommendations in cooperation with the 
Budget Director and his White House Counsel, for two sub­
sequent draft proposals— January 2J4. and February 10,
19ij.9--bear the signatures of Frank Pace, Jr. and Clark 
169Clifford. The President could derive some satisfaction
from these recommendations, since, to a quite appreciable 
extent, they proposed the kind of unification that Truman 
had asked for in his original message to Congress of 
December 19, 19
The President sent a special message to Congress on 
March 5, 19lf-9, requesting changes in the National Military 
Establishment. He based his request on the experience 
gained under the National Security Act and on the Hoover 
Commission Report on the National Security Organization, 
which had recently been submitted to the Congress. The 
message followed very closely the recommendations made in
l68Marx Leva to Clifford, December 3, 191+8, Clifford 
Papers, Subject File, National Military Establishment: 
Security Council, Truman Library.
169^0 draft memorandum, dated January 21+, 19i+9, 
is in Clifford Papers, Subject File, Unification:
Amendment of National Security Act, 191+9, Truman Library. 
The draft of February 10, 19^9 can be found in Eisenhower 
Papers, PF/DDE, Truman folder (2), Eisenhower Library.
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the February 10 memorandum from Forrestal, Pace and 
Clifford.170
After following the normal legislative process, 
without the interservice struggles that characterized the 
original reorganization, save for a continued opposition 
from the Navy Department, Truman’s proposals became law on 
August 10, as the National Security Act Amendments of 
19̂ 4-9- At the bill-signing ceremony, Truman said that he 
was pleased that the act had passed embodying most of the 
recommendations he had made, as well as several suggestions 
made by the Hoover Commission: "These provisions afford
sound basis for further progress toward the unification of 
our Armed Forces and the unified management of our military 
affairs,
IfOltem No. 5>0, Special Message to Congress or 
Reorganization of the National Military Establishment, 
March 5, 19lj.9> Public Papers . . . Truman, 19hS» 163-66.
See also, Forrestal, et. al., to Truman, February 10, 19ll9, 
RG3/l;0, S/AF, AF381, National Archives. A Defense Depart­
ment staff paper comparing the Truman and Eberstadt 
recommendations is "Tab C" to a memorandum, Marx Leva to 
Forrestal, April 7, 19i+9, RG330, OSD, D70-1-5, National 
Archives. For the recommendations made by the Hoover 
Commission, see "Recommendations of Hoover Commission 
Report on National Security Organization," Clifford Papers, 
Subject File, National Military Establishment, Security 
Resources Board, Truman Library. See also the exerpted 
version of the Eberstadt Commission Report in Hoover 
Commission Report, 192-97-
•^Item No. 1771 Statement by the President Upon 
Signing the National Security Act Amendments of 191+9,
August 10, 1949, Public Papers . . . Truman, 19il9, Ip.7-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Under the terms of the act, the National Military 
Establishment became the Department of Defense, an execu­
tive department of the government. The Army, Navy and Air 
Force became military departments within the Defense 
Department, rather than executive departments. The powers 
of the Secretary of Defense were significantly expanded 
giving him a far more effective control over the entire 
military. He was also provided with an Under Secretary 
of Defense and three Assistant Secretaries, all civilians. 
The Chiefs of Staff lost their individual influence with 
the Commander in Chief, but the JCS gained a chairman who, 
as military adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the 
President, represented the views of the military to these 
officials and in the National Security Council. The post 
of Chief of Staff to the President was abolished, although 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in practice, 
would function in approximately the same capacity. A 
fourth title was amended into the National Security Act 
providing for uniform budgetary and fiscal procedures and 
the appointment of comptrollers for the Department of 
Defense as well as the Army, Navy and Air Force.
James Forrestal never enjoyed the newly-obtained
■^^Public Law 216, 81 Cong., 1 Sess., (63 Stat.
578)• See also, Bernardo and Bacon, American MilTtary 
Policy, 14.60—61; Hoare, "Truman," 187-88; Rogow," Victim of 
Duty, 270-71.
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powers and prestige of the office. For reasons both 
personal and political, Truman forced Forrestal to resign. 
In a "Dear Jim" letter dated March 2 and made public the 
next day, Truman wrote of his reluctance to accept the 
resignation made necessary by ". . . those urgent 
personal considerations about which you have spoken to me 
so many times." The President indicated he was reassured 
to know that Forrestal would be ". . . standing by to give 
advice and counsel as we go forward in the work of 
enhancing the national security." Forrestal would not 
be "standing by" very long; he was dead before the 
amendments passed.
There can be little doubt that Truman was right in 
urging unification. The reorganization brought many
173porrestal to Truman, March 2, 191+9, Truman Papers, 
OF, 1285, Truman Library. Item No. 1+6, Letter Acoepting 
Resignation of James Forrestal as Secretary of Defense,
March 3, 191+9, Public Papers . . . Truman, 191+9, 160. 
Forrestal was apprently suffering from severe mental strain. 
In late 191+8 and early 191+9 he became increasingly inde­
cisive and forgetful. He began to act quite erratically 
and paranoidal, convinced he was constantly being followed 
and that his telephone was tapped. Correspondents, with 
Drew Pearson taking the lead, had been attacking him and 
suggesting that Truman wanted him out of the Cabinet. See, 
for example, Pearson's column in the Washington Post,
June 10, 191+8* Forrestal had remained aloof from’'the 191+8 
presidential campaign, while the man chosen as his 
successor, Louis Johnson, had been the chief fund-raiser 
for the Democrats. Rogow claims that the Secret Service 
reported to Truman "late in 191+8 or early in 191+9>11 that 
Forrestal was suffering from "a total psychotic breakdown 
. . . characterized by suicidal features." Victim of Duty, 
271-73, 277-80, 306. See also, Millis (ed.), Forrestal 
Diaries, 518-19, 51+1+-1+7, 550-531 Hammond, "Super Carriers 
and B-36 Bombers," 1+92; Krock, Memoirs, 252-27.
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desirable changes and ended much of the duplication and 
interservice bickering that was undesirable. Truman 
established a modern military structure capable of immed­
iate and effective response to any threat to the security 
of the nation. However, in their unity the military 
services found greater strength in making budgetary 
requests, in obtaining desired legislation in Congress 
and in determining the foreign policy of the United States. 
Military strength grew so much following unification that 
Truman's successor, the most honored military officer of 
this century, took the occasion of his departure from the 
presidency to warn the nation against the dangers implicit 
in the power of the "military-industrial" complex.
Although recognizing that he had not obtained the 
full, "true" unification desired, Truman was proud of what 
had been accomplished in that direction: "To me, the
passage of the National Security Act and its strengthening
17^-Time, XCIII (April 11, 1969), 22. The same issue 
also quotes retired Marine Commandant General David Shoup 
as charging that the officer corps' romanticizing of war, 
along with the influence of the ''defense community," had 
led to the United States becoming a "militaristic and 
aggressive nation." See ibid., 20-21. The effort to pro­
vide an efficient military organization has-obviously-not 
been an unalloyed triumph. In mid-1970, a "Blue Ribbon 
Panel" reported the results of a year's study of the Defense 
Department to the President. The panel reported on 
numerous examples of gross inefficiency and recommended 
major reforms. Gilbert Pitzhugh, who headed the study, 
described the Pentagon as, ". . . just an amorphous lump 
with nobody in charge of anything. See ibid., XCVI 
(August 10, 1970), off.
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amendments represented one of the outstanding achievements 
of my administration."^7% Some time after his presidency, 
Truman was asked if the unification process should continue 
so that there could be an even-tighter amalgamation of the 
armed forces. He replied:
There isn’t a doubt in the world but that the 
whole thing ought to be tightened up so that the 
President, as commander-in-chief, could deal through 
a Secretary of Defense who should have direct control 
of the defenses of the nation. . . .  We need to get 
the idea over that the Defense Department of the 
Government of the United States is of vital 
importance and must not be tampered with by conflict­
ing forces. It ought to operate under direct control 
of a man who knows where he's going and why. He 
should be the Secretary of Defense in complete 
control of all the services, ground, sea and air, 
under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief-~the 
President of the United States.
The prevailing racial attitudes in the United 
States were traditionally mirrored by the military 
services. Until the manpower demands of World War II 
made necessary the calling of men regardless of color, 
the services had enlisted a limited number of Negroes.
Those that were accepted were assigned to the more menial 
ratings and found themselves segregated from Caucasian 
servicemen. According to a War Department public statement 
in October 191̂ -0, separation of the races had proven
175>Truman, Memoirs, II, £3* 
•^^Truman, Mr. Citizen, lij.5-1̂ 6.
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"satisfactory over a long period of years"; any change 
might hamper national defense preparations and be detri­
mental to morale.-*-7? The Navy Department was blunter:
"The policy of not enlisting men of the colored race for 
any branch of the naval service but the messman’s branch 
was adopted to meet the best interests of general ship 
efficiency."1^® During the war, although the number of 
black persons in all of the services increased, they were 
normally assigned to all-Negro units. These units were 
often given insignificant duties or ignored altogether.
An example of this attitude was the experience of several 
Negro air units which were in training for well over a 
year; they were not considered for combat service until
w. Kenworthy, "Taps for Jim Crow in the 
Services," New York Times Magazine (June 11, 19$0), 12.
Hereinafter cited as Kenworthy, ^aps for Jim Crow in the 
Services." Kenworthy served as executive secretary on the 
President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Oppor­
tunity in the Armed Forces. See also, Richard M. Dalfiume, 
Desegregation of the U.S.Armed Forces: Fighting on Two 
Fronts, 1939-1^3 (CoTumbia, Missouri: University of 
Missouri Press, 1969), 38-39. Hereinafter cited as 
Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces. For a 
thorough, but generally uncriticaT study of the1 Negro 
soldier in World War II, see Ulysses Lee, The Employment 
of Negro Troops, in Stetson Conn (genl. ed.), United 
Spates Army in World War II (Washington, 1966).
^fytenworthy, "Taps for Jim Crow in the Services," 
12. See also, Jean Byers, "A Study of the Negro in 
Military Service," (263-page, mimeographed, restricted 
document, "reproduced for departmental use," January,
1950), 1. Copy in RG340, S/AF, Special Interest File,
19l}.8—19ip9, National Archives. Hereinafter cited as Byers, 
"A Study of the Negro in Military Serivce."
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black Congressmen began to apply pressure. At the request 
of the War Department, General MacArthur " . . .  agreed to 
take a composite group of two medium bombardment and one 
P-lj.7 fighter squadron, provided we assure him it is 
properly trained, and well organized and led. . . ."179
Improvement in the postwar period was slight. The 
Navy had begun integrating Negroes into numerous branches 
and departments during the war and in February 19^6 
lifted all racial restrictions as to the assignments of 
Negro personnel. But the implementation of this non- 
discriminatory policy was very slow. The great majority 
of enlisted blacks continued to serve as messmen, and there 
were only two Negro officers in the entire Navy in April 
of 192+6. In early 19if7 the Marines gave every enlisted 
Negro the option of transferring to the steward's branch 
or being discharged from the Corps. Army integration in 
the postwar period existed almost exclusively as a 
recommendation on paper.'1'®®
On December 5* 19lf-6, by Executive Order 9808,
Truman created the President’s Committee on Civil Rights 
with instructions to investigate and make recommendations
179jra Eaker to Joseph T. McNarney, June 2, 1945* 
RG118, AAF, 312.1 - Operations ltrs. - 19i+5 (v. 3) >
National Archives.
l80Byers, "A Study of the Negro in Military Service," 
262-63. Copy in RG3lj.O, S/AF, Special Interest File,
192+8—19i+9 i N at i onal Ar chi ve s .
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to him on all areas of religious and racial discrimination
1 ftlin the United States. The committee took the President
at his word. The report to Truman, entitled ”To Secure 
These Rights" was submitted in October, 1947* The report 
was a stinging condemnation of bias in America; it made 
numerous recommendations with regard to voting rights, 
anti-lynch laws, fair employment practices for federal 
employees, naturalization procedures and discrimination 
in the armed forces. One writer has called the committee's 
report, " . . .  one of the great documents in the tradition
. x. M182of our free society.
To implement the report, the President sent a special 
message to Congress, February 2, 191̂ 8. In it, Truman 
went right down the line in asking for legislation 
suggested in the committee’s ten basic recommendations.
He also announced that he had already taken steps (for 
which he did not need legislative sanction): He had
created the Civil Rights Division within the Department of 
Justice, ordering the FBI to closely assist the new
l8lTruman, Memoirs, II, 180. See also, Item No. 9, 
Remarks to Members of the President’s Committee on Civil 
Rights, January 15, 1947, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1947, 
98-99.
^®^John P. Roche, The Quest for the Dream: The 
Development of Civil Rights and Human Relations in Modern 
America (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), 238. See also, 
Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U..S. Armed Forces, 155-56; 
Truman, Memoirs, II, lBl. For Truman's message praising 
the report see Item No. 215, Public Papers . . . Truman, 
1947, 479-80.
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division. Truman also informed the Congress that he had 
" . . .  instructed the Secretary of Defense to take steps 
to have the remaining instances of discrimination in the 
armed services eliminated as rapidly as possible."'1'®̂  As 
he might have expected, the Congress took no action.
Political controversy clouded the civil rights 
question. In May 191+8 Truman’s request for Selective 
Service legislation faced opposition from southern Demo­
crats because of his order to Forrestal to eliminate 
discrimination in the military forces. But Truman told 
reporters that his order to the Secretary of Defense 
remained u n c h a n g e d . P o l i t i c a l  considerations did 
cause Truman to postpone executive action to end racial 
discrimination in federal agencies and in the military 
departments. A Washington correspondent reported that on 
the advice of J. Howard McGrath, Chairman of the Demo­
cratic National Committee, Truman had decided to delay 
any action until after he had received the presidential
1®3jtem No. 20, Special Message to the Congress on 
Civil Rights, February 2, 191+8, Public Papers . . . Truman, 
191+8, 121-26.
181+New York Times, May 28, 191+8. Forrestal, who 
believed completely in the idea, had begun work upon 
receipt of the President’s orders. See, for example, his 
interim progress report in a memorandum, Forrestal to 
Truman, February 29, 3-91+8, RG330, OSD, CD25-1-11,
National Archives .
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l8£nomination of his party.
Ten days after winning the nomination, Truman 
issued two Presidential decrees. The first, Executive 
Order 9980, established fair employment policies for all 
departments of the executive branch of the national govern­
ment. The second, Executive Order 9981, was the pivotal 
step in reforming the racial policies of the American 
military. The major provisions of the order are quoted 
below:
WHEREAS it is essential that there be maintained 
in the armed services of the United States the highest 
standards of democracy, with equality of treatment and 
opportunity for all those who serve in our country’s 
defense:
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in 
me as President of the United States . . . and as 
Commander in Chief of the armed services, it is hereby 
ordered as follows:
1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the 
President that there shall be equality of treament 
and opportunity for all persons in the armed services 
without regard to race, color, religion or national 
origin. This policy shall be put into effect as 
rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time 
required to effectuate any necessary changes without 
impairing efficiency or morals.
2. There shall be created in the National Military 
Establishment an advisory committee to be known as the 
President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and 
Opportunity in the Armed Services, which shall be 
composed of seven members to be designated by the 
President.
3. The Committee is authorized on behalf of the 
President to examine into the rules, procedures, and
iQ^James a . Wechsler, New York Post, June 6, 1948.
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practices of the armed services in order to determine 
in what respect such rules, procedures and practices 
may be altered or improved with a view to carrying 
out the policy of this order.^°°
Prodded by the Secretary of Defense and the Presi­
dent's Committee, the military departments began to 
initiate new policies designed to end discrimination.
The Army and Navy were relatively slow in implementing 
these policies, while the Air Force set the pace under the 
leadership of Stuart Symington. The relative slowness of 
change in the Navy Department would appear to come from 
an inherent traditionalism which was slow to accept 
change, rather than any general desire to subvert Truman's 
orders. The Army, however, was not encouraged to move 
toward desegregation by the attitude of Secretary Royall.
In April 191+8 Forrestal had assembled a conference of 
fifteen Negro leaders to get their views on how best to
l86ji;Xecutive Order 9981, July 26, 19i+8 (13 F.R., 
1+311+). Text of both orders is in Joint Army and ATr Force 
Bulletin, No. 32 (August 2, 191+8) • See also, Richard J. 
Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces 
(New York: Frederick a . PraegerJ l9"̂ ET)7 1+1 —1+2*. Hereinafter 
cited as Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the U.jS. 
Armed Forces. Original draft is in Clifford Papers, Sub­
ject File, Segregation in the Armed Forces, Truman Library. 
The original idea for the committee was Clark Clifford's:
"I would suggest . . .  a defense establishment board . . . 
charged with the development of a uniform racial policy in 
the Services consistent with the President's two goals of 
equal opportunity and non-discrimination." Clifford to 
Truman, May 11, 19lj-8, Clifford Papers, Subject 'File, Segre­
gation in the Armed Forces, Truman Library. Clifford 
repeated this proposal in a memorandum to Secretary 
Forrestal, May 13, 19lj-8, Clifford Papers, Subject File, 
Unification: Secretary of Defense, Truman Library.
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improve race relations in the military. During the 
meeting Royall held firm to the Army policy of keeping 
black soldiers in segregated units. Royall told the 
conferees that this segregation did not represent discrimi­
nation.'1'®̂  In a bitter memorandum to the Secretary of 
Defense several months later, Royall complained that the 
Army was taking an unfair "rap" from ". . . the Negro and 
the liberal press in the matter of race relations." The 
Army Secretary recognized that the attacks stemmed from 
his remarks at the April meeting, but he told Forrestal 
that since neither the President nor the Secretary of 
Defense had disapproved of the Army policy, Forrestal 
should now publicly endorse it. If not, Royall continued, 
he would feel it necessary to make public " . . .  the facts 
showing the tacit approval of the Army’s position and 
demonstrating the fact that our own treatment of the Negro 
is equal to that of the Air Force and superior to that of 
the Navy."188
l87New York Times, April 27, 19i+8j Baltimore Sun, 
April 27, 19^8. See also, Dalfiume, Desegregation ot the 
U.S. Armed Forces, 165-6&; Stillman, Integration of~T;he 
Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces, 2+0i Barton J. Bernstein, 
^The' AmEiguous Legacy: The Truman Administration and Civil 
Rights," in Bernstein (ed.), Politics and Policies of the 
Truman Administration (Chicago! Quandrangle Books, T^YOTT 
256-87. Hereinafter cited as Bernstein, "The Ambiguous 
Legacy."
l88Royall to Forrestal, September 22, 19^8, RG330, 
OSD, CD30-1-2, National Archives.
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Despite Royall*s comments, it seems clear that the 
Air Force had adopted a much more enlightened policy. In 
January 1949 Symington approved an Air Force policy that, 
except for allowing the continuation of a few all-Negro 
units, proposed a complete end to any racial reference as 
a factor in determining personnel p o l i c i e s . O n e  other 
qualification was made in a memorandum to commanding 
officers describing implementation of the order: "Care
should be taken to insure that a reasonably small number 
of Negro personnel is assigned to any individual white 
organization."190 Symington was clearly in earnest when 
he told the Secretary of Defense and later the President 
that he planned ". . . to completely eliminate segregation 
in the Air Force. "193.
Louis Johnson, who replaced Forrestal as Secretary
l89Eugene M. fcuckert to Symington, January 12,
1949, RG3J+0, S/AF, Special Interest File, 35-Staff,
National Archives. The original draft of Symington's 
order to all commanding officers is in RG340* S/AF, Special 
Interest File (35) > Negro Affairs— 1949* National Archives.
1^°R. E. Nugent to Symington, et. al., January 3, 
1949* RG340, S/AF, Special Interest FlTe,""35-Staff,
Nat ional Archi ve s.
"Meeting of the President and the Four Service 
Secretaries with the President's Committee on Equality of 
Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, 12:15 
P.M., 12 January, 1949* Cabinet Room, White House," in 
RG330, OSD, D54“l~l6, National Archives. See also, 
Symington to Forrestal, January 6, 1949* RG330, OSD, 
CD30-1-2, National Archives.
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of Defense at the end of March, issued a directive to 
the service secretaries in early April, 1949, establishing 
"supplemental policies" to Truman's Executive Order 9981. 
Johnson insisted that there must be uniform application 
of the racial equality policy throughout the armed 
services.^92 subatance and some of the language of
the Johnson directive were quite similar to the statement 
of policy that Symington had proposed for the Air Force 
in January.
The final report of the President's Committee on 
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed 
Services, entitled "Freedom to Serve," was submitted to 
Truman on May 22, 1950. The Committee was able to report 
that significant strides had been made. The Navy had 
eliminated all vestiges of segregation and opened all 
jobs, ratings and technical schools without regard to 
race. The Marine Corps had eliminated segregation in 
basic training, but still assigned some black Marines to 
all-Negro units. The Air Force had established its
•̂ 92Johnson to Secretaries of Army, Navy, Air Force 
and Chairman, Personnel Policy Board, April 6, 1949,
RG330, OSD, SD291.2— Negroes, National Archives. For the 
Secretary of Defense's explanation of the need for his 
servicewide directive of April 6, see letter, Louis 
Johnson to Lyndon B. Johnson, July 8, 1949, RG330, OSD, 
D54-1-6, National Archives. Secretary of the Army Royall 
resigned effective April 27. See Truman to Royall,
April 21, 1949, Truman Papers, OF, 1285-B, Department of 
the Army (1949), Truman Library.
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policy of equality in the spring of 19lf9 and at the time 
of the report was proceeding with the phasing-out of the 
few segregated units remaining. By January 1950 the 
Army had removed racial restrictions from all jobs and 
technical schools and discontinued the practice of 
assigning Negroes to overhead (housekeeping) units. An 
Army policy change of March 27, 1950, ended the ten per­
cent limit on Negro strength in the Army and the racial 
quotas on enlistments were d i s c o n t i n u e d . ^93 The Korean 
War began soon after the report was submitted to Truman. 
During the course of the Korean emergency, the military 
services, particularly the Army, were able to eliminate 
the majority of segregated units and discriminatory
193Excerpts from the key portions of the report 
are, Item No. 121, Freedom to Serve: Report of the
President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and 
Opportunity in the Armed Services, in Leslie H. Fishel,
Jr. and Benjamin Quarles (eds.), The Black American: A
Brief Documentary History (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, 
Foresman and!Company, 1970), 312-11).. See also, Dalfiume, 
Desegregation of the U.J3. Armed Forces, 198-200;
Kenworthy, "Taps for Tim Crow in the Services, ,f 21)..
There is some evidence that Truman had to intervene 
directly with Gordon Gray, then Secretary of the Army, 
to have the racial quotas dropped. See Gray to Truman. 
March 1, 1950, Truman Papers, OF, 1285B, Department of 
the Army, Truman Library. Gray to Truman, March 11, 1950, 
ibid. Truman to Gray, March 27, 1950, RG335, Office of 
the Secretary of theArmy (0SA), 291.2, National 
Archives.
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practices
Although Truman was frustrated by the Congress in 
his efforts to guarantee the civil rights of all American 
citizens, his success in eliminating racial bias in the 
military service has earned him a permanent status among 
the courageous few who championed civil rights when it was 
not yet a popular cause. The example set by the military 
establishment in eliminating jde jure and de facto bias 
gave an immeasurable, but undoubtedly strong, impetus to 
the civil rights movement in the civilian community. If 
America can one day stand free at last of racial bigotry 
it can well reflect that Harry Truman's desegregation of 
the armed forces was an important early step on the road 
to that utopia.
^F o r  example, in July, 19^1» General Marshall, 
then Secretary of Defense, was able to tell two Senators 
who inquired that racially-segregated units had been 
almost totally eliminated in the Far Eastern Command 
(Korea and Japan) and that progress was being made in 
other areas, . . to carry forward the principle of 
integration in a planned and orderly manner." Marshall to 
Herbert H. Lehman and Hubert H. Humphrey, July 20, 19$1, 
RG330, OSD, SD291.2, National Archives. General Matthew 
B. Ridgway recommended and was very active in bringing 
about the integration of the units in his Far Eastern 
Command. See Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting 
Front in Stetson Conn (genl. ed),UnTted States Army in 
the Korean War (Washington, 1966), lOlf.-lO'̂  See also, 
Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, 210-11; 
Bernstein, "The Ambiguous Legacy,** 297-96.
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CHAPTER VI
THE COLD WAR YEARS
We must not at any time falter in maintaining 
our strong position, no matter what it costs, 
since we are the principal discouraging force to 
Communist imperialism--and to war.l
The most immediate military problem facing Truman 
at the end of the Second World War was demobilization.
At war's end the United States faced the problem of an 
orderly disassemblage of the mightiest war machine the 
world had ever known. There were over twelve million men 
and women in uniform in mid-19ij-5 and over seven million
Owere stationed outside of the United States. Planning 
for the eventual release of these personnel began during 
the war, and, in September 19ijij. the War Department 
announced that releases would be by a point system on an 
individual basis. A serviceman accumulated points for 
length of service, number of children, overseas service
^Truman, Mr. Citizen, 20lj..
^R. Alton Lee, "The Army ’Mutiny’ of 19k&* " Journal 
of American History, LIII, No. 3 (December 196b), 55T« 
Hereinafter cited as Lee, "The Army ’Mutiny’ of 19ij.6.i” See 
also, Rostow, United States in the World Arena, 265.
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and combat experience, as well as a set scale of points
3for various military decorations.
Military planning, which had the President's 
approval, provided for an orderly, gradual demobilization 
of forces. The postwar Array strength was set at one and 
a half million; the Navy expected a six hundred thousand 
man force; and the Army Air Force was hopeful of becoming 
a separate service with about four hundred thousand 
m e m b e r s T r u m a n  and the military planners were to find 
that their orderly demobilization schedules would become 
irrelevant in the face of concerted pressure for the 
immediate release of all servicemen. As Truman recalled, 
"With the end of hostilities in the Pacific, the public 
demand for the discharge of the millions of men in the 
service became insistent."^ Truman told an August 23 
press conference that talks with his military leaders had 
led him to the conclusion that the armed services were 
doing all that they possibly could to expedite the 
demobilization process.^
In his special message to Congress on September 6,
-^Truman, Memoirs, I, 506; Lee, "The Army 'Mutiny' 
of 191^6," 556.
^American Military History, 530.
-’Truman, Memoirs, I, 506.
^Item No. 107* Press Conference, August 23* 19i|5* 
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19l;5* 233.
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191+5# the President asked Congress to continue conscrip­
tion, since enlistments would not fill the anticipated gap 
created by discharging those who served during the war. 
Truman told Congress that to suspend inductions now would 
be "an unforgivable discrimination . . . requiring
continued sacrifice from those who have already done their 
7part." The President already knew that retention of some
veterans was inevitable. He gave some indication of that
in his message, since he asked for continuation of the war
powers granted to the executive branch and he asked the
Congress not to pass a resolution declaring that the war
had ended. The war statute declared that those inducted
could not be retained beyond six months of the war’s 
8termination.
What Truman was trying to make clear in his several 
statements on demobilization was that the postwar military
^Item No. 128, Special Message to the Congress 
Presenting a 21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period, 
September 6, 191+5# Public Papers . . . Truman, 191+5# 288.
8Ibid., 277-78, 288-89. In a letter on August 23, 
191+5# to Senator Elbert Thomas, Chairman of the Military 
Affairs Committee, Truman said that the necessary force 
levels could not be attained by enlistments and induction 
alone and that some World War II veterans would have to be 
retained in the service. Quoted in Lee, "The Army ’Mutiny’ 
of 191+6," 557* The portion of Truman’s message to Congress 
dealing with selective service and retention of veterans, 
as well as the letter to Senator Thomas, were drafted by 
General Marshall, then Army Chief of Staff. See Marshall 
to Truman, August 23, 191+5# Rosenman Papers, Subject Eile, 
Message to Congress, Truman Library.
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posture of the United States was to be far different from
our past experience. The President envisioned a new
military and foreign policy that rejected traditional
isolationism and projected the United States into the role
of defender of the peace. "We are committed now," Truman
told Congress, "to an armed occupation of the lands of
our defeated enemies. . . .  To meet these . . . obligations
will require the maintenance for some time of a real
9measure of our present land, sea, and air power. " Much
of what Truman said with regard to the postwar military
reflected the views of General Marshall. For example,
in the biennial report which Marshall had made to the
President in June of 1 9 he had written:
We finish each bloody war with a feeling of acute 
revulsion against this savage form of human behavior, 
and yet on each occasion we confuse military pre­
paredness with the causes of war and then drift 
almost deliberately into another catastrophe. . . .
We have ignored the hard realities of world affairs.
We have been purely idealistic.
. . . until . . .  a solution is found to prevent 
wars, a rich nation which lays down its arms as we 
have done after every war in our history, will court 
disaster. The existence of the complex and fearful 
instruments of destruction now available make this a 
simple truth which is, in my opinion, undebatable .10
%tem No. 128, Special Message to the Congress Pre­
senting a 21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period, 
September 6, 19i|5>, Public Papers . . . Truman, 19k$» 288.
lOttpor the Common Defense: Biennial Report of the 
Chief of Staff, July 1, 19̂ 4-3 to June 30, 194£»" quoted in 
Millis (ed.), American Military Thought, 436-37»
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Global military policy did not concern the service­
men who, having fought the good fight, wanted to return to 
their homes and families. Neither they nor their relatives 
and congressmen could understand why the mustering-out 
process should take so long. As the clamor rose, Truman 
tried to stem it with a statement issued on September 19* 
telling the nation that the Army assured him they would 
have two million out before Christmas and that there was 
no "padding” of the size of the postwar forces. The 
country would maintain only those numbers necessary to 
meet "national commitments"; he had ordered that all other 
military personnel be discharged as rapidly as possible.^
The original form of protest to the pace of 
demobilization was a letter-writing campaign directed 
at Congress by parents and wives of servicemen, and, 
eventually, letters from the servicemen themselves. The 
letters were followed by petitions and cables to the 
President and the Congress. The Army responded by reducing 
the total points required for discharge eligibility some 
five times in the closing months of 19l}-5. This rapid 
reduction in requirements overtaxed the available trans­
port, which the Navy tried partially to offset by
■^Item No. 138, Statement by the President Concern­
ing Demobilization of the Armed Forces, September 19, 19lj-£, 
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19l|5, 327-28; Truman, Memoirs,
I, £07-508":
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temporarily converting over forty cruisers, battleships
and carriers into troop transports. Demobilization
succeeded to the extent that a War Department announcement
in early 1914-6 stated that inductions were not high enough
to meet overseas troop requirements, so that the one and
a half million servicemen then eligible for discharge
would be released gradually over a six-month period,
12rather than the planned three month span.
The resentment and frustration which had been 
accumulating among troops idled by victory six months and 
more was ignited by the War Department announcement. The 
protests now took the form of non-violent mass marches 
and demonstrations, the first by 20,000 soldiers in Manila 
on January 6. Similar protests occurred in France,
England, Guam, China, Japan, Germany, Hawaii, Austria,
India and the United States.^ Two days after the initial 
mass demonstration at Manila, the White House released a 
Presidential statement on demobilization. In the message 
Truman said that in consideration of the shipping involved, 
as well as the clerical mountains that had to be moved, 
the processing was going as fast as possible. About
•^Lee, "The Army 'Mutiny' of 19ij.6," 558-61;
American Military History, 530.
■^Lee, "The Array 'Mutiny' of 19ij.6," 562-63;
American Military History, 530.
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eight and one-half million had been separated from the 
service in the months since the fighting ended in Europe.
Already the critical need for troops overseas has 
begun to slow down the Army’s rate of demobilization. 
This is not an arbitrary action on the part of the 
Army. . . .
To satisfy myself that demobilization is being 
carried out with all possible speed, I have reviewed 
once more the Army and Navy procedures. I am con­
vinced, as every other American who examines the 
record must be, that the services are carrying out 
demobilization with commendable efficiency and with 
justice to all concerned .li|
Patterson and Forrestal had met with Truman on 
October 26, 19k$} and warned him that the continuous 
acceleration of the demobilization process was endangering 
the strategic military posture of the United States in 
its world-wide commitments. Truman was of a like mind:
"I agreed entirely with this view and stated at that 
meeting that . . . the program we were following was no 
longer demobilization— it was disintegration of our armed 
forces. " ^  Thus while privately recognizing that the 
system was chaotic, Truman allowed it to continue because 
of political pressure and publicly praised demobilization’s
■^Item No. 8, Statement by the President on Demobi­
lization, January 8, 19^6> Public Papers . . . Truman, 19l;6,
15.
^Truman, Memoirs, I, £09. There is ample evidence 
that both the President and the military agreed as to the 
dire effects of the program. For example, Eisenhower could 
write to the President about the "demoralization” of the 
"entire Army" that was brought about by the "drastic demobi­
lization program." Letter, Eisenhower to Truman, January 
30, 19U6, RGij.07, OSW, AG370.01, National Archives.
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"commendable efficiency." It is upon such rocks that the 
credibility of presidential statements run aground.
The demobilization process— which, combining 
Truman's public and private utterances, could be styled 
"efficient disintegration"— continued throughout 19ij-6 and 
into 19i+7• By June 30, 19l)-7, there were just over a 
million and a half under arms . The Army ground forces 
numbered just under seven hundred thousand. For this 
same date, the Army had projected a two million-man force, 
but the pressure for accelerated demobilization, budget 
cuts by Truman and further cuts by Congress, had altered 
these plans. By July, 19i+6, Army Chief of Staff Eisen­
hower was vainly hopeful of getting a ceiling of 1,070,000
16officers and men. An Army spokesman said that of these
numbers, only about two and one-third divisions were
available for immediate deployment in a national security
emergency. By mid-19l+7» the American Army ranked sixth
17in size among the nations of the world.
Numerous factors were converging in the early post­
war period, and these in their own mass and momentum 
changed American strategic thinking. The rapid demobili­
zation, combined with a traditional American distaste for
^Letter, Eisenhower to Matthew J. Connelly,
July 27, 19i|.6, Eisenhower Papers, PF/DDE, Truman folder 
(1), Eisenhower Library.
■^Osgood, Limited War, l£4*
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a large standing armed force, the defeat of Truman’s 
universal training proposal and the forced budgetary 
economies sharply reduced the size of the military estab­
lishment. Roughly half of the forces-in-being were 
employed as policemen, i.e., enforcing occupation policies 
in Germany, Japan and Korea. With the portents of war 
with the Soviet Union an increasingly insistent theme of 
the early Cold War years, the United States was impelled 
to prepare for war in time of peace for the first time in 
its history. The final factor in the evolving equation 
was the existence of nuclear weapons.
These imperatives brought to the forefront a growing 
reliance on a strategic air force armed with atomic 
bombs. The concept of employing conventional, ready 
forces as a deterrent to aggression received lip-service, 
but was gradually losing out to the "air-atomic reaction" 
school of thought. This type of planning did not prepare 
the United States for the conventional, limited warfare 
that it eventually became involved with in Korea and 
IndoChina.
•̂ Ibid. See also. O'Connor, "Harry S. Truman:
New Dimensions of Power," 30-31; Millis, Arms and Men,
273; American Military History, $l\.0; David S. McLellan and 
John W. Reuss,” "Foreign and Military Policies," in Richard 
S. Kirkendall (ed.), The Truman Period as a Research 
Field (Columbia, Missouri T  University of mTs s our i £ress, 
W ,  76-77* Hereinafter cited as McLellan and Reuss, 
"Foreign and Military Policies." It is well to note here, 
that while the armed services were reduced to levels well
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Truman came to the presidency convinced from his 
Truman Committee experience that the military services 
had " . . .  unquestionably squandered billions of 
dollars."^ In planning for the 19i}.6 budget during the 
closing days of World War II, Truman developed a "remainder 
method" of determining military allocations; he would 
continue to employ this standard until the advent of the 
Korean War. The method involved subtracting all antici­
pated expenditures of the civilian government from
anticipated revenues, the remainder determining the
20dollar ceiling on military appropriations.
The Navy fought hardest against the cancellation 
of shipbuilding contracts and the reduced spending levels 
in the postwar budget. Truman had cut back on all ship 
construction that was less than fifty percent completed. 
Forrestal .struggled with the President, in the first of
below those desired by Truman and the military, this still 
left the United States with the largest peacetime military 
establishment in its history. By 19l|-7* one-third of the 
total national budget was being appropriated to the 
military. Ekirch, Civilian and the Military, 273•
^Quoted in a diary entry, June 5, 19k5> Smith 
Papers, Diary, copy in the Truman Library of the original in 
the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. In a similar vein,
Truman wrote: "I knew . . . that Army and Navy profes­
sionals seldom had any idea of the value of money. They did 
not seem to care what the cost was. . . . "  Memoirs, I, 88.
20American Military History, 530-31. The Eightieth 
Congress, which convened in January, 19i|.7, with both houses 
dominated by the Republicans, will force much greater 
economies on the military than Truman ever had.
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several appropriations fights, to reinstate five heavy
21cruisers to the Navy. The Navy, as well as the other 
services, found that Truman was very difficult to move on 
budget questions. He told the Budget Director in Feb­
ruary 19^6, in the midst of a naval personnel dispute,
22that his instructions were to hold the budget line.
Forrestal told the President in August that it would
jeopardize the security of the nation to meet the budget
23reductions he had ordered for the Navy. In a very 
crisp reply, the President instructed the Secretary of 
the Navy to reduce naval expenditures to the levels 
called for. He also informed Forrestal that in the 
future he wanted a monthly report submitted to him through 
the Bureau of the Budget, detailing actual and projected 
expenditures of the Navy Department.2 -̂ Truman wrote in 
his Memoirs that he found that the military always made 
excessive budgetary demands, " . . .  but the Navy was the
piForrestal to Truman, November 2, 1945* Historical 
Records Division, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),
(SC)Al|-l (11), Navy Yard.
22Diary Entries, September 13, 19̂ 5>> February 18, 
191̂ 6, Smith Papers, Diary, copy in the Truman Library of 
the original in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
^Forrestal to Truman, August 21, 19I+6, Historical 
Records Division, CNO, (SC) Ll-1, Navy Yard.
^Truman to Forrestal, October 9, 19l|6, ibid.
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25>worst offender." However, the most extensive and 
acrimonious dispute over the military budget arose out of 
the Air Force1s demand for seventy air groups.
Because of rapid developments in civilian and 
military aviation which dated most aviation policy and 
procedures, Truman appointed a temporary "Air Policy 
Commission" in July 19^7* He charged the commission, 
chaired by Thomas K. Finletter, with the task of making 
an objective analysis of national aviation problems and 
submitting recommendations to him on an integrated
of.national aviation policy. At the same time a similar 
review was being carried out by the Joint Congressional 
Aviation Policy Board. Upon completion, the studies were 
found to be in agreement on one important military recom­
mendation: the establishment of seventy regular air groups
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 3b* ln Chapter 3 (Vol. II), 
from which this citation is taken, Truman presents a 
detailed explanation of his budgetary methods and 
philosophy.
2^Item No. IJ4.8, Letter Appointing Members of Air 
Policy Committee, July 18, 19^7 > Public Papers . . . Truman, 
19U7i An "air group," as defined by General
Vandenberg, was structured similarly to an Army division. 
There were groups of fighter aircraft (seventy-five per 
group), and of light, medium, and heavy (or, long-range) 
bombers, with fifty, thirty-six, and thirty planes per 
group, respectively. Vandenberg testimony, Far .East 
Hearings, Pt. 2, IZ4.27 -
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2 7within the Air Force. 1 However, in his budget message to 
Congress on January 12, 19lj.8, the President said, "The
plans for the Air Force contemplate operation of 55 combat
28groups. . . . "  Although Truman had received the Fin-
letter Commission report twelve days earlier, he released
it on the 13th, the day after the budget message was
29transmitted to Congress recommending 55 air groups.
The Air Force had apparently set a seventy air group 
goal for itself late in 19^5* How they arrived at that 
precise figure has never been made clear. Walter Millis 
has made the credible suggestion that it was probably 
based " . . .  more on a deduction as to what the taxpayer 
would stand for and the air industry could reasonably 
supply than on a calculation of the probable military 
requirements. por the next four years and more the 
Air Force's spokesmen would argue that the seventy air 
groups they were proposing represented an irreducible ,
27Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, 
k73i Rogow, Victim of Duty, 2'5lj.~. The Congressional 
Aviation Policy Board (known also as the Brewster-Hinshaw 
Board), submitted its report to Congress on March 1, 19i|.8.
po Item No. 5> Annual Budget Message to the Congress,
Fiscal Year 191+9, January 12, 19ij.8, Public Papers . . .
Truman. 19^8, 27-28.
29Item No. 7t Statement by the President Upon 
Making Public the Report of the Air Policy Commission,
January 13» 19i|8, ibid., 61.
■^Millis, Arms and Men, 277.
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minimum. As Air Secretary Symington wrote in December,
191+7* "The Air Force has consistently advocated its 70
Group Program as the minimum force adequate to the
requirements imposed by the position of the United States
31in the modern world." But with the fluid military
situation in the period 191+5--1950 and the technological
advancements in nuclear weaponry and jet propulsion, the
consistent advocacy of seventy groups had more of a
symbolic than specific meaning.
Secretary Symington, who saw the budget message
before it was sent to Congress, informed Forrestal and
White House aide Clifford that he was going to protest
over the Secretary of Defense’s head. He did so in a
letter to James Webb, Director of the Bureau of the
Budget, on December 16, 191+7• Symington warned of the
grave implications that would result from not meeting the
33Air Force seventy group proposal. While the Secretary 
of the Air Force was really attacking the budget that 
Truman wanted and had approved, he ended up in a public
^Symington to James E. Webb, December 16, 191+7* 
Clifford Papers, Subject File, National Military Establish­
ment: Air Force, Truman Library.
32Haramond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," 1+71? 
Millis, Arms and Men, 276-77.
33symington to Forrestal, Symington to Clifford, 
Symington to Webb, (all) December 16, 191+7* Clifford 
Papers, Subject File, National Military Establishment:
Air Force, Truman Library.
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fight with Forrestal, who, while opposed to the low 
ceilings himself, was obliged to defend them as Secretary 
of Defense.
The issue came to a head late in March 19lf.8 with 
Forrestal's testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee in support of supplemental appropriations 
necessary for the rearmament requested by Truman in a 
special message on March 17. The Secretary, who was 
cognizant of Congressional sympathy for the seventy- 
group Air Force, expressed agreement in principle with 
the concept of a powerful air arm. But, Forrestal said, 
Air Force requirements had to be obtained within the 
framework of a balanced military force. As a compromise, 
Forrestal proposed a small supplemental appropriation of 
$775 million for aircraft procurement and research. He 
also asked for additional funds for increasing the size 
of the Army and Marine Corps. In all, his requests would 
add $3 billion to the President’s budget proposal of $11 
billion for defense in fiscal year 19l}-9.-̂  A few days
^Forrestal’s requests to the Armed Services 
Committee were based on figures worked out with Truman 
earlier and confirmed in a letter, Truman to Forrestal, 
March 26, 19lj.8> Truman Papers, OF, 1285, Truman Library. 
See also, Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 1j.00-1j.01j 
Millis, Arms and Men, 286j Rogow, Victim of Duty, 256-57; 
Schilling! "Politics of National Defense,T7LjO-ij.l.
Truman’s March 17 message to Congress (noted earlier) 
emphasized a need for rearmament and aid to European 
nations, such as Finland, Greece, and Italy, threatened by
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
320
later, on April 2, Forrestal wrote a letter to Senator 
Gurney, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, 
clarifying the remarks he had made in his testimony on the 
25th of March. He explained to the Senator in convincing 
detail that the Air Force program, if approved and 
balanced out by concomitant increases in land, sea and 
merchant marine elements, would mean an increase of over
■3 Cf$18 million in the total military budget a n n u a l l y . T o  
bolster his position that such an increase would be 
necessary if the seventy-group program were initiated, 
Forrestal ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study and 
report the probable costs of a military establishment 
balanced around such an increment in the strength of the 
Air Force.3^
While the crossfire continued in the press and
Communist takeover. Czechoslovakia had already fallen to 
Communist pressure in February. Text of Truman’s message 
is in Item No. 52, Public Papers . . . Truman, 19l|8, 182-86. .
3£porrestal to Chan Gurney, April 2, 19ij.8, RG3i|-0, 
S/AF, Reorganization of the National Military Establish­
ment, Special File i|A, Roles and Missions— Correspondence, 
National Archives. In a Pentagon press release (OSD No.
Forrestal made his letter to Gurney public. Copy 
in Clifford Papers, Subject File, National Military 
Establishment: Air Force, Truman Library.
3^Forrestal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 27, 
19^8, RG3i|.0, S/AF, Reorganization of the National Military 
Establishment, Special File I4A, Roles and Missions—  
Correspondence, National Archives.
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congressional hearings, the President kept silent. 
Forrestal was carrying the burden of defending a budget 
that was not his in any sense, but Truman's. Most of the 
fuel for the attacks was coming from Symington, who, like 
Forrestal, was obliged to support Truman's budget, but 
refused to do so. Symington told the Senate Armed 
Services Committee that expansion to seventy air groups 
had been his position for years and he did not propose to 
change it now. General Spaatz, Air Force Chief of Staff, 
added his testimony to Symington?s; together they con­
stituted a refutation of their nominal superior's 
37testimony. By this time, Forrestal must have been 
fully aware of his great, error during the unification 
struggle in insisting that the Secretary of Defense be a 
powerless "coordinator" rather than a true executive 
officer.
Truman was unable to stifle Air Force resistance 
to the proposed budget and ended up making a deal. The 
JCS, which had reported to Forrestal that their review 
showed that a military establishment "balanced" against 
a seventy group Air Force would cost an additional nine 
billion dollars annually, agreed to back a $3»5 billion 
supplement instead. The Air Force agreed to support the 
request, since they would get sixty-six air groups and
3?Rogow, Victim of Duty, 258-59.
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oQ
most of the additional appropriation.
With Truman's approval Forrestal went back to
Congress on April 21 with the compromise. Forrestal
emphasized the unanimity of the President, the JCS and
39the Service Secretaries on this revised proposal.
However, Truman made a review of the supplemental 
request by the Bureau of the Budget a condition of his 
approval.
The President had apparently had his fill of 
opposition from his own military leadership to the Admin­
istration's budget. Shortly after Budget Director Webb 
and he agreed on the limits, Truman called for a White 
House session (May 13# 19i+8) with the Secretary of 
Defense, the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. He began the meeting by reading to them a ten- 
page statement in which he explained that the Budget 
Bureau review was completed. The study had recommended a 
cut from the April compromise figure of $3*1+8 billion to 
$3*17 billion. Truman said he was willing to submit a 
request for $3*19 billion, a figure suggested by
3®Schilling, "Politics of National Defense," 1+3-lUl-J 
Millis, Arms and Men, 287*
-̂ New York Times, April 22, 191+8. An excellent 
analysis of the controversy and an accurate prediction of 
the outcome are contained in an article by Hanson Baldwin, 
"Defense Plan Debate Reveals Sharp Conflict," ibid.,
April 25, 19h8.
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Forrestal, provided the Armed Forces did not try to spend 
it all. His reasons for this rather unique solution were 
described as "the uncertainty of world conditions" and 
"other factors." Truman also set a ceiling of $15 billion 
for the defense budget for fiscal years 19^9 and 1950, 
explaining that to exceed it would drive the total 
national budget several billion dollars above anticipated 
revenues. He concluded with an emphatic warning to all 
presents
Therefore, as Commander in Chief, I am issuing in 
writing instructions as outlined in the memoranda 
delivered to you today. I expect these orders to be 
carried out wholeheartedly, in good spirit, and 
without mental reservation.
If anyone present has any questions or misgivings 
concerning the program I have outlined, make your 
views known now— for once this program goes forward 
officially, it will be the Administration program—  
and I expect every member of the Administration to 
support it fully, both in public and in private,.
The statement I have just read will form part of 
my record of this meeting. This paper will be on 
file for your examination.M-O
On the same date, Truman also sent a lengthy 
memorandum to Forrestal, reiterating much of What he had 
said in his statement.^ His troubles, of course, were not
^"Statement by the President to the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretaries of the Three Departments, and the 
Three Chiefs of Staff," May 13, 191+8, Papers of James E. 
Webb, "President" folder, Truman Library. Hereinafter 
cited as Webb Papers. See also, Schilling, "Politics of 
National Defense," l5lj.-55j Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 
1+35-39.
^Truman to Forrestal, May 13, 191+8, Clifford 
Papers, Subject File, National Military Establishment—  
Miscellaneous, Truman Library.
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with Forrestal. In fact, the statement Truman had read 
to the meeting had been drafted in the Pentagon by William 
McNeil, Forrestal's assistant, according to specifications 
provided by the President.^ But Truman sent identical 
memoranda, attaching copies of his letter to Forrestal, 
to the Air Force, Army and Navy secretaries, the Army and 
Air Force Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Naval Opera­
tions. In these memoranda, Truman informed the military 
leaders that he was sending them copies of his letter to 
the Secretary of Defense in order to eliminate any mis­
understanding as to the policies he had approved:
This means that everyone must make a conscious effort 
to subordinate personal and service preferences to 
the broader interests of the national program. Our 
several conferences have indicated that there are 
still some of you who are thinking more of representing 
the interests and objectives of your individual 
service than of interpreting the broad national 
program and its requirements to your subordinates 
and to the Congress.^3
As the bill finally passed in April, it provided 
for a total defense budget for fiscal 19i+9 of $13.8 
billion. Against the express wishes of Truman and 
Forrestal, the Congress voted an extra $822 million 
appropriation to bring the Air Force up to a full seventy 
air groups. The vote for the budget supplements in
^Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, k35»
^Truman to Air Force Chief of Staff, «*t. al.,
May 13, 19l|8, Truman Papers, OF, 128£, Truman Library.
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Congress— which was understood to he an affirmation of 
the seventy group concept— was an overwhelming 3I4.3 - 3 
in the House and 7i+ - 2 in the Senate.^ The Air Force 
had clearly won out over the Secretary of Defense and the 
Commander in Chief. But it was a hollow victory. Truman 
signed the supplemental appropriation act, but, as 
promised, refused to spend the extra funds voted by 
Congress. The Air Force was allowed only fifty-nine air 
groups by Truman for fiscal year 19^9.^ Most of the 
Congress and a majority of the public were convinced 
that "the next war would be fought in the air," but the 
Commander in Chief seemed more inclined to Forrestal’s 
"balanced forces" concept, although more for fiscal than 
strategic reasons. Truman later discussed the controversy 
with journalist Arthur Krock:
He explained that his reasons for limiting the 
new air-combat groups below the point desired by . . . 
Symington and the Air Force generals was "we are on 
the verge of an aviation discovery that will make
^•Schilling, "Politics of National Defense," liJLj.—i+6. 
See also, Rogow, Victim of Duty, 265.
^ N e w  York Times, May 22, 19ij-8. See also, Item 
No. 106, Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill 
Providing Funds for Military Aircraft, May 21, 19i]-8,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19U8, 272j Millis, Arms and 
Men, 287; Schilling, "Politics of National Defense," ij.6- 
47. In a letter dated June 3> 19l|8, the President set the 
maximum troop strengths for all services and stipulated the 
active aircraft inventory for the Navy and Air Force at 
6000 and 92k0, respectively. See Truman to Forrestal,
June 3, 19ij.o, RG330, OSD, CD9-2-1*., National Archives.
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obsolete everything now being manufactured." 
(Evidently, new big bombers.) His plan, as he 
described it, was also to maintain flexibility in 
aviation production so that it could be stepped up 
when desired, and planning altered, "as we did 
during the Second World W a r . " 4 °
The President’s decision to freeze appropriated 
Air Force funds was repeated in the next budget.^
Truman’s action represented a new dimension of the com­
mander in chief function. The Congress, which exercises 
a constitutional check on the executive powers through 
its annual appropriations for the budget, now found that 
it could not force the President to increase the size of 
the military establishment against his will. And the 
ability of Congress to argue against any requested 
increase was hampered by a lack of information and 
military intelligence which, by the terms of the National 
Security Act (19U7) they were not privy to, except at 
the discretion of the President.
One more serious struggle erupted within the 
Defense Department which eventually required presidential 
intervention. The Navy had received authorization in the
^Krock, Memoirs, 2ijl.
^Discussing the budget for fiscal year 19^0 in a 
press conference, Truman said of the Air Force: "You
never can satisfy them. I have to put my foot down and 
tell them what they can have. If you didn’t do that they 
would take all the money in the budget." Item No. 7» 
Press Conference on the Budget, January 8, 19i}-9, Public 
Papers . . . Truman, 19l;9, 3l+.
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fiscal 1949 budget to construct a prototype, flush-deck
aircraft carrier, on condition that it halt construction
on thirteen smaller vessels then under construction.
While this was a heavy price to pay, the Navy agreed,
since such a carrier would be capable of participating in
strategic atomic warfare. At the time, the Air Force
objected strenuously, but to no avail, since Forrestal
considered the project sound. However, Louis Johnson,
Forrestal's successor as Secretary of Defense, was
determined to cut defense spending.^"®
On April 23, 1949, five days after the keel of the
carrier had been laid, Johnson ordered the construction
to halt. In his decision the Secretary of Defense was
backed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Denfield,
Ii9dissenting) and the President. John L. Sullivan, 
Secretary of the Navy, who had not been consulted on this 
decision and was in Texas when Johnson made his announce­
ment, immediately informed Johnson that under provision 
of Section 202 of the National Security Act of 1947, he
was exercising his right to appeal the decision directly
90to the Commander in Chief. However, Truman decided 
^Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers,"
JLf.70—71 •
^Louis Johnson to Sullivan, April 23, 1949,
RG330, OSD, D16-2-44, National Archives.
^Sullivan to Johnson, April 24, 1949, ibid.
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against Sullivan.
The Navy Secretary resigned on April 26, but not 
before delivering a bitter attack on the Secretary of 
Defense. In a letter to Johnson, Sullivan accused the 
Secretary of killing the one weapon upon which the Navy 
placed the highest priority without even the courtesy of 
consulting with the Chief of Naval Operations or the 
Secretary of the Navy. Sullivan was "very deeply dis­
turbed" by this -unprecedented action blocking the 
development of a new, powerful weapon, he told Johnson.
He also added his conviction that " . . .  this will result 
in a renewed effort to abolish the Marine Corps and to
cjltransfer all Naval and Marine Aviation elsewhere. . . ." 
The Navy Secretary talked with Truman on April 25 and the 
President agreed to make Sullivan's letter to the Secre­
tary of Defense public. Sullivan apparently felt no ill 
will toward the President over cancellation of the 
carrier, since his letter of resignation was quite
E>2friendly, as was Truman's acceptance.
Secretary Sullivan's fears for the future of the
^Sullivan to Johnson, April 26, 19^9» Truman 
Papers, OP, 1285C, Truman Library.
^Sullivan to Truman, July 26, 191+9, ibid.;
Truman to Sullivan, July 26, 191+9, ibid. See also, 
Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 BomSers," 1+95; Bernardo 
and Bacon, American Military Policy, 1+71? Truman,
Memoirs, II, 53.
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Marine Corps and Naval Aviation were a surface indication 
of deep-seated interservice bickering that had not ended 
with unification. The Navy was particularly resentful 
of the growing power of the Air Force. Not only had the 
romantic and heroic legend of the grizzled seadog been 
replaced in the public mind by the glamorous image of a 
dashing jet pilot, but the Navy's prestigious role as the 
first line of the nation's defense had also been lost to 
the continent-spanning, nuclear weapons delivery vehicle, 
the B-36 bomber. Soon after cancelling the Navy's super­
carrier, Secretary of Defense Johnson, who was emerging 
as a strong advocate of strategic air power, allowed the 
Air Force to order seventy-five additional B-36's. The 
result was a rebellion within the Navy Department called 
the "Revolt of the Admirals."^
Charging corruption and favoritism in the B-36 
contract awards, a Representative from Pennsylvania,
5kJames E. VanZandt, demanded an investigation. ^ The 
resulting Congressional hearings before the House Armed
^Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy,
I4.73. See also, Feis, Between War an? Peace,' 29T, 337«
summation of the charges made by Van Zandt 
and Symington's seventy-nine page rebuttal statement are 
both attached to a memorandum, Glenn ¥. Martin to 
Clifford, July 22, 19^9, Clifford Papers, Subject File, 
National Military Establishment— B-36 Investigation,
Truman Library. The source of Van Zandt's generally un­
substantiated charges was an anonymous civilian employee 
in the Navy Department.
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Services Committee constituted a complete examination of 
the national military posture, for it broadened into an 
inquiry on unification, military strategy, the B-36 and 
other matters. During the course of the hearings, a host 
of high-ranking Navy and Marine officers attacked the 
prevailing Air Force policy of long-distance, nuclear air­
borne retaliation as dangerous, deceptive and not based 
on sound military principles. One of the charges made 
by the admirals was that massive nuclear retaliation was 
immoral and that the Navy was better able to deliver 
massive air strikes against the heartland of Russia. 
Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations, 
summarized the Navy’s position in an attack leveled 
principally at the Secretary of Defense. Denfeld accused 
Johnson of violating the spirit of unification, criticized 
him for canceling the super-carrier and said that "unin­
formed and arbitrary decisions" had greviously weakened 
the Navy. The chief rebuttal witnesses were Air Secre­
tary Symington and General Omar Bradley, then Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Generals Eisenhower and 
Marshall, Secretary Johnson and ex-President Hoover also 
testified, generally asking for unity and cooperation and
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an end to interservice politicing. One thing that
clearly emerged from the contentious testimony was that
the integrated strategic viewpoint which unification
promised had not been achieved.
Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews,
Sullivan’s successor, wrote to Truman saying that " . . .
for the good of the country, I respectfully request you
as President and Commander in Chief to authorize the
transfer of Admiral Denfeld to other important 
96duties. . . . Matthews had the support of the Secre­
tary of Defense in asking Truman to remove Denfeld as 
Chief of Naval Operations. Following some deliberation in 
the White House over the extent of the Commander in Chief’s 
authority to remove Denfeld, who had just been confirmed 
by the Senate for re-appointment for another two-year
57term as CNO, Truman ordered his removal on October 21.
^Among the naval officers who attacked the pre­
vailing policies during the controversy were Captain John 
G. Crommelin and Admirals William Halsey, Ernest King, 
Gerald Bogan, Arthur Radford, Thomas Kincaid, William 
Blandy, Ralph Ofstie, Chester Nimitz, Raymond Spruance, 
and General Vernon Magee of the Marine Corps. Bernardo 
and Bacon, American Military Policy, ij.73-76; Hammond,
"Nsc-6 8 ," zm-wjr.---------------------
^Matthews to Truman, October 21, 19i+9, Clifford 
Papers, Subject File, National Military Establishment—  
Navy, Truman Library.
^ I n  a memorandum to Johnson’s aide, an Assistant 
General Counsel in the Pentagon discussed the power of the 
President to remove the Chief of Naval Operations from 
office. He offered numerous legal precedents justifying 
such an action and added that it was "self-evident" that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
332
Other officers were eventually transferred to ’’less 
sensitive" assignments or they retired, ending the "Revolt 
of the Admirals."
The revolt had revealed not only a fundamental 
failing of unification, it also had pointed up a lack of a 
fixed over-all military strategy. The President and the 
Bureau of the Budget still held— in principle— to the 
balanced-force concept of national defense, to which the 
military leadership paid at least a grudging lip-service. 
However, Truman's hard-money policy of fixing a $15 billion 
ceiling on the military budget in an inflationary period 
dictated, as Paul Hammond has written, " . . .  increasing 
reliance solely on the most 'efficient' weapons system, 
strategic air atomic retaliation, which was a military 
capability designed for a showdown war with the Soviet
the President, in his "constitutional power as Commander 
in Chief," had the unquestioned right to change the duty 
assignment of any subordinate officer as he pleased. 
Nathaniel Goodrich to Marx Leva, October 26, 191+9, Clifford 
Papers, Subject Pile, National Military Establishment—  
Navy, Truman Library. Truman's authorization of the 
removal is contained in a memorandum, Truman to the Secre­
tary of the Navy, October 27, 191+9, ibid. For a published 
text of this message, see Item No. 2l+l, Memorandum on the 
Transfer of Admiral Denfeld Prom the Post of Chief of 
Naval Operations, October 27, 191+9, Public Papers . . . 
Truman, 191+9, 535>-36. See also, Truman, iMemoirs, II, 53? 
Louis Johnson testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1+, 2681.
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CtfjUnion.”-3 The value of this controversy was that it led 
to a study by the National Security Council of national 
military strategy. Their recommendations, contained in a 
very important policy paper submitted to Truman (dis­
cussed below) was implemented during the Korean War. In 
the interim between the Second World War and Korea, 
despite the inefficiencies and the lack of a coherent 
strategic policy, the American military establishment was 
adequate to the demands made upon it by the events of the 
Cold War.
It takes no more than an elemental knowledge of 
geography to comprehend the intense concern of the Soviet 
Union with the Dardanelles Straits. The straits are a 
direct warm-water gateway to Soviet commerce with the 
oil-rich Middle East. Premier Stalin had received at 
Potsdam the concurrence of the United States and Great 
Britain to a revision of the Montreaux Convention of 1936, 
which was an international agreement regarding control of 
the Straits. The Soviet Union desired a more favorable 
agreement. The United States, although not a signatory to
^Hammond, "NSC-68," 281. Robert Osgood feels 
that Truman placed an ". . . overwhelming reliance on 
nuclear retaliation as the military means of containing 
Communism," because of a preoccupation with the threat of 
a third world war and a fascination with the "vast and 
strange power of the atomic bomb." Limited War, lf>l.
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the original convention, indicated it would be a willing
party to any new international agreement for controlling
the use of the Dardanelles.-^
On August J, 19k&* Soviet Union sent a
diplomatic note to Turkey insisting, among other things,
in replacing the Montreaux Convention with a bilateral
agreement which would eliminate British influence in
Turkey and provide for joint Russo-Turkish control and
the establishment of Russian military bases along the
Straits. Dean Acheson, then Under Secretary of State,
considered the Soviet proposal merely a euphemism for the
6*1occupation of Turkey. Acheson was ordered by Truman to 
prepare recommendations for him in consultation with the 
Secretaries of War and Navy and the Joint Chiefs.
The Committee had its report ready on August 1$ 
and they met with Truman in the White House. Acheson told 
the President that the Committee was recommending that a
^Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 301; Alexander DeConde,
A History of American Foreign Policy (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1963)” 66'7. Hereinafter cited as DeConde, 
History of American Foreign Policy. Truman had been 
willing to go much further at Potsdam. Then he had urged 
the internationalization of the Rhine, Danube and 
Dardenelles, because, he claimed, all the wars of the pre­
ceding two centuries had originated in Central Europe. 
Neumann, After Victory, 173-7^*
^°DeConde, History of American Foreign Policy, 667; 
Phillips, Truman Presidency, 170.
k-*-Ache son, Present at the' Creation, 195*
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strong diplomatic note be sent to the Soviet government, 
acknowledging the need for a revision of the Treaty of 
Montreaux, but insisting that there be no interference 
with the exclusive rights of Turkey to defend the Straits. 
To impress the Russians that the United States was in 
"deadly earnest" on the matter, Truman's advisers also 
felt that a strong naval force should be sent to the area. 
They recommended that the battleship Missouri, already 
at Istanbul on an unrelated mission, be held there and 
joined by the Mediterranean fleet, led by the newly- 
commissioned aircraft carrier, Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
Truman immediately approved the recommendations and asked
ZL pthat the diplomatic notes and orders be drafted at once. ^ 
General Eisenhower, who was present at the meeting as 
Army Chief of Staff, apparently taken aback by the abrupt­
ness of the President's decision, asked if Truman was 
cognizant of all the implications; the recommended course 
could lead to war with the Soviet Union. Acheson has 
recorded Truman's response:
The President took from a drawer of his desk a large 
map of the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean and 
asked us to gather around behind him. He then gave 
us a brief lecture on the strategic importance of the 
area and the extent to which we must be prepared to
^Ibid., 195-96; Phillips, Truman Presidency, 171. 
See also, LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 
28-29.
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go to keep it free from Soviet domination. When he 
finished, none of us doubted he understood fully all 
the implications of our recommendations#°3
The American fleet moved into Turkish waters as 
soon as it was assembled. This naval presence was 
sufficient enough to cause the Soviet Union to ease its 
pressure on Turkey. The Turkish government felt it nec­
essary to continue a full mobilization of its armed 
forces, a constant strain on the economy that sapped the 
government’s resources. The Soviet Union switched its 
offensive pressures to the Balkan peninsula in hope of 
toppling the monarchical government of Greece.
Following the German withdrawal in late 19i|if»
Greek Governraent-in-exile returned to power. The Greek 
leadership was soon confronted by a Communist-inspired 
guerilla revolt against its authority. As a result of 
this struggle, the United States urged an international 
commission to supervise an election in Greece to determine 
majority will. The electorate, voting in March, 19i|-6, 
chose the monarchical party of King George II. The Greek 
Communists, united under the banner of the National Liber­
ation Front, resumed guerrilla warfare following their 
electroal defeat. The Greek insurrectionaries received 
substantial military equipment and supplies from the 
bordering Communist nations of Yugoslavia, Albania and
^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 196.
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Bulgaria. The Greek conservative leaders, or "raonarcho- 
fascists," as the Soviet press styled them, were sustained 
in their struggles by the presence of British troops and a 
great deal of economic assistance from Great Britain.^
The British, facing grievous financial conditions 
at home, informed the United States in February 191+7 that 
their financial and military support of Greece (and 
financial assistance to Turkey as well) would have to 
cease by March 31• Th© British expressed hope that the 
United States would be able to assume the burden of sus­
taining Greece and Turkey. The message from England 
underscored what American envoys in the field had been 
reporting: Because of inflation, corruption in the right-
wing government, strikes and the effectiveness of the 
guerrilla forces, Greece was near collapse even with 
British aid. Without it, a Communist takeover was 
inevitable, unless the United States, the only nation then 
capable of such large-scale largesse, was willing to 
intervene.
^LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, ijjj.. 
See also, Byrnes, S peaking Frankly,'"̂ 99~‘3̂ >'Q; t)eConde, 
History of American ForeigrT Policv, 668-69; Major Problems 
of Unite^Stat'es' Foreign' Fol'icy, 19£l-195>2 (Washington:
TEe Brookings Institution", 19>L),' 36£-66, Hereinafter 
cited as Major Problems of Uni ted States Foreign Policy.
69Acheson, Present at the Creation, 217; Truman, 
Memoirs, II, 9 9 -1 0 0 . See also, Fleming, The Cold War, I, 
lj.38-39; DeConde, History of American Foreign Policy, 669; 
Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 293; Sidney Warren, The
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The Secretary of State, Goerge Marshall, was away 
on a speaking engagement when the British note arrived on 
February 21, so Under Secretary Acheson informed the 
President of its substance. Truman ordered Acheson to 
convene the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for 
preparation of a detailed policy memorandum. Acheson 
reported to Truman on the Committee’s progress as of the 
twenty-fourth. The basic recommendation was that Greece 
should receive whatever funds and military equipment the 
President could provide under existing legislative authority 
as soon as possible. Truman approved. On February 25 
Truman met with the Congressional leadership. Truman, 
flustered by the glaring, but accidental ommission of 
Senator Robert Taft from the list of those invited, allowed 
Dean Acheson to brief the Congressmen on the situation 
and urge their support of an American aid program for 
Greece and Turkey. Acheson made a very effective presen­
tation of the case. None of the Congressional leadership
present saw fit to question the propriety of the nation
66extending a protective shield over Greece and Turkey.
President as World Leader (Philadelphia and New York: J.
B. LippincoEt, 1961;), 3I0-II. Hereinafter cited as 
Warren, President as World Leader.
^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 218-19; Fleming, 
The Cold War, I, If 39-IfO. In a subsequent meeting with the 
congressional leadership (including Senator Taft, this time), 
on March 10, Acheson felt the atmosphere was somewhat 
cooler. While Vandenberg was favorably disposed, no
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The executive and legislative leadership were agreed then,
at least in principle, that the United States should
assume the historical British role of containing Russian
expansionism in the eastern Mediterranean.
Secretary Marshall, accompanied by Acheson, brought
Truman the policy recommendations on February 26. Their
report carried the endorsement of the Coordination
Committee, the Secretaries of War and Navy and the Joint
Chiefs. Greece needed immediate and substantial
assistance, the report stated, aid which only the United
States was capable of providing. Turkey, while not in
danger of immediate collapse from Russian pressure, could
not long sustain its full mobilization without economic
disaster. If either nation fell, the other would be
seriously endangered. The choice was to abandon both to
Communist ambition, or intervene directly and immediately.
The report recommended the latter course to Truman and
urged him to request an appropriation from Congress for
67economic and military aid for Greece and Turkey. The 
President approved and ordered the State Department to
legislator was willing to commit himself to the message 
proposals. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 222. Truman, 
discussing the same session, cfescribed "it differently: 
"There was no opposition to what had to be done." Memoirs, 
II, 10$. See also, Vandenberg, Private Papers, 3l±3~bfa..
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 100; Acheson, Present a.t 
the Creation, 219.
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draft an address to Congress.
When Truman finally received a satisfactory draft 
of his message, he arranged to appear before a Joint 
Session of the Congress on March 12, 1947* President
knew that what he was going to ask of the nation 
represented a dramatic reversal of traditional American 
peacetime isolationalism. He knew, he said, that the 
names of Washington and Clay and " . . .  the other patron 
saints of isolationists" would be invoked against his 
stand. But he was thoroughly convinced that this action 
was essential to continued free world Is adership by the 
United States.^*®
Truman began his speech by telling the Congress 
that a grave situation had arisen that involved the foreign 
policy and the national security of the United States. 
Truman then reviewed the desperate condition of Greece, 
repeatedly referring to Greece!s democratic government, 
but acknowledging that that government had made some mis­
takes. He briefly summarized Turkey’s need for financial 
support. The President then said that a primary objective 
of the foreign policy of the United States was to establish 
conditions whereby other nations " . . .  will be able to 
work out a way of life free from coercion." Free people
Truman, Memoirs, II, 102. See also, McLellan and 
Reuss, "Foreign and Military Policies," $7 •
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could not maintain free institutions and national integrity
against totalitarian aggressors unless other nations are
willing to help them. ”1 believe,” Truman said, "that it
must be the policy of the United States to support free
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures."^ This was the
essential statement of what has come to be known as the
Truman Doctrine. It represented a significant alteration
of American policy, since it proposed that the United
States stand as guarantor and protector, not just of
Greece and Turkey, but of all "free, democratic nations"
which were confronted by internal or external threats to
the existing regime. While emphasizing that ". . . our
help should be primarily through economic and financial
aid. . . Truman did not preclude direct American
70military intervention. It might well have been called 
the Truman Corollary, since it proposed a revival of the 
principles of Monroe's defunct doctrine and an expansion 
of the paternalistic protection of that doctrine to the
^Item No. 56, President's Message to Congress on 
Greece and Turkey, March 12, 19lj.7, Public Papers . . . 
Truman, 19li7, 178-79. The speech is excerpted "in Truman, 
Memoirs, 11,' 106-108; Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The 
Truman' Administration, 251-56.
^°Item No. 56, Public Papers . . . Truman, 191-1-7, 
178-79. It was this vagueness and universality of 'the 
doctrine which brought objections from George P. Kennan, 
director of the Policy Planning Board of the State Depart­
ment. See his Memoirs, 319-22.
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7 1Eastern, as well as the Western Hemisphere.
Specifically, Truman asked the Congress for $1|00 
million for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the present 
fiscal year. He also requested permission to send civilian 
and military personnel as financial, political and military 
advisers, with the latter also serving as instructors in 
the use of American weapons. In addition, the President 
asked Congress to provide him with the authority to 
implement this assistance in the fastest and most efficient 
manner possible.Implicit throughout the message was the 
identification of the Soviet Union as the malefactor and 
the recognition that the United Nations Organization was 
too weak to perform its primal function.
News media reaction to the address was mixed, but 
all seemed to recognize that the implications of Truman’s 
proposal went well beyond simply aiding Greece and Turkey. 
The New York Times endorsed the speech as signalling an 
end to the era of "isolation and occasional intervention"
"^Journalist Arthur Krock, writing on March 22,
1947* compared the Truman and Monroe Doctrines: " . . .
both are founded on the fear that our freedom is threatened 
by ambitious European powers, and both were precipitated 
by Russian policy." See Krock, In the Nation: 1932-1966 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), 175* Herein-
after cited as Krock, In the Nation.
?2Item No. £6, Public Papers . . . Truman, 19lj-7»
179. See also, Fleming, The Cold War, I, I4J4.3•
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and the beginning of "an epoch of American responsibil­
ity."^ The Baltimore Sun editorial writer lamented the 
shift in thinking with respect to the Russians reflected 
in this address, " . . .  from the possibility, and the 
necessity, of finding a formula for living together to 
emphasis on the differences which divide u s . " ^  The 
Philadelphia Inquirer called the assistance program, "a 
task we must not shirk. "7£ The Miami Herald headlined, 
"Truman Doctrine Means U.S. Takes Road to Bankruptcy."7^
A New York writer urged the use of American troops if 
necessary, because ". . . to rule out any possibility of 
military support in advance removes any possibility of 
success. We would in that case merely be throwing our 
money away."^ The Chicago Tribune felt that "the outcome 
will inevitably be war. . . .  We are to have the 
'commander in chief' back with us again."7® "He was 
asking America to be Atlas," according to a Washington 
Post editorial, "offering to lead his country in that
73n o w York Times, March 12, 19l|7•
7 ̂-Baltimore Sun, March 13» 191|7»
7^Philadelphia Inquirer, March 13 > 19ij-7 •
7^Miami Herald, April 13, 19k7•
77George P. Eliot, New York Herald-Tribune,
March 18, 19lj-7« 
78chicago Tribune, March 13, 19^7•
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tremendous role, yet his flat voice carried no signifi­
cance of his fateful r e c o m m e n d a t i o n . Izvestia 
described the Truman Doctrine as . . a  fresh intrusion 
of the U.S.A. into the affairs of other states," which 
was designed to place Turkey and Greece under American 
control
A Gallup poll on the Truman Doctrine proposal found 
the people, like the newspapers, divided, with a majority 
favoring assistance. For example, eighty-three percent 
were in favor of sending civilian advisers to Greece, but 
only fifty-six percent approved of financial aid. The 
same questions with respect to Turkey found seventy-seven 
percent endorsing civilian advisers, but only forty-nine 
percent backing the financial assistance. Only thirty 
percent of those surveyed felt that lending the money to 
both nations would lead the United States into war, but 
less than one-third supported the sending of military 
advisers to either country. There was some inconsistency 
in these views however, for sixty-eight percent agreed 
that if another nation found itself in a situation similar
O’!
to Greece's, the United States would have to take action.
^Washington Post, March 13» 191+7-
^Izvestia, March 13, 1947* quoted in Williams 
(ed.), Shaping of American Diplomacy, 1003-1005.
^Philadelphia Bulletin, March 29> 19l|7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31*5
The President had hoped that Congress would act on 
his proposals before March 31, 191*7, the deadline Great 
Britain had set for the cut-off of their assistance to 
Turkey and Greece. But the public hearings on the bill 
and the floor debate continued through March and late 
into April. Finally the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill passed 
the Senate by a vote of 67 to 23 and the House, 287 to
On107. In signing ceremonies on-May 22, Truman called the 
Aid Bill ". . .an important step in the building of the 
peace." He also said that the "overwhelming majorities" 
it received in both Houses of Congress was ". . . proof 
that the United States earnestly desires peace and is 
willing to make a vigorous effort to help create conditions 
of peace. On May 22 Truman also issued Executive Order 
9857, which contained the regulations for carrying out the
®^As enacted, the bill is Public Law 75* 80 Cong.,
1 Sess., (61 Stat. 103). See also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 
108; Phillips, Truman Presidency, 176; Steinberg, Man 
from Missouri, £94; LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold 
War, 1*5-1*6; beConde, History of American Foreign Policy, 
670. One writer uses the Greelc-Turkish aid bill as an 
example for his contention that the President, because of 
his international stature and the worldwide distribution 
of his remarks on almost any subject, can commit the 
nation to a particular course, leaving the Congress little 
choice save to acquiesce when he comes to that body for 
approval. Crabb, American Foreign Policy, 59•
®^Item No. 100, Statement by the President Upon 
Signing Bill Endorsing the Truman Doctrine, May 22,
191*7, Public Papers . . . Truman, 191*7, 251*-55•
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31+6
provisions of the bill.^ The order delegated the 
authority conferred on the President by the act to the 
Secretary of State, George Marshall. It also allowed 
Marshall to subdelegate his authority to "Chiefs of 
Mission" for Greece and Turkey. Marshall actually wrote 
the order for the President which facilitated his carrying 
out the task of Greek-Turkish aid Truman had entrusted to 
him.8^
The Communist-led Greek rebels intensified their 
attacks after Truman announced his intention to aid the 
government of Greece in opposing them. Their success, 
particularly in northern Greece, led the American embassy 
to report on June 9 that there was a "marked deteriora­
tion" in the government’s position. A week later, the 
Greek government sent an urgent appeal for an acceleration 
in the delivery of critical materials and for a greater
portion of American aid to be allocated to weapons and
86other military supplies. Secretary Marshall, agreeing 
with the first part of their message, asked Truman to 
indicate to the agencies involved the urgent necessity of
^Executive Order 9857* March 22, 19i+7 (3 C. •?•*!•> 
19U3-19^8 Comp., 6J+6) .
8^Marshall to Patterson, April 30* 191+7> RGl6£,
USA, 092-Plans and Operations, Case No. 96, National 
Archives.
8^Truman, Memoirs, II, 108.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3b7
their hastening the procurement and shipment of materials 
destined for G r e e c e . T r u m a n  complied with Marshall’s 
request, asking the Secretary of War, for example, to 
spare no effort in employing the full power and facilities 
of his office in expediting, as efficiently as possible,
O Dthe Greek aid program. Eventually, by the fall of 
191+9 > the American aid and advisers brought about a shift 
in the balance of power that led to the triumph of the 
government over the guerrillas. This was accomplished 
with some difficulty because the Greek leadership con­
tinually attempted to use all American aid for military 
purposes, to suppress opposition, rather than to stabilize 
the economy and broaden their base of popular support. 
Turkey, not facing a massive internal revolt, was a far 
less serious problem. U.S. financial aid was sufficient 
to continue the Turkish mobilization without endangering
the economy.®^
®?Marshall to Truman, June 27> 19J+7> RGl+07, AG091.3* 
National Archives.
®®Truman to Royall, August 30, 191+7> ibid.
®%a3or Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 
261+-65; Truman, Memoirs ,~Tl, 109. Some observers have 
noted a curious lack of uniformity in U.S. policy towards 
Greece and China. In the same period of time that the 
United States was providing the werewithal to suppress 
Communist insurgents in Greece, the American government 
provided some military, economic and technical aid to the 
Nationalist Chinese, but encouraged them to form a coali­
tion government with the Communists. See Osgood, Limited 
War, 162.
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Truman considered the decision to take over Bri­
tain’s commitment to aid Greece and Turkey one of the most 
important of his acts, because it set an entirely new pat-
QQtern in foreign policy. However, he later said that it
was incorrect to call this decision the ’'Truman Doctrine’*
since he had obtained the consent of the leaders in Con-
91gress before implementing this policy.7
The idea that the United States should shore up the 
endangered economies and political structures of Greece 
and Turkey led to the proposition that other nations should 
get the same aid before they collapsed from Communist pres­
sure. With this in mind, and with Truman’s endorsement,
Dean Acheson made a speech at Cleveland, Mississippi, in 
92May 19ll-7. He told his audience that many nations needed 
outside aid in recovery or their people would seek desper­
ate remedies.9^ Increased appropriations were needed, he
said, as well as power to allocate commodities that were
9kin short supply.7̂  The speech had little impact in the
9 9U.S. press, but received thorough;coverage in Europe. ^
90Phillips, ‘'Truman at 75," 107.
9^Truman Spe aks, 70.
9^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 226-28.
93̂Acheson’s speech, May 8, 1914-7, is printed in 
Williams (ed«), Shaping of American Diplomacy, 1006.
9^Ibid .; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 229. 
9^Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 295.
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Soon after, Secretary Marshall agreed to speak at 
Harvard's commencement on June f?. Truman participated in 
drafting the proposals Marshall made at Harvard and he was 
the first to call it the "Marshall Plan."^ Marshall 
spoke of the demoralizing effect of economic deprivation 
in Europe, and the chance that severe disturbances might 
arise out of the desperation the people endured. He said
97that America was the logical nation to provide assistance. 
Marshall then called upon European nations to come to­
gether and agree among themselves as to their needs and as 
to what each country could do to help itself and its neigh­
bors. The United States would then assume the burden of
98assistance to the limits of its available resources.
The European response to the Marshall address was 
immediate and enthusiastic. Sixteen nations of Western 
Europe banded together as the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation. They made detailed studies of the 
long-term needs of their region and, in mid-August, sub­
mitted a request for American financial assistance in
^ T r u m a n ,  Memoirs, II, III4..
^Marshall’s address, June $, 19i|-7, is printed in 
Lawrence S. Kaplan fed.), NATO and the Policy of Contain­
ment (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.'C. Heath ancT*Company,1968), 8. Hereinafter cited as Kaplan (ed.), NATO and the 
Policy of Containment.
9®lbid., 8-9. See also, Rees, Age of Containment, 
22; LaPeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, l4.8-ij.9;
. Tinman, Memoirs, II, 113-l£0
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the amount of $30 billion over a four-year period. The 
proposed total was reduced to a more manageable $17 billion 
in Truman’s request for the appropriation from Congress on 
December 19* 19i|-7• Describing his plans for the European 
Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) in this message, Truman 
tied the recovery of Europe to American security:
". • . I am proposing that this Nation contribute to world 
peace and to its own security by assisting in the recovery 
of sixteen countries which . . • are devoted to the preser­
vation of free institutions and enduring peace among 
nations.n<̂  But the European Recovery Act did not pass 
until April, 19lj.8, subsequent to a Communist coup d'etat 
in Czechoslovakia and more prodding of Congress by Truman 
in another message on March 17. When the European 
Recovery Program ended in 1951* actual appropriations to 
the European Cooperative Administration, counterpart to 
the OEEC in America, totalled $12.5 billion.^00
The Marshall Plan, working on the "belly reform"
^Item No. 238, Special Message to Congress on the 
Marshall Plan, December 19, 19^7, Public Papers • . .
Truman, 1 3 K L - 528. See also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 117-19*
lOOcrabb, American Foreign Policy, 226-28; American 
Military History, 537-181 Warren, President as World Leader, 
315-16; Rees, Age of Containment, 2^-25; laP'eEer, America. 
Russia, and the Cold War, 6k. 5he European Recovery Pro­
gram (Marshall Plan) was later merged with the military 
assistance program into an administrative structure known 
as the Mutual Security Administration. Truman, Memoirs,
II, 119.
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premise that Communism appeals only to hungry and 
desperate people, went a long way toward restoring 
European prosperity and equalizing trade inbalances. The 
motivation of the United States in pursuing this recovery 
program was justified by the Truman Administration in 
terms of economic and humanitarian reasons. However, 
beyond these considerations was the growing East-West 
schism that caused a high strategic importance to be 
placed on bolstering the economies of nations that might 
otherwise fall into the Soviet camp.
The commitment of the United States to the 
political status quo in the Balkans and western Europe 
was more than an economic tie; it carried with it the 
strong implication that America would resort to military 
intervention to sustain these governments and its own 
substantial investments. However, the United States did 
not have sufficient forces-in-being to back up this 
implied commitment. For while the services argued for a 
build-up of their force levels to meet any challenges on 
the European continent, they generally faced budgetary 
cutbacks in the late Forties. The Marshall Plan and 
Greek-Turkish Aid were "measures short of war," designed 
to prevent the spread of the Communist philosophy of 
government. They have succeeded to the extent that the 
nations involved remained more-or-less democratic in their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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governmental organization.'^'1’ The Marshall Plan was a
natural outgrowth of the Truman Doctrine. At the same
time, however, the Truman Doctrine was hardening into a
102policy called containment.
The thinking underlying the attitude toward 
communism in the containment policy is similar to that of 
the Republicans toward slavery in the pre-Civil War 
period. Although they would have been happiest if slavery 
were to disappear, they were at least determined that this 
pernicious institution be prevented from expanding beyond 
the boundaries of the region where it already existed.
So, too, with the advocates of containment, who maintained 
that:
. . . the main element of any United States policy 
toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, 
patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian 
expansive tendencies. . . . the Soviet pressure 
against the free institutions of the Western world is 
something that can be contained by the adroit and
Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-3& Bombers," 
ij.72-73. See also, Phillips, Truman Presidency, 19̂ 4-- 
Robert Osgood says that Gr eek-Thrki'sh aid reflected a view 
in the White House and mong the foreign and military 
advisers to the President, that the Middle East and the 
Mediterranean regions formed a strategic unity, no part of 
which could be allowed to fall to Russian imperialism if 
the United States were to preserve the geopolitical basis 
of its security. Yet, Osgood notes, it was not in these 
terms that the decision was presented to Congress and the 
general public. See Limited War, llj.6-lj.7 •
■^^Malor Problems of United States Foreign Policy,
28.
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vigilant application of counter-force at a aeries 
of constantly shifting geographical and political 
points. . . .1°3
George Frost Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning
Staff of the State Department in 19lj.7> is the putative
"father of the containment doctrine." Although he has
since denied paternity,^^ the first known outlines of
such a policy appear in a cable Kennan sent to the State
Department on February 22, 19l}.6, while he was still charge
105d1affaires in Moscow. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal 
was greatly impressed with the cable and had Kennan write 
a paper for him elaborating on these views. Finally, at 
Forrestal's insistence, Kennan*s paper received wide 
publicity when it was anonymously published in Foreign 
Affairs, an influential quarterly, in July, 19ii7«'1‘0^
The quotation (above) from the article contains the gist
^Quoted from George F. Kennan*s article (under the 
pseudonym, "Mr. X"), "Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign 
Affairs (July, 19I(.7) > as reprinted in Williams (ed.’), 
Shaping of American Diplomacy, 996. The article is sum­
marized Tn "KiiiTipsT, Truman Presidency, 259-62.
10^See, for example, Kennan*s disclaimer in his 
Memoirs, 358-67.
•^^Kennan's cable is quoted verbatim in Bernstein 
and Matusow (eds.), Truman Administration, 198-212. For a 
summation and analysis of the Kennan cable, see Millis 
(ed.), Forrestal Diaries, Editor's Note, 135-^0* See 
also, Rogow, Victim of Duty, 177-80.
10 ftuoForrestal *s role in having the containment paper 
published is described in Rogow, Victim of Duty, 180-81.
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of the fundamental policy-line of the contaiment doctrine.
Truman has said that it is a mistake to call his 
foreign policy a policy of containment: "This is not
true. Our purpose was much broader. We were working for 
a united, free, and prosperous w o r l d . E u p h e m i s m s  
aside, the application of American policy has fit the 
pattern called containment. Since 191+7 the United States 
has become party to regional military alliances having the 
effect of encirclement of the Communist-bloc nations; has 
met the threat of Soviet force with the threat of counter­
force; and has met Communist aggression in Korea and 
IndoChina with Military intervention.
Truman believed that the Marshall Plan, promising 
hope and assistance to the peoples of Europe, seriously 
upset Soviet attempts at gaining hegemony over all of 
Europe. Soviet reaction to the Marshall Plan, according 
to Truman, precipitated a serious military confrontation 
with the United States in 191+8. As he explained:
Russia was caught off guard by the Marshall Plan. 
Moscow quickly realized that when the Marshall Plan 
began to function, the opportunity to communize 
western Europe by exploiting her economic miseries 
would be lost. Failing to prevent Allied co-operation 
for European recovery, Russia sought to retaliate by 
two moves. The first move was to set up a counterpart 
of a Marshall Plan under Russian auspices for her 
satellites. . . .
The second and even more provocative move was to
•^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 290.
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risk a military incident in Berlin designated to 
test our firmness and patience.30°
The Allied "Big Three" conferences at Teheran,
Yalta and Potsdam had defined the status of postwar 
Germany. The city of Berlin, deep within the Russian 
zone of Germany, was divided into zones of occupation 
itself, just as the German nation had been. For the 
immediate postwar period, Germany wa3 to be governed by 
an Allied Control Council, sitting at Berlin, whose 
membership was to be made up of the Allied military 
commanders in chief. In practice, these military leaders 
acted as a supreme authority for Germany, but they 
operated under a regrettable rule which required unanimity 
for action. The general principles that guided their 
deliberations had been established at Potsdam and provided 
that, in most matters, Germany was to be regarded as an 
entity, with uniform treatment for all citizens, and to 
whatever extent feasible, freedom of the press, speech 
and religion were to be restored. Further, Germany was to 
be treated as a single economic unit, with common opera­
tional policies established on such matters as trade, 
industrial production, agriculture, currency and banking,
lo8Ibid., 120.
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transportation, communications, wages, prices and
rationing.^09
What had been agreed to in principle with respect
to Germany, did not often pertain in actual practice. In
the American zone, steps were taken to implement the
Potsdam Agreement, with Eisenhower moving rapidly to turn
governmental administration over to civilian authority.
As the General wrote to Truman in November of 19k5'-
" . . .  separation of occupational and governmental
responsibility is sound . . .  if for no other reason than
because of its conformity to the American principle of
,,110keeping the Army as such out of the civil government."
The Russians, however, began to intensify control over 
their zone and eliminate contacts with other parts of 
Germany. It became increasingly difficult to treat Germany 
as a single economic unit because of Soviet policy. 
Eventually, the British and American governments, later 
joined by the French, created machinery to deal with their 
combined zones as a unit, to the exclusion of the Soviet 
zone of occupation. However, the access of the western
Phillips Davison, The Berlin Blockade; A Study 
in Cold War Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1958)* 3-6. Hereinafter cited as Davison, 
Berlin Blockade. See also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 120.
110Eisenhower to Truman, October 26, 19i+5> Eisen­
hower Papers, PF/DDE, Truman folder (1), Eisenhower Library. 
See also, Truman to Eisenhower, November 2, 19lj.5* ibid.
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powers to their zones of occupation in Berlin was by
111narrow corridors through the Soviet-controlled zone.
The access corridors through the Soviet Zone of
Germany were not guaranteed by any written agreement.
The Western Powers had agreed that Germany should be
governed from Berlin, deep in the Soviet sector, but their
right of access to their respective enclaves in Berlin
was not formally stipulated. The Soviet governor for
Germany, Marshall Zhukov, had orally assured General
Lucius Clay, Eisenhower's deputy, that the simple presence
of American and other forces in Berlin presumed the right
of access. The Russians initially provided ample access
112by a railroad line, highway and an air corridor. The
absence of a bilaterally-guaranteed permanent access 
route to Berlin became a serious issue in 19lj.8 when the 
Soviets chose to block the land corridors. As journalist 
Arthur Krock wrote, " . . .  we can't throw the book at them, 
because there is no book. 3
On March 5, 19^8, a few days after the communist
•^Davison, Berlin Blockade, 8-9J Truman, Memoirs,
II, 120.
•^%)avi son, Berlin Blockade, }±; Steinberg, Man from 
Missouri, 258. Steinberg says that Truman blames Eisen­
hower 'for the lack of a written agreement, but offers no 
evidence.
-̂̂ •̂ Krock, "Background to the Berlin Blockade," New 
York Times, July 7» 19U8, reprinted in Krock, In the 
NsTETon, 178-79.
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coup in Czechoslovakia, General Clay, military governor 
of the U.S. zone, dispatched a message to the Army’s 
director of Intelligence:
For many months, based on logical analysis, I have 
felt and held that war was unlikely for at least ten 
years. Within the last few weeks, I have felt a 
subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define 
but which now gives me a feeling that it may come with 
dramatic suddenness. I cannot support this change in 
my own thinking with any data or outward evidence in 
relationships other than to describe it as a feeling 
of a new tenseness in every Soviet individual with 
whom we have official relations. I am unable to sub­
mit any official report in the absence of supporting 
data but my feeling is real. You may advise the 
Chief of Staff of this for whatever it may be worth 
if you feel it advisable .11*+
Walter Millis says that Clay’s cable had a 
"cataclysmic" effect on the Pentagon and the White House. 
The Central Intelligence Agency was set to work studying 
the possibility of war. On March 16 they reported to 
Truman that " . . .  major war was not probable within sixty 
days."-*-^ The following day, the President spoke to a
liveable is quoted in Millis (ed.), Forrestal 
Diaries, 387* See also, Millis, Arms and Men, 2B5; 
Davison, Berlin Blockade, 73; Hammond, "Super Carriers and 
B-36 Bombers, h If.73 •
H^Millis, Arms and Men, 2j?5>. During the Berlin 
Crisis, members of Forrestal rs staff prepared a report for 
the Secretary of Defense on the power of the President to 
declare a state of national emergency. Forrestal was 
informed that the Commander in Chief could declare a state 
of limited or unlimited national emergency upon his own 
discretion and that the consent of Congress, while 
desirable, was not necessary. Memorandum (unsigned) to 
Forrestal, March 29, 19i|.8, RG330, OSD, President, 19i|.7- 
19l;9, National Archives.
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Joint Session of Congress on "The Threat to the Freedom of
Europe.” He directly attacked the Soviet Union for
obstructionism in the United Nations and the destruction
of ". . . the independence and democratic character of a
whole series of nations in Eastern and Central Europe.
He spoke of the "ruthless course" and "growing menace" of
Soviet imperialism and summed up with a call for additional
action, saying that "there are times in world history when
it is far wiser to act than to hesitate. Considering
the tone of his speech, Truman's requests were relatively
mild. He asked for passage of two stalled programs:
universal military trining and the Marshall Plan, as well
n 3as the temporary reinstitution of selective service.
General Clay was notified by the Russians on 
March 31 > 191̂ .8, that they intended henceforth to check 
the identification papers of all American military personnel 
and check all freight shipments traveling through the . 
Soviet zone. Clay informed the Pentagon that he proposed 
to order his troop trains to continue their normal runs 
and to ". . . prevent the Russians from coming aboard and
•^^Item No. 52, Special Message to Congress on the 
Threat to the Freedom of Europe, March 17» 19i|-8, Public 
Papers . . . Truman, 191̂ 8, 183.
H 7lbid., 181#..
11®Ibid., 185.
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119shoot if necessary." Forrestal met immediately with 
the service secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They recommended an order to Clay, which Truman subse­
quently approved, telling the General that his troops 
were not to open fire, except in self-defense. The trains 
went through to the East German border, where they were 
stopped. When the Americans refused to allow a search by 
Soviet personnel, the trains were turned back. There was 
no shooting. Had fighting begun, the United States Army 
could have bolstered the occupation forces by only one 
division (approximately l£,000 troops) without reverting
. r *  • . . 120to mobilization.
Throughout April, May and June, the Soviet military 
authorities made it increasingly difficult to get into or 
out of Berlin. On June 18, 19^8, Britain, France and the 
United States, in a move to halt an inflationary spiral, 
announced that they were to immediately establish a new 
type of currency for the three western zones of Germany.
The Soviets opposed this change, according to Truman,
". . . because it exposed the basic unsoundness of their 
own currency." That the Russians considered this important
H9j)avison, Berlin Blockade, 73; Millis (ed.), 
Forrestal Diaries, Ij.08; 'Truman, Memoirs, II, 122.
120Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, i|07; Truman, 
Memoirs, II, 122.
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is illustrated by Truman’s statement that "They offered 
to reopen the approaches to the city of Berlin if the
121Western powers would call off the currency change-over."
The three nations refused the Soviet offer, although this 
meant violation of that part of the original agreement 
which provided for a single economic and financial policy 
for all of Germany. The Soviet Union, of course, had 
violated both the spirit and letter of the agreement on 
numerous occasions.
As an apparent reaction to the announced currency 
reforms, all rail traffic to the three western zones of 
Berlin was cut off completely by Soviet officials on 
June 21. At six o’clock on the morning of the twenty- 
fourth, all highway, river and canal traffic was also 
halted. U.S. Air Force C-i|7 transport planes, on orders 
of General Clay, had begun a small-scale airlift of food- 
stuffs into Berlin on the 21st. But the western 
sectors of Berlin with two million residents became an 
island, totally devoid of any surface contact outside their
12lTruman, Memoirs, II, 122.
•^^LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 70j 
Rees, Age of Containment, 28. See alscT, "Berlin Airlift,"
A report in RG330, OSD, D70-1-5j National Archives. It 
seems evident that the "technical difficulties" the Soviet 
Union used to explain the full blockade of the 2lf.th were, 
in reality, the currency reforms. The exchange of old for 
new currency was to begin on the 25th. Davison, Berlin 
Blockade, 105-106.
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boundaries* The only way left to enter or leave Berlin 
was by air. A written agreement existed, dated November 
30, 19ij.£, establishing three twenty mile-wide air 
corridors over the Soviet zone.12^
Despite the three months of increasing pressure and 
restrictions on access to Berlin, there was, apparently, 
no contingency plan in force at the time the blockade was 
established. The planners in Washington would have to 
improvise a solution. The basic decision the President 
had to make involved three alternatives: Order American
forces to abandon the city, postpone any positive measures 
or force a military confrontation by sending an armed 
column down the blockaded highway to Berlin, as General 
Clay had suggested. Truman decided to defer any 
irrevocable decision until the situation was clarified.
A meeting of the President with the Secretary of Defense, 
Secretary of the Army and Under Secretary of State Lovett 
on June 25 was inconclusive, dealing only with the legality 
of the American position in Berlin. On June 26 Truman 
ordered that Clay's improvised airlift be continued and 
stepped up to meet the immediate needs of the Berliners,
■^^Davison, Berlin Blockade, 33-3^*
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as well as those of American military personnel
Truman’s order of June 26 to continue the airlift
did not anticipate that the planes were to be anything
more than a stopgap measure, a way to temporize until
diplomatic means could be found to settle the Berlin
Crisis. The following day, General Curtis LeMay, Air
Force Commander at Wiesbaden, European headquarters of the
U.S. Air Force, cabled Washington a request for forty-five
C-5>i|. heavy transport planes. The C-ljJ’s available to
LeMay had only a three-ton load capacity, whereas the
12£newer and larger C-5^ could lift ten tons. To meet 
the need for transports in Germany, a total of fifty-four
C-fJlj. aircraft were eventually moved from bases in Alaska,
126Hawaii, the Caribbean and the United States. General 
Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, protested to 
Truman that this concentration of aircraft in one region 
seriously endangered national security, but the President 
overruled him.'1,2̂
12i|rruman, Memoirs, II, 123. See also, Millis,
Arms and Men, 288; Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, ij.5l-f>2; 
IJavTson, Berlin Blockade, 75* 106-107, 13l; Jotun Lukacs,
A History of ihe Cold War (Rev. ed.; Garden Citv, New 
York: Double day and' Company, Incorporated, 1962), 70. 
Hereinafter cited as Lukacs, History of the Cold War.
"Berlin Airlift," RG330, OSD, D70-1-5, National
Archives.
126Ibid.
■^^Truman, Memoirs. II, 125*
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Secretary of Defense Forrestal met with top Pentagon 
officials on Sunday, June 27, 191+8, to discuss what 
recommendations they should make to the President the 
following day on Berlin. Those present were agreed
that the existing supplies in Berlin, plus additional 
material that could be brought in by air, would allow 
approximately sixty days before the logistical situation 
became critical. The group spent considerable time on the 
alternatives of abandonment, the difficulty of remaining 
under extant circumstances and the odds of war if they 
opted to force their way into Berlin. According to 
Forrestal*s diary record of the meeting, there was no 
consideration given to the possibility that the airlift 
provided another choice. The planners may have been 
influenced by General Clay's initial estimate that the 
airlift could bring in a maximum of 5>00 to 700 tons a 
day, whereas the food requirements for West Berlin were 
estimated at 1,100 tons a day.^9 The meeting adjourned 
after deciding that Forrestal, Lovett and Royall should 
meet with the President the following day, apprise him of 
the alternatives and the arguments for and against each.
*i p Q In addition to Forrestal, among those present 
at the June 27 meeting were Under Secretary Lovett, Secre­
taries Royall and Sullivan of the Army and Navy, 
respectively, and Generals Bradley and Norstad.
•^•^^Davison, Berlin Blockade, 105, 112, l£0-5l. See 
also, Millis (ed.), Forrestal' Diaries, New York
Times, July 5, 191+8.
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They were also to discuss sending two squadrons of B-29 
bombers to Germany or England. The advantage of
(negotiating with nuclear weapon carriers within striking 
distance of the Soviet Union could not be ignored.
Secretary Lovett began the meeting with the Presi­
dent on June 28 by reciting the options derived from the 
Pentagon meeting the previous day. Truman interrupted 
him to say that there was no discussion necessary on
131staying in Berlin; he had no intention of pulling out.
This major decision represents one of the infrequent
instances of Truman making a command decision without
benefit of considerable deliberation and recommendations
by his staff of military advisers. The latter were still
busily trying to decide jif the United States should
132attempt to remain in Berlin.
The President made two other command decisions in 
the meeting on the twenty-eighth, in addition to the 
pivotal decision to stay in Berlin. He agreed to the 
sending of additional B-29 bombers to Germany, a decision
13°Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, ij.53-5̂ *
•̂ •̂ Ibid. s j.. See also, LaFeber, America, Russia, 
and the Cold War, 70; Millis, Arms and Men, 2tib.
132q »Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of 
Power," I|.2—lf-3 • O ’Connor claims, but without adequate 
substantiation, that the JCS had to overcome Truman's 
"predisposition" to break the blockade by means of an 
armed convoy.
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with which Clay heartily concurred, since he did not have 
enough of a conventional land force in Germany to confront 
the Russians. (Nor was he to obtain such a force. On the 
basis of existing Army manpower and global requirements, 
no additional troops could be made available for Germany.) 
Truman also instructed the National Military Establishment 
to take whatever steps were necessary to make the airlift 
sufficient to the immediate needs of West B e r l i n .
Truman has recalled the reasoning behind these decisions 
in his Memoirs:
The Russians were obviously determined to force us 
out of Berlin. They had suffered setbacks recently 
in Italy, in France, and in Finland. Their strongest 
satellite, Yugoslavia, had suddenly developed a taste 
for independent action, and the European Recovery 
Program was beginning to succeed. The blockade of 
Berlin was international Communism's counterattack. .
. . Our position in Berlin was precarious. If we 
wished to remain there, we would have to make a show 
of strength. But there was always the risk that 
Russian reaction might lead to war. We had to face 
the possibility that Russia might deliberately choose 
to make Berlin the pretext for war. . . .13h-
The actions and decisions of the Commander in Chief 
during the early days of the Berlin Crisis are both 
unusual and revealing. What seems most obvious is that 
he bypassed the very institutional framework he had worked 
to create. One of the prime purposes of the Armed Forces
■*-33Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, See
also, O'Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of 
Power," I4.2—14.35 Davison, Berlin Blockade, 110-11.
■^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 123-2ij..
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unification that Truman had brought into being was to 
establish an efficient, clear line of communication in the 
command system. The National Security Council recommenda­
tions to the President were not yet before him when he 
acted. The Central Intelligence Agency had failed to antic­
ipate the Soviet move. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were 
still debating alternatives, but were at least certain 
that the airlift Truman endorsed could not work for any 
extended period. The War Council of the National Military 
Establishment seems to have been moribund during this 
crisis period. In the normal, institutionalized process 
Truman had established, policy recommendations would have 
come up to the Commander in Chief from the military ad­
visers represented in these bodies. In this instance,
Truman decided on a course of action--to stay in Berlin 
and supply the city by air-~and he then convinced his 
military advisers that it would work. In the hectic days 
of the Korean decision the President would again bypass 
part of the staff process which he otherwise placed great 
faith in.133
135m an editorial note, Walter Millis cites many 
of the same factors mentioned here. He sees the June 27 
Pentagon session as an ac[ hoc response which bypassed 
". . . the formal machinery of the Security Act to take 
large (if rather vague) politico-strategic decisions." 
Forrestal Diaries, k5k' LaFeber, in America, Russia, and 
the Cold War (p. 70) writes: "Without consulting anyone
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By early July the airlift, which someone in the 
Air Force with a singular lack of imagination had code- 
named "Operation Vittles," was beginning to show signs 
that it could succeed against all odds. Much of the 
burden had been eased by the arrival in late June of the 
four-engine C-5i| Skymaster transports, which had triple 
the capacity of the smaller C—1̂ 7T s.-̂-36 r^e British Royal 
Air Force soon joined in the airlift, taking up approxi­
mately one-third of the burden. To make the operation 
more efficient, the British and American air elements were 
joined in October, 19i|-8, into the Combined Airlift Task 
Force.137 jn the 32lj. days of the airlift, well over a 
quarter million flights were made, delivering a total of 
over two million tons of food and other supplies necessary
■j
to the survival of the people of Berlin.
The National Security Council had studied at length 
the proposal to send B-29 atomic bombers to bases in Great 
Britain, which the British were willing to accept, although, 
supposedly, they would be armed with nuclear weapons. In
but a few Cabinet advisors, Truman decided. . . . "  This 
is not accurate and it conveys a false impression that 
Truman had acted intemperately. See also, O'Connor,
"Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of Power," if.3.
136"Berlin Airlift," RG330, OSD, D70-1-5, National 
Archives.
^•^Davison, Berlin Blockade, 195*
U ^ e e s ,  Age of Containment, 28.
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a report to Truman, July 15, 19ij.8, the NSC recommended, 
and the President approved, this move. They reasoned 
that it would underscore the seriousness of the current 
crisis to the public, provide experience for the Air 
Force and accustom the British people to having the 
atomic bombers around as a permanent f i x t u r e  . ^ 9
The atomic bombers stationed in Germany and now in 
England were obviously designed to intimidate the Russians. 
At the same time the Berlin crisis provided the perfect 
cover for a permanent long-range decision to extend the 
atomic perimeter around the Soviet Union. The first 
American Strategic Air Command base in Great Britain was 
established as a direct result of the Berlin blockade. 
However, it is not at all certain that these planes were 
carrying atomic bombs. Whether they were or not remains 
a military secret,^®
Beginning in the spring of 19lj.8, as the Berlin 
crisis developed, Secretary of Defense Forrestal tried to 
get the President to formulate a specific atomic policy as 
to whether or not the U.S. would ever use the bomb again 
in war,and, if so, under what circumstances. The Secre­
tary also wanted Truman to transfer custody of the atomic
■^^illis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, Davison,
Berlin Blockade, 129-30.
^+°Millis, Arms and Men, 289*
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bombs from the Atomic Energy Commission to the Air Force, 
arguing that those responsible for using the weapon when 
ordered to do so, should possess it.'*'^ In the next few 
months Truman displayed an •unusual reluctance to decide 
the issues on nuclear policy that Forrestal had raised.
In a meeting on July 15>> 19̂ 4-8, the Defense Secretary in­
formally raised the subject of atom bomb custody again.
The President told Forrestal that he wanted to keep the 
decision on use of the bomb "in his own hands." According 
to Forrestal's diary entry for this date, Truman said that 
he did not intend " . . .  to have some dashing lieutenant 
colonel decide when would be the proper time to drop 
one. Six days later, the NME formally requested an
executive order transferring bomb custody from the aEC to 
the Military Establishment. Truman reserved decision on 
the transfer, but commented that since the responsibility 
was his, he proposed to keep that power intact. Two days 
later, June 23, he privately told Forrestal he was going 
to reject the proposed transfer of bomb custody to the 
military. Forrestal claimed the President admitted that 
his decision was politically-inspired, but that after the 
presidential race was over he would be willing to reconsider
^-^-Rogow, Victim of Duty, 183-8^? Millis (ed.), 
Forrestal Diaries, IjjjB.
^•^Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, lj.£8.
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his position.'1'^ In fact, the issue of civilian or 
military custody— presuming proper fail-safe systems— is 
of only passing importance, since only a civilian, the 
Commander in Chief, can order their employment. Of far 
greater significance is the question of whether they 
should be used. And on this, Truman clearly wanted to 
keep his options open.
The President’s reluctance to fix conditions under 
which he would approve nuclear warfare, while under­
standable, created serious problems for military 
contingency planners. This was particularly true in the 
bellicose atmosphere of 191̂ .8 when available conventional 
forces were at their lowest levels. The reduction in 
military appropriations, except for strategic bombers, 
indicated a reliance on massive nuclear retaliation in 
the even of total war. A conventional military response 
in a limited conflict could not be planned for, since, in 
lieu of a stipulated nuclear policy, the guiding 
assumption prescribed that the American response to 
attack would be strategic atom-bombing of the aggressor.
The atom bombers went to European stations without 
an established policy as to the use of the weapons which
lU3ibid., lj.60-6l. Forrestal records Truman 
repeating these political considerations with General 
Marshall present on September 16. See ibid., lj.90.
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were— theoretically at least--nestled in their bellies.
The B-29's were atomic guns pointed at the Soviet heart­
land. Soviet intelligence was reasonably sure Truman 
would not pull the nuclear trigger over Berlin. However, 
neither they, nor Truman's military advisers, really knew. 
Forrestal discussed this policy vacuum with the President 
several times in July and August, without receiving a 
conclusive response.'1'^ The Defense Secretary persisted 
in pressing Truman for a nuclear-use policy and was 
rewarded with an answer, of sorts, on September 13:
". . . the President prayed that he would never have to 
make such a decision, but that if it became necessary, no 
one need have a misgiving but what he should do so.’1̂ ^
The Secretary must have considered the answer satisfactory 
for, as Millis noted editorially, "Forrestal never again 
felt it necessary to raise the matter with the Presi­
dent."'1'^
Whether or not they carried atomic bombs, with or 
without a clearly-defined policy, the B-29's Truman ordered 
to Europe changed the military and diplomatic policies of
■^•^•Davison, Berlin Blockade, l£6.
^Ibid.
U+^Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, I4.87.
1^7lbid.; Schilling, "Politics of National Defense,"
173-7^.
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the United States. In a brilliant passage from his Arms
and Men, Walter Millis has analyzed the effect on policy
of the B-29’s:
. . . when at last they roared off across the Atlantic, 
they were bringing the nuclear weapons for the first
time directly into the system of diplomacy and
violence by which the affairs of peoples were thence­
forth to be regulated. . . . The Berlin crisis itself 
was successfully met by . . . essentially nonmilitary 
means, and the fact that they succeeded may have con­
tributed to the continued American inattention to the 
military foundations of the new world order which was 
developing. There was no real review of the military 
problem. . . .
Yet in another sense, 19l;8 represents a major 
divide in American military thought. The atomic 
bombers had gone to Britain. . . . The bombs exploded 
over Hiroshima and Nagasaki had represented a one- 
shot, last-ditch effort, so to speak, to bring to an 
end a war which already had taken its toll of 
millionsJ and the first impulse in the aftermath had 
been to insure that such things would never be used 
in war again. By 19i+8 the impulse had died; it was 
plain that the atomic arsenal had entered American 
thought as an appropriate instrument of policy for bhe 
future.
It was still a back-door, largely unacknowledged 
entrance. The supposed atomic monopoly lay somewhere 
behind nearly every policy decision in the military,,g 
field, but outwardly things went on much as before. ^
The Secretaries of State and Defense met with the 
President on July 19 to review the Berlin situation.
General Marshall emphasized to Truman that if he did not 
hold to a "firm policy" there, then the remainder of 
American European policy would also fail. Secretary 
Forrestal added a note of caution, telling the President 
that the United States had just slightly more than two
3 - ^ - ® M i l l i s ,  Arms and Men, 288-90.
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Array divisions in reserve, only one of which could be in 
Europe quickly. Truman concluded the discussion by 
saying, in Forrestal's words, " . . .  our policy would 
remain fixed . . .  we would stay in Berlin until all 
diplomatic means had been exhausted in order to come to 
some kind of an accommodation to avoid war."1^  On first 
reading, Truman seems to have made a firm statement, but 
much depends on what he meant by "until all diplomatic 
means had been exhausted." As one writer points out, 
"Diplomatic means would be exhausted if the Soviets simply 
said 'no' consistently over a period of time.
It is quite possible that Eorrestal misunderstood 
Truman or that the President's language was not precise 
enough. Writing a diary-type note to himself the evening 
of the meeting with the Secretary, Truman clearly stated 
that the United States would stay in Berlin, whatever 
happened. The strain of these days on the President is 
evident in the note:
July 19, 19^8
Have quite a day. See some politicos. A meeting 
with General Marshall and Jim Forrestal on Berlin 
and the Russian situation. Marshall states the facts 
and the condition with whioh we are faced. I made the 
decision ten days ago to stay in Berlin. Jim wants to 
hedge. . . .  I insist we will stay in Berlin— come
■^^Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 459.
-^Davison, Berlin Blockade, 157*
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what may.
Royall, Draper and Jim Forrestal came in later. I 
have to listen to a rehash of what I know already and 
reiterate my "Stay in Berlin" decision. I do not pass 
the buck, nor do I alibi out of any decision I make.
Went to Pershing's funeral in the marble 
amphitheatre. An impressive ceremony. . . .
Bess and Margaret went to Missouri at 7:30 EDT 
6:30 God's time. I sure hated to see them go. Came 
back and read the papers, some history and then wrote 
this. It is hot and humid and lonely. . . .3-51
Truman apparently felt a need to talk to his field 
commander face to face about Berlin. He ordered General 
Clay and Robert Murphy, State Department adviser to Clay, 
to return to Washington for consultation. The President 
invited the General to attend the National Security 
Council meeting on July 22 with him, so that Clay might 
brief them on the German situation. Clay told the NSC 
that the airlift was working well, averaging 2500 tons of 
goods per day, but that additional aircraft would be 
required to bring in the coal necessary for the coming 
winter. He said the morale of the German people was high 
and they were determined to wait out the Soviet blockade. 
Clay then returned to the possibility of sending an armored 
convoy up the highway to Berlin. It was his opinion that 
it would be met by armed Soviet resistance .3-52 gu^
General was not quite consistent, for he had dined with 
Forrestal the previous evening and told him that he
3-53-Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, II4.O.
l52Qirumanj Memoirs, II,
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believed that three weeks earlier he could have put 
through an armored convoy without difficulty and that he 
still believed it could be done.^^ Clay had, on July 10, 
cabled Washington a request for authority to force his 
way through the blockade, convinced that the Russians 
would not forecefully resist such a passage.
The Air Force Chief, General Vandenberg, objected 
in the National Security Council meeting of July 22 to 
any further concentration of forces in Germany. Truman 
asked the General if he thought it better to send an armed 
force down the highway, thus precipitating World War III. 
Without giving Vandenberg a chance to answer, Truman said 
that the airlift was working and involved less risk than 
a convoy. He ordered the Air Force to ". . . furnish the 
fullest support possible to the problem of supplying 
Berlin."1^
By September the Berlin airlift had expanded to the 
point where it could provide foodstuffs and most other
•^^Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, •
l^Davison, Berlin Blockade, 126. Robert Murphy, 
a State Department representative who accompanied General 
Clay back from Germany, is quoted in Time magazine (June 1, 1970) as having said he regretted that he had not resigned 
at the time of the blockade as a' protest. Murphy felt 
that the United States should have challenged the Soviet 
blockade "more vigorously."
l£5>Truman, Memoirs, II, 125-26.
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necessities of life without difficulty. However, bulk
commodities, like coal, which would be needed in great
quantities in the coming winter, would require additional
aircraft. A review on Berlin in the National Security
Council on September 9 disclosed that the diplomatic
negotiations to end the blockade had broken down because
of Soviet intransigence on all key points. In addition,
the Russians announced they planned to hold ground and
aerial training maneuvers in an area of East Germany that
156included the airlift corridors. A meeting with the 
Secretary of Defense and other Pentagon leaders four days 
later left Truman despondent: "Berlin is a mess," he
confided in a diary note that evening (September 13).
"I have a terrible feeling . . . that we are very close 
to war. I hope not.
Truman's somber estimates of the threat of war may 
have been colored by his own political problems; he was in 
the midst of a campaign for re-election which few thought 
he had a chance of winning. In any event, the Russians 
continued to make hostile gestures, but they always stopped 
short of actual armed contact.
The success of the airlift was an ever-increasing 
embarrassment to the Soviet government. The airlift
1^6Ibid., 128.
■^^Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, lij.1.
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project, Clay reported to the NSC, was no longer an
experiment, but a success which could be continued
indefinitely. On October 22 General Clay received the
authorization of the National Security Council and the
Commander in Chief to add sixty-six more C-51| transports
158to his airlift. Truman and the Security Council also 
approved appropriations to the Air Force for expansion of 
maintenance facilities and the procurement of new aircraft
159to offset the attrition caused by the airlift.
Early in 19U9 the Soviet Union began sending out 
diplomatic signals indicating a willingness to discuss an 
end to the Berlin blockade. Talks began between Philip 
Jessup and Jacob Malik, the American and Soviet represen­
tatives to the United Nations, in March of 19^9. The end 
result was an agreement made public on May ii, announcing 
that the blockade would end as of May 12.^0 The detente 
had been made possible by Truman’s resort to the only 
peaceful and honorable course left open to him, the 
dramatic and amazingly effective airlift. The Air Force 
could well boast, as Secretary Symington did, that "The
•^^Davison, Berlin Blockade, 250; Truman, Memoirs,
II, 129.
•^^Symington to Forrestal, November 2ip, 191̂ 8,
RG3i|.0, S/AF, Vittles, folder (1), National Archives.
3-60l'i’uman, Memoirs, II, 130-31. See also, Davison, 
Berlin Blockade, 270-71«
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Berlin airlift is one of the great transportation 
achievements of all time.
Truman’s conduct in the Berlin blockade crisis 
showed him at his best; resolute but restrained. He 
rejected the direct military solution of testing the 
blockade with an armed convoy in favor of the airlift, 
which, for a time, only he seemed to believe could work. 
While Berlin, like Greece and Turkey and other lesser 
confrontations with the Soviet Union could be counted as 
victories for Truman’s containment doctrine; it should be
noted that all were achieved while the United States
162enjoyed a monopoly on nuclear weapons. This monopoly 
ended four months after the Berlin blockade. Which is not 
to gainsay what Truman accomplished: he had taken a
peaceful path and obtained his objective without appreciable 
compromise. That West Berlin still stands as a republican 
enclave in the center of a Soviet satellite is due largely 
to the firm leadership of Harry Truman. That Berlin still 
stands unnaturally divided is a mocking reminder in
^-Symington to Forrestal, November 20, 19k&,
RG3i|.0, S/AF, 031.1, National Archives.
l^D(enna) F)rank) Fleming, "America's Responsi­
bility," in Brian Tierney, Donald Kagan, and L. Pearce 
Williams (eds.), The Cold War— Who Is To Blame? (New York: 
Random House, 1967)* 1J|-15* Hereinafter cited as Fleming, 
"America's Responsibility." See also, Glenn D. Paige,
The Korean Decision, June 2U-30* 1950 (New York: The Free 
Press, i960;, iiereinarter cited as Paige, Korean
Decision.
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microcosm of the politico-military dichotomy of the world 
which began with Truman and his Soviet counterpart.
The Berlin blockade offers an excellent illustration 
of the great power inherent in the accepted modern concept 
of the commander in chief. At no time during the days of 
decision in the Berlin crisis, nor in the long months of 
tense confrontation with the Soviet Union, did the Presi­
dent consult with the legislative leaders. Not once did 
he ask authority from Congress to take action, nor request 
that they give legislative sanction to decisions he had 
m a d e . T r u m a n  was virtually without check. He could 
just as easily have ordered General Clay to send an armed 
convoy to Berlin and to meet force with force. The 
resulting bloodshed would have confronted the nation with 
a state of war, albeit undeclared. The exclusive power of 
the Congress to declare war is a largely-illusory consti­
tutional check on the sweeping military power of the modern 
presidency.
In March 19ij-8 Great Britain, Prance, the Nether­
lands, Belgium and Luxembourg signed a collective self- 
defense treaty, called the Brussels Pact. This was a 
purely military agreement predicated on the principle that
163q !Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of 
Power, " ij.3 •
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an attack on one was an attack on all. The reasons for 
it, of course, were the events of the Cold War in Europe 
in 19l|-7 and early 19lf-8, particularly the Soviet-sponsored 
Communist takeover of the governments of Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia. Finland was under extreme pressure to 
enter irifco a "pact of friendship" with the Soviet Union.
A general malaise existed in Western Europe occasioned by 
Communist pressure on the "free nations" which led 
directly to the formation of the Brussels Pact.'1'^
Speaking to Congress at the time of the pact's 
signing, Truman called it ". . . a  notable step in the 
direction of unity in Europe for the protection and 
preservation of its civilization."1^  The President told 
the Congress that the Brussels Pact deserved the full 
support of the United States. Then, in what was probably 
a trial balloon regarding American association with the 
pact, Truman said: "I am sure that the determination of
the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be
l6^John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since 
World War II (2nd rev. ed.j New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
• Hereinafter cited as Spanier, American For­
eign Policy. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern­
ment aTToperations, Subcommittee on National Security and 
International Operations, The Atlantic Alliance— Basic 
Issues: A Study, Committee Print, 89 Cong., 2 Bess'., 1966. 
rfereTnafTTer cited as Atlantic Alliance— Basic Issues. See 
also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 2173;' Steinberg, Man From 
Missouri, 359.
^•^item No. 52, Special Message to the Congress on 
the Threat to the Freedom of Europe, March 17, 19lj.8,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19ijB, I8I4..
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matched by an equal determination on our part to help
166them to protect themselves.” The President was aware
that the military alliance between Prance, Britain and the
Benelux nations did not constitute any genuine deterrent
to Soviet ambition. Any effective military alliance for
Europe was only possible with American participation.
But here Truman was wary of American tradition: ”. . . 1
always kept in mind the les.son of Wilson’s failure in
1 6*71920. I meant to have legislative co-operation.”
What Truman hoped to do was to enlarge the Brussels 
Alliance by the inclusion of the United States and the 
nations of western Europe who were not yet members.
This meant, of course, that he would eventually have to 
ask a generally-hostile Republican Senate to ratify 
American participation in an international military 
alliance. He was fortunate in that Arthur Vandenberg, a 
staunch believer in bipartisan foreign policy, was then 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
Vandenberg, with the encouragement of Under Secretary of 
State Robert Lovett, agreed to try to obtain the prior
l66Ibid.
•L^Truman, Memoirs, II, 2l±3-
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consent of the Senate to the principle of such an 
alliance
The result of Vandenberg's efforts, Senate Resolu­
tion 239, was artfully led through the legislative process 
by the Senator to passage on a final roll call vote in 
which only four votes were recorded against it. Thus, on 
June 11, 19i|-8, the Senate went on record as endorsing the 
participation of the United States in a regional collective 
security arrangement. The significant provisions of the 
resolution are noted below:
(3) Association of the United States, by constitu­
tional process, with such regional and other collective 
arrangement as are based oncontinuous and effective 
self-help and mutual aid, and as effect its national 
security.
(If.) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by 
making clear its determination to exercise the right 
of individual or collective self-defense . . . should 
any armed attack occur affecting its national security.169
With the resolution as security, Truman then 
initiated talks with other nations, that resulted, on
^ Ib id * *  Acheson Testim ony, U .S . ,  Congress,
S en ate , Committee on Government O p e ra tio n s , Subcommittee 
on N a tio n a l S e c u r ity  and In te r n a t io n a l  O p e ra tio n s , H e a rin g s , 
The A t la n t ic  A l l ia n c e , 89 C ong., 2 Sess . ,  (7 P a rts ;  A p r i l  
27 - August 15, 1966), P t .  1, 9. H e r e in a f te r  c ite d  as 
A t la n t ic  A l l ia n c e  H e a rin g s .
■^^Text of Vandenberg Resolution is in Bernstein 
and Matusow (eds^, Truman Administration, 27k-75>* Watson, 
United States in the Contemporary World, 82-83. See also, 
Henry M. Jackson (ed.), The Atlantic Alliance: Jackson 
Subcommittee Hearings and Findings (New York: Frederick A. 
"Praeger, 1967), 8. Hereinafter cited as Jackson (ed.),
The Atlantic Alliance.
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April !{., 19l;9, in a pact establishing the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) The President submitted
the treaty to the Senate for approval on April 12,
reminding them that the document was in accord with their
resolution of the previous June and re-hashing the
venerable argument that the way to lasting peace was through
military m i g h t . L e n g t h y  hearings and floor debate
followed. The most persistent question dealt with the
power of the Commander in Chief to send troops abroad
without congressional sanction in compliance with a
military alliance. Administration leaders blocked an
172attempt by the Senate to stipulate on the matter. The
ratification vote came on July 21 with the treaty passing
170The signatory nations were Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Prance, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States. 
Spanier, American Foreign Policy, 50 J Phillips, Truman 
Presidency, 266-67. For a “ de t'ai led account of the negotia­
tions that led to the NATO Treaty, see Truman, Memoirs, II, 
21̂ -50.
•^^Item No. 75j Special Message to the Senate Trans­
mitting the North Atlantic Treaty, April 12, 19l|9, Public 
Papers . . . Truman, 191-1-9 > 206-207.
172o»Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of 
Power,." 58. Senatorial efforts to check the Commander in 
Chief with respect to the NATO agreement are described in 
Powers of the President to Send the Armed Forces Outside the 
United Spates. The problem is also "discussed in a column 
by Arthur Krock, "The Power of Congress to Declare War,"
New York Times, February Ij., 19i|9, reprinted in Krock, In 
the Nation, I6I-63. See also, Robert Taft, "A Conservative 
Opposes the Treaty," in Kaplan (ed.), NATO and the Policy 
of Containment, 18-22.
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82-13* The ratification process was completed on August 
2ij., 19i}-9> and NATO began its formal existence.
The American commitment to a peacetime military 
alliance was a unique and significant departure from 
established practice. It was an obvious extension and 
militarization of the Truman Doctrine. However, its 
value, particularly in the first years of its operation, 
was largely symbolic since it lacked sufficient aims, 
forces and coordination.^^ As Urs Schwarz has said, 
what the establishment of NATO recognized was ”. . .  
the truth that military power had become a permanent 
corollary of foreign p o l i c y .  "•*• 75
Standing alone, the North Atlantic Treaty was, in 
Richard Leopold's words, ". . . a  diplomatic gesture rather 
than a military bulwark. "176 nations of Europe
■l-73Truman, Memoirs, II, 2f>l; Spanier, American 
Foreign Policy. The text of the North Atlantic Treaty is 
officially published in U.S. Statutes at Large (63 Stat. 
22l|l). The text is reprinted in Jaclcson (ed.), The 
Atlantic Alliance, 2S1-83J Kaplan (ed.) NATO and t!he Policy 
of Containment, 12-lk; Watson (ed«), United Stages in the 
'Contemporary World, 83-87.
1 ̂"Leopold, "United States in World Affairs," 233*
See also, Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 
15>6-i>7» McLelian and Reuss, "Foreign and Military 
Policies," 61, 66-68; American Military History, 5^3*
■^-’Schwarz, American Strategy, 135*
176RiChard W. Leopold, The Growth of American 
Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 6^8. Here­
inafter cited as Leopold, Growth of American Foreign Policy.
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involved could act as little more than a tripwire in the
face of an all-out Soviet movement westward. These
nations could not meet even a conventional probe by
Communist forces without significant military assistance
from the United States. A program of military aid was an
essential concomitant if NATO were to be anything more
than a wall of paper.
The National Security Council recommended to the
President that the request for military assistance
appropriations for the NATO nations be combined with
similar existing aid programs into one package for
presentation to the Congress. The programs already in
operation provided for the military equipment and troop-
training assistance for Iran, Greece, Turkey, the
Philippines, China, Korea, and several Latin American 
177republics. There was an obvious efficiency to
combining all military aid into a unified program, but 
the administration was also concerned about the resistance 
in Congress to military aid to the NATO bloc. Accord­
ingly, the tactic was to divorce the request for military 
assistance from the NATO treaty and tie it to a unified
military aid r e q u e s t
Pour days after the Senate advised favorably on the
•^^American Military History, 543*
•*-7®McLellan and Reuss, "Foreign and Military 
Policies," 62; Hammond, "NSC-68," 283.
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NATO Pact, Truman sent to Congress a request for a Mutual 
Defense Assistance Program (MDAGP) . The principal purpose 
of the bill was to provide the requisite military imple­
mentation of the NATO alliance. The President asked the
Congress for $l.lj.5 billion. The bulk of his request,
179$1.09 billion, was intended for Western Europe. In his
special message to Congress asking for MDAP, Truman said 
it was intended to provide compact, mobile defensive 
forces for nations whose security was vital to the 
national security of the United States. He acknowledged 
that the foreign forces envisioned by his program would 
provide the nations involved only with sufficient arms 
and equipment to resist internal disorder and " . . .
l80resisting the initial phases of external aggression.1 
Truman recognized that the only genuine "deterrent to 
aggression" was still the military might of the United 
States, and said that no nation need fear that he would
■I O - j
not use this power to prevent their being overrun. The
President told the Congress that the requirements for 
military aid had been unified under one program so that 
the distribution of American arms and equipment could be
■*-79phillips , Truman Presidency, 269-70 .
100Item No. 163, Special Message to the Congress on 
the Need for a Military Aid Program, July 25, 19il9,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19k.9j 398.
l8lIbid.
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adapted to U.S. foreign policy and changing conditions
Many members of the Congress, appalled uy the amount 
of the MDAP request, joined with the neo-isolationists, 
led by Senator Taft, in opposition to the President's 
request. One of Taft's strongest allies was Senator 
Vandenberg, a key figure in making NATO a reality. 
Vandenberg believed, as did Taft, that the bill was too 
costly and that it was " . . .  almost unbelievable in its 
grant of unlimited power to the Chief Executive."'1' ^  The 
President assigned to Dean Acheson, who had replaced 
Marshall as Secretary of State in January, the task of 
steering the MDAP bill through Congress.'1"®̂ ' The Congress 
battled over the bill the rest of the summer months and 
well into September; it seemed clear that Truman would 
have to accept major amendments in the amount and con­
ditions for military aid in order to secure passage. But 
Truman's program and Acheson's task were both simplified 
by the Soviet Union. On September 23, 19i|9, the President 
made public the information that the U.S.S.R. had
•*-®̂ Ibid., 399. See also, Truman, Memoirs, II,251-53.
• ^ ^ V a n d e n b e r g  i s quoted in Acheson, Present at the 
Creation, 309.
18^-Ibid., 309ff. provides a thorough, if slightly 
slanted account of the struggle to get the bill through 
Congress.
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successfully tested a nuclear device.'*'®^ Impelled by the
loss of the nuclear monopoly, solid majorities in both
legislative houses approved the bill in less than a week,
T RAcutting the original request by only $100 million.
The President signed the Mutual Defense Assistance
Act of 19^9^^ on October 6, describing it as " . . .  a
notable contribution to the collective security of the
188free nations of the world.” In an obvious reference 
to the Soviet atomic explosion, Truman also said at the 
bill-signing: "Recent developments in the field of 
armaments have strengthened the free nations in their 
adherence to the principle of a common defense . . . that 
underlies this act.”̂ ®^ Truman made implementation of the
l8^Item No. 216, Statement by the President on 
Announcing the First Atomic Explosion in the U.S.S.R., 
September 23* 192+9» Public Papers . . . Truman, 19ll9* lf-85.
l86phiiiipS, Truman Presidency, 270. See also, 
Steinberg, Man from Missouri", 380; Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, 313 •
l87The act is Public Law 329 (63 St at. 712+) . A 
description of the principles involved in the act as 
passed and as amended in 1950* can be found in Major 
Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 121, 17^-73•
■̂88Item No. 22£* Statement by the President Upon 
Signing the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, October 6,
191+9* Public Papers . . . Truman, 191+9* 500.
l89Ibid.
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act the responsibility of the Secretary of S t a t e . -*-90 
However, the Department of the Army was given the duty of 
administering the Mutual Defense Program. In operation, 
each country that received MDAP-authorized arms and 
equipment had an American "Military Assistance Advisory 
Group" assigned to it. Each group was composed of Army,
Air Force and Navy sections. The functions assigned to 
these groups have been described in the Army’s official 
history: " . . .  each advisory group assisted its host
government in determining the amount and type of aid 
needed and helped train the armed forces . . .  in the use 
and tactical employment of material received from the 
United States.”191
It took more than a year for the NATO countries to 
come to agreement on the precise implementation of the 
principles they had approved in the North Atlantic Treaty. 
The difficulties centered around reaching accord on each 
nation’s contribution to the common effort, the partici­
pation of West Germany in the alliance, and the
190rpruraan £0 Acheson, November 23, 19ij.9, RG165,
USA, Plans and Operations 092, Case 66/5, National Archives. 
The Secretary of State’s authority and the terms of ad­
ministering the act were formalized by Truman in Executive 
Order 10099, January 27, 1950 (3 C.F.R., 19*1.9-1953 Comp., 
295)* See also, Item No. 22, Statement by the President 
Upon Issuing Executive Order for Administering Mutual 
Defense Act, January 27, 1950, Public Papers . . . Truman, 
1950, 131-32.
-1-91 American Military History, 5̂ 4-3•
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amalgamation of national forces into a common "balanced 
force" for mutual defense. The outbreak of the Korean War 
impressed upon the NATO signatories the need of a function­
ing body to prevent a similar attack in Europe. A general 
agreement was finally hammered out by Secretary Acheson 
and the allied representatives on September 26, 1950, 
which established SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers Europe) .^92 one understanding reached by the NATO 
countries was that the supreme commander of the NATO 
forces was to be an American. And Truman knew just the 
American he wanted for the job.
To a note for General Eisenhower on October 19,
1950, Truman had added a handwritten postscript: "First
time you’re in town I wish you'd come see me. If I send 
for you we'll start the 'speculators' to work."'*'^ 
Eisenhower saw the President on October 28. Truman asked 
him to take supreme command of the NATO armies. The 
General accepted, Truman recalled, because he felt that 
bringing the nations of Europe together " . . .  was a job
•^^Truman has described the difficult negotiations 
leading to this agreement in his Memoirs, II, 252-57* See 
also, William T. R. Fox and Annette B. Fox, NaTO- and the 
Range of American Choice (New York and London! Columbia 
University Press, T W 7 7 7  11+-15* Hereinafter cited as Fox 
and Fox, NATO and the Range of American Choice.
193Truman to Eisenhower, October 19, 1950, Eisen­
hower Papers, PF/DDE, Truman folder (2), Eisenhower Library.
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that very badly needed to be done."^9^ Elsenhower's 
formal appointment was made by the President on December 
19, 1950. The order gave the General full operational 
command of all American Army, Air T?orce and Naval Forces 
in the European theater, as well as designating him as 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. "You are undertaking 
a tremendous responsibility,” Truman concluded in his 
order to Eisenhower. "As President and Commander-in-Chief 
of the Armed Forces of the United States, I know that our 
entire country is wholeheartedly behind you."^^ Truman 
might have thought twice about this prestigious appoint­
ment had he any way of knowing that in less than two 
years Eisenhower would be the Republican nominee, publicly 
damning the Korean military policies of his former 
commander in chief.
Six years after he left office, Truman told cun 
interviewer that the conclusion of the NATO treaty gave 
him the greatest sense of personal satisfaction.^-9̂  The 
ex-President wrote in his Memoirs that western Europe was
19î prUjnan, Memoirs, II, 257• See also, Fox and 
Fox, NATO and the Range of American Choice, 15. Officially, 
Eisenhowerfs title will "He Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe (SACEUR).
195Truman to Eisenhower, December 19, 1950, 
Eisenhower Papers, PF/DDE, Truman Folder (2), Eisenhower 
Library•
196Phillips, "Truman at 75*" 107.
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secure largely because the United States was able to 
break with tradition during his administration and join a 
peacetime military alliance .^97 Subsequent events did not 
serve to shake his conviction that NATO is an important 
deterrent shield:
Student: Mr. President, you said that during your
admin is tra t ion the country moved from isolationism to 
internationalism. I would imagine that one of the 
ways you did this was by joining NATO. . . .  Do you 
have any regrets about moving this nation quite so 
quickly into an organization like NATO?
President Truman: I have not. NATO has been a
very successful organization. It was one of the 
things that kept us out of a third world war. • . •
It's working, and itSs going to continue to work.
When It quits working, we'll be in the third world 
war. Just keep that in mind.198
The test detonation of an atomic device by the 
Soviet Union had encouraged the Congress to pass the Mutual 
Defense Assistance Act substantially in the form Truman 
had requested. The Soviet test had also been a major 
factor in Truman's decision to authorize a crash program 
to develop the thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb. There was 
another major development directly attributable to the 
successful Russian experiment: The drafting of a policy
197Truman, Memoirs, II, 260-61.
Speaks, ll|.-lfj. In 1966, in a letter to 
Senate Sub-conraTttee on National Security, Truman wrote: 
"It seems to me that there is continued need for NATO to 
guard against the use of force to resolve issues which 
remain 20 years after the war." Truman to Henry M. 
Jackson, July 26, 1966, quoted in Atlantic Alliance 
Hearings, Pt. 7# 227.
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paper for Truman that would come to have a major influence
on the military and foreign policy thinking of the
American government. The paper had its beginning in a
report dated January 31, 1950, dealing with recommendations
to the President in light of the end of the American atomic 
199monopoly. One of the recommendations made then was 
that the President order the State and Defense departments 
to make a detailed examination of American objectives in 
both war and peace. They should also assess the effect 
that those objectives have on strategic planning now that 
the Soviet Union had a ". . . probable fission bomb capa­
bility and possible thermonuclear bomb capability. • • .
The President accepted this recommendation and when he 
signed the directive ordering the acceleration of the 
hydrogen bomb program on January 30, 1950, he appended 
to it a letter ordering the Secretaries of State and 
Defense to make this reassessment of defense and foreign 
policy.
199The recommendations to Truman have been discussed 
at length in Chapter IV, supra.
200Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 621̂ .
^^•Hammond, "NSC-68,” 290-92. See also, Phillips, 
Truman Presidency. 305-306; Paige, Korean Decision, $8} 
American Military History, 5iilt; Rostow, United gltates in 
the World Arena,' 22U.-2&; Schwarz, American strategy, 1*35. 
Another- factor leading to this assessment was the loss of 
mainland China to the Communist forces late in 19l|9. How­
ever, the prime motive appears to have been the Soviet 
atomic bomb. See O ’Connor, ’’Harry S. Trumans New 
Dimensions of Power," 32.
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The staff studies that followed eventually produced 
a "white paper" titled NSC-68 (National Security Council 
Policy Paper No, 68), The paper began by recognizing that 
events since World War II had brought about a basic 
realignment among nations, with the United States and the 
Soviet Union forming the terminals of an international 
polarization. NSC-68 discounted the existence of a 
Communist "master plan," but did conclude that the Soviet 
government had three major objectives:
(1) to preserve the internal power position of the 
regime and develop the U.S.S.R. as the base for that 
power;
(2) to consolidate control over the Soviet 
satellites and add them as support for that base;
(3) to weaken any opposing centers of power and 
aspire to world hegemony.202
American objectives of individual freedom and 
self-determination constituted a threat to the three 
objectives of the Soviet Union. There existed a basic 
incompatibility between the two systems of government.
The assumption was then made that a continuous assault 
upon the United States and other democratic nations was in 
prospect, since force was an accepted means of obtaining 
Communist political objectives. America must be willing 
to preserve its avowed principles both at home and abroad, 
no matter what the cost. This should be accomplished by 
peaceful means, but should these means fail, the nation
202Reumond, "NSC-68," 304-305•
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should be willing and prepared to wage war to preserve 
those conditions under which this form of government can 
survive and prosper.203
The paper next analyzed the relative military capa­
bilities of both nations and their respective allies in 
the event of war. The Russians would have sufficient 
atomic weapons and an adequate delivery system by 19^«
The effect of this would be to negate the deterrant value 
of American atomic weapons, bringing about an atomic 
stalemate. In a recourse to conventional warfare, the 
Soviet Union had substantial superiority. The United 
States and its Western allies were inadequately prepared 
for limited warfare because of low troop levels, weakness 
in the military and economic structure of western 
European nations and a lack of strength in the Western 
alliance system.*20̂ -
The document described for the President four 
possible courses of actions (1) a continuation of the 
present policy course of limited defense budgets with the 
same commitments and military capabilities! (2) a pre­
ventive war against the Soviet Union; (3) withdrawal from 
international commitments and acceptance of the "fortress 
America" strategy; (ij.) development of the conventional war
203phillips, Truman Presidency, 306.
^^Hamraond, "NSC-68," 306.
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deterrent potentional of the free world by a massive 
buildup of the American military forces as well as those 
of the allied nations to the point where they were capable 
of responding to each new Communist challenge quickly and 
decisively.2®^ The NSC-68 drafters, who obviously 
endorsed the fourth option, deliberately avoided making 
any cost estimates in the paper itself, but in their dis­
cussions estimates had ranged from $3 to $35 billion over 
Truman's current ceiling of $15 billion. But the paper 
did indicate a belief that even in time of peace a 
military budget totalling up to twenty percent of the 
gross national product was possible without bringing about 
national bankruptcy.2®̂ *
The Secretaries of Defense and State signed the 
document and submitted it to Truman on April 7# 1950.
Five days later, the President sent the policy paper to 
the National Security Council (where it acquired the 
designation "NSC-68"). The President instructed the 
Council to work out a program based on the fourth option 
and present him with cost estimates for its implementation. 
Truman had not approved NSC-68 as the new national military
20^Ibid., 306-307; Phillips. Truman Presidency,
307.
2®^Paige, Korean Decision, 59; Hammond#”NSG-68,"
306. For a general outline of the document, which is still 
classified as a state secret, see Acheson, Present at the 
Creation, 37i}.-76.
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policy, he simply committed it to his staff for further 
s t u d y . B e f o r e  the difficult task of translating the 
generalized principles of NSC-68 were completed, war 
broke out in Korea.
The value of NSC-68 was that it provided a frame­
work within which the build-up of strength to meet the 
demands of the Korean conflict were considered. It pro­
vided the rationale which rejected the strategy of those 
who urged total war in Korea. NSC-68 was an important 
milestone for overall military defense planning because 
it established, in Paul Hammond's phrase " . . .  some kind 
of order of priority and magnitude between economy and 
security, domestic and foreign commitments, economic and
military means, American and allied strength, and short
208and long-run national interests." But, while it did 
clarify the policies employed infighting that war,
NSC-68fs warning that the nation must be prepared to 
fight limited, conventional wars came too late to prevent 
the initial military defeat suffered by the United States 
in the opening months of the Korean War.
207Hammond, "NSC-68," 330. Cabell Phillips would 
appear to be in error when he says that Truman approved 
the paper in April, 1950, and it then became "official 
government policy." Truman Presidency, 308.
20®Haramond, "NSC-68," 363. See also, Rostow, United 
States in the World Arena, 22ij.; O'Connor, "Harry S.
Truman: New Dimensions of Power," 32.
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CHAPTER VII
THE DECISION TO INTERVENE IN KOREA
This is the Greece of the Far East. If we are 
tough enough now, there won*t be any next step.l
Korea, destined to become the arena of a serious 
East-West conflict, is a mountainous peninsula jutting out 
from the land mass of Asia. The Sea of Japan to the 
east, the Yellow Sea to the west and the Korea Strait to 
the south wash against its more than 5,lj.00 miles of 
coast line. To the north, the Yalu and Tumen Rivers form 
the natural common boundaries shared with China (£00 
miles) and Russia (only eleven miles). The Korean 
peninsula, encompassing some 85,000 square miles, varies 
from 90 to 200 miles in width and from £25 to 600 miles 
in length.2
•^Truman, quoted in Beverly Smith, "Why We Went to 
War in Korea," Saturday Evening Post. CCXXIV (November 10, 
1951)# 80. Hereinafter cited as Smith, "Why We Went to 
War in Korea."
2Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong. North to 
the Yalu. June-November.1956. in Stetson Conn (genl. ecT.), 
United States Army in Vhe Korean War (Washington, 1961),
TI Sereinafter 'cited as Appleman, South to the Naktong.
399
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Uoo
The first American military assistance to Korea 
arrived in 1888, in the form of U.S. Army personnel sent 
to train the Korean forces.^ This aid was a result of a 
"treaty of friendship” signed at Tientsin in 1882 between 
the United States and Korea, then under the suzerain!ty of 
China. The peninsula was a focal point in power struggles 
between Russia, Japan and China throughout the next 
quarter-century which culminated with Japan establishing 
dominion over Korea by 1905»^ "We can not possibly inter­
fere for the Koreans against Japan,” President Theodore 
Roosevelt said in January 1905* "They couldn’t strike 
one blow in their own defense." The Taft-Katsura "agreed
memorandum" of July 27, 1905, put the United States on 
record as accepting Japanese suzerainity over Korea. When 
Japan formally annexed Korea in August, 1910, the United 
States offered no objection.^
3walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 
in Stetson Conn (genl. ed.7, tfnited Stat'es_ArBiy In^the 
Korean War (Washington, 1966), 3. Hereinafter cTfTed as 
Kernes, frruoe Tent and Fighting Front.
^William L. Langer (ed.), An Encyclopedia of World 
History (Bostons Houghton MlfflinTTompany, ,““886-07.
Hereinafter cited as Langer (ed.), Encyclopedia of World 
History. See also, Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean TTar 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 196 /)V 5-6. 
Hereinafter cited as Ridgway, Korean War.
^Quoted in Leopold, Growth of American Foreign 
Policy, 271.
^Ibid.; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 3.
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From 1910 until 1945 Japan retained its control 
over Korea. That control was imperiled by the Cairo 
Declaration of December 1943* in which China, The United 
States and the United Kingdom pledged that "in due course” 
Korea would become a free, independent nation. A reaffir­
mation of this promise was made in the Potsdam Declara- 
tidn, issued on July 26, 1945* When the Soviet Union
declared war on Japan on August 8, it became a party to
7this guarantee. The atomic-bombings on the sixth and
the ninth, coupled with the entry of Russia into the war,
forced Japan to sue for peace. While the negotiations
were being carried out, armies of the Soviet Union pre-
8pared to enter the Korean peninsula.
The President received a good deal of encouragement 
from numerous sources, urging him to order American forces 
into all of Korea to accept the surrender of the Japanese 
Army and to act as an occupation force. The State Depart­
ment urged this action on Truman. He also received 
separate cables from Ambassadors Averell Harriman and 
Edwin 0. Pauley advising him to block Soviet intentions by
^U.S., Department of State, United States Policy in 
the Korean Crisis, State Dept. Public at ion No. 3922, $ar 
Eastern Series 34 (Washington, 1950)» Intro., ix. Herein­
after cited as United States Policy in the Korean Crisis. 
See also, Ridgway, Korean War, Y ; Hermes, Truioe -Tent and 
Fighting Front, 4; Warren, President as World Leader, j}35.
Q°Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 4»
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having the United States Army occupy as much of Korea and
9Manchuria as possible* However, physical conditions 
dictated otherwise. The Soviet forces were already in 
Manchuria and nearing the Korean border which they would 
cross on August 12. There were no American forces in 
Korea, the closest units being on Okinawa, with very little 
shipping available to transport them to the peninsula.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the President that any 
attempt to race the Russian Army for territory in Korea 
was doomed from the outset by the logistics of the 
situation.-1-0 The War Department recommended that an 
arbitrary dividing line, the thirty-eighth parallel of 
north latitude, should be suggested to the Soviet Union 
as an operational and occupational division between the 
Russian and American forces. The Army planners reasoned 
that acceptance of this line would operate to the 
advantage of the United States. The Russians were in a 
position to take all of Korea if they chose to, since the 
XXIV Corps assigned to occupy Korea was at Okinawa, 600
? M a rtin  L ich te rm a n , "To th e  Y a lu  and B a c k ,"  in  
H a ro ld  S te in  ( e d . ) ,  Am erican C i v i l - M i l i t a r y  D e c is io n s : A
Book o f  Case S tu d ies  (U n iv e r s i ty ,  Alabama: U n iv e r s ity  o f ” 
Alabama P re ss , 1 9 6 3 ), 5 7 6 . H e r e in a f te r  c i te d  as L ic h te rm a n , 
"To th e  Y a lu  and B ack." See a ls o , Truman, M em oirs« I I ,
317; Trumbull Higgins, Korea and the Fall of riacArthur; A 
Precis in Limited War (Mew tfork: 'Oxford University Press, 
i960), £7“ Hereinafter cited as Higgins, Korea and the 
Fall of MacArthur.
^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 576.
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miles away. On August li|. the Joint Chiefs accepted this
recommendation, as did the State Department, and it was
11forwarded to the President, who also approved.
While the status of Korea remained questionable,
the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) began
drafting a directive on August 11 for General Douglas
MacArthur, prescribing the procedures to be followed in
accepting the surrender of all Japanese forces in the Par
East. MacArthur, who was Commander in Chief, U.S. Army
Forces, Pacific, had been designated by Truman as Supreme
Commander, Allied Powers, Japan (SCAP), a selection
12endorsed on August 12 by all the Allied powers. By 
August 1$ SWNCC had completed the drafting of the orders to 
MacArthur and they had received the President’s approval. 
The orders included the proposal to establish the
^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front. k”5>» 
Lichterman, "To the Yalu and teaok, Truman, Memoirs,
•I, II, 317. Por the background of events which led
to the selection of the thirty-eighth parallel as a 
dividing line, see Appleman, South to the Naktong, 2-3.
•^Because of Soviet intransigence in the European 
settlements, Truman had decided that he- "would not allow 
the Russians any part in the control of Japan." On the way 
back from Potsdam he decided to give complete control of 
Japan to MacArthur. Truman, Memoirs, I, ij.12, lj.32-33* See 
also, Item No. 100, Press Conference, August llj., 19l|.5>> 
Public Papers • . . Truman, 19ij£, 216. Frazier Hunt, 
eulogistic biographer of General MacArthur, claims that 
Truman chose the General because he had "not yet" 
succumbed to the envy and hatred of MacArthur nurtured by 
certain "leftist groups" in the White House, State Depart­
ment and Pentagon. See Untold Story of MacArthur, 399.
(.•
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thirty-eighth parallel as a line of d e m a r c a t i o n . * ^
The directive to MacArthur, known officially as 
General Order No. 1, was transmitted to him on August 15. 
The text of General Order No. 1 was also submitted to 
Premier Stalin for his approval on the 15th. The follow­
ing day, August 16, the Soviet leader cabled his approval, 
without taking exception to the provisions regarding 
K o r e a . T h e s e  provisions stipulated that the Japanese 
troops in Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel should 
surrender to the Soviet Army and those south of that line 
to the American Amy. The United States did not intend to 
create fixed zones of occupation, as in Germany, by asking 
that the thirty-eighth parallel be used as a divider. The
line was considered temporary; a military expedient made
1^necessary by extant conditions. ^
General MacArthur caused General Order No. 1 to be 
promulgated on September 2, 19^5* Six days later, the 
XXIV Corps arrived in Korea and the following day Japanese 
forces south of the parallel formally surrendered to Lt.
^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 576.
*^Ibid.; Hemes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, J4.—5• 
The full text of General Order No. 1 is printed in Feis, 
Contest over Japan, Appendix 5» 165-66.
•̂ United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, Intro., 
ix. See alao, Truman, MemoIrs, I, I4I4J4.; Appleman, South 
to the Naktong, 3; Higgins, Korea and the Fall of 
MacArthur, 5.
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General John R. Hodge, commander of the XXIV, who was 
designated as U.S. Commander for (South) Korea. The 
Soviet Army, which had advanced beyond the thirty-eighth
parallel, occupying the cities of Seoul and Inchon, retired
16to the dividing line without incident. The demarcation 
line quickly became a permanent border. General Hodge and 
his Russian counterpart became de facto military rulers of 
their respective halves of the peninsula. Hodge started 
off on the wrong foot with the Korean people by announcing 
on September 9 that the Japanese civilian officials con­
trolling the government would be temporarily retained in 
their posts. The clamor in the United States and Korea 
was strong and immediate. Truman had to order the JCS to 
send Hodge a countermanding directive and issued a public 
statement assuring that the "Japanese warlords are being 
removed,” but cautioning that full independence for Korea 
would require "time and patience.
•^L i c h t e r m a n ,  "To the Yalu and Back," 576-77* Dr* 
Syngman Rhee, long a Korean nationalist leader, and soon 
to be president of his country, had wired Truman on 
August 22, imploring him to intervene rapidly in order to 
insure a, ". • . united, democratic, independent Korea." 
Telegram, Rhee to Truman, August 22, 19l|5* Truman Papers,
OP, 571 Misc., Truman Library.
•^Item No. 136, Statement by the President of the 
« Liberation of Korea, September 18, 1955* Public Papers • • • 
Truman, 1955, 325-2$. Truman’s statement was actually 
written by Dean Acheson, then Acting Secretary of State.
See Acheson to Truman, September 15* 1955* Truman Papers,
OP, lf.71 (1955-58)* Truman Library.
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A growing resentment of the United States arose
among the Koreans during the latter months of 191+5. The
Korean people were beginning to realize that the dividing
line was a permanent partition of their land, for which
l8they blamed the United States* Soviet authorities 
vigorously patrolled the thirty-eighth parallel, severely 
restricting passage between the zones. Hodge was 
frustrated in his persistent efforts to negotiate with 
his Russian counterpart on arrangements for reestablishing 
Korean unity. The General sent a message to the Joint 
Chiefs in December which was forwarded to Truman, reporting 
on the first three months in his command. Hodge said that 
the dual occupation of Korea "imposed an impossible 
condition" on any sincere efforts at achieving the assigned 
missions of stabilizing the economy and preparing Korea 
for full independence. Hodge recommended that the Allied 
governments reiterate their promise of complete inde­
pendence for Korea and demonstrate sincerity by removing 
the barrier imposed by the thirty-eighth parallel. As an 
alternative, Hodge suggested that the United States and the 
Soviet Union remove their forces simultaneously, " . . .  
and leave Korea to its own devices and an inevitable
l®Truman, MemoirB, I, 521-22; II, 317-18. See 
also, Lichterman, **To the Yalu and Back," 577.
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internal upheaval for its self-purification.”"^
As an alternative to Hodge’s recommendations, the 
President instructed Secretary of State Byrnes to take up 
the independence of Korea in a meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States and the 
Soviet Union, held at Moscow in December, 19lj5. Out of 
these negotiations came the Moscow Agreement which pro­
vided that the American and Soviet commands in Korea 
should establish a Joint Commission. This body was to be 
charged with making recommendations for the establishment 
of a provisional government for all of Korea, following 
consultation with the leadership of the various political 
parties and social organizations. The Moscow Agreement 
was never put into effect. The United States and the 
Soviet Union were unable or unwilling to make mutually-
acceptable accommodations that would have made the re-
20unification and full independence of Korea possible. w 
The result of this impasse was that an artificial and 
illogical line became a permanent international boundary,
Truman, Memoirs, II, 317-18. General Hodge 
reported in February, 19i|6, that he was convinced that the 
Soviet Union had no intention of pulling out until U.S. 
forces left. He also complained that the State Department 
was not considering the information and recommendations 
he sent in. See diary entry, February If?, 19^6* Millis 
(ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 135«
^United States Policy in the Korean Crisis,
Intro., x; Truman, Memoirs, II, 3TB^2TTZ
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cruelly dividing a racially and ethnically homogeneous 
people into separate, hostile nations.
The political stalemate regarding Korea continued 
throughout 19i|6. In June of that year, the President 
received an informative report from Ambassador Pauley, 
who as Truman's personal representative, was one of the 
few Americans allowed to visit North Korea by Soviet 
officials. Pauley reported that the Soviet armies dis­
played no immediate intention of pulling out of North 
Korea. The Soviets were, in the Ambassador's view, 
clearly stalling on creating a provisional government for 
a united Korea, while at the same time engaging in an 
intensive propaganda campaign extolling the Soviet form 
of government and promoting the interests of the Korean 
Communist Party. Pauley recommended to Truman that the 
United States resort to similar tactics, propagandizing 
"to sell democracy and the four freedoms." He also 
recommended that the United States publicly condemn the 
Soviet Union for its failure to implement the Moscow
Agreement and take the question to the United Nations or
21a Big Pour summit conference.
In responding to Pauley's letter, Truman outlined
^Pauley to the President, June 22, 19lf6, RG107, 
OSA, 091 Korea (19if.6—19l|-7) * National Archives. Text of 
this letter is partially reprinted in Truman, Memoirs, II, 320-22.
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his basic thinking on post-war Korean policy:
I have given further consideration to your informa­
tive letter of June 22, 19^6, on the Korean situation.
I agree with you that Korea is, as you so aptly phrase 
it, "an ideological battleground upon which our entire 
success in Asia may depend." Korea has been for many 
decades the focus of international rivalries and I 
consider one of the principal objectives of our policy 
there to be to prevent Korea from again becoming the 
source of future conflict.
. . .  I believe that the most effective way to meet 
the situation in Korea is to intensify and persevere 
in our present efforts to build up a self-governing 
and democratic Korea, neither subservient to nor 
menacing any power.
. . .  We intend to carry on an informational and edu­
cational campaign to sell to the Koreans our form of 
democracy. . • •
Our commitments for the establishment of an 
independent Korea require that we stay in Korea long 
enough to see the job through and that we have adequate 
personnel and sufficient funds to do a good job. I 
am, therefore, requesting the agencies concerned to 
see that means are found to insure that General Hodge 
has the men and funds he needs to attain ourobjectives.22
Truman's letter to Pauley caused the War Department 
to plan a program of increased military assistance to 
Korea, designed to implement the policies suggested by the 
President. On August 12 Truman wrote to Secretary of War 
Patterson to indicate his "particular interest" in the aid 
program. Truman assured Patterson that if the plan 
required additional funds, the Secretary could count on 
his support. The President also informed Patterson that he
22Truman to Pauley, July 16, 19lf6, RG107, OSA, 
091 Korea (192+6—192+7), National Archives.
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had asked the State and Navy departments to assist in the 
accomplishment of this program. Truman repeated the belief 
expressed in his letter to Pauley: "I am convinced that
we may be required to stay in Korea a considerable length 
of time in order to fulfill our pledge to aid in the
23establishment of a free and independent government.”
In his reply, Patterson assured the President that the War 
Department would do its utmost in working toward the 
attainment of American objectives in the Far East.2 -̂ 
By June, 1950, the United States had provided the Republic 
of Korea over $57 million in military equipment. Total 
economic assistance in the period between the end of 
World War II and the inception of the Korean War amounted
QCfto over $lj.95 million.
Early in 1914-7 it became apparent that the issue of 
Korean unification was completely stalemated by the failure 
of the United States and the Soviet Union to find a common
2^Truman to the Secretary of War (Patterson),
August 12, 19^6, RG107, OSA (Patterson), 091 Korea,
National Archives.
2^Patterson to Truman, August 29, 19^6, ibid.
25'»pacts on Korean Military Aid Debunking the ’$200 
charge’." (Unsigned Study), Files of David D. Lloyd,
Truman Papers, Speech on Korean War Situation, Sept. 1,
1950, Truman Library. LaFeber’s charge that military 
assistance "had scarcely begun" by June, 1950, is contra­
dicted by the above document, which cites information 
received from the Senate Armed Services Committee. America, 
Russia, and the Cold War, 95*
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P Aground for agreement.410 General Hodge was concerned 
enough about the attitude of the Russians to warn Washing­
ton that he ". . . might be faced with a serious military
27situation at any time." The General had already warned
Truman, in January and again in February, 19i|.7* that a
civil war between North and South Korea was in the offing
28if the two occupying powers could not find a solution.
On the basis of Hodge’s warnings the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
decided to warn MacArthur, the Far East Coramaner, that he 
faced ". . . a  possible critical military situation in 
Korea. "2<̂  Late in May the United States made a final 
attempt to achieve a diplomatic accord through the Russo- 
American Joint Commission. These negotiations continued 
for several months, but they proved fruitless.^
^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 577•
^Benjamin P. Taylor, May 13, 19i|-7 (Memorandum for 
Record), RG165, USA, 091^Korea, National Archives.
2®Truman, Memoirs, II, 322. Truman met with his 
field commander for the first time in a conference at the 
White House in February, arranged by Secretary of War 
Patterson. See Patterson to Truman, February 19* 1914-7> 
Truman Papers, OF, I4.7I (19lj.5-lj.8)» Truman Library.
^Benjamin F. Taylor, May 13, 1914-7 (Memorandum for 
Record), RG165, USA, 091-Korea, National Archives.
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 323~2lj.. See also, Steinberg, 
Man from Missouri, 37lu In a move towards self-government 
(and in response to Korean criticism), the U.S. Military 
Government established the South Korean Interim Government 
on May 17* 19U7* See Far East Hearings, Pt. 5, 3362.
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In May 19l|.7 Secretary of War Patterson, concerned 
over the severe cutbacks in personnel necessitated by 
budgetary limitations on military spending, recommended to 
Secretary of State Marshall that his department consider 
the advisability of withdrawing all American forces from 
Korea. Marshall and Truman were not ready to take such a 
step in May, but with the failure of diplomatic efforts 
in the Joint Commission meetings in September, the Presi­
dent ordered the Joint Chiefs to study and make recommenda­
tions on the withdrawal question.-^1 The JCS study was 
submitted on September 25, 19^7* It was their opinion 
that, " . . .  from the standpoint of military security, the
United States had little strategic interest in maintaining
32the present troops and bases in Korea. . . . ” The Joint 
Chiefs defended this conclusion by saying that the lj.5>,000 
men in Korea were a military liability: They could not
resist an attack without heavy reinforcements; an American 
offensive operation in Asia would bypass the Korean 
peninsula; the Korean force was expensive to maintain, yet 
contributed little of lasting value to American security; 
given current military manpower shortages, the forces
^Admirals Leahy and Nimitz and Generals Eisenhower 
and Spaatz comprised the membership of the JCS at the time.
32porrestal to Marshall, September 26, 19l|7»
Truman Papers, OP, 1285 (Feb. 1952-1953)* Truman Library.
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could be used more profitably elsewhere.33 MacArthur 
agreed with this estimate. In fact, he believed that any­
one who advocated fighting a land war in Asia was 
demented.^ General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who had been 
sent to study the Par Eastern situation by the President 
in the summer of 19lf-7> reported substantially the same 
conclusions as the Joint Chiefs reached. However, he 
also recommended that the United States endeavor to 
strengthen the Korean military forces prior to withdrawal, 
since they would surely fall to the far superior North 
Korean A m y  otherwise ̂
The failure of the Joint Commission to reach agree­
ment on Korean unification and independence, particularly 
the Soviet rejection of a seven-point proposal submitted 
by the United States in late August, led Truman to con­
clude that it would be futile to continue direct negotia­
tions with the Soviet Union. Therefore he directed the 
Secretary of State to place the question of Korean
•̂ Ibid. see also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 32£-26; 
Lichterman,' v,To the Yalu and B a c k H i g g i n s , Korea 
and the Fall of MacArthur, 7—6J John W. Spanier, TKe 
Iffruman-MacArtEur Controversy and the Korean War (New York: 
W. W. Norton and Company, 1965), 15-1V. Hereinafter cited 
as Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy.
•^Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 17; 
Steinberg, Man from Missouri,
^Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur, 7«
See also, Lichterman, "To the' Yalu and Back,” 5>7?*
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independence before the General Assembly of the United
Nati o n s . M a r s h a l l  addressed the General Assembly on
September 17» 19i|-7. He acknowledged th a t  th e  Russian and
American representatives in the Joint Commission had been
unable to agree on the means of implementing a process
leading to the independence promised to Korea at Cairo in
1943 • After summarizing the vain efforts to achieve
agreement, the Secretary said: "It appears evident that
further attempts to solve the Korean problem by means of
bilateral negotiations will only serve to delay the estab-
37llshment of an independent, united Korea." Marshall 
proposed that the occupying forces hold elections in their 
respective zones of Korea. The elections should be super­
vised by a United Nations Commission, which would also 
assist in the formation of the central government thus 
elected. Following this, Marshall suggested, the new 
government should arrange for the prompt withdrawal of the 
American and Soviet forces.^®
36/pruman, Memoirs, II, 324* See also, Korea, 1945 
to 1948: A Reporir'on Political Developments and' Economic 
Resources with Selected Documents (New York: (Greenwood 
Press', 1'965J,' 47-4&» Hereinafter cited as Korea, 1945 
to 1948.
^Marshall, Address to the General Assembly on the 
Problem of Korean Independence, September 17» 1947* 
excerpted in Korea, 1945 to 1948* 1*.7—14-8•
3®Leopold, Growth of American Foreign Policy, 678.
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Through the Joint Commission, the Russians offered 
a substitute proposal which called for the withdrawal of 
all foreign military forces from Korea very early in 1948* 
The Koreans were to be left to their own devices in 
structuring a unified government. However, Truman was 
aware from Wedemeyer’s report and other intelligence infor­
mation, that the North Korean Army had been very well- 
equipped and trained by the Soviet Union and that the 
constabulary forces of the South Koreans would be no match 
for them. Although it was this fear that South Korea 
would be at the mercy of North Korea which motivated 
rejection of the Soviet proposal on October 18, the State 
Department informed the Russians that the United States 
could not enter into a bilateral agreement on troop with­
drawal while the larger question of Korean independence
39was before the United Nations. With the Soviet bloc 
objecting and abstaining, on November 14* 1947* the UN 
General Assembly voted 43 to 0 to hold legislative 
elections in all of Korea for a National Assembly which 
would then form a national government for Korea. The 
General Assembly resolution, which followed closely the 
recommendations made by the United States, provided that 
the elections should be held no later than March 31 * 1948*
Memoirs iory of American IForeign
Policy, 703-704*
^Korea. I9li£ to 19k8. 6-7. See also, Truman,
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S u p e rv is io n  o f  the e le c t io n s  was to  be c a r r ie d  o u t by a 
n in e -n a t io n ,  U n ite d  N atio n s  Temporary Commission on 
K o rea . "Upon the es tab lis h m en t o f  a N a t io n a l Governm ent,"  
the  G eneral Assembly r e s o lu t io n  re a d , " th a t  Government 
should . . . arrange w ith  the occupying powers f o r  the  
complete w ith d ra w a l from  Korea o f  t h e i r  armed fo rc e s  as 
soon as p r a c t ic a b le  and, i f  p o s s ib le , w ith in  90 d a y s ." ^  
S h o r tly  a f t e r  the v o te , Louise Kim, Korean Peoples  
Assembly R e p re s e n ta tiv e  to  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s , w ro te  to  
the  P re s id e n t exp ress in g  . . the  h e a r t f e l t  thanks o f  
the  Korean people f o r  your governm ent’ s s u c c e s s fu l e f fo r t s  
on b e h a lf  o f  Korea a t  the U n ite d  N a t io n s ." ^
The UN Temporary Commission was re fu se d  access to  
N o rth  Korea by th e  Red A m y . I t  had to  co n ten t i t s e l f  
w ith  s u p e rv is in g  e le c tio n s  h e ld  in  th e  Am erican zone in  
May 19i|-8. Syngman Rhee’ s p a r ty  captured  a m a jo r i t y  o f  the  
s e a ts . On June 25 the Temporary Commission on Korea  
c e r t i f i e d  to  th e  U n ited  N a tio n s  th a t  the e le c t io n  had been 
"a v a l id  express io n  o f  the  f re e  w i l l  o f  the e l e c t o r a t e . " ^  
On J u ly  17 Korea adopted a c o n s t i tu t io n ,  and on J u ly  20
^°Text of the main provision of the resolution is 
quoted in Korea. 19k5> to 19k8 , 9 .  See also, Leopold, 
Growth of Amer 1 can Foreign Policy, 678.
^"Kira to  Truman, November 1 8 , 19k7> Truman P ap ers , 
OP, k71 (19k5**k8)» Truman L ib r a r y .
^ F a r  E ast H e a rin g s , P t .  5* 3 3 62 . See a ls o ,  
L ic h te rm a n , "To ‘ttie  Y a lu  and B ack ," 5 7 7 -7 8 .
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Syngman Rhee became President. Rhee informed General Hodge 
on August 11 that his government was prepared to take 
control, and the General, responding on the same date, 
told him that the American Military Government was prepared 
to transfer all responsibility to the new regime.^ In a 
statement issued through the State Department on August 1 2 , 
Truman recognized the Rhee Government as the "Government 
of Korea" and named John J. Muccio as his Special Repre­
sentative, with the personal rank of Ambassador.^- The 
State Department release implied that the new government 
was the government for all Korea, but neither the President 
nor the State Department could have seriously believed 
Rhee would govern above the thirty-eighth parallel. In 
fact, in a warm letter of congratulations to General 
Hodge on August 15, Truman wrote of the "constitutional 
government of southern K o r e a . T h e  formal transfer of
^Rhee to Hodge and reply, August 1 1 , 1948* printed 
in Korea, 1945 1 9 4 8, Annex 2 1 , 2 2 , 98—1 0 0 . See also,
Leopold, Growth of American foreign Policy, 678; Truman, 
Memoirs, II,
W gorea, 1945 to 1 9 4 8 , 1 9 -2 0 , 10 0 -1 0 1 ; Truman, 
Memoirs, II,-327-2o# “Hueclo began an exemplary period of 
service as U.S. representative to Korea with this appoint­
ment. President Rhee was quite pleased with him. Less 
than a month after the appointment, Rhee will tell Truman 
that, "Muccio has already proved himself a genuine friend 
of Korea. . . . "  Rhee to Truman, September 8 , 1 9 4 8 ,
Truman Papers, OP, 471 (1945-48)* Truman Library.
^Truman to Hodge, August 15* 1948* Truman Papers, 
OP, 471* Truman Library.
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authority was completed in a ceremony on August l£ 
creating the "Republic of K o r e a .  American military 
authority ended with this transfer of power.
In the spring of 19^8, during the formative period 
of the new Republic of Korea, the National Security Council 
was studying the future military relationship of the 
United States to that nation for the President. The 
Council informed Truman that several courses of action 
were open: Abandonment of Korea; continuation of
American political and military responsibility; extension 
of U.S. military training, equipment and assistance to 
Korea’s security forces, as well as extensive economic 
aid to the burgeoning nation. The Security Council 
recommended the latter option to the President, which he 
approved.^-® Thus, when Korea became an independent nation 
in August, it was the avowed policy of the United States 
to militarily and economically assist the new Republic,
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 328. In a counter-move, the 
Soviet officials ordered an election on August 25* On 
September 9, the "Democratic People’s Republic of Korea" 
was established with Kim II Sung as President. This 
government, which was immediately recognised by the Soviet 
Union, claimed it had jurisdiction over all of Korea.
Thus, there were two governments on the Korean peninsula, 
both claiming thev spoke for all of Korea. As Richard 
Leopold wrote: '". . . the outlook for peaceful coexistence
was dim." Growth of American Foreign Policy, 678. See 
also, Appleman, Souffli to the"lTaktong7
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 328.
^-®Ridgway, Korean War, 7»
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but to consider it outside of the U.S. defensive shield.
The American Embassy in Moscow received a diplo­
matic note from the Soviet Foreign Office on September 19, 
1948> with the information that Red Army forces would be 
completely withdrawn from Korea by the end of December, 
1948*^ The Soviet Union would meet this timetable. The 
U.S. Army had withdrawn about 29,000 soldiers from Korea 
by December, 1948* However, the State Department and 
President Rhee opposed any further rapid withdrawal.
Their reasons were simply that the South Korean Army was 
not ready to perform its primary functions of preserving 
internal security and preventing external (Communist) 
aggression. So it was that at the end of 1948* while all
Soviet Army personnel had left North Korea, 16,000 Ameri-
50can troops were still stationed in South Korea.
On New Years' Day, 1949, the White House announced 
that the United States was now according full diplomatic 
recognition to the Republic of Korea. The statement was 
a legal technicality, necessary to officially terminate 
the military occupation and relieve the Army of responsi­
bility for administering economic assistance programs for
^Korea. 1945 to 1948, 22.
^H erm e s , Truce Ten t and F ig h t in g  F r o n t , 8 .
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K o r e a .^  On March 2 2 , 1 9 4 9 , th e  N a t io n a l S e c u r ity  Council 
re p o rte d  to  Truman on a re v ie w  o f  th e  Korean m i l i t a r y  
s i t u a t io n .  Based on th is  s tu d y , Truman issued  orders th e  
n e x t day , d ir e c t in g  th a t  a l l  U .S . fo rc e s  rem ain in g  in  
Korea be w i t h d r a w n . T h e  P re s id e n t had a lre a d y  agreed  
th a t  th e  U n ite d  S ta tes  would p ro v id e  support f o r  a 6$,0 0 0 -  
man army in  South K orea. When the  w ith d ra w a l o f  American 
fo rc e s  was com pleted, June 2 9 » 1949* a 5>00-man re g im e n ta l 
combat team rem ained beh ind  to  su p e rv is e  th e  t r a in in g  o f  
the Korean a r m y .^  The P re s id e n t had ac te d  on the  
unanimous advice o f the J o in t  C h iefs  o f  S t a f f  and the  
N a tio n a l S e c u r ity  C ouncil in  rem oving a l l  fo rc e s  from  
K o rea . G enera l M acA rthur*s o p in io n  had a ls o  been 
s o l ic i t e d ,  and he had agreed th a t  w ith d ra w a l was a d v is a b le .
In 195>1, during the hearings on his dismissal, 
General MacArthur charged that the withdrawal of American 
forces from Korea in 1949 was a grievous error. The
^Item No. 1, White House Statement Announcing 
Recognition of the Government of Korea, January 1, 1949* 
Public Papers • . . Truman, 1949, 1« See also, Ray T . 
Maddocks to  Chief of Staff l&radley), December 23, 1948* 
RG165>, USA, 091 Korea, National Archives.
^2Appleman, South to  th e  N aktong, £ ; Truman,
M em oirs, I I ,  329 .
^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 8. See 
also, Appleman, South to the Waktong, 5l Roatow, United 
States in the World Arena, 23hi biggins, Korea and the “frail 
of MacArthur, 8-9J Far 'East Hearings, Pt. "3’,™ "2o^8, 5112- 
15; Pt7  4T 2576, 25357 TFT*," 3'5“ ' 3571.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1*21
heated controversy over MacArthur’s firing obscured the 
fact that he had endorsed this action. In February of 
191*9 Secretary of the Army Royall reported to Truman that 
in a conversation with the General he had urged a prompt 
removal of troops from Korea.^ In the report requested 
by the Joint Chiefs in March, MacArthur had again approved 
withdrawal, adding that ”. . .  the training and combat 
readiness of the new security forces of the Korean Republic 
had reached such a level that complete withdrawal • . . 
was justified and would not adversely effect our position 
in Korea. Meeting in Tokyo with junketing Congressmen 
on September 5, MacArthur told them, "South Korea is in 
no danger of being overrun by North K o r e a . T h e  citation 
below is from MacArthur!s testimony taken during the dis­
missal hearings, wherein he attempted to disassociate 
himself from any connection with the removal decision:
S en ato r S m ith . . . . p r io r  to  the ou tbreak  o f the  
war in  K orea, you d id  n o t have g e n e ra l ju r is d ic t io n  
over Korea in  any way.
G eneral M acA rthu r. No, s i r ;  I  had no ju r is d ic t io n  
w hatsoever over K o rea . . . .  I  had n o th in g  w hatsoever 
to  do w ith  the  p o l ic ie s ,  th e  a d m in is tra t io n , o r  the  
command r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  in  Korea u n t i l  th e  war broke  
o u t.
^•Trum an, Mem oirs, I I ,  329 .
^ I b i d .  See a ls o , P a r East H e a rin g s , P t .  3 , 2113; 
H ig g in s , Korea and the  F a l l  o f  frlacArthur, 9 .
^Allen Moreland to Deputy Chief of Staff 
(Greunther), September £, 191*9 (Memorandum of Conversa­
tion), RGl6£, USA, 091 China, Case 35* National Archives.
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Senator Smith, Did you have anything to do with 
the policy that withdrew your troops or our troops 
from Korea prior to the outbreak of the war?
General MacArthur. That decision was made in 
Washington.
Senator Smith. That decision was made in Washing­
ton; it had nothing to do with you or your command 
there?
General MacArthur. The troops were a part of my 
command at the time; they were the Twenty-fourth 
Corps.57
Later in his testimony, General MacArthur responded as 
follows to questions on troop withdrawal:
Senator Morse. . . . Did you join in any 
recommendation to withdraw those troops from South 
Korea?
General MacArthur. I concurred in it.
Senator Morse. Do you think that was a mistake?
I don’t mean to give you a hindsight question.
General MacArthur. In the aftermath and hindsight, 
I should say it was a very grave mistake.
• • • •
Senator Morse. . . .  you concurred in the decision 
to withdraw, were you asked for a recommendation?
General MacArthur. I don’t recall. I think that 
the thing reached me in the form of a suggested 
action, and that suggested action was the withdrawal; 
and I concurred; but I do not recollect, Senator. I 
would have to look back in the files.58
The decision of the Truman Administration to with­
draw from Korea left that nation vulnerable to attack. In 
the cold light of power politics and the planning for
^7par East Hearings, Pt. 1, 37.
^®Ibid., 242-43. Senator Wayne Morse (Repub., 
Oregon) was the questioner. In the several thousand pages 
of testimony Morse emerges as the one Senator who remained 
entirely objective and was also the only one to be con­
sistently and fully prepared to intelligently examine the 
issues raised.
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global, not limited, war, Korea was of no strategic
importance to the United States. While efforts were
sincerely made to bolster the Republic of Korea(ROK)
armed forces, Truman had difficulty in obtaining funds
from Congress in 191*9-1950. The President also went along
with his advisers in not supplying the ROK forces with
offensive weapons, such as aircraft, tanks and heavy
artillery. President Rhee had often threatened to attack
North Korea, so there was an obvious reluctance to provide
59him with the means of doing so. In his memoirs, 
MacArthur described the State Department decision to 
lightly-equip the ROK Army, precluding their use in 
offensive operations as "curiously myopic reasoning."^®
The Mutual Defense Assistance Act, which Truman had 
signed on October 6, 191*9, provided for $10.2 million in 
military aid for South Korea, but these aid items were 
just beginning to arrive when the fighting broke out.^
Secretary of State Dean Acheson defined the
59Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 20; Truman, 
Memoirs, II, 329. See also. Ridgway, Korean war, 10-11. 
Two weeks prior to the attack on South Korea, Ambassador 
Muccio informed the State Department that the North Korean 
forces had a great superiority in aircraft, heavy 
artillery, and tanks, which would " . . .  provide North 
Korea with a margin of victory in the event of a full- 
scale invasion of the Republic." Muccio's report is 
quoted in T*ar East Hearings, Pt. 2, 1052-53*
6°MacArthur, Reminiscences, 328-30.
^Paige, Korean Decision, 70.
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strategic military thinking of the Truman Administration 
with regard to the Par East in a celebrated and contro­
versial speech to the National Press Club in Washington on 
January 12, 1950. Acheson described the defensive 
perimeter of the United States in the Pacific by tracing 
an imaginary line from the Aleutians through Japan and the 
Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Within the boundaries 
of this strategic perimeter the United States had the
resources and assumed the responsibility for reacting
6?immediately against any aggressor. The line Acheson 
described was not drawn by him, but by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, with the concurrence of the National Security 
Council and the President. In fact, in an interview in 
Tokyo on March 1, 19l|-9, General MacArthur had described 
exactly the same line of defense.^
The omission of Korea and Formosa, the latter by 
then the home of Nationalist China, from the perimeter 
defined by Acheson, made the speech controversial, 
particularly since the attack on South Korea occurred 
six months later. With respect to nations beyond the 
pale, Acheson said that ”. . .no person can guarantee
^2Acheson, Present at the Creation, 356-57* Major 
excerpts from the speech are printed in Bernstein and 
Matusow, (eds.), Truman Administration, lj.30-37*
^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 357*
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these areas against military attack, . . • should such an 
attack occur • . • the initial reliance must be on the 
people attacked to resist it and then upon the • • .
United N a t i o n s . W h a t  the Secretary said was not new.
It was a reiteration of an official policy of American 
military disengagement from the Asian mainland, Formosa 
and Korea that was plainly evident. Acheson was saying 
that any nation attacked outside the American perimeter 
would have to defend itself. Should it prove unable to 
contain the aggressor, then the United Nations would come 
to that nation’s aid. The United States would not 
automatically regard an act of aggression outside the 
perimeter as a cause for war, but would act in concert 
with the United Nations.^ Some critics have said that
the Acheson speech ". . • could have been interpreted by
66the Communists as a green light." The criticism seems 
strained, since the reverse of the proposition would have 
it that the North Korean attack would not have taken place 
had the Secretary of State not made this speech.
^Ibid. See also, Paige, Korean Decision. 67.
^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 35>6-5>7J Spanier, 
Truman-MacArthur Controversy, Paige, Korean Decision, 
67-68; Lichterman, "To the Xalu and Back, " i??8.
^^Warren, President as World Leader, 337* "For 
similar opinions,- see Higgins, Korea""and the Fall of 
MacArthur, 11^1$; Paige, Korean Decision, 333-jM.; 1?ees,
A^e o f  C ontainm ent, 38; Lukacs, H is to ry  o f  the  Cold War,
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. . • the critics . . . assume that if the Secretary- 
had not publicly broadcast the outlines of the 
Pacific defense perimeter, the Soviets would have 
remained completely unaware of our decimated army, 
our pre-occupation with total war, and inflexible 
military strategy; that they would not have learned 
of the Joint Chiefs' reluctance to commit their 
troops on the Asian continent, of the few troops 
at their command, and their emphasis upon stationing 
these troops in areas considered more vital...to 
American security in ah all-out war than Korea. . . .  
it was not American words but American policy that 
probably encouraged the Communists to believe that 
the United States would not defend South Korea.67
The animosity between the two Koreas increased by 
early 1950 to the point where military conflict seemed 
more and more of a possibility. The North Koreans con­
tinuously probed the 38th parallel with hit-and-run raids 
and sent bands of guerrillas into South Korea to foment 
internal disorder. The chief source of military 
intelligence on Korea for Truman was MacArthur's head­
quarters in Tokyo. The reports coming in in the spring 
of 1950 told of a rapid build-up of North Korean forces. 
The Central Intelligence Agency informed the Commander 
in Chief that the North Koreans were capable of a full- 
scale attack at any time they should choose. A weekly
^Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 21. Dip­
lomatic historian Richard W. Leopold would agree that 
Acheson's speech was not a factor in the attack on Korea. 
See "United States in World Affairs," 235. For Acheson's 
own testimony in defense of his Press Club speech, see Far 
East Hearings, Pt. 3, 1681, 17^0-ip., 1816-18, 2019-20. 
Acheson again had to defend his "perimeter speech" against 
an attack made by Eisenhower in the presidential campaign 
of 1952. Present at the Creation, 691.
^®Truraan, Memoirs, II, 331*
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intelligence cable from G-2 (Intelligence Section) of
MacArthur's headquarters, dated March 10, 1950, contained
a l in e  re a d in g , "Report re c e iv e d  th a t  P e o p le 's  Army w i l l
69invade South Korea in June 1950." But attached to this 
report was a commentary that clearly stated that G-2 did 
not anticipate that such an attack would occur. "It is 
believed," read a March 25 cable from the Par East Command 
Intelligence Section, "that there will be no civil war in 
Korea this spring or summer."^® A MacArthur aide, Major 
General Courtney Whitney, has claimed that "the record 
shows" that the Par East Command had warned Washington of 
an impending North Korean attack 1,500 times in the period 
between June 191*5 and the actual attack in June 1950, 
among them the warning of March 1 0 MacArthur has also 
written of these warnings:
In vain were my efforts to expose the growing 
Communist threat in the Par East. Prom June 191*9 to 
June 1950, constant intelligence reports of increasing 
urgency were submitted to Washington, advising of a 
possible North Korean thrust. But little impression 
was made against the general apathy. • • . One of 
these reports even suggested that June 1950 would be 
the likely time for North Korea to cross the 38th 
parallel.72
69par E ast H e a rin g s , P t. 3, 1991.
7 0 jb id .  See a ls o , H ig g in s , Korea and the F a l l  o f  
M acA rthu r, 15.
Courtney W h itney, M acA rthu r: H is Rendezvous w ith  
H is to ry  (New Y o rk : A lf re d  A . K nopf, 1 9 5 M , 3 2 0 .  H e re in ­
a f t e r  c i te d  as W h itney, M acA rthu r.
"^M acA rthur, Rem iniscences, 321*.
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The intelligence data from Korea did indicate the
possibility of armed conflict. The problem faced by the
President was that the daily intelligence summary he
received from the CIA also informed him, as he put it,
". . , that there were any number of other spots in the
world where the Russians ’possessed the capability' to
attack."”̂  At the time of the attack on South Korea,
there were abundant rumors of war, but they were not at
7kall confined to the Korean peninsula. It would have 
been impossible for Truman to take immediate, remedial 
steps as each of these warnings was received. He would be 
especially disinclined to react to a warning from 
MacArthur's G-2, since that unit had sounded the tocsin 
more than 1,500 times. In addition, since it was the 
President's policy not to become unilaterally involved in 
conflict outside the Pacific defensive perimeter, it is 
difficult to imagine what action could have been taken on 
these reports warning that the "possibility” of attack 
existed.
President Truman was back in his home state of
"^Truman, Memoirs, II, 331. Admiral Roscoe H. 
Hillenkoetter, Director of the CIA, told a Senate committee 
the day after the attack that his agency had been report­
ing North Korean troop movements for months and could not 
understand why the "receiving agencies" had failed to 
properly evaluate them. New York Times, June 27, 1950.
?^Far East Hearings, Pt. 3, 2113.
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Missouri on June 9, 1950, to give the commencement 
address and receive an honorary degree at the University 
of Missouri. He spoke with pride of the path of inter­
national cooperation the nation had followed since 19^5 , 
rejecting the "dangerous futility of isolationism." He 
had praise for American support of the United Nations, 
the economic recovery of Europe, ratification of the NATO 
pact and ". . . our military assistance to the common 
defense of free nations . • . part of our strong, positive 
program to achieve a just and lasting p e a c e . T h e  
President remained in St. Louis to join his comrades of 
the 3f?th Division in their annual reunion, highlighted by 
a parade on June 10 which Truman led on foot: " . . .  the
President cut a jaunty figure as he marched proudly with 
his old World War I division, and especially with Battery 
D, 129th Pield Artillery, of which he was captain.
Two weeks later, Truman returned to Missouri, this time to 
spend a quiet weekend at home in Independence. A telephone
call from the Secretary of State informed "Captain Harry"
77of a new call to arms.
^Itera No. 159, Commencement Address at the Univer­
sity of Missouri, June 9, 1950, Public Papers . • . Truman, 
1950, ij-65. Pull text of this speech also appears in the 
few York Times, June 10, 1950.
7% e w  York Times, June 11, 1950•
7?Albert L. Warner, "How the Korea Decision Was 
Made," Harper*s Magazine, CCII, No. 1213 (June, 1951)» 99• 
Hereinafter c'i’ted as Warner, "How Korea Decision Was Made."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
430
A cable from Ambassador Muccio in Seoul had
arrived at the State Department at 9:26 P.M., Saturday,
June 2k» 19f?0. Shortly after ten o ’clock the message was
decoded. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Par Eastern
Affairs, called Secretary of State Acheson at his Maryland
farm to inform him of Muccio*s note. Acheson immediately
called the President at his home in Independence to relay
the message, which read, in part: ”, . . North Korean
Forces invaded Republic of Korea territory at several
points this morning. . . .  It would appear . • . that it
constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of
K o r e a . T r u m a n  gave tentative approval to Acheson's
suggestion that the matter be brought before the United
Nations Security Council. He accepted Acheson*s advice
that he remain in Independence at least until morning,
79when the situation would be clearer.
78 d o c . No. 1, Cable, Muccio to State Department,
June 2f>, 195»0, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, 
11. The cable is reprinted in Paige, Korean~"De ci s i on, 901 
Truman, Memoirs, II, 333-34* See also. Appleman, &outh to 
the Naktong, 36-37; Ridgway, Korean War, 23. Seoul and 
Washington are separated by seven thousand miles and the 
International Date Line. Korean time was fourteen hours 
ahead of Washington. Thus, Muccio*s cable arrived in Wash­
ington at 9:26 PM, June 24, but it was then late morning of 
June 2f> in Seoul. For a more detailed explanation of the 
time differential, see Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 
571* Korean or Washington time will be indicated where 
it is not clear and is relevant.
"^Truman, Memoirs, II, 331-32. See also, Paige, 
Korean Decision, 93-94Y Warner, "How Korea Decision Was 
Made," 100; Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 23.
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During the night, reports continued coming in from
the wire services, Ambassador Muccio, and Par Eastern
Command Headquarters in Tokyo, all confirming that the
attack constituted an all-out invasion, not just another
border probe. Acheson called the President again, two
hours after the first call. The Secretary told Truman that
the fighting in Korea was serious. Acheson said that the
State Department had drafted a resolution which charged
the North Koreans with breaching the peace by an act of
aggression. Truman gave his final approval for Acheson
to request an emergency session of the UN Security 
finCouncil. At 3:00 A.M. Trygve Lie, UN Secretary General,
was asked to convoke a meeting of the Security Council as
fixsoon as possible.OA
The Security Council of the United Nations met at
®®Paige, Korean Decision, 101-102; Warner, "How 
Korea Decision Was Made7" lOl.
®^Doc. No. 2, Deputy Representative of the United 
States to the United Nations (Ernest A. Gross) to the 
Secretary-General (Lie), June 25, 1950, United States 
Policy in the Korean Crisis, 11-12. See also, Warner,
"How Korea Decision Was Made," 100; Glenn D. Paige (ed.), 
1950! Truman!s Decision, The United States Enters the 
Korean"War (New York: Chelsea House, 197^)* 55~5&« Here- 
inafter cited as Paige, 1950: Truman^ Decision. Truman 
wrote an interesting note to Acheson about a month later.
In part, it reads: "Your initiative in immediately calling
the Security Council of the U.N. on Saturday night and 
notifying me was the key to what followed afterwards. Had 
you not acted promptly in that direction we would have had 
to go into Korea alone." Truman to Acbeson, July 19,'
T95o7 quoted in Acheson, Present at the Creation, ijJL5>. 
Emphasis supplied.
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2:00 P.M., June 25 in response to the American request.
By this time, the ON Commission in Korea had filed a report 
with the Secretariat, describing the conflict as "full- 
scale war" endangering international peace. The Com­
mission recommended that the matter be brought before the
OpSecurity Council. In the Security Council Session the 
United States Deputy Representative, Ernest A. Gross, 
reviewed developments in Korea since 194£ an(* offered a 
draft resolution calling upon North Korea to end hostile
Q Oactions and withdraw beyond the thirty-eighth parallel. 
After some minor revisions, the Security Council adopted 
the United States’ draft resolution by a vote of nine to 
zero, Yugoslavia abstaining and the Soviet Union unrep­
resented.®^-
®%oc. No. 3, United Nations Commission on Korea 
to Secretary-General, June 25, 1950, United States Policy 
in the Korean Crisis, 12. See also, Paige (ed.), 1956: 
Truman1 s De'cision, 56-58. Among American scholars, D7 P. 
Pleming seems alone in suggesting the possibility that the 
fighting was a North Korean reprisal for a South Korean 
attack. The Cold War, II, 598-600. On June 26, the Com­
munis t-orTente'3"I)any Worker (N.Y.) had made the same charge. 
See New York Times, June 27, 1950. A Soviet diplomatic 
note to the United States on the 29th took the same posi­
tion. See Doc. No. 95* United States Policy in the 
Korean Crisis, 61+,
®3d o c . No. 4» Statement by U.S. Deputy Representa­
tive to the Security Council, June 25, 1950, United States 
Policy in the Korean Crisis, 13-15* Text of statement also 
appearsTn Far feast Hearings, Pt. 5» 3365-68; Paige (ed.), 
1950: Truman* s' decision, 58-64.
®4uew York Times, June 26, 1950; United States 
Policy in~"the Korean Crisis, 1-2, 16. See also, Smith,
""Why We”vTent to War in Korea," 76; Warner, "How Korea
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The President received a call from Acheson as he 
was sitting down to Sunday dinner. The Secretary told him 
that the UN Security Council would meet in emergency 
session that afternoon and would undoubtedly approve the 
cease-fire resolution. It was Acheson’s opinion that the 
North Koreans would ignore the resolution, in which case 
it would be necessary for the President to decide what the 
United States should do to assist the Republic of Korea. 
Truman told Acheson that he was leaving for Washington at 
once. In the meantime, he instructed the Secretary to 
meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service 
Secretaries and begin working out recommendations for a 
meeting to be held upon his return. ^
On the three-hour flight back to Washington, Truman 
remained alone in his compartment. He later recalled that 
he spent the time considering the Korean situation in
Decision Was Made," 101; U.S., Department of State, United 
States Policy in the Korean Conflict: July, 195>0-February, 
1951« PublicatTon No. 42637 Par Eastern Series 44 (Washing­
ton, 1951 )> 46* Hereinafter cited as United St&tes Policy 
in the Korean Conflict. The UN resolution of June 25 is 
printed in Par feast hearings, Pt. 5» 3368-69. The intent 
of the resolution is" discuss ed at some length in ibid.
See, for example, Pt. 1, 360-61; Pt. 3, 1720-21, 201£,
2020. See also, Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 579.
®^Truman, Memoirs, II, 332. See also, Warner,
"How Korea Decision Was" Made," 101. As he departed for 
Washington from the Kansas City airport, Truman told 
reporters: "Don’t make it alarmist. It could be a
dangerous situation, but I hope it isn't." Anthony 
Leviero, New York Times, June 26, 1950*
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light of the "lessons of history." Truman believed firmly 
that the proper principles to guide the decisions he 
would now have to make were to be found in past exper­
ience.®^ Truman's recollection of the flight back was 
recorded in his Memoirs:
I had time to think aboard the plane. In my genera­
tion, this was not the first occasion when the strong 
had attacked the weak. I recalled some earlier 
instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I
remembered how each time that the democracies failed 
to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going 
ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, 
Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, 
and twenty years earlier. . . .  If the Communists 
were permitted to force their way into the Republic 
of Korea without opposition from the free world, no 
small nation would have the courage to resist threats 
and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If 
this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a 
third world war, just as similar incidents had 
brought on the second world war. . . .87
The President's plane landed in Washington at 7:15
on the evening of June 25?. He was met by Acheson and
Defense Secretary Louis Johnson. Acheson was able to
inform Truman that the Security Council had adopted the
fiflAmerican resolution. During the ride in from the air­
port, the President gave the impression that he was 
determined to take firm action, but, as usual, he was not
®®Paige interviewed Truman in July, 1957 * See 
Korean Decision, llZj..
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 332-33*
®8smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 76. See 
also, Phillips, Truman Presidency, 29If.; Truman, Memoirs. 
II, 333.
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ready to specify any steps until hearing from all his 
a d v i s e r s h6 was to meet with those advisers at Blair 
House, the temporary presidential residence, immediately 
upon hi s arrival•
Truman opened the Blair House meeting with a brief 
statement to the effect that he was maintaining an "open 
mind" as to possible actions. He wanted to hear fully 
from all his advisers, but planned to make no major 
decisions that night.90 Truman then asked Acheson to 
summarize the latest developments in Korea and present 
the recommendations that the State and Defense Departments 
had prepared during the day. The Secretary of State read 
the various reports received from Muccio and described 
the emergency session of the Security Council. He also 
sketched in the military situation which saw the North 
Koreans advancing along a broad front. In Acheson's
®9warner, "How Korea Decision Was Made," 101.
90paige, Korean Decision, 126. The conferees were. 
Secretary Acheson, Under Secretary James Webb, Deputy 
Under Secretary Dean Rusk, Assistant Under Secretary John 
Hickerson and Ambassador-at-Large Phillip Jessup from the 
State Department. Defense was represented by Secretary 
Johnson, Secretary of the Army Prank Pace, Secretary of 
the Navy Francis Matthews, Secretary of the Air Force 
Thomas Finletter, and, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Generals Omar Bradley, J. Lawton Collins, Hoyt Vandenberg 
and Admiral Forrest Sherman. See Truman, Memoirs, II,
333S Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 10if.9; Jay Walz, tiew York 
Times, June 25, 19^07
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91words: "I gave a darkening report of great confusion.”
The Secretary of State then presented the recommen­
dations prepared for the President's consideration: (1)
that American nationals, particularly dependents of the 
military and diplomatic missions to Korea, be evacuated; 
(2) that the U.S. Air Force be commanded to protect this 
evacuation by force, if necessary to keep the requisite 
ports and airfields open; (3) that General MacArthur be 
instructed to provide the Republic of Korea forces with 
arms and ammunition over and above current allocations;
(ij.) that the Seventh Fleet be ordered into the Formosa 
Strait to prevent a Chinese Communist invasion of Formosa 
or vice versa; (5) that consideration of additional 
assistance for South Korea should be given, based on the
Security Council resolution, or supplementary resolutions;
92(6) that military aid to Indochina be increased.
Following his long-established routine in this type 
of meeting, the President then went around the table, 
asking each adviser in turn to state his opinion of these 
recommendations and soliciting any additional views they 
might have. The general consensus supported the
^Acheson, Present at the Creation, lj.06. See also, 
Truman, Memoirs, II, 333-3^7 Paige, Korean Decision,
126-27. *
^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 2+.06. See also, 
Truman, Memoirs, II, 33l*; Taige, Korean Decision, 127.
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recommendations made by Acheson, with varying degress of
enthusiasm for particular points.^ Truman's questions to
the Joint Chiefs were quite extensive, leaving Defense
Secretary Johnson with the impression that the Commander
in Chief had a thorough knowledge of troop dispositions
9kand the existing military situation. ^ The military men 
told Truman that they did not believe the Soviet Union 
would use the Korean situation as a pretext for a general 
war. The Air Force and Navy chiefs, Vandenberg and Sher­
man, told the President that their services would probably 
be able to provide enough assistance to the ROK Army, if 
ordered, to enable them to stem the tide of the North 
Korean advance. The military men were not disposed to 
using ground forces in Korea because of the terrain and 
the uncertain conditions.^
As the first Blair House conference ended (about 
11:00 P.M.), Truman began to make his decisions. He 
approved the use of military aircraft and ships for the 
evacuation of American nationals. He also authorized the 
use of naval and air units in combat if needed to protect
93Acheson, Present at the Creation, 1+.06.
^Louis Johnson testimony, Far East Hearings,
Pt. Ij., 2£80.
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 335>J Acheson, Present at the 
Creation, 1*06. For a detailed description of the 'first 
Blair House meeting, see Paige, Korean Decision, 12^-lfl.
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the evacuation area (Inchon-Kimpo-Seoul) from falling into 
the hands of the North Korean forces. In no case were 
these operations to be conducted above the thirty-eighth 
parallel.MacArthur was to be ordered to provide as 
much ammunition and military equipment as he deemed 
necessary to South Korea. The Seventh Fleet— the carrier 
Valley Forge, the Rochester, a heavy cruiser, eight 
destroyers and some twelve lesser craft— was ordered to 
sail North to the Formosa Strait at once. Truman 
stipulated that no further orders to the fleet were to be 
transmitted until they arrived on station.^ Reflecting 
his belief that the invasion might be a Soviet ruse,
Truman instructed Acheson to survey all areas of the world 
where the Russians might strike. Before midnight, cables 
were being transmitted from the State Department to all 
diplomatic and military missions in the world, requesting 
an intelligence recheck of Soviet intentions.^® At about
9®Bradley testimony, Far East Hearings. Pt. 2,
933; Vandenberg testimony, ibid., 1II75; Johnson testimony, 
ibid., Pt. i|., 2573; Appendix K, ibid., Pt. 5* 3192. See 
also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 33̂ 4-—35; Phillips, Truman 
Presidency. 295^
97Truman, Memoirs, II, 33̂ 4-; Acheson, Present at the 
Creation, lj.06; New YoirlT^Times, June 26, 1950. See aTso, 
Paige, Korean Decision, 135; Warner, "How Korea Decision 
Was Made,ir l02; Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 78*
9®Acheson, Present at the Creation, lj.06. See also, 
Paige, Korean Decision, 13HT Phillips, Truman Presidency,
295.
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the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were transmitting 
orders to MacArthur based on Truman's decisions.99
These first decisions by the Commander in Chief were 
tentative. They did not represent a positive commitment 
to the defense of South Korea. Truman had made minimal 
decisions, not out of any fear to act, but because he 
wanted to wait until his military and diplomatic intelli­
gence clarified the situation. However, there is every 
reason to believe that he was already resolved to take 
whatever action was required to defend South Korea.
Truman has written that one strong impression he had from 
the Blair House meeting was " . . .  the complete, almost 
unspoken acceptance on the part of everyone that whatever 
had to be done to meet this aggression had to be 
done. . . • This was the test of all the talk of the last 
five years of collective s e c u r i t y . T h e  President and 
all of his major counselors were of one mind on the need
99t. r. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in 
Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, T96377 05-81• Here­
inafter cited as Fehrenbach, This Kind of War. See also, 
Higgins, Korea and t ^  Fall of MacArthur, ”23-26; Paige, 
Korean Decisi onTTljT H 2 ; AppTeman, South to the Naktong,
35; Lichterman, "To Jie Yalu and Bank,,r 579-50; Whitney, 
MacArthur, 323; J« Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The 
History and Lessons of Korea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
19&9) > l'J5. Hereinafter cited as Collins, War in Peacetime.
lOOTruman, Memoirs, II, 33k* See also, Acheson, 
Present at the Creation, t.06; Spanier, Truman-MacArthur 
ControversyT301 Phillips, Truman Presidency, 29£-9&.
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for action to defend the Korean Republic, with the degree 
of American involvement apparently to be determined chiefly 
by the ability of the South Korean forces to resist the 
attack, "Once this decision had been made, the progressive 
commitment of forces and the enlargement of their scope of 
action was only a reflection of increasingly clear intel­
ligence reports from the battlefield."^^
The White House issued a press release on Monday, 
June 26, 1950, in which Truman acknowledged that he had 
conferred with the leadership of the State and Defense 
Departments Sunday evening. He avoided mentioning any 
decisions reached, except to state that the "type" of aid 
being furnished Korea under the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Program was being augmented and expedited. The President 
had praise for the Security Council resolution and words 
of warning to the aggressors: "Willful disregard of the
obligation to keep the peace cannot be tolerated by
102nations that support the United Nations Charter."
The President was subject to numerous pressures 
for action on Monday. He had begun the day— as was his
101Hoare, "Truman," 192.
102preas Release No. 2i|l|i|, Statement by the Presi­
dent, June 26, 1950, copy in Tannenwald Papers, Chronology, 
Public Statements, MacArthur Hearings, Truman Library. 
Statement is published as Item No. 172, Public Papers . . .  
Truman, 1950» if.91-92; Doc. No. 6, United States Policy in 
the Korean Crisis, 16-17; Paige (ed.T, 1950: ̂ Truman*s 
Decision, 90«
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custom— by reading four major newspapers (New York Times,
New York Herald Tribune, Baltimore Sun and Washington
Post) after breakfast. Two of the papers, the Times and
103the Sun, called for firm and decisive action. ^ As the 
day wore on, he received several appeals directly from 
Korea. A cable from the Korean National Christian Council 
was received from Seoul at the White House at 8:If.6 A.M. 
saying, "Large invading forces are pressing around us, 
begging your immediate help."^^- The Korean National 
Assembly appealed to the United States for immediate 
a s s i s t a n c e . T r u m a n  also received a message from Presi­
dent Rhee bearing the same urgent plea for assistance 
At 3:50 P.M. Truman received the Korean Ambassador, John 
M. Chang, who delivered the messages from Rhee and the 
National Assembly. Truman recalled Chang looking so 
depressed that he tried to encourage him: "I told him to •
103paige, Korean Decision, lZj.j?-ij.6. See also,
Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 80.
10̂ -H. Nam Kung to the President, June 26, 1950, 
Truman Papers, OF, lj.71 Misc. (19^8-53) > Truman Library.
■l-O^United States Policy in the Korean Crisis,
2, 17. See also, Paige ted.), 1956:' Truman's~Decision, 
100; Paige, Korean Decision, 156-57*
106Truman, Memoirs, II, 336.
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1 0 7hold fast— that help was on the way."
Early on the evening of June 26 Dean Acheson called 
the President to inform him that conditions in South 
Korea had seriously deteriorated during the day. The 
Secretary suggested that another full scale conference 
was necessary so that Truman could hear these reports 
directly and issue further instructions. The President 
told Acheson to assemble his advisers at Blair House for 
a meeting at 9:00 P.M. The group which assembled was 
essentially the same although Francis Matthews, Secretary
 ̂a Q
of the Navy, was absent.
Truman first heard the military situation reports. 
He learned that the South Korean government had abandoned 
Seoul in the face of a rapidly-advancing North Korean 
armored column. General Vandenberg told the President 
that American fighter planes had been in combat over the 
South Korean capital and that at least one North Korean 
aircraft had been destroyed.’*-®^ General Bradley then read 
Truman the latest communique from MacArthur:
10^Ibid., 336-37* See also, Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, i|07* Paige, Korean Decision, 157-5b; New 
York' Clines, June 27, 1950.
•*-°®Acheson, Present at the Creation, i+07» Truman, 
Memoirs, II, 3375 Anthony Leviero, New York Times, June 
28, 1950. See also, Bradley testimony," Far teasl;
Hearings, Pt. 2, 933*
*^°^Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 80; New 
York Times, June 27, 1950.
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Piecemeal entry into action vicinity Seoul by South 
Korean Third and Fifth Divisions has not succeeded 
in stopping the penetration recognized as the enemy 
main effort for the past 2 days with intent to seize 
the capital city of Seoul. Tanks entering suburbs 
of Seoul. . . .
South Korean units unable to resist determined 
Northern offensive. Contributory factor exclusive 
enemy possession of tanks and fighter planes. South 
Korean casualties as an index to fighting have not 
shown adequate resistance capabilities or the will 
to fight and our estimate is that a complete collapseis imminent.110
At the President's request, Acheson led off the 
discussion of further American action by making a number 
of recommendations. The Secretary of State felt that a 
new resolution should be presented to the United Nations, 
asking the member states to furnish South Korea with all 
aid necessary to repel the invasion and restore peace. 
Acheson also urged that the Seventh Fleet be instructed 
to block any Chinese Communist attack on Formosa and any 
Nationalist Chinese thrust at the mainland. The most 
significant of his recommendations, however, was that the 
Air Force and Navy should be allowed to provide full 
tactical'support for South Korean forces, but that their 
military activities should not extend to areas above the 
thirty-eighth parallel
•^^Quoted in Truman, Memoirs, II, 337* See also, 
Paige, Korean Decision, 162.
^•■^Acheson, Present at the Creation, ij.07-ij.08.
See also, Johnson testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. ij., 25>8l; Warner, "How the Korea Decision Was Made," 103? 
Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea,” 80.
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All the advisers present were asked to comment on 
AchesonTs recommendations by Truman, who had already made 
it clear that he considered Korea a test of American
H Presolve, like Berlin, that had to be met. Secretary of 
Defense Johnson had no recommendations of his own to 
o f f e r . General Bradley and Collins of the Army doubted 
that air and naval support could stem the momentum of the 
invasion. They also told the President that if American 
ground forces were needed, it would probably require at 
least a partial mobilization. Johnson objected to using 
ground troops in Korea, but Truman asked the Joint Chiefs 
to give immediate consideration to that possibility. Al­
though the conferees discussed whether the Soviet Union 
might take the use of American air and navy as sufficient 
cause for intervention or expansion of the conflict into 
other areas, these possibilities were considered remote. 
None of the advisers present told the President that the 
United States should not use the Air Force and Navy in the
u p Truman, Memoirs, II, 337*
113̂It is Johnson’s recollection that neither he nor 
anyone else from the Defense Department specifically 
approved or disapproved of military involvement in Korea 
during the meeting. See his testimony, Far East Hearings, 
Pt. ij., 2581, 258Ij.. Acheson has said that‘,'~',TEh.e~recom- 
mendations met with general favor, including Louis 
Johnson’s. . • . ” Present at the Creation, J4.O8.
H^-Paige, Korean Decision, 165-66, 173! Acheson, 
Present at the Creation, U08.
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11^defense of South Korea. Truman approved the recommenda­
tions presented by Acheson. He ordered Secretary Johnson
to contact General MacArthur and directly inform him of
116the decisions which had been made. The conference broke
up at 9:lj-0 P.M. As Truman left the meeting room he
remarked, "Everything I have done in the last five years
has been to try to avoid making a decision such as I had
to make tonight.
The directive transmitted to MacArthur assigned to
him operational control of all military and naval forces
in and around Korea. It also made clear that there was to
be no military action against North Korean territory. A
paraphrased excerpt from MacArthur's orders read:
In order to clear South Korea of North Korean 
military forces, all military targets south of the 
thirty-eighth parallel were cleared for attack by the 
Air Force. Similarly naval forces were authorized to 
operate against forces engaged in aggression against
^Paige, Korean Decision, 173-7i|-* See also, Smith, 
"Why We Went to War in Korea," 80; Warner, "How the Korea 
Decision Was Made," 103*
ll^Truman, Memoirs, II, 337J Far East Hearings,
Pt. 2, MacArthur1 s "official" biographer said the
General paused in amazement to reflect on how, without 
consulting Congress or the field commander: "Step by 
hesitant step," Truman, Acheson and Bradley, "agreed among 
themselves to enter the Korean War." Whitney, MacArthur,
3 21+. See also, MacArthur, Reminiscences, 331-
^■^Quoted in Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea, " 
80. See also, Phillips, Truman Presidency, 299.
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South Korea without restriction in coastal waters 
and sea approaches south of the thirty-eighthparallel.118
At 10:00 P.M., shortly after leaving the meeting 
with his military advisers, Truman placed a call to Charles 
S. Murphy, Special Counsel to the President. Truman gave 
Murphy a list of congressional leaders he wished to have 
attend a conference in his office at 11:30 the following 
morning, June 27 During the session with his advisers,
the President had apparently broached the subject of 
asking Congress for a joint resolution supporting his 
decisions, but had been dissuaded by Acheson on the grounds 
that it would precipitate attacks on him by hostile 
Republicans and generate lengthy discussions of the eventual
effect and financial expenditures involved in this inter-
1 Pfivention. Truman then decided on this meeting with the 
legislative leadership to simply inform them of what had
•^®Marshall testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 
f?35>» See also, Appleman, South"To the Naktong, 38,
Paige, Korean Decision.
^^The following persons were on the list: Vice
President Alben Barkley, Speaker Sam Rayburn, Senators 
Scott Lucas, Tom Connally, Alexander Wiley, Alexander Smith, 
Walter George, Elbert Thomas, Millard Tydings, Styles 
Bridges and Congressmen John McCormack, John Kee, Charles 
Easton, Carl Vinson, Dewey Short. See Murphy to Matthew 
Connelly, June 27, 19^0, Truman Papers, Lloyd Files, Korea 
folder, Truman Library. Mike Mansfield, who was not on the 
list, apparently did attend. Barkely and George, who were 
out of town, did not. See Truman, Memoirs, II, 338;
Acheson, Present at the Creation, J4-OB; Smith, ’’Why We Went 
to War in Korea, ”H?2; I*aige, Korean Decision, 187.
120paige, Korean Decision, 187*
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121occurred and the decisions he had made.
The meeting between the President and the congres­
sional leaders was held in the Cabinet Room of the White 
House at 11:30 A.M., Tuesday, June 27. With Truman were 
the Secretaries of State and Defense and most of the other 
officials who had participated in the two conferences at 
Blair House. Acheson summarized all that had transpired 
since Saturday evening, stressing the desperate situation 
being faced by the South Korean forces and the Administra­
tion’s belief that a failure to respond to this invasion 
would inevitably lead to World War III. The President then 
spoke at some length, emphasizing that the United States 
was not acting unilaterally, but through the United 
Nations which he believed would suffer the fate of the 
League of Nations if it failed to act in this instance. 
Truman told those present of his effort to get the Soviet 
Union to intercede with North Korea. He read the text of 
a statement he planned to release following the meeting 
which would make public the actions he had taken. Truman
then asked for questions and a general discussion of the
122American role in the crisis followed.
121jrumanj Memoirs, II, 338; Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, lj.08.
122«prUman, Memoirs, II, 338. See also, Acheson, 
Present at the Creation, k09* Paige, Korean Decision, 
10B-8^j Smith7 "Why We Went to War in Korea, " 02. A dip­
lomatic note to the Soviet Union, dated June 27, 1950,
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The Senators and Representatives posed several 
questions as to military dispositions. They were assured 
by the Joint Chiefs that no American ground forces were 
being employed in Korea nor were there any plans for such 
a commitment. Senator Millard Tydings, Chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee, informed Truman that his com­
mittee had that morning favorably reported out bills 
allowing the President to call up the National Guard and 
to extend the Selective Service Act of 19^8. Truman 
personally assured the Congressmen present that his actions 
were in full accord with the principles and policies of 
the United N a t i o n s . T h e r e  is clear-cut agreement in 
the recollections of the participants that no one present 
disputed Truman’s decisions. They were agreed that the 
Administration’s course was the proper response to the
asked that the Kremlin disavow any responsibility for the 
North Korean invasion and also that it use its influence 
to convince the North Koreans to withdraw their forces 
immediately. The USSR responded on the 29th, saying that 
the fighting was brought on by South Korean border raids, 
so the responsibility rested with them, " . . .  and upon 
those who stand behind their back." The Soviet Union re­
fused to intercede, since this, they said, would constitute 
interference in the internal afYairs of Korea and such an 
act would not be consonant with Soviet principles. See 
Docs. No. 9l|, 95, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, 63—6I4.J New York Times, June 2b', 1956.
l^Acheson, Present at the Creation, lj.09. See 
also, Paige, Korean Decision, l9'6-9i; Par East Hearings,
Pt. 3, 1779; Pt. 4, 2609.
^2^-Acheson, Present at the Creation, I4.O9 •
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s i t u a t i o n . H o w e v e r ,  two of the participants, Secretary
Johnson and Senator Alexander Smith, later recalled that
Senator Smith and, perhaps, Senator Tom Connally as well,
wanted to know why Truman had not consulted Congress
before making the decision to intervene militarily. There
is no evidence to indicate that the subject was discussed
at this meeting, but it was at a subsequent meeting of
Truman with these same conferees on June 30> three days 
126later. In any event, while Truman had entertained
thoughts of obtaining a joint resolution from Congress,
he believed he was acting within the scope of his powers
as commander in chief in ordering naval and air inter-
127vention without congressional sanction. Testifying a 
year later before Congress, Acheson supported this con­
clusion. The Secretary of State was asked by Senator 
Harry Byrd how he could justify the President's action 
without the prior approval of Congress. Acheson replied:
"Those orders were issued by the President in exercise of
,,128his authority as President and Commander in Chief.
12^Truman, Memoirs, II, 338; Acheson, Present at the 
Creation, lj.09. See also, Paige, Korean Decision, lb9-ffi); 
Far EasTT Hearings, Pt. 3> 1779.
■^^Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 82. See 
also, Far East Hearings, Pt. 3# 1779-80, 2021; Pt. ij., 2^92.
12?Hoare, "Truman," 191-92.
^2^Far East Hearings, Pt. 3> 201ij., 1£.
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As the meeting with the Congressmen ended, the 
White House released to the press the President's state­
ment on the American response to the Korean crisis. In 
part, it read:
In Korea the Government forces, which were armed 
to prevent border raids and to preserve internal 
security, were attacked by invading forces from North 
Korea, The Security Council of the United Nations 
called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities 
and to withdraw to the 38t;h parallel. This they have 
not done, but on the contrary have pressed the 
attack. The Security Council called upon all members 
of the United Nations to render every assistance to 
the United Nations inthe execution of this resolu­
tion. In these circumstances I have ordered United 
States air and sea forces to give the Korean Govern­
ment troops cover and support.
. . .  I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent 
any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action 
I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa 
to cease all air and sea operations against the main­
land. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is 
done. . . .
I have also directed that United States Forces in 
the Philippines be strengthened and that military 
assistance to the Philippine Government be 
accelerated.
I have similarly directed acceleration in the 
furnishing of military assistance to the forces of 
France and the Associated States in Indo China and 
the dispatch of a military mission to provide close 
working relations with those forces. • • .129
129a copy of theoriginal press release, dated June 
27, 1950, is in Tannenwald Papers, Subject File, Chronol­
ogy, Public Statements, MacArthur Hearings, Truman Library. 
This statement by Truman has been reprinted in numerous 
places. See,for example, Item No. 173, Public Papers • • . 
Truman, 19j>0, ij-92; Truman, Memoirs, II, 338-39» Doc. No.
9, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, 18; Far 
East Hearings, Pt. 5, 33^9‘;*~^ew York Times, June 28, 1950J 
Paige (ed.)I 19f>0: Truman's Decision,~l03-10^»
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An editorial in the New York Times, commenting on
Truman’s statement, said that his decision was " . . .  a
130momentous and courageous act." In the same paper,
correspondent James Reston wrote that Truman’s decision
had " . . .  produced a transformation in the spirit of the
United States Government." Reston added that differences
of opinion as to what reaction the United States should
take ". . . have apparently been swept away by the general
conviction that the dangers of inaction were greater than
131the dangers of the bold action taken by the President."
The New York Herald Tribune, in a fron t page editorial, 
declared: "The President has acted— and spoken— with a
magnificent courage and terse decision. . . .  It was time 
to draw a line. • . ."^32 scores of telegrams came to the 
White House, endorsing Truman’s action by a margin of 
ten-to-one.1^  One of the telegrams was from Thomas E.
•*~-̂ New York Times, June 28, 1950.
131Ibid.
■^■•^Quoted in Eric P. Goldman, The Crucial Decade—  
And After: America, 1945-1960 (New York: Random House, 
l9597> 1*59. Hereinafter- cited as Goldman, Crucial Decade.
133(j0i<3rilanj In ibid. (p. 159), said that the letters 
and telegrams were ten to one in favor of the President's 
action. An internal White House memorandum was not as 
generous. It noted that letters were running approximately 
ten to one in favor, but a combined total of letters and 
telegrams showed that 775 approved, 278 were opposed, and 
125 were described as "miscellaneous in nature," for an 
average of approximately three to one favoring Truman's 
decision. "W. J. H." (William J. Hopkins, White House
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Dewey, the Republican nominee in 19l|4 and 19I4.8s "I
wholeheartedly agree with and support the difficult
decision you have made today. • . Columnist Arthur
Krock noted that Truman had been determined ". . • from
the outset to adopt the forceful policy which was announced 
135this morning." Joseph C. Harsch, writing in the 
Christian Science Monitor, said Truman's announcement was 
received in Washington with a sense of relief and a strong
1 oiexpression of unity and satisfaction.
The decision to use the Navy and Air Force was 
greeted by a general approval and enthusiasm which 
few people— after all the war's trouble and contro- 
versy— now remember. Practically every major newspaper 
in the country approved, with the exception of the 
Chicago Tribune and its affiliate, the Washington 
Time s-Heraid.137
Truman's statement was read to the House on the
afternoon of the 27th by Democratic TPloor Leader John
McCormack. As he concluded, the members rose as a body
to cheer and applaud. Before the afternoon had ended
they had rushed to passage extension of the Selective
Executive Clerk) to Charles Ross (Press Secretary), June 
29, 1950, Truman Papers, OF, lj.71-B, Korean Emergency, 
Truman Library.
•^^-Quoted in New York Times, June 28, 1950.
Governor Dewey's telegram and tfruman's reply are printed 
as Item No. 175* Exchange of Messages with Governor Dewey, 
June 271 19^0, Public Papers . . • Truman, 1950» i|96.
^ N e w  York Times, June 28, 1950.
136christian Science Monitor, June 29» 1950. 
137smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 82.
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Service Act by a 315 to vote. Truman was accorded 
unprecedented peacetime powers as Commander in Chief by 
this act, particularly in the provisions authorizing him 
to call up the National Guard and reserves for up to 
twenty-one months active d u t y T h e  only dissonant 
note struck in the House came from Vito Marcantonio, an 
American Labor party Representative from New York. He 
charged that Truman " . . .  had usuiyed the powers of 
Congress by declaring war against North Korea.
The Senate reaction to the reading of the President’s 
statement was much more reserved, but reflected a general 
bipartisan endorsement of the decision to intervene. 
Republicans such as Willian Knowland (California),
Leverett Saltonstall (Massachusetts) and Wayne Morse 
(Oregon), endorsed the President’s statement as did Henry 
Cabot Lodge, Jr., (Massachusetts), who went further than 
his fellow Republicans in expressing the hope that Truman 
would use ground forces in Korea if the military fejt 
they were needed. These Senators were joined in their 
expressions of approval of the Korean decision by Demo­
cratic leaders like Herbert Lehman (New York), Estes
•^®New York Times, June 28, 1950*
•^^Harold B. Hinton, New York Times, June 28, 1950. 
See also, Goldman, Crucial Decade, 158-59i Paige, Korean 
Decision, 198; Warner, "How Korea Decision Was Made,'* lOif..
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Kefauver (Tennessee) and Hubert Humphrey (Minnesota).
While no senator voiced open opposition to the announced 
decisions, Arthur Watkins (Utah) and James Kem (Missouri), 
both Republicans, challenged the President’s decision not 
to obtain congressional approval. Kem, noting the 
passages in the statement ordering the Seventh Fleet to 
isolate Formosa and prevent attack, asked: "Does that
mean he has arrogated to himself the authority of declaring 
w a r ? B y  way of rebuttal, Senator Scott Lucas told Kem 
that, . . on 126-occasions in the past a President. . . , 
acting in his capacity as Commander in Chief of the 
nation’s armed forces, had deployed these forces . . • 
without asking a declaration of war of Congress.
The most significant challenge to the President’s 
authority to send American forces into foreign combat 
without the approval of Congress came from Senator Robert 
A. Taft, an Ohio Republican. Taft delivered a lengthy 
major speech on the floor of the Senate, Wednesday after­
noon, June 28. The Senator blamed the Korean crisis on the 
"outrageous, aggressive attitude" of the Soviet Union and 
the "bungling and inconsistent foreign policy of the
■^^Paige, Korean Decision, 196; Hinton, New York 
Times, June 28, 1950 • See also, Warner, "How Korea 
Decision Was Made," 10l|.
i^P-New York Times, June 28, 1950. See also,
Paige, Korean Decision, 196.
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administration. But Taft pointed out that Truman had
not attempted to consult with Congress or request a reso­
lution approving the action taken. Truman's actions,
Taft charged, created a de facto condition of war between 
the United States and North Korea, without the constitu­
tionally-required approval of the Congress It was the
Senator's opinion that these actions represented usurpa­
tion of power by the Commander in Chief. Taft believed 
that if the Senate did not protest ". . .we would have 
finally terminated for all time the right of Congress to 
declare war. . . The bulk of Taft's address damned
the Far Eastern policy of the Administration since World 
War II. Taft saw Truman's decisions as representing a 
change of policy in the Ear East, which he endorsed, but 
with some concern over whether the crisis in Korea was the 
right time or place for such a change to take place. Taft 
may have weakened his argument somewhat by acknowledging 
during the course of his speech that should a joint reso­
lution be offered asking the Congress to authorize the use 
of American military forces in Korea, he would vote in favor
^ P a r  East Hearings, Pt. 5, 3211. For the original 
text of the Senator's speech, see Congressional Record,
Vol. 96, Pt. 7, June 28, 1950, 93192T7
^^ Far East Hearings, Pt. 5, 3216.
^ I b i d . ,  3217.
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111*of the measure. ^
The Administration reacted quickly to Taft’s 
challenge, even though the Senator seemed to have little 
support for his position. Less than a week later, 
Congressmen received copies of a lengthy memorandum, 
dated July 3# 1950, "on the authority of the President to 
repel the attack in Korea. The memorandum cited
volumes of historical and legal precedents to justify the 
President's decision to use force in Korea. It offered as 
further justification, the membership of the United States 
in the United Nations and the resolutions of the Security 
Council, June 25 and 27* The North Korean aggression had 
to be met, the memorandum argued, because it constituted 
a threat not only to international peace, but to the peace 
and security of the United States and the security of 
United States forces in the Pacific area. Concluding,
^ I b i d .j 3211. Taft’s speech and a rebuttal by 
Senator Paul ft. Douglas (Democrat, Illinois), are ex­
cerpted in Doc. No. 28, Senate Debate of the Commander in 
Chief’s Authority,” John P. Roche and Leonard W. Levy 
(eds.), The Presidency (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
World, 15blj.) # Hereinafter cited as Roche and
Levy (eds.), The Presidency. For other commentary and 
analysis of Tsift’s speech, see New York Times, June 29# 
1950J Paige, Korean Decision, 2X6-21} Warren, President as 
World Leader," 3X7-381 Acheson, Present at the CroationT 
IjlO; Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 52-6k# LaFeber, 
America, Russia, 'tuncl the ColcTWar, 99«
■^^Text of the memorandum appears twice in the Far 
East Hearings, Pt. 3198-3201;, 3373-81. It is also puH-
lUshecTin Background Information on the U3e of United 
States Armed Forces in Fbrelgn Countries, Appendix I,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
457
the memorandum reads:
These interests of the United States are interests 
which the President as Commander in Chief can protect 
by the employment of the Armed Forces of the United 
States without a declaration of war. It was they 
which the President’s order of June 27 did protect. 
This order was within his authority as Commander in Chief.147
The military situation continued to worsen.
Virtually unimpeded, a column of North Korean tanks
entered Seoul on June 26 (Washington time). A spokesman
for Rhee's Government, which had to flee the city, said
that the Korean President " . . .  is greatly disappointed
with American aid; coming as late as it has it is very
difficult to save anything. We have nothing to stop those 
1)0
tanks." On June 27, MacArthur’s headquarters announced 
that American combat aircraft were engaged in bombing and 
strafing missions south of the thirty-eighth parallel in 
support of South Korean ground forces. U.S. naval forces 
were also engaged in limited action below the parallel. 
During the day, four Russian-built, North Korean (YAK) 
fighters were shot down over Seoul by American aircraft.
l47par East Hearings, Pt. 5, 3381•
^^ N e w  York Times, June 29, 1950. The Korean Army- 
less than 160,000 strong— had no combat aircraft, tanks, 
or heavy artillery and few anti-tank weapons. The ROK 
Navy was a farcial flotilla, consisting mainly of light 
patrol craft of World War II vintage. Hanson W. Baldwin, 
New York Times, June 27, 1950.
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lli9The North Korean advance was temporarily stalled. One 
conclusion emerges from these combat reports: Truman
ordered U.S. forces into combat in support of the South 
Korean armies prior to the passage of the Security 
Council resolution requesting member nations to intervene 
militarily. That resolution was not passed until late in 
the evening of the twenty-seventh.
Warren Austin, the U.S. representative at the United 
Nations, addressed the Security Council on Tuesday after­
noon, June 27. Austin told the other delegates that North 
Korea's failure to accept their resolution of June 25 
constituted an attack upon the United Nations itself. He 
informed the Council that the United States stood ready to 
provide military aid to South Korea. Austin then offered 
a resolution asking member nations to provide South Korea 
with the forces necessary to repel the a t t a c k . A f t e r  
long delays while the Indian and Egyptian delegates vainly 
attempted to receive voting instructions from their 
governments, at 10:lj.5 P.M. the Security Council adopted 
the American-sponsored resolution seven to one, with two
^^Lindesay Parrott, ibid., June 28, 1950.
■^•^Doc. No. l$t Statement, Austin to the Security 
Council, June 27, 1950, United States Policy in the Korean 
Crisis, 23-21j.. The text of Austin's statemenTf"may also be 
found in the New York Times, June 28, 1950; Far East 
Hearings. Pt. 5, 3370-7i; Paige (ed.) , 1950: ‘fruman1 s 
Decision, 105-107•
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abstentions. The operative line of the document recom­
mended " . . .  that the Members of the United Nations 
furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be
necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore inter-
151national peace and security in the area."
That Truman sent American forces into combat before 
the sanctifying resolution was even proposed, thus pre­
senting the Security Council with a fait accompli, is true, 
but of little consequence. The State Department had every 
assurance that the resolution would be approved that day. 
Additionally, a very braod interpretation of the June 25
resolution might be taken as justification for military
152intervention by U.N. members. It would certainly seem 
an overdrawn statement to assert, as one writer has: "The
Truman Administration had been stampeded, and it in turn
i^lDoc. No. 16, Security Council Resolution, June 
27, 1950, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, 2lj., 
Text is also printed in Far EasIT*Hearings . Pt. 2, 986;
Pt. 5, 3371: New York Times, June 2b, 1950* Allen Guttman 
(ed.), Korea and theTheory of Limited War (Boston: D.C. 
Heath and Company, 1967) * 2-jT7 “hereinafter cited as 
Guttman (ed.), Korea and the Theory of Limited War. In the 
voting, Yugoslavia cast’ the dissenting vote and India and 
Egypt abstained. India approved two days later. The 
Soviet Union was absent as it had been since a boycott 
begun in January, 195>0. Warner, "How Korea Decision Was 
Made," 104.
^•^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 580-81.
See also, Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 36; 
Fleming, The Cold War, II, 60£.
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1^3stampeded the United Nations."
In the 1951 hearings on MacArthur's dismissal, 
General Bradley told Senator Byrd that the United States 
entered the fighting following the resolution of June 27. 
Byrd retorted by reading part of a paraphrase of the JCS 
orders to MacArthur: "Instructions furnished CINCPE . . .
26 June 1950 provided for the employment of United States 
naval and air forces against North Korean units south of
15kthe thirty-eighth parallel." Bradley then acknowledged 
that some forces were in combat prior to the resolution, 
but only to cover the evacuation of American nationals. 
With a little more candor, Acheson has acknowledged in his 
memoirs that military action had been ordered, "and
l£6possibly taken," prior to the June 27 resolution.
The combat reports received in Washington on 
Wednesday gave little cause for optimism. The South 
Korean forces driven from Seoul on Tuesday, had continued 
a "demoralized retreat" during the night. Early on 
June 28 (Washington time) the Korean forces were reportedly
Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean 
War (New York: Monthly Review tress, 19 *?2), 7$ • S*e re in- 
after cited as Stone, Hidden History of Korean War.
•*~̂ a r  East Hearings, Pt. 2, 992. CINCPE is a 
military acronymTTor one of MacArthur's titles,
"Commander in Chief, Par East."
^I b i d . ,  992-93.
•^■^Acheson, Present at the Creation, ij.08.
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holding the enemy advance in check at the Han River, south 
of the capital. One report reaching Washington indicated 
that two of the seven understrength ROK divisions had 
"disintegrated." U.S. B-29 bombers attacked Kimpo airfield 
(near Seoul) while jet fighters were seeing action against 
North Korean tanks and troops. The American jets were not 
able to provide close support for ground troops because no 
direct ground-to-air communications had yet been estab­
lished.^^
The President met with the National Security 
Council on the afternoon of June 23. This was a regularly- 
scheduled meeting of the NSC. Truman had not seen fit to 
call this body into special session since the Korean 
crisis had begun. The President began the meeting with a 
brief review of the bleak military picture in Korea.
Vice President Barkley, arriving late, informed Truman 
that the draft extension bill had just cleared the Senate 
by a unanimous vote.-^® This meant that both houses of 
the Congress had shown almost total unanimity in con­
ferring greater military authority on the President.
Acheson cautioned that the present enthusiasm would wither 
away if Americans began to die and taxes rise because of 
Korea. "The President, mistaking my purpose," Acheson
l^ N e w  York Times, June 29, 1950; Warner, "How 
Korea Decision Was Made," 10ij.-105.
IS^Truman, Memoirs, II, 3^0.
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recalls, ". . • insisted that we could not back out of the
159course upon which we had started."
The remainder of the Security Council meeting 
dealt with the probable intentions of the Soviet Union 
and the desirability of making Administration policy clear 
to MacArthur. Truman and many others were anticipating 
that the Soviet Union would take overt action somewhere 
in the world in order to capitalize on American preoccupa­
tion with Korea. Another consideration was direct military 
involvement by the Soviet Union in the fighting in Korea, 
particularly since the United States had entered the con­
flict. Army Secretary Pace told Truman that he had 
instructed military intelligence to be especially alert 
for signs of a Soviet move into Korea. Truman told Pace 
that he had already ordered an intensification of strategic 
intelligence efforts in the areas of northern Europe, 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The President also ordered a 
thorough reappraisal of American policies in all areas 
continguous with the U.S.S.R.*^0
During the NSC meeting of June 28, Air Force Secre­
tary Thomas Finletter suggested to the President that 
General Vandenberg be sent to Tokyo to personally instruct
Ache son, Present at the Creation, ij.ll; Truman, 
Memoirs, II, 3l|0•
■^^Truman, Memoirsi, II, 3/j.O-ij.l. See also, McLellan 
and Reuss, "Foreign and Military Policies," 75*
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MacArthur in the strategic thinking of the Administration.
Pinletter was concerned that MacArthur might err in an
initial response to new developments in Korea without
such instructions. However, Truman vetoed this suggestion
on the grounds that he needed the Chiefs of Staff with him
X 6lin Washington during this crisis. Recalling this dis­
cussion in his Memoirs, Truman clearly had in mind his 
later confrontation with MacArthur when he added:
. . .  I understood the need for mutual understanding 
between Washington and Tokyo and expressed my regret 
that General MacArthur had so consistently declined 
all invitations to return to the United States for 
even a short visit. There had been no opportunity 
for him to meet me as Commander in Chief. I felt 
that if the Korean conflict^was prolonged I would want 
to see General MacArthur.162
The limited records available do not indicate 
whether or not the subject of employing American ground 
forces in Korea was discussed in the National Security 
Council session on June 28. It is known that General John 
Church had reported to MacArthur from the scene on 
Wednesday (Korean time), his belief that the thirty-eighth 
parallel could not be restored as the boundary line 
without the use of United States ground combat forces.
^•^Truman, Memoirs, II, 3I4.O—Ip.. Pinletter was 
correct. As described later, without requesting authority 
to do so, MacArthur will order the Air Force to attack 
targets north of the thirty-eighth parallel.
l62Ibid.t $1)1.
l63paige, Korean Decision, 223-2lj.. See also, 
Acheson, Present at the Creation, i|ll.
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Some indication that the use of infantry may have been 
discussed appears in an article published in the New York 
Times the following morning. Written by Hanson W.
Baldwin, the distinguished military analyst, shortly after 
the Security Council adjourned, the article bears the 
headline: "Ground Aid in Korea: Use of U.S. Troops Con­
sidered to Bolster Weak Southern Army." Considering the 
decision reached two days later, Baldwin displayed an 
amazing prescience or access to someone in the inner 
circles of the Administration:
The probability that United States ground troops 
will have to be employed in Korea if the North Korean 
Communists are to be driven back to the Thirty-eighth 
Parallel increased by the hour today. . . .
If the invading forces cannot be held north of the 
Han River . . . another defensive position of some 
strength runs about across the center of Southern 
Korea to the coast. A final line lies in a great 
semi-circular arc in front of Pusan on the southeast 
coast.
The next few days— particularly the operations 
tomorrow— will probably determine whether or not the 
intervention of United States ground combat forces 
will be necessary. Such intervention should be 
avoided, on military grounds, if possible. • . .
However, the political necessity for prompt 
intervention— if the .South Korean ground armies melt 
away— is clear; once our hand had been laid to the 
plow we cannot turn back. Moreover, in a military 
sense, prompt and decisive action to force the 
invaders back to the Thirty-Eighth Parallel is deemed 
of great importance; what we want to avoid in Korea 
is a protracted wearing campaign of attrition which 
would gradually such (sic., suck) in greater and 
greater United States1 strength, and might result in a 
sort of Spanish Civil War condition.
■^•^Hanson Baldwin, New York Times, June 29, 19$0.
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Baldwin continued with the same theme in an 
article written on the twenty-ninth. The journalist 
claimed that two tentative answers had been proposed in 
the event that the South Koreans could not repel the North 
Korean forces, a result which now seemed certain. First, 
Truman could authorize his air and naval forces to operate 
north of the thirty-eighth parallel against air fields 
and weapons dumps. Second, the President could commit 
American ground elements to combat. While Baldwin con­
sidered these to be "unhappy alternatives," he particularly 
saw great disadvantages in extending the fighting into 
North Korea. It was his opinion that such operations 
would have psychological and political repercussions; 
serve to unify the North Koreans against the United States; 
cause questions as to the legality of American inter­
vention and, while widening the war, provided no guarantee 
that the war would be brought to a rapid and decisive 
solution. "There is a growing conviction here (in Wash­
ington) ," Baldwin concluded, "that more quick and decisive 
action in the form of one or both courses may be necessary 
in the next few days. . . .  What Baldwin did not know
was that both decisions had already been taken before his 
article appeared the next morning.
General MacArthur flew to Korea from Tokyo at dawn,
l6£lbid., June 30, 1950.
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June 29 (Korean time). At some point in the flight he
dictated an order to Lt. General George E. Stratemeyer to
he sent by radiogram to Major General Earl E. Partridge,
who, in Stratemeyer’s absence, was commanding the Par East
Air Force. The order read: "Stratemeyer to Partridge:
Take out North Korean Airfield immediately. No publicity.
1 66MacArthur approves. The Par East Commander took this
167action without consultation or approval from Washington. 
General Whitney, who was on the flight to Korea, explained 
that MacArthur felt that allowing North Korea a sanctuary 
beyond the thirty-eighth parallel ". . . would not be 
giving to the South Korean defenders the ’effective 
military assistance* that the U.N. had directed him to 
give. He concluded . . . that implicit in his directive 
was the discretion normal to field command.”-^8 MacArthur 
was, of course, never actually under the "direction" of 
the United Nations. The directive from his superiors in 
Washington had specifically drawn the thirty-eighth 
parallel as the outer limits of U.S. military activity.
l^Appieman, South to the Naktong, According
to United Press reports from London, Soviet and North 
Korean radio broadcasts charged, on June 29» that U.S. 
B-29’s were bombing Pyongyang, North Korea. Washington 
denied these reports. Lindesay Parrott, New York Times, 
June 30, 1950.
•^^Collins, War in Peacetime, 18-19j Lichterman,
"To the Yalu and BacIc7ir3STI
"^^Whitney, MacArthur, 326.
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"Here was no timid delay while authorization was obtained
from Washington, here was the capacity for command
decision and the readiness to assume responsibility which
had always been MacArthur’s forte. There is no record
of any countermanding order or message of censure from 
170Washington. 1 Instead, less than twenty-four hours
later, the President sent MacArthur authorization to do
precisely what he had already done.
The reports arriving in Washington from Korea on
Thursday, June 29, continued to describe the ROK position
as desperate. The North Koreans were massing along the
Han River for another push southward. The South Korean
army was sustaining very heavy casualties and its ability
to continue resistance was diminishing hourly. Shortly
before noon, Secretary Johnson called Truman to suggest
that he hold another meeting with the National Security
Council. The President agreed, and the meeting was
171scheduled for £:00 that evening.
One hour before his meeting with the NSC, Truman 
held his regular weekly press conference, the first since
169Ibid.; Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur,27-28.
■^^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," £81.
17lLindesay Parrott, New York Times,June 30, 19£0. 
See also, Smith, "Why We Wen¥ to War in Korea," 86; 
Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 86; Goldman, Crucial Decade, 
l6£-66.
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the crisis in Korea erupted. In response to a reporter's 
question, Truman said that the United States was not at 
war. Asked to elaborate, he said that South Korea had 
been . • unlawfully attacked by a bunch of bandits•
The United States was one of the members of the United 
Nations aiding in the relief of Korea. A reporter then 
asked if it would be accurate to refer to American 
assistance as a "police action" under the aegis of the 
United Nations. "That is exactly what it amounts to," 
was the President's rep ly .^73 The unfortunate phrase 
became part of the language and a source of embarrassment 
to Truman. The President was concerned that action in 
Korea be undertaken through the United Nations with the 
active involvement of as many other nations as possible.
He revealed this concern for emphasizing that Korea was an 
act of collective security in a personal letter written in 
July: "Every effort is being made to line up the United
Nations in a practical way on our side. I hope we can get 
it worked out so that all the allies on our side will be
■^^Item No. 179, Press Conference, June 29, 1950, 
Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950, 50lj..
-*-73xbid., 50i|~5j Anthony Leviero, New York Times, 
June 30, 1950. In a press conference on 3uTy 13, a 
reporter asked Truman if he would still call the Korean 
fighting, a "police action." His reply was, "Yes, it is 
still a police action." Item No. 191, Public Papers • . . 
Truman, 1950, 522.
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in the fight. ,|1711-
In the Security Council meeting following his press 
conference, Truman listened as Secretary of Defense 
Johnson presented the text of a proposed directive to 
MacArthur which had been drafted by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Johnson said that the major difficulties encountered 
by United States1 forces in carrying out the assigned 
mission of aiding Korea were many: a lack of proper ground-
air liaison existed between American fighters and the ROK 
Army; support missions being flown from Japan could spend 
only minutes over Korea because of fuel expenditure on the 
long flights; transportation facilities available in Korea 
made supplying American munitions difficult; the prohibi­
tion of aerial and naval operations above the thirty-eighth 
parallel provided the enemy with a sanctuary and secure 
base of s u p p l y . T h e  directive proposed to offset these 
disadvantages by allowing MacArthur to strike above the 
thirty-eighth parallel (the conferees being apparently 
unaware MacArthur had already given such an order), by 
allowing the use of Army service units of the Signal Corps 
and transport companies to provide air-ground communication
Ifij-Truman to Harry I. Schwiramer, July 12, 1950,
Truman Papers, OP, Korean Emergency, Truman Library.
■*-7£paige, Korean Decision, See also, Smith,
"Why We Went to War in Korea," ti6; Phillips, Truman 
Presidency, 300-301.
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and transport of munitions, and by allowing the use of 
Army combat forces to be stationed in the Pusan-Chinhae 
area to protect the port and guard an airfield to be 
used by American fighter aircraft.
In the general discussion that followed Johnson's
presentation, the proposed directive underwent substantial
revision. Both Secretary Pace and Truman were reluctant
to allow a blanket endorsement for military action in
North Korea. Truman also deleted some lines from the
directive that allowed the implication the United States
was planning for war with the Soviet Union: "I stated
categorically that I did not wish to see even the slightest
177implication of such a plan." After other modifications 
the President approved the directive for MacArthur, the 
major decisions being that military operations against 
North Korea were permitted and that the first ground 
combat units were committed, although not for actual combat 
purposes, since the Pusan area was some two hundred miles 
south of the existing battle l i n e s . A  paraphrase of
■^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 3i|l» See also, Warner,
"How Korea Decision Was Made," 10£; Smith, "Why We Went 
to War in Korea," 86; Paige, Korean Decision, 2lj.5; Collins, 
War in Peacetime, 19-20.
•^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 3lj.l.
•^^Ibid., 3kl-k2 > See also, Acheson, Present at the 
Creation, ip. 1-12; Phillips, Truman Presidency, 301;
Goldman, Crucial Decade, 167; Smith, "Why We Went to War 
in Korea,' 88; Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 87; Alexander
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the original directive approved by Truman on the twenty- 
ninth reads:
. . • you will provide fullest possible support for 
South Korean forces by attack on military targets so 
as to permit these forces to clear South Korea of 
North Korean forces.
Employment of Army forces will be limited to 
essential communications and other essential service 
units except that you are authorized to employ such 
Army combat and service forces as to insure the 
retention of a port and air base in the general area 
of Pusan-Chinhae. . . .
You are authorized to extend your operations in 
Northern Korea against air bases, depots, tanks, farms, 
troop columns, and other purely military targets, if 
and when this becomes essential for the performance
of your mission........Special care will be taken to
insure that operations in North Korea stay well clear 
of the frontiers of Manchuria or the Soviet Union.
The decision to commit United States air and naval 
forces to provide cover and support for South Korean 
troops does not constitute a decision to engage in 
war with the Soviet Union if Soviet forces intervene 
in Korea. . . .  If Soviet forces actively oppose our 
operations in Korea, your forces should defend them­
selves but should take no action to aggravate the 
situation, and you should report the situation toWashing ton. ̂79
Later in the evening of June 29, Acheson called 
upon Truman to deliver to him the text of an offer just 
received from President Chiang Kai-shek. The Generalis­
simo offered to provide 33,000 combat troops to South
L. George, "American Policy-Making and the North Korean 
Aggression," in Guttman (ed.), Korea and the Theory of 
Limited War, 73. Hereinafter cTEeT"asHIeorge” "American 
Pol icy-Mak'ing."
1 7 % arshall testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1,
536. See also, Appleman, SoutTi -bo Ehe* Nakkong, 6;
Paige, Korean Decision, 2^0-£1; Taige (ed.),' 1950: Truman1s 
Decision, 150-51.
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Korea. The offer was apparently contingent upon American
willingness to provide the transportation necessary from 
180Formosa. In his eagerness to involve other U.N. member 
nations in the Korean fighting, Truman wanted to accept 
the offer immediately. Acheson opposed this, arguing that 
the Chinese were probably not properly equipped and that 
they performed a much more valuable service by protecting 
Formosa, which was vulnerable to attack from the Chinese 
mainland. While Truman was still disposed to accepting 
the offer, he agreed to postpone a decision until a con­
ference the following day with Acheson, Johnson and the 
181Joint Chiefs .
While these deliberations were going on in Washing­
ton, MacArthur was completing a personal reconnaissance 
of the Korean battlefield. The General later recalled 
that the battlefront scenes he witnessed convinced him 
that the South Koreans had already depleted their 
defensive potential. American naval and air support was 
not sufficient to reverse the tide: "Only the immediate
lfiOpocs. No. 89, 90, Chinese Embassy to Department 
of State, June 29, 30, 1950, United States Policy in the 
Korean Crisis, £9-60. Documents are also publisnecT""in 
Far ffast Searings, Pt. £, 3382-83.
■^^■Truman, Memoirs, II, 3ij-2j Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, 1|12. See also, Paige, Korean Peels Ion ,~13j.9» 
General MacArthur did not want the Formosan troops when 
they were originally offered. See Bradley's testimony,
Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 6$2; Truman, Memoirs, II, 3q-8.
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commitment of ground troops could possibly do so. The 
answer I had come to seek was there. I would throw my
*i O p
occupation soldiers into this breach." On the flight 
back to Tokyo, MacArthur drafted his report to the Penta­
gon. It called for a commitment to Korea far greater than 
most of Truman's advisers had anticipated five days 
earlier.
About three o'clock on Priday morning, June 30, the 
Pentagon received a cable from MacArthur reporting on his 
inspection trip to Korea. The General said that the ROK 
forces were disorganized and ill-equipped to repel the 
North Korean invaders. Unless some new factor was intro­
duced, there was nothing to prevent the conquest of the 
entire peninsula. MacArthur felt that the only way to 
stop the North Korean advance and retake the lost ground 
was by employing United States ground combat forces. The 
cable concluded with a dire warning: "Unless provision
is made for the full utilization of the Army-Navy-Air 
team . . .  our mission will at best be needlessly costly 
in life, money and prestige. At worst, it might be 
doomed.
^■®%IacArthur, Reminiscences, 333* See also, 
Whitney, MacArthur, 329 V fount, Untold Story of Douglas 
MacArthur, ij.52.
■^®^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 33̂ 4-• The text of 
MacArthur's cable is also published in Paige (ed.), 1950: 
Truman's Decision, l£9-60. See also, Pehrenbach, This
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The duty officer at the Pentagon immediately in­
formed General Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, of the 
nature of MacArthur's message. Collins ordered that a 
telecon circuit be established with Tokyo so that he 
might talk (by teletype) with MacArthur. In the course of 
their exchange, MacArthur insisted that he needed immediate 
authorization for the use of combat troops if the situation 
were to be saved. Collins replied that the President had 
shown considerable reluctance the previous day to using 
ground forces in Korea and that he was sure that Truman 
would want to consult further with his military advisers 
before making such a decision. This would take several 
hours. Collins suggested that the directive of June 29 
just sent to MacArthur might be sufficient. The General 
replied that he needed new instructions at once, since he 
proposed the immediate dispatch of a regimental combat 
team from Japan to the Korean front. MacArthur added
that he planned to build up to a strength of two divisions
18kin order to launch a counteroffensive. After repeated
Kind of War, 89J Paige, Korean Decision, 237-38; Whitney, 
MacArllKur, 332-33; Phillips, Truman presidency, 303»
Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur, £6-27.
•*-®^Collins, War in Peacetime, 21-22; Appleman, South 
in the Naktong, 1|7. See al so, Mchterraan, "To the Yalu and 
lack, 5til; !Paige, Korean Decision, Smith, "Why We
Went to War in Korea,,y 88. General Bradley testified in 
1951i " . . .  you might say we underestimated their numbers, 
and their equipment and their ability to fight . . .  at 
least to start with." Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 9I4-Q•
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urgings from General MacArthur, Collins said he would
try to contact the President through the Secretary of the
Army, Prank Pace.
Truman received a call from Secretary Pace shortly
before five o'clock. Pace explained the substance of
MacArthur's messages from Tokyo, stressing that the
General was emphatic in his insistance that a combat
troop authorization was of the utmost urgency. The Army
Secretary asked Truman for instructions: "I told Pace
to inform General MacArthur immediately that the use of
185one regimental combat team was approved." Within 
moments the command decision Truman had reached alone in 
his bedroom at Blair House had been relayed to MacArthur. 
Within two hours, the first -units of the combat regiment 
began arriving by airlift at Pusan.
Colonel Henry Ahalt of the Joint Staff came to 
Blair House from the Pentagon at seven o'clock to brief
Truman, Memoirs, II, 3U3i Harold Hinton, New 
York Times, July 1, 19^0; Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. 
ScKIesinger, Jr., The General and the President and the 
Future of American Foreign Pol’icy (New-York: Farrar,
Straus and Young, 1*951) > 10"5̂  Hereinafter cited as 
Rovere and Schlesinger, The General and the President.
See also, Goldman, CruciaT' Decade, 168^69;Phillips , Truman 
Presidency, 30h; H x m t UnTold Story of Douglas MacArthur, 
k33 1 Far East Hearings, Pi. 1, 2 3 5 - 3 Pt. 2,1122, llj.76.
^®6gmith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 88. One 
of MacArthur's biographers will later claim that Far East 
Headquarters had not been consulted, " . . .  when suddenly 
General MacArthur received orders from Truman to inter­
vene." Willoughby and Chamberlain, MacArthur, 355*
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the President fully on all of the telegraphic conversa­
tions and the existing military situation in Korea. As 
soon as the briefing was completed, Truman called Secre­
tary Johnson and said that he wanted a full-scale 
conference with his military and diplomatic advisers (the 
original Blair House conferees) in his office in two and 
a half hours. The President said his advisers should be 
prepared to discuss and make recommendations on MacArthur's 
request for two combat divisions and on the Nationalist 
Chinese troop offer.'L®^
The June 30 conference began with Truman asking 
his advisers if it would be worthwhile to accept the 
33*000 troops offered by Chiang Kai-shek. Acheson was 
against the idea for the reasons expressed to Truman the 
previous evening. Additionally, he felt their use might 
encourage the Red Chinese to intervene in Korea. The 
Joint Chiefs were agreed that the best of Chiang's troops 
were not properly equipped or trained for modern combat 
operations. They believed that the available transport 
could be better used to transfer American forces to Korea. 
"I accepted," Truman wrote later, "the position taken by 
practically everyone else at this meeting; namely, that
l87Truman, Memoirs, II, 3l|3«
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188the Chinese offer ought to be politely declined."
The discussion of committing other divisions into 
combat was brief. There is no record of any adviser 
present dissenting from the view that MacArthur should be 
allowed to use available United States infantry forces to 
stop the North Korean advance. Truman ordered that the 
limitations imposed upon American ground troop use in the 
directive of the previous evening be rescinded and that 
MacArthur be given full discretionary authority to use the 
ground forces of his command in Korea. The order did not 
limit MacArthur to the two divisions which he had re­
quested. At Admiral Sherman's suggestion, Truman also 
approved a second order to the Par East Command, estab­
lishing a naval blockade of the entire coastline of North 
K o r e a . T h e  meeting was over in thirty minutes. There 
seems to have been little consideration given to the 
eventual cost in lives and treasure that could and did 
ensue from this decision. The employment of land armies
1 flfiIbid. See also, Acheson, Present at the Crea­
tion, 1+125 Higgins, Korea and the Fall of~lffacAr~tiaur,
2tf-£'9 J Spanier, Truman-llacArthur Controversy, 3l. ' For 
text of the State Department no te—de cl in frig "the National­
ist Chinese offer, see Doc. No. 91> United States Policy 
in the Korean Crisis, 60-61; Far East Hearings, Pt. 5»
338T.------------- ---------------------
IflqTruman, Memoirs, II, 32+35 Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, ip.2. See also, Collins, War in' Peace'time, 
23; Paige, Korean Decision, 259-60; Fehrenbach, Thi's Kind 
of War, 90; Appleman, South to the Naktong, i+?J Smith,
""ffihy We Went to War in™Torea"77T bb.
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on foreign soil is prone by nature to be regarded as an 
irrevocable commitment. This distinction is not accorded 
to aerial and naval combat, probably because of their 
remote and impersonal character.190
The President met with the congressional leadership 
at eleven o'clock in order to inform them of the decisions 
he had just reached. Some thirty officials of the 
Administration were joined in the Cabinet Room of the 
White House by fifteen senators and representatives.191 
Truman began the meeting by summarizing the actions taken 
by both the United States and the United Nations during 
the preceding five days. The President then acquainted 
the gathering with the latest battle reports from Korea, 
which described an increasingly desperate general retreat 
by the South Korean forces. Truman then told the congres­
sional leaders of his recent decision to send in combat
units. There was a stunned silence, followed by several
comments indicating general approval.^92
A few of the members of Congress present registered 
varying degrees of disapproval with the way Truman had
3-90por an interesting speculative analysis of the 
thinking of the policy-makers at this meeting, see George, 
"American Policy-Making," 71̂ -75-
191por a list of the congressmen in attendance see 
Paige, Korean Decision, 262.
^•^Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 88; 
Acheson, Present at the Creation, I4.I3 .
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decided, but none challenged the decision itself. Senator
Connally, not by way of censure, but "for the record,"
asked Truman if this were a unilateral action by the United
States, or in support of the U.N. resolutions. The
President assured him that this step was taken in concert
193with the United Nations. Senator Kenneth Wherry 
challenged the legal authority of the Commander in Chief 
to make such a decision without the consent of Congress. 
Truman replied that this was an emergency situation 
requiring immediate action; that it was his duty to act 
and he had.^^ Senator Alexander Smith suggested that 
Truman could still seek a congressional resolution 
approving his decision and the President agreed to consider 
such a step. Wherry began again to question Truman's 
right to act, but he was cut off by Representative Dewey 
Short, the ranking Republican on the Armed Services 
Committee. Short told Truman that he was certain he 
spoke for "practically everyone in Congress" in thanking 
the President for the quality of his leadership in the 
present crisis. On that note, the meeting adjourned.^9^
^•^Paige, Korean Decision, 262. For the text of 
Ambassador Austin's' statement to the Security Council later 
the same day explaining the American action, see Doc. No.
18, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, 2f>~27.
3-9^Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 88.
19%bid. See also, Acheson, Present at the Creation, 
i|13; Paige, Korean Decision, 262-63*
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Just as the meeting was ending, the White House released 
the following presidential statement;
At a meeting with Congressional leaders at the 
White House this morning, the President, together 
with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviewed with them the 
latest developments of the situation in Korea. The 
Congressional leaders were given a full review of 
the intensified military activities.
In keeping with the United Nations Security 
Council's request for support to the Republic of 
Korea, the President announced that he had authorized 
the United States Air Force to conduct missions on 
specific military targets in Northern Korea wherever 
militarily necessary, and has ordered a Naval blockade 
of the entire Korean coast. General MacArthur has 
been authorized to use certain supporting ground 
units.196
The last sentence of the release was deliberately left 
vague, for reasons of security. However, the congressional 
leaders were told very little more than that in the 
meeting with regard to the number of troops that were to 
be committed or how they would be employed.-^?
The decisions made on Friday morning, June 30, 
were conclusive: Truman had committed the United States
to the defense of South Korea. He found no difficulty in 
explaining why: "We could not stand idly by and allow
196White House Press Release No. 2I45I4, June 30, 
19^0, copy in Tannenwald Papers, Subject File, Chronology, 
MacArthur Hearings, Truman Library. For text of this 
statement see Item No. I8I4, Public Papers . . .  Truman, 
1950, 513; Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 987; Pt. 5, 3372;
Doc. No. 17, United States"Policy in the Korean Crisis, 
214-25; Paige ( e d . 1950: ifruman' s‘~5ecislon, 1&1-62.
197paige, Korean Decision, 263-6I4.
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the Communist imperialists to assume that they were free
to go into Korea or elsewhere. This challenge had to be
met--and it was met."^8 But the President, in meeting
this challenge, went to great lengths to point out that
the United States was merely acting as a member of the
United Nations, diligently upholding the principle of
collective security. In truth, considerations of power
politics and the American doctrine of containment weighed
heavily in the decision to intervene. As Robert Osgood
phrased it: " . . .  our eagerness to represent American
intervention as an altruistic act of pure collective
security tended to obscure the underlying basis of
Realpolitik without which intervention, regardless of UN
199sanction, would have been unjustified."
There is no reason to doubt that Truman's decision 
to intervene in Korea was initially accorded strong public 
acceptance. As measured by public opinion pollsters,
■ ^ ® T r u m a n ,  Memoirs, II, l|i>h* General Bradley, 
testifying in 1951$ demonstrated complete accord with 
Truman's sentiments. Asked why the United States inter­
vened, he said that everyone was in agreement that this was 
an act of aggression that had to be met. Far East Hearings, 
Pt. 2, 890. Similar views were expressed by "former Sec­
retary Johnson in his testimony. See ibid., Pt. 1|, 2585- 
See also, General Vandenberg's testimony, Ibid., Pt. 2, 
lij.90.
199Osgood, Limited War, 167. D. F. Fleming would 
agree with Osgood, addinig that the failure of the Truman 
Doctrine in China endangered Truman's European policy as 
well as his political base in America. Thus, he could not 
afford another defeat in Asia. The Cold War, II, 602-603.
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Truman's popularity was at one of its lowest points just
prior to the Korean crisis. The Gallup Poll taken a few
days before the fighting began listed thirty-seven percent
200of the public approving of his leadership. The record 
indicates that the President was under no significant 
pressure from either domestic or foreign sources either 
to intervene or stay out of the Korean conflict. Also, 
it is known that Truman deliberately excluded any consid­
eration of domestic political repercussions from the 
conferences held during the week in which these decisions 
were made. It is possible, that as an old political
hand, he knew intuitively that his decision would receive
201strong public support. In any event, such was the
case. A Roper Poll taken in August 1950 claimed that a
total of seventy-three percent of the people agreed that
202Truman was right in sending the troops into Korea. 
Journalist Arthur Krock wrote prophetically on July 1, 
1950, that eventually the American people would, " . . .  
call for a reckoning by the transfer of office and power. 
But few among these are disturbing the indispensable unity
20®Cited in Paige, Korean Decision, l\$,
201Ibid., 289, 30I/.-305, 310-11.
20?Fifteen percent disagreed and twelve percent had 
no opinion. Roper, You and Your Leaders, 1 In 1952* 
Truman told a reporter that the- decision to intervene was 
backed by "almost" ninety percent of the American people. 
Edward T. Folliard, Washington Post, December 27> 1952.
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of the moment, or contending that in the circumstances 
the President could have done otherwise."2^
This military intervention in Korea, that Truman 
later called his "toughest" decision,20 -̂ was made without 
calling on the National Security Council, which his uni­
fication reforms had established as the primary advisory 
body on major military and foreign policy decisions.20^ 
The NSC did not have contingency plans available, because
the Korean peninsula had not been included in long-range
20 6strategic planning. The deliberative process of the 
NSC, in which policy recommendations evolve gradually 
from a series of position papers drafted by several 
agencies which must be coordinated at several administra­
tive levels, was too time-consuming to be utilized in a 
crisis requiring immediate decisions. However, even while 
Truman bypassed his Security Council for the sake of 
expediency, almost all of the members of that body were 
present at the five informal meetings from which these
203Krock, "Korea: Truman’s Leadership," New York 
Times, July 1, 19^0, reprinted in Krock, In the Nation,TSIjT
20^Ernest B. Vaccaro, New York Herald-Tribune, 
December 27, 19f?2. See also, Warren, Pre'si'dent as World 
Leader, 335>»
2^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 5>79.
20^Higgins, Korea and the Pall of MacArthur, 22.
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major military policy decisions emerged. The President 
preferred to work through the conventional staff and 
command structure created by his administration, but he 
was flexible and confident enough to find ad hoc 
solutions in an emergency c o n d i t i o n .
The President’s decision to forego asking Congress 
for an authorization to intervene in Korea has far more 
profound implications than his decision to ignore the 
formal machinery of the National Security Council. Truman 
bypassed Congress on the advice of Secretary Acheson:
"I . . . recommended that the President should not ask 
for a resolution of approval, but rest on his constitu­
tional authority as Commander in Chief of the armed2oQ
forces." As with the decision not to involve the NSC, 
the President may have been motivated by pressing consid­
erations of t i m e . C e r t a i n l y  historical precedent 
supports the commander in chief’s prerogative of
^0?Hoare, "Truman," 190-91; Lichterman, "To the 
Yalu and Back," 579.
208Acheson, Present at the Creation, /j.13-15* See 
also, Paige, Korean Decision, 2897
209Senator Tom Connally had told Truman on June 26 
that a request to Congress for authorization would be ill- 
advised because of the possibility of extended debate.
See Paige, Korean Decision, 305-306.
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210committing troops without prior approval of Congress.
However, it is difficult to comprehend why Truman did not
ask Congress to sanction his decisions after they were
made. In the first weeks of the war, with the nation
responding with generous ardor, aflush with crusading
zeal at yet another opporunity to safeguard democracy,
211the consent of Congress was an absolute certainty.
Since Truman chose to act alone, he also stood alone as 
the martial spirit faded from the nation when confronted 
by the bitter reality of defeat in the hills of Korea.
210See Chapter One, passim. Merlo Pusey has written 
that Truman's failure to obtain congressional approval for 
the Korean intervention violated the United Nations Partici­
pation Act and stands as a precedent which imperils 
democracy and impedes establishment of a sound system of 
collective security. See Merlo J. Pusey, The Way We Go To 
War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 79-9£, passim. Here­
inafter cited as Pusey, Way We Go To War. Raymond"’G. 
O'Connor considered Truman* s reTusaT to secure a declara­
tion of war from Congress to be, "among the innovations" 
made by the President during the Korean War. See "Harry 
S. Truman: New Dimensions of Power," 73*
^■^Senator Richard B. Russell said (in 1962) that 
if the Administration had requested congressional approval 
after the first troops went in, ". . . it would have been 
granted unanimously." Quoted in Pusey, Way We. Go To War, 111.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE PRESIDENT AND THE WAR
I pinned a medal on General MacArthur the other 
day, and told him I wished I had a medal like that, 
and he said that it was my duty to give the medals, 
not to receive them. That is always the way. About 
all I receive are the bricks.
Once the decision was made to intervene in Korea,
Truman established a procedural system wherein he kept
a close supervisory control over the conduct of the war.
Each morning at about ten o'clock, General Bradley or an
officer from the Joint Staff would call on the President
and provide him with a full briefing on the battle reports
2received from Korea in the preceding twenty-four hours.
As Commander in Chief, Truman insisted that all directives 
concerning the Korean War, except those involving the 
most routine of matters, had to be presented to him for 
approval prior to their being transmitted to the Par
Item No. 272, Remarks to Members of the National 
Guard Association, October 25, 1950, Public Papers . . .  
Truman, 1950* 688.
2Truman, Memoirs, II, 3l|i(.. See also, Lichterman, 
"To the Yalu and Back," 583i O'Connor, "Harry S. Truman: 
New Dimensions of J?ower," 69. When military activity had 
scaled down considerably, these briefings were cut to 
three per week. Hoare, "Truman," 19i|..
ij.86
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3East Command.
The day-to-day strategic direction of the war was 
handled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since the war was 
limited in scope and area, the JCS were able to function 
calmly and efficiently. Military problems were referred 
to the JCS from the Far East Command, the United Nations 
Command, the National Security Council, the three service 
Secretaries and the State Department. These problems were 
then channeled to the Joint Staff for deliberation and the 
drafting of a paper. The JCS would then consider the 
paper's proposals. If their decision necessitated a 
directive to the Commander in Chief, "Par East (CINCFE), it 
was transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for approval. 
Then the directive was sent through the National Security 
Council to the President. If Truman assented, the order 
was then forwarded to the theater commander by the Joint 
Chiefs. While very few commands to the military bore 
Truman's name, they all were cleared through him.^ For 
the remainder of his Presidency, Truman never slackened 
this close control. He considered it part of his function 
as Commander in Chief to make all final decisions and
%oare, "Truman," 19̂ 4-J Hermes, Truce Tent and 
Fighting Front, £3 .
^Hoare, "Truman," 193~9ij-» See also, Lichterman,
"To the Yalu and Back," £82-83; Hermes, Truce Tent and 
Fiediting Front, £3, ££-£6.
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approve all strategic plans dealing with the fighting in 
Korea. Truman's military chiefs and his civilian admin­
istrators in the Pentagon clearly assumed a subordinate 
role under the President's style of leadership. As Wilber 
Hoare wrote in his essay on Truman as Commander in Chief: 
"The actions of the Secretary of Defense and of the JCS 
all fell into one of two categories— advice to the 
commander in chief or implementation of his directives."^ 
The system worked because the civilian advisers and the 
military chiefs worked well together, free from most of 
the interservice bickering that had fragmented efforts at 
unified command in the past.0
Prom the very beginning of the war, Truman gave 
increased prestige and importance to the deliberations and 
recommendations of the National Security Council. The 
President ordered the NSC to meet weekly and he regularly 
sat in on these sessions, a practice he had deliberately
^Hoare, "Truman," 199.
Ibid., 195-96. During most of the Korean War the 
following men constituted the civilian-military hierarchy 
of the Pentagon: George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense;
Prank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army; Francis P.
Matthews, Secretary of the Navy; Thomas K. Finletter, 
Secretary of the Air Force; General Omar N. Bradley, 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; General J. Lawton Collins, 
Army Chief of Staff; General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force 
Chief of Staff; Admiral William M. Fechteler, who replaced 
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman who had died of a heart attack 
on July 22, 1951* Chief of Naval Operations.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ij.89
7avoided in the past. On July 6, the first time the NSC 
met following the decision to send in land armies, Truman 
gave instructions to all present that he did not want 
unilateral proposals regarding Korea sent to him directly.
He said that recommendations requiring presidential action 
must be transmitted to him through the machinery of the
Q
National Security Council. Except in extraordinary cir­
cumstances, policy would be formulated and decisions made 
through this highly-institutionalized civil-military staff 
structure.*^
The UN Security Council, recognizing the need for a 
unified command in Korea, as well as the predominant role 
played by the United States, passed a resolution on July 7* 
1950. The resolution asked all members providing military 
assistance for Korea to integrate their forces into a 
single command directed by the United States.^ In a
7Truman, Memoirs, II, 3i&.
QGeorge M. Elsey to Charles S. Murphy, July 7* 1950, 
Truman Papers, OF, ltfl-B - Korean Emergency, Truman Library.
^For a detailed description of the operation of the 
chain of command under Truman, see Lichterman, "To the 
Yalu and Back," 582-83.
■^For text of the Security Council resolution, see 
Doc. No. 90, United States Foreign Policy in the Korean 
Crisis, 66-6fl See also, Far Sast Hearings, TFT 5*3372.
The Soviet Union rejected "the July 7 resolution as an illegal 
use of the United Nations to mask American aggression 
against the people of Korea. Doc. No. 101, Cable, Andrei 
A. Gromyko to Trygve Lie, July 11, 1950, United States 
Policy in the Korean Crisis, 67-68.
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presidential statement released the following day, Truman
designated General MacArthur as commanding general of the
1 3United Nations Command. All other nations participating
in assistance to Korea would amalgamate their forces under
him. The process was completed on July 15 when MacArthur
received a message from Korean President Rhee which
granted the General full command authority over all land,
12sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea.
General MacArthur, who was now seventy years old, 
shouldered an enormous burden. He was Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers in Japan (SCAP), the single executive 
authority for the administration of the Japanese nation.
He was Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), the overall 
authority for all American military forces in the Far 
East. The General was also military governor of the 
Ryukyus Islands and was in technical control of all U.S. 
ground forces operating in the Far Eastern theatre. And 
now, as noted above, he was also Commander in Chief,
United Nations Command (CINCUNC), exercising command
■^White House Press Release, July 8, 1950, copy in 
Tannenwald Papers, Subject File, Chronology, MacArthur 
Hearings, Truman Library. Truman's statement is printed 
as Item No. 189, Public Papers . • . Truman, 1950, 520;
Doc. No. 100, United STa'bes Folicv in the Korean Crisis, 
100; Far East Hearings, Pt. 5, 33 f2*̂ 73. See also, Truman, 
Memoirs, II, 34?J MacArthur, Reminiscences, 337.
to MacArthur, July 15, 1950, quoted in United 
States Policy in the Korean Conflict, 10-11.
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responsibilities over the military forces of all nations 
operating in and around K o r e a M a c A r t h u r  had uncomplain­
ingly accepted this additional command although the sum of 
his existing responsibilities would have easily broken a 
far-younger, less-gifted man. When notified of his 
appointment to the United Nations Command he wrote to 
Truman: "I can only repeat the pledge of my complete
personal loyalty to you as well as an absolute devotion 
to your monumental struggle for peace and good will 
throughout the world. I hope I will not fail you."^-
The placing of all forces in Korea under a United 
Nations banner did not, in fact, substantially change 
anything. While Truman had to practice some restraint in 
order to maintain United Nations support of the Korean 
operations, the links in the chain of command remained 
the same. MacArthur still reported to the Army Chief of 
Staff (Collins) and through him to the JCS, Secretary of 
Defense, NSC and the Commander in Chief, who was not 
obliged to clear anything with the United Nations.^
•^MacArthur defined his commands during testimony 
in 19^1• See Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 36-37. See also, 
American Military History, £50, Hunt, Untold Story of 
Douglas MacArthur,~lt56; Appleman, South to the Naktong, 112.
^-Quoted in Whitney, MacArthur, 338*
■^Hoare, "Truman," 19ij.-95» See also, Hermes, Truce 
Tent and Fighting Front, $3 ; O ’Connor, "Harry S. Truman:
New Dimensions of Power," 68-69* Spanier, Truman-MacArthur 
Controversy, 65*
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18support forces. He reported that he found the enemy to 
be "both skillful and resourceful.Intelligence esti­
mates at the time held that the North Korean Invading 
force numbered about ninety thousand. MacArthur had ten
thousand Americans and twenty-five thousand ROK forces
20with which to meet the enemy.
Reports coming in from the Par East Command during
the second week of July continued to emphasize the need
for more troops and the gross underestimation of the
training and equipment of the North Korean People’s Army.
On the ninth, MacArthur informed the JCS that his tactical
situation continued to worsen. He asked that four more
divisions, with all components, be sent to him, over and
above those already requisitioned. "The situation,"
MacArthur concluded, "has developed into a major 
21operation." On the sixteenth, General Collins, Army 
Chief of Staff, sent his own estimate of the tactical
10Appleman, South to the Naktong. 118. See also, 
Ridgway, Korean War,' 3$i WacArthur, Reminscences, 337 •
^•^MacArthur to Department of the Army, July 7> 19£0, 
quoted in Appleman, South to the Naktong, 118.
20Truman, Memoirs. II, 3 For MacArthur's esti­
mate of the training and quality of the South Korean and 
American forces at his command at the outset of the war, 
see his testimony, Far East Hearings. Pt. 1, 236-37.
^MacArthur to JCS, July 9* 19f>0, quoted in 
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 119.
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MacArthur himself later testified: "Senator (Russell),
my connection with thp United Nations was largely 
nominal. . • • everything I did came from our own Chiefs
of Staff. . . .  I had no direct connection with the United
16Nations whatsoever. Had the Administration been
obliged to act through the UN Security Council, little
would have been accomplished. On August 1 the Soviet
Union ended a seven-month boycott of the sessions.
Shortly thereafter the Soviet representative became
17president of the Council.
By early July 195?0 American ground troops were 
actively engaged in combat against the North Korean 
People’s Army (NKPA). MacArthur became immediately aware 
that his first estimate of two divisions would be insuf­
ficient to repulse the aggressors. The General sent 
several requests to Washington for various infantry, air­
borne and Marine units, as well as three medium tank 
batallions and seven hundred more combat aircraft.
Finally, on July 7> MacArthur told the Joint Chiefs that 
turning back the North Koreans would require four and a 
half full-strength infantry divisions and numerous other
•̂ Far East Hearings, Ft. 1, 10.
3-7Ma.1or Problems of United States Foreign Policy,
6.
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position of the United Nations Command to Truman. Collins
praised MacArthur1s "magnificent leadership" and the
effectiveness with which the General had committed and
employed his forces. However, Collins added, the North
Koreans are ", • . well-equipped, well-led, and battle-
trained and • . . have at times out-numbered our troops
PPby as much as twenty to one."
While MacArthur was still certain that he had to 
have more troops at once, he was much more optimistic in 
a personal communication to Truman on July 19. He told 
the President that with the full deployment of the 8th 
Army having by then been accomplished, the possibility of 
a North Korean victory had ended. MacArthur said his 
hold upon southern Korea was not a "secure base" and that 
he anticipated being able to establish a final stabiliza­
tion line. The General said that the NKPA had enjoyed the 
advantages of surprise, over-whelming force, speed and 
superior weapons. But the extraordinary speed with which 
Eighth Army had been deployed robbed the enemy of these 
advantages: "His supply line is insecure. He has had his
great chance but failed to exploit it. We are now in
22Collins to the Commander in Chief, July 16,
1950, Truman Papers, OF, ij.71-B - Korean Emergency,
Truman Library.
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23Korea in force, and . . .  we are there to stay. • • „" 
MacArthur recalls being amazed when his initial request 
for more troops was denied by Washington. He was told 
that his request was disapproved because no increase in 
troop strength had been authorized, shipping was in short 
supply and there was a need to maintain the American 
military posture in other areas of the world. MacArthur 
dismissed this as faulty reasoning which placed the Far 
East on the bottom of the priority list. The General felt 
it should have been obvious, "even to the non- military 
mind" that Soviet military deployment in Eastern Europe 
was defensive, not offensive.^ By way of rebuttal,
Truman wrote in his memoirs that area commanders always 
lack a global perspective and believe that their command 
should receive top priority. The President said this was 
understandable to him because during World War I he had 
considered his artillery battery to be the center of the
^MacArthur to Truman, July 19, 1950, Lloyd Files, 
Message to Congress and Speech re Korea, July 19, 1950, 
Truman Library. See also, "General MacArthur’s Estimate 
of the Military Situation, July 11, 1950," Far East Hear­
ings, Pt. 5, 3381-82; Item No. 19ij-, Radio AddresiT’Eo the 
American People on the Situation in Korea, July 19, 1950, 
Public Papers • . . Truman, 1950, footnote, 5̂ -2.
^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 337* MacArthur’s state­
ment can be contrasted with his testimony in 1951 when he 
said that the responsibility for global strategy rested 
with the JCS and other agencies in Washington and that he 
was not familiar with their studies. Far East Hearings,
Pt. 1, 76.
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entire war effort and had continually fought for more con­
sideration for his unit.^
The Administration had not completely disapproved 
MacArthur*s recommendation, as he implied. Decision was 
postponed on any major commitment of American forces in 
Korea over and above the units performing occupational 
duties in the Par East. Truman was reluctant to engage 
a large body of troops without positive confirmation that 
the Soviet Union would not take action elsewhere in the 
world. To this end, he had asked the State and Defense 
Departments to consider the probable course of Soviet con­
duct and report to him at a Cabinet meeting on July 1J+, 
19f?0. The report concluded that the Soviet Union possessed 
the military capability, either alone or in concert with 
satellite nations, of beginning a general war or applying 
pressure at numerous locations along common borders.
Acheson told the President that Defense and State could 
not agree on which area the Soviets might select to apply 
military pressure. However, he told Truman that the two 
agencies were in complete agreement that there existed,
. • the extreme danger of some such action flowing from 
either Soviet desire or the momentum of events."^ Truman 
was also informed that should such military action occur,
25Truman, Memoirs, II,
^ A c h e s o n ,  Present at the Creation, lj.20-21.
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the United States did not possess military power sufficient
27enough to make an adequate response.
The report of the Secretaries of State and Defense 
recommended that Truman take several steps that represent 
the first efforts to implement NSC-68, the major policy- 
planning paper drafted just prior to the outbreak of the
pO
Korean conflict. The President was urged to request an
increase in the authorized manpower levels of the armed
forces from Congress, as well as substantial appropriations
for an increase in the production of military goods and the
power to allocate supplies of certain critical raw
materials. Truman approved these proposals and five days
later (July 19), sent a special message to Congress re-
29questing everything the report had called for.
The President's message of July 19 traced the course 
of recent events in Korea and elsewhere in the world, in­
sisting that circumstances dictated that the United States 
increase its total military strength, not just to meet the 
needs in Korea, but to prepare the common defense of all 
free nations to resist further anticipated aggression.
The requested increments fell into three categories: (1)
more men, supplies and equipment were required to meet the
27lbid., ij.21.
28Hammond, "NSC-68," 3^1.
2^Acheson, Present at the Creation, ij.21.
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situation in Korea; (2) over and above the needs for 
defending Korea, the force levels of the armed services 
as well as the supporting materiel must be substantially 
increased; (3) American military support of other nations 
must be augmented by increased appropriations. The Presi­
dent also told the Congress he had instructed the Secre­
tary of Defense to exceed budgeted levels for military 
personnel in the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Selective 
Service System had been ordered to increase the draft in 
order to fill the allocated spaces. Truman's message also 
revealed that he had directed the Secretary of Defense to
activate as many National Guard units and Array, Navy and
30Air Force Reserve components as might be required. The
day after his message was sent to Congress, Truman received
a note from John Foster Dulles of the State Department.
Dulles told the President that talks he had with the
Republican leadership on the message indicated he would
31receive strong bipartisan support. Responding on July 
21, Truman thanked Dulles and added: "I see no other way
to meet the present world situation than the manner in
3®Item No. 193, Special Message to the Congress 
Reporting on the Situation in Korea, July 19# 1950,
Publi c Papers • . . Truman, 1950, 532.
■^Dulles to the President, July 20, 1950, Truman
Papers, OF, ij-71-B - Korean Emergency (June-July, 1950), 
Truman Library.
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32which we are meeting it."
Truman found the Congress most cooperative in pro­
viding the manpower levels and additional appropriations 
which he requested in this and other messages during the 
next few months. Before requesting additional force levels 
from Congress, he had already authorized the Army to 
increase its manpower by 110,000 "spaces" above the total 
strength of 592,000 at the beginning of J u l y . on the 
day Truman's message went up to Congress (July 19) a bill 
was introduced which would remove all statutory limita­
tions on personnel ceilings for the services for the next 
four years. The bill was approved on August 8, 1950.3^- In 
the next few months a bewildering series of measures flowed 
swiftly through the Congress moving the country, as 
Acheson put it, ". . • in a somewhat disorderly way into
35a more formidable military posture." The rapidity of 
this partial mobilization was amazing. For example, 
within eleven months the size of the Army had almost 
tripled.3^ The assumptions which guided Truman and his
3^Truman to Dulles, July 21, 1950# ibid.
3^Collins testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 1309« 
See also, Hammond, "NSC-60,
3**Hammond, "NSC-68," 351.
3^Acheson, Present at the Creation, ij.21.
3^Collins testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2,
1309.
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planners in this urgent rearmament effort were taken 
largely from NSC-68. ^
To the small American force first committed to 
battle in early July by MacArthur’s self-styled "arrogant 
display of strength," the additional troops and equip­
ment came too late. They were committed to fighting a 
superior force with outdated equipment. In a letter to 
Eleanor Roosevelt, Truman denied that the forces were ill- 
equipped for combat, an accusation made in a story in the 
New York Herald Tribune on August 8, 1950• The President 
told Mrs. Roosevelt that he had checked with "no less an 
authority than General Bradley himself," and the General 
had assured him that the story was untrue. Apparently the 
story had been leaked to the press by someone high in the 
Administration, for Truman wrote: "Nevertheless, I
fervently wish that some of my top men would learn the old,
37jp0r an excellent description of the relationship 
of NSC-68 to rearmament, see Hammond, "NSC-68," 35l-55> 
358-59. The myriad of changes in troop levels and supple­
mental budgetary increments brought on by Korea are detailed 
in Schilling, "Politics of National Defense," 211-13. See 
also, Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, 485-86; 
Ache son, Present at the Creation*, U21; Fehrenbach, This 
Kind of War, 163-T>E;L ̂ Louis Johnson! s Testimony Before 
Armed~!Tervlces Subcommittee on Appropriations, House of 
Representatives, July 25, 1950," printed in Far East Hear­
ings, Pt. 5> Appendix AA, 3250-55*
MacArthur, Reminiscences, 338.
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•.39old lesson about the golden quality of silence." The 
official A m y  history of the Korean War does not support 
Truman and Bradley's contention that these forces were 
properly equipped. One of the major problems noted in 
the account of early fighting, for example, was the lack 
of any ordnance capable of stopping the powerful Russian- 
built T-3lj. tank with which the North Koreans were 
equipped. There were no anti-tank mines immediately 
available, and the standard 2.36-inch bazooka rockets and 
75-mti recoiless rifles were ineffective against these 
tanks. Task Force Smith of the 21st Infantry Division, 
the first sizable unit to see combat in Korea, reported 
that even at close range their standard high-explosive 
rounds for the 105-ram howitzer bounced harmlessly off the 
T-3lj.'s. Almost all of the equipment was of World War II 
vintage, much of it was obsolete and worn and not combat 
serviceable. "Equally bad," was the term used by the 
official A m y  historian to describe the physical condition 
of military vehicles and combat weaponry employed in the 
first months of the fighting in Korea.^0
The ground combat forces initially committed in
■^Truman to Eleanor Roosevelt, August 22, 1950,
Truman Papers, OF, i|71-B - Korean Emergency, Truman Library.
^Appleman, South to the Naktong, 68-72, 113-llj..
See also, Millis, Arms and~~Men, 29ij.-95*
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Korea fought gallantly and suffered great losses.^- 
Essentially, they were involved in a delaying action, 
trading space for time. MacArthur felt they did admirably, 
causing the enemy to delay and re-deploy in a conventional 
line of battle, rather than pressing through with their 
unstoppable tank columns. "This,” MacArthur later wrote 
of his North Korean counterpart, "was his fatal error.
This miscalculation of American strength gave MacArthur 
time to place enough force in Korea to establish a secure 
foothold on the southeastern tip of the peninsula. By 
early August the Korean and American defenders were crowded 
into the "Pusan Perimeter," an area roughly the size of 
the state of Connecticut.^ The perimeter was staunchly 
maintained by Lt. General Walton H. Walker, Commander of 
the Eighth Army, to whom MacArthur had delegated field 
command over all ground forces in Korea.^ The important 
thing about the perimeter was that it fixed the enemy in a 
relatively static position on the end of a very long,
^•As of September 30, 1950, the U.S. Army had 
103,601 personnel committed in Korea. They had sustained 
2i|.,172 casualties by September 30, with 5*l4£ of that total 
having been killed in action. See Appleman, South to the 
Naktong, 605-606.
^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 336.
^Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy,
^■Truman, Memoirs, II, 3ij-7*
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vulnerable line of supply.
MacArthur had always intended, once he was able to 
halt the North Korean advance, to strike deep behind the 
enemy, cutting supply and communication lines and blocking 
the escape routes. This would place the main body in an 
untenable position, between the "hammer" and the "anvil" 
of military jargon. Early in July MacArthur had informed 
Washington that this was his intention: "Once he (NKPA) is
fixed, it will be my purpose fully to exploit our air and 
3ea control, and, by amphibious maneuver, strike him 
behind his mass of ground f o r c e . G i v e n  MacArthur's 
extraordinary success in World War II with amphibious 
sweeps striking at his opponent's rear, it was natural for 
him to devise such a tactical maneuver for relieving the 
pressure on the Pusan Perimeter
It was MacArthurfs genius as a tactician to choose 
the one site the enemy would consider least likely as an 
invasion target and the one locale that would bring the 
quickest military rewards if successful. The General's 
problem was that he alone, among the military hierarchy, 
believed that such an assault could succeed. Eor 
MacArthur selected the port city of Inchon (Inch'on) on
^CINCFE to Department of the Army, July 7> 1950, 
quoted in Appleman, South to the Naktong, 118. See also, 
Truman, Memoirs, II, -7.
^Appleman, South to the Naktong, lf.88 •
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the western coast of Korea. The second largest port in 
South Korea, Inchon is located on the Yellow Sea, some 
twenty-five miles west of the capital city of Seoul, 
which is a point of convergence for the highways and rail
| M
lines of Korea. However desirable a target the Inchon- 
Seoul area represented, the physical geography of the 
area created seemingly insurmountable obstacles to a 
massive amphibious assault. As one of MacArthur's 
planning staff for Inchon remarked: "We drew up a list of
every conceivable and natural handicap and Inchon had them 
all."^ MacArthur was firmly convinced that Inchon must 
be the attack site. On July 23 he wired the Pentagon for 
clearance of the operation, telling his superiors that the 
alternative would be an expensive, protracted breakthrough 
from the Pusan Perimeter. The General waited three weeks 
for a response. When it came, it was a wire informing him 
that Army Chief of Staff Collins and Chief of Naval Opera­
tions Sherman were flying to Tokyo to discuss the proposed 
operation with him. MacArthur believed Collins and Sherman 
were sent to dissuade him, not to discuss his plans.
Behind Washington's opposition to the Inchon invasion,
^American Military History, 553; MacArthur, 
Reminiscences',' 3h6.
^Quoted in Higgins, Korea and the Pall of Mac­
Arthur, I+I4.• See also, Willoughby and Chamber 1 aTn,
MacArthur •
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according to MacArthur, wore General Bradley and Presi­
dent Truman; the former believing that amphibious 
operations were obsolete, the latter opposing any use 
of the Marines except as a police force.^
MacArthur and his staff met with Collins and 
Sherman on August 23, to discuss the Inchon invasion. A 
naval briefing team began the meeting by explaining that 
many hazards were present at Inchon. Most notably, one 
of the greatest tides in the world, that on the antici­
pated invasion date (September 15) would fall about 
thirty feet at full ebb, leaving mud flats extending 
from the shore as much as two miles. This meant that 
landing craft would have about two hours in the morning 
and two and a half hours in the evening to land troops, 
neutralize defenses, secure a beachhead and prepare for 
counterattack. The rest of the time the landing craft 
would be stuck helplessly in mud awaiting the next full 
tide.-’® The Marine invaders would face sixteen-foot 
high seawalls in an attack on a highly-built up area 
offering extensive cover to the defensive forces. Admiral 
James T. Doyle, the Amphibious Group Commander, summarized
^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 3JU-6—JU-7• See also, 
Truman, Memoirs. II, 3lj-7-lfH.
-^MacArthur, Reminiscences. 3̂ 4-Q• See also,
American M i l i t a r y  H is to r y , 553; Appleman, South to  the  
Haktong, I}.93 .
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the Navy's position by saying that while the operation
Clwas not impossible> he would recommend against it.
General Collins suggested that the amphibious assault take
place further down the coastline at the port of Kunsan,
the object being a flanking envelopment linking with
General Walker's force in the Pusan Perimeter. Admiral
£2Sherman indicated he favored Collins' proposal.
MacArthur took the floor and in a veiy eloquent 
forty-five minute discourse, made believers of almost all 
of the skeptics present. He argued that Collins' plan 
would be a wasteful "short envelopment" that would serve 
no real purpose. The value of striking at Seoul was 
simply that it was the key to the extended enemy supply 
line. He recognized all of the Navy's objections as real 
but not insuperable obstacles. MacArthur said his ex­
perience with the Navy in the last war made him confident 
they could accomplish their part of the task. To those 
who doubted, he cited the example of James Wolfe at 
Quebec in 1759# who won a pivotal battle of the French and 
Indian War by attacking the Marquis de Montcalm at the one 
point where the French deemed an attack to be impossible. 
In closing, MacArthur said that he would be at Inchon and
^Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 21+0.
^Collins, War in Peacetime, 123, 125* See also, 
MacArthur, Heminiscences, 3ll#-49; Higgins, Korea and the 
Fall Of MacArthur, Uli-liS,
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if the defenses were too strong, he would order with­
drawal: "The only loss then will be my professional repu­
tation. But Inchon will not fail. Inchon will succeed.
And it will save 100,000 lives.
Sherman and Collins returned to Washington follow­
ing their meeting with MacArthur to discuss Inchon with 
the other members of the Joint Chiefs. The plans were sub­
sequently brought to Truman with the JCS recommendation 
that they be approved. The President agreed, later 
writing: "It was a daring strategic conception. I had
the greatest confidence that it would succeed."^
Truman’s enthusiasm after the fact is quite strong, but 
the JCS directive he approved for transmission to Mac­
Arthur carried qualifications. It read, in part:
We concur in making preparations for and executing a 
turning movement to amphibious forces on the west 
coast of Korea, either at Inch'on in the event the 
enemy defenses in the vicinity of Inch'on prove 
ineffective, or at a favorable beach south of Inch'on 
if one can be located. We further concur in
^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 3ij.9-50; Collins, War in 
Peacetime, 125-26. See also, Appleman, South to the 
NaktongTh93-9li; Willoughby and Chamberlain, MacArthur,
370-72J Ridgway, Korean War, 33; Higgins, Korea and the 
Fall of MacArthur, li5.'
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 358* Apparently Secretary
Johnson was the only Washington official to back the 
Inchon plan from the outset. See his testimony, Far East 
Hearings, Pt. ij., 2618, 2661.
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preparations, if desired by CINCFE, for an 
envelopment by amphibious forces in the vicinity 
of Kunsan.55
Since the invasion of Inchon had not been ruled 
out, MacArthur concentrated on it with single-minded 
purpose. The target date was set at September 15* On the 
fifth he received a message from the Joint Chiefs asking 
for details on pending operational plans. The General 
replied that his plans remained unchanged. The JCS 
cabled the Far East Commander again on the seventh. They 
expressed concern over the Inchon attack in light of a 
recent massive offensive against General Walker’s Eighth 
Army around Pusan. The Joint Chiefs reminded MacArthur 
that he would be committing practically all of his avail­
able reserves and that the only substantial reinforcements 
available— recently federalized National Guard divisions—
would not be ready for an additional four months. On this
56basis they asked MacArthur to reconsider his plans. 
MacArthur’s reply to the JCS was that he contemplated no 
change in his plans and that he believed that the Inchon 
operation presented the only genuine opportunity to take
^\JGS to CINCFE, August 28, 1950, quoted in Apple­
man, South to the Naktong, lf.9lf-* See also, MacArthur, 
Reminiscences, 351; dollins, War in Peacetime, 127•
JCS to CINCFE, September 7, 1950, printed in Far 
East Hearings, Pt. k, 2661-62. See also, Appleman, Soirbb 
to theTNak'fcong, lj.9lf.-95*
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57the initiative away and strike a decisive blow. Mac­
Arthur recalled, while waiting anxiously for a reply, 
that he asked himself if, 11. • . even now . . .  timidity 
in an office thousands of miles away, even if by a Presi­
dent himself, could stop this golden opportunity to turn
.,58defeat into victory?" A message from the Joint Chiefs 
soon arrived to reassure the General: "We approve your
59plan and President has been so informed."
It is a tribute to the military brilliance of 
Douglas MacArthur that the Inchon landing went off on 
September 15 exactly as planned. The Tenth Corps, 
especially created for this attack, captured Inchon 
against unexpectedly light resistance.^® The American force
^MacArthur to JCS, September 8, 1950, quoted in 
Appleman, South to the Naktong, lj.95* MacArthur also 
printed his reply in liis Reminiscences. 352. See also,
Par East Hearings, Pt. It, 2&62; Higgins, Korea and the Pall 
oT~M acAr thur~, HiT." -------------------
£®M acArthur, Rem iniscences, 352 .
^ J C S  to CINCFE, September 8, 1950, quoted in 
Appleman, South to the Naktong, lj.95*
60American M i l i t a r y  H is to r y , 555* The N o rth  Koreans 
p ro b ab ly  knew t h a t  an amphibious a s s a u lt  was im m inent, bu t 
were u n c e r ta in  o f  th e  s i t e .  Appleman, South to  th e  Naktong  
(p . lj.87) says i t  was g e n e ra lly  known among UN fo rc e s  th a t  
such a la n d in g  was planned f o r  m id-Septem ber. Dean Acheson 
cla im s th a t  th e  Inchon a t ta c k  was nicknam ed, "O peration  
Common Knowledge" in  Japan. He a ls o  says th a t  Communist 
sp ies  le a rn e d  o f  the  in v a s io n  p lans through a s e c u r ity  
le a k ,  b u t were unable  to  c o n ta c t t h e i r  N o rth  Korean c o u n te r­
p a r ts .  P resen t a t  th e  C re a tio n , Jjij.8.
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pushed inland against stiffer opposition with one a m  
heading south to seize Suwon and the other moving relent­
lessly toward Seoul, which was recaptured on the twenty- 
eighth, On September 16 General Walker had begun to 
push out of the Pusan Perimeter, Hie Eighth Army gained 
slowly at first, but the NKPA, cut off from supplies and 
reinforcements and aware of the impending envelopment, 
broke into disorderly retreat on September 23. Three days 
later, elements of the Tenth Corps and Eighth A m y  linked 
up. Allied troops continued to roll back th6 North 
Korean Army with little difficulty once the rout began.
At th e  end o f  September o rg an ized  re s is ta n c e  had ceased 
south o f  the t h i r t y - e ig h t h  p a r a l l e l . ^
The J o in t  C h ie fs  o f  S t a f f ,  who had doubted th e
wisdom o f  Inchon from  th e  v e ry  b e g in n in g , w i l l i n g ly
acknowledged M acA rthu r's  triu m p h : ” . . .  you have
exploited to the utmost all capabilities and opportunities.
Your transition from defensive to offensive operations was
62magnificently planned, timed and executed." Similar
^American Military History, 555* Out of a force 
of some 100,066, approximately 50,000 ©scaped into North 
Korea, disorganized and without their support equipment.
See L ic h te m a n , "To th e  Y a lu  and B a c k ,"  56^5 S p a n ie r , 
Trum an-M acArthur C o ntro versy , 81; Rovere and S o h le s in g e r, 
The G eneral and""the P re s id e n t , 133-3k* F o r a f u l l  account 
o f  th e  f ig h t in g  fo r  Inchon and up from  th e  Pusan p e r im e te r ,  
see Appleman, South to  the  N aktong, 488- 606.
^Quoted in MacArthur, Reminiscences, 356. See 
also, Collins, War in Peacetime, litl.
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warn messages o f  c o n g ra tu la tio n s  on th e  Inchon v ic to r y  
were re c e iv e d  by M acA rthur from  the  S e c re ta ry  o f  D efense, 
S e c re ta ry  o f  th e  Army, G e n e ra l E isenhow er, W inston  
C h u r c h il l ,  A d m ira l H a lsey  and numerous o th e r  in te r n a t io n a l  
f ig u r e s .  Truman sent a message o f  c o n g ra tu la tio n s  
p r a is in g  M acA rth u r's  h is t o r ic  triu m p h :
I  know th a t  I  speak f o r  th e  e n t i r e  American  
people  when I  send you my warmest c o n g ra tu la tio n s  on 
th e  v ic to r y  w hich has been ach ieved  under your 
le a d e rs h ip  in  K o rea . Few o p e ra tio n s  in  m i l i t a r y  
h is to r y  can match e i t h e r  the  d e la y in g  a c tio n  where 
you tra d e d  space f o r  tim e in  which to  b u i ld  up your  
fo rc e s , o r  th e  b r i l l i a n t  maneuver w hich had now 
r e s u lte d  in  the  l ib e r a t io n  o f  S eo u l. I  am p a r t ic u ­
l a r l y  im pressed by the s p le n d id  co o p era tio n  o f  ou r  
Army, Navy and A ir  F o rc e . . . .  My thanks and the  
thanks o f  th e  people o f  a l l  the f re e  n a tio n s  go out 
to  your g a l la n t  fo rc e s . • •
In  the m id s t o f  th e  Inch on -S eou l campaign the  
Defense Departm ent a c q u ire d  a new S e c re ta ry , f o r  Truman 
found i t  exp e d ien t to  re p la c e  Louis Johnson, As S ecre ­
t a r y  o f  D efense , Johnson had come under c r i t i c a l  f i r e  fo r  
th e  la c k  o f  preparedness o f  th e  American m i l i t a r y  th a t  
had been made e v id e n t by th e  e a r ly  f ig h t in g  in  K o rea . 
A lthough th is  c o n d it io n  was caused by the budget cuts  
imposed by Truman and the Congress on the  m i l i t a r y  e s ta b ­
lis h m e n t, th e  S e c re ta ry  was th e  n a tu r a l  ta r g e t  o f
^ M a c A rth u r , Rem iniscences, 356-57*
^Trum an to  M acA rth u r, September 29, 1950, Truman 
P ap ers , OF, i|.71-B -  Korean Emergency (August-Novem ber, 
1950), Truman L ib r a r y .  v
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criticism. Additionally, it was widely-known that
Johnson was unable to get along with Dean Acheson and the
State Department.^ Johnson testified in 1951 that he
had no idea why he had been made to resign, but it would
seem that his feud with Acheson and an unfavorable press
66made him an expendable liability to Truman. Johnson's
testimony makes it clear that his resignation was a
result of pressure from the White House. He said he did
not know why he was "ousted" and regretted having to resign
three days before the Inchon landing which he felt would
end much of the criticism, since he had favored the plan
67from the outset. He said when the White House failed 
to deny an Associated Press story that he was to be 
removed and Acheson was to remain in the Cabinet, he called 
Truman and later resigned as a result of that telephone 
conversation•^
In his letter of resignation, dated September 12, 
Johnson recalled telling Truman when accepting the post
^Hoare, "Truman," 196-97. See also, Bernardo and 
Bacon, American Military Policy, lj.77; O'Connor, "Harry S. 
Truman: New Dimensions of Power," 695 Steinberg, Man from 
Missouri, 380-81; Johnson testimony, Far East Hearings, 
ij., 2625.
^ Far East Hearings , Pt. ij., 26l8.
67Ibid.
68Ibid., 262/4.. *n kis memoirs, Truman does not 
discuss Johnson's dismissal at all.
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that in performing his tasks as Secretary he would
probably make more enemies than friends and now admitted,
’’somewhat reufully," that he had been right. So Johnson
tendered his resignation for the sake of the war effort.
He closed by recommending that Truman appoint as his
successor a man whose stature would promote unity, General
69George C. Marshall. Truman accepted Johnson’s resigna­
tion in a letter dated the same day. He spoke of the 
’’terribly regrettable circumstances” that had arisen, 
forcing him to concur in Johnson's decision to resign, 
effective September 19. The President also accepted the
recommendation that Marshall be appointed as the new
70Secretary of Defense. Johnson departed without rancor
71and full of praise for Truman and Marshall.1 For 
seventy-year old General Marshall to be appointed, Truman 
would have to change the law, since the National Security 
Act of 19if-7 in Section 202(a) prohibited service by a 
military officer as Secretary of Defense.
^Johnson to Truman, September 12, 1950, Truman 
Papers, OF, 1285, Truman Library.
7°Truman to Johnson, September 12., 1950, ibid.
This letter waa published as Item No. 2l\$, PublicHFapers 
. . . Truman, 1950, 632.
7*See, for example, Johnson's remarks before the 
American Bar Association on his last full day in office, 
September 18, 1950» Office of Publio Information, Depart­
ment of Defense, Press Release No. 177-50S, copy in Truman 
Papers, OF, 1285, Truman Library.
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Truman was prepared to act on General Marshall’s 
appointment. The day after Johnson’s letter of resigna­
tion, he sent draft legislation that would allow Marshall 
to serve as Secretary of Defense to the chairmen of the 
House and Senate Armed Services Committees. In a covering 
letter, Truman explained that he believed strongly in the 
"general principle" that civilians should direct the 
Department of Defense. "However," Truman wrote, "in view 
of the present critical circumstances and of General 
Marshall’s unusual qualifications, I believe that the
national interest will be served best by making an
72exception in this case." The Congress was willing. On
September 18, only five days after submitting his draft
legislation, Truman was able to sign the bill into law.
Senate confirmation quickly followed, and Marshall took
7 7the oath of office on September 20, 1950.
The defeat of the aggressors in South Korea in the 
last week of September restored the status quo ante bellum. 
It must have seemed to many that MacArthur’s bold strike 
at Inchon had dramatically achieved the objective for 
which the United States had fought. At the outset Acheson
^Truman to Millard E. Tydings, September 13, 1950, 
Truman Papers, OF, 1285, Truman Library.
73”a Bill . . .  to Appoint General of the Army 
George C. Marshall to the Office of Secretary of Defense" 
(64 Stat. 853). See Item No. 246, Public Papers • . • 
Truman. 1950. 633-34-
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had said that American intervention was ". . • solely for
the purpose of restoring the Republic of Korea to its
status prior to the invasion from the north. But the
expulsion of the North Korean attackers led to a decision
to change objectives from maintaining the independence of
South Korea to the conquest and political unification of
all Korea. Through hindsight it can be seen that the
decision to cross the thirty-eighth parallel was a tragic
75miscalculation.
The first suggestion that the United Nations 
forces should carry the fight into North Korea came from 
MacArthur. On July 13 he told Generals Collins and 
Vandenberg that the destruction of the enemy forces might 
necessitate the occupation of all North K o r e a . on 
July 31, 1950, the National Security Council completed a 
study of crossing the parallel, which was submitted to the
^Quoted in American Military History, 556.
^D. P. Fleming, who had described the crossing of 
the 38th parallel as a ‘'monumental error” and a "plain 
invitation to disaster," has estimated that a total of five 
million casualties (on both sides, military and civilian), 
resulted from the fighting in Korea, with two million of 
these dead. Of all casualties, according to Fleming, 
four-fifths were sustained after the liberation of South 
Korea. The Cold War, II, 655-56. See also, Fleming,
"America*s~ResponsTbility," 15-16; Hermes, Truce Tent and 
Fighting Front, 10,.
^Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur, 51.
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State and Defense Departments for comment. The plan recom­
mended that MacArthur be allowed to cross the boundary 
line in order to defeat the North Korean People's Army and 
occupy the country. The proposal carried three contingent 
assumptions: (1) that America would provide the men and
materiel sufficient to the task without depleting forces 
in other strategic areas around the world; (2) that no 
threat of Soviet or Chinese intervention in Korea or else­
where then existed; (3) that Truman, Congress and the 
United States accepted the unification and independence of 
all of Korea as a new war objective.??
The National Security Council proposals, incorpo­
rating some modifications suggested by the JCS, were 
approved by the President on September 11, 1950. The 
President also allowed the Joint Chiefs to send MacArthur 
a tentative advisory in respect to operations above the 
thirty-eighth parallel.?® The message to MacArthur, dated 
September 15, informed him that final decisions on future 
operations could not yet be made until several factors 
were added to bhe equation regarding Soviet and Chinese 
intentions, the risk of general war involved and the
??Acheson, Present at the Creation, ij5lj Truman, 
Memoirs, II, 359. See also, Lichterman, "To the Yalu and 
Back,^ 58i|-J Collins, War in Peacetime, II4I1-—14.6•
?®Truman, Memoirs, II, 35>9J Collins, War in 
Peacetime, llj.6•
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viewpoint of "friendly members" of the United Nations. 
However, MacArthur was told that it was Washington’s belief 
that a legal basis for crossing the parallel into North 
Korea already existed on the basis of the UN resolution of 
June 27* The directive instructed MacArthur to make plans 
for the invasion and occupation of North Korea, but to 
execute the order only with the express consent of Presi­
dent Truman. The General was also cautioned not to under­
take ground action into North Korea if Soviet or Chinese 
Communist units were found to occupy the area, although he 
could continue to attack with his air and naval units.
One last warning was a portent of the future: MacArthur
was informed that if a major Chinese Communist force pene­
trated below the thirty-eighth parallel, he was to resist 
this incursion as long as it was militarily feasible to do 
so, but that the United States would not— as a matter of 
policy— allow itself to be drawn into a general war with 
China. ̂
Six days after instructing MacArthur to prepare for 
an advance into North Korea, a reporter asked Truman if he 
had decided what American troops would do when they reached
?9jcs to MacArthur, September 15, 1950, printed in 
Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 718. This message also appears 
in Lichterraan, tto the Yalu and Back," 58^-85* See also, 
Warren, President as World Leader, 338; Spanier, Truman- 
MacArthur Controversy, 95? Higgins, Korea and the' gall""of 
MacArthur, 5l-52.
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the thirty-eighth parallel: "No, I have not. That is a
flnmatter for the United Nations to decide. Asked in a
press conference on September 28, seven days later, if
MacArthur had been granted specific authority to cross the
boundary, the President replied that he could not answer
the question publicly yet. The questioner persisted,
asking Truman if he considered that MacArthur had implied
authority to cross the thirty-eighth parallel. Truman
replied: "General MacArthur is under direct orders of the
President and the Chief of Staff, and he will follow those 
„8lorders." Truman had inadvertently tripped on the thread 
of fiction which held that the United Nations, not the 
United States, was determining the course of action in 
Korea. A reporter reminded him that a week earlier he had 
said that crossing the thirty-eighth parallel was a 
decision to be made by the United Nations, but he was now 
saying that the United Nations Commander would take orders 
directly from him on whether or not to cross the parallel. 
Truman tried to salvage the sinking myth by saying that 
while it was he who would give orders to MacArthur, the 
United Nations would have to first decide the matter and
PoItem No. 253, Press Conference, September 21, 
1950, Public Papers . . .  Truman, 1950, 61jl|..
Q*|
Item No. 258, Press Conference, September 28,
1950, Public Papers • . '. Truman, 1950, 658.
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02
then request that he command MacArthur to act.
On the day prior to this press conference of
September 28, Truman had approved a directive which the
Joint Chiefs transmitted to MacArthur. Based on the NSC
policy statement the President had endorsed on the
eleventh, it began: "Your military objective is the
destruction of the North Korean armed forces. In attaining
this objective, you are authorized to conduct military
operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel in
Korea." The directive also specifically commanded that
the General was not to allow his ground, sea, or air
elements to cross the borders of North Korea into Mancuria
or the USSR. MacArthur was further instructed to use only
Korean ground forces in those provinces bordering China
and the Soviet Union. Decisions as to the "character of
occupation of North Korea" would be made later as circum-
81+stances warranted.
Why Truman and his advisers decided to cross the
®^Ibid.,. 659. See also, Stone, Hidden History of 
Korean War, 108-109; Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 
100-101*:
^Quoted in MacArthur, Reminiscences, 358*
®^Ibid. T?or a paraphrased text of the directive, 
see Acheson, Present at the Creation, 1+52-53S Collins, War 
ln Peacetime, lli?-li.8. See also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 
3t>0-62; Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 585-87;
Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur, 53? Ridgway, 
Korean War, lili-li'57 Appleman, South to the Naktong, 607J 
Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 273'»
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thirty-eighth parallel, having already achieved their 
limited objective of containment, seems to have been based 
on considerations largely divorced from the original 
purpose. The explanation favored by Acheson was that it 
was a tactical decision. Not to pursue the retreating 
North Korean force and destroy it would have violated a 
fundamental principle of warfare. The North Korean Army, 
if not pursued and conquered, would be able to re-group 
in its sanctuary and launch another offensive. At the 
same time, barring an unknown factor such as Chinese 
intervention, the political unification of Korea would 
constitute a desirable by-product of this purely military 
operation.®-*’ MacArthur later testified that his original 
mission was to "clear all of Korea" and that if he had
not crossed the 38th parallel he would have been in
86defiance of the orders which he had received.
That an imperative military need to cross into 
North Korea motivated Truman's decision is unlikely, at 
best. The very fact that the Secretary of State took the 
initiative in urging this step would argue against such 
an assumption. The unexpectedly swift conquest of the 
invading army after months of clinging tenaciously to a
®**Acheson, Present at the Creation, lj-53; Acheson 
testimony, Par East Hearings 3, I$k3-Wl, 2258* See
also, Spanier, ttruman^MacArktaur Controversy, 89-90.
®^Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 2i}5-lj.6.
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toe-hold on the peninsula had created a new atmosphere of 
confidence. Additionally, the opportunity to accomplish 
the long-frustrated promise of a unified, independent 
Korea must have been an irresistible temptation, seemingly 
easy to achieve. The threatened Chinese intervention was 
not taken too seriously. One other factor may have been 
weighed in the balance by the President: His Administra­
tion's Par Eastern policies had been severely criticized 
since the fighting began and the mid-term congressional 
elections were only weeks away. There is no justification 
for implying that Truman would allow the invasion of 
North Korea in response to domestic political pressures, 
but the fact is that the pressure existed. The subcon­
scious mind is a trackless labyrinth and it would be 
presumptuous to attempt to measure its influence on 
conscious decisions. On the other hand, it would be 
naive to assume that Truman was superior to personal and 
political considerations that influence the best of men.®?
Having received authority to invade North Korea 
in the September 27 directive from Washington, MacArthur 
submitted his plans for this attack to the JCS. He
®?Truman did not discuss this decision at any great 
length. For estimates by others of his thinking, see 
Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 595-97; Spanier, 
Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 89-91, 95-96, 100-103;
!!?Eone, Hidden Efis tory of Korean War, 108-110.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
proposed to send the Eighth A m y  up the western coastal 
corridor through Kaesong and Sariwon to Pyongyang, the 
capital of North Korea. By an amphibious operation, the 
Tenth Corps was to attack Wonsan, a port city on the 
eastern coast, roughly parallel to Pyongyang. Following 
a juncture along the Wonsan-Pyongyang road by his 
separate commands, MacArthur proposed to advance north­
ward toward the Yalu River. Since his directive had 
instructed him not to use non-Korean forces close to the 
Russian and Chinese borders, the General’s plan called 
for the use of South Korean forces only, north of a line 
(Chungjo-Yongwon-Hungnam) fifty miles beyond the Pyongyang- 
Wonsan line and approximately sixty miles below the Yalu 
at its mouth. MacArthur ended by saying he had no indi­
cation of entry into Korea by major Russian or Chinese 
communist armies.®®
Both Secretary of Defense Marshall and Secretary of
State Acheson recommended MacArthur’s operational plans
89to Truman, who gave his consent. MacArthur had
®®MacArthur, Reminiscences, 358; Far East Hearings, 
Pt. 1, 719, Acheson, Present at bhe CreaTTTon, h53. See 
also, Truman, Memoirs, ll, 36TT riiggins, Korea and the 
Fall of MacArthur, 53-51u
®^ Ache son, Present at the Creation, i|53* General 
Collins admits that he ahd"""£he other Joint Chiefs, "some­
what overawed by the success of Inchon," recommended 
approval of MacArthur's plan without having received any 
details. See his War in Peacetime, 158.
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resented the insistence that he submit his plans to the
Pentagon for final approval prior to crossing the
thirty-eighth parallel.9® Apparently to placate him,
Marshall sent a curious "eyes only" personal message to
MacArthur on September 29, the same day the Joint Chiefs
transmitted to him the Presider\t's approval of his battle
plans. In part, Marshall's message reads: "We want you
to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed
91north of the 38th parallel." The Secretary also added
92that the President concurred in this view. The follow­
ing day, September 30, MacArthur responded: "Unless and
until the enemy capitulates, I regard all of Korea open
gofor our military operations." It is difficult to
comprehend the necessity for the secret message to Mac­
Arthur. It was later used by him to justify using American 
troops in the provinces bordering Manchuria; an action 
which precipitated intervention by Chinese forces. His 
response would appear to indicate that the General did 
not feel bound by the restrictions of the September 27 
directive or the restrictions on the use of non-Korean
^Appleman, South to the Naktong, 607-608•
^Acheson, Present at the Croat ion, lj.£>3.
92|?ehrenbach, This Kind of War, 273* See also, 
Appleman, South to the Waktong,"!^#.
^Appleman, South to the Naktong, 608.
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troops he wrote into his own operational plans of the 
twenty-ninth, Acheson, who was unaware of this message at 
the time, feels it w' ; sent simply to soothe MacArthur*s 
ruffled feelings at having to seek approval from Washing­
ton for his plans.^
The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted 
a resolution on October 7> 1950, which had the effect of 
sanctioning the invasion of North Korea by the United 
Nations Command. The resolution recommended that "All 
appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of 
stability throughout Korea • • . including the holding of 
elections . • . for the establishment of a unified, inde­
pendent and democratic government in the sovereign State 
95of Korea." The thinking behind this act seemed to be 
more than just an effort to place the United Nations 
behind a decision already made by the American Commander 
in Chief. The United Nations was also changing objectives
^Acheson, Present at the Creation, i|>53-5h«
9^Do c . No . 9, Resolution Adopted by the General 
Assembly, October 7» 1950, United States Policy in the 
Korean Conflict, 17-18. Text of the resolution aTso 
appears in Far East Hearings , Pt. 3 $ 2i|j6“37i Lichterman, 
"To the Yalu and feack, " 59IT The resolution, which 
passed forty-seven to five, witheight abstentions, had 
been introduced by Kenneth Younger, the British delegate, 
with the "full support" of President Truman. Guttman 
(ed.), Korea and the Theory of Limited War, 6-8. The 
Joint Chiefs believed that tEe language of the resolution 
gave permission for military operations north of the 
thirty-eighth parallel. JCS to CINCPE, October 6, 1950, 
printed in Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 720.
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in the light of MacArthurfs success, from simple preser­
vation of the independence of South Korea, to the 
unification of all Korea as called for in the resolution 
of November 11}., 19i|7*^
The Republic of Korea, whose very existence was 
threatened in mid-September, was eager to take over the 
governing of all Korea early in October. Truman had 
received a message from President Rhee of South Korea 
following the liberation of Seoul that expressed deep 
gratitude: "The Korean people will always cherish the
memory of your bold leadership in defense of liberty.
On October 11, ten days after this message, the President 
met with representatives of the Korean government, who 
thanked him for liberating their country. They also 
expressed the hope that now all of Korea could be united . 
under the rule of President Rhee. Truman thanked his 
callers, but avoided committing himself on the question of 
unification under Rhee, saying only that the United States 
would have to be guided by the forthcoming survey report
^Acheson, Present at the Creation, kSk*
^Rhee to the President, quoted in cable, Truman 
to Acheson, October 1, 1950, Truman Papers, OP, If71-B - 
Korean Emergency, Truman Library.
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of the United Nations C o m m i s s i o n . ^  The following day 
the UN Interim Committee resolved that South Korean civil 
authority extended only to the thirty-eighth parallel and
all civil control north of the border was delegated to
ogGeneral MacArthur. The United States endorsed the 
Interim Committee resolution on October 13* The resolu­
tion was declared "unacceptable" by the South Korean 
Government on the following day. A week later President 
Rhee announced that it was his intention to rule over all 
of K o r e a . T h e  intervention of the Chinese forces 
would spoil these plans.
At nine o'clock on the morning of October 9, 1950 
(Korean time), the American Eighth Array began its initial 
advance across the thirty-eighth parallel. It had been 
preceded by several divisions of the ROK Army a few days 
earlier. The Korean units made excellent progress, 
particularly along the eastern seaboard. They captured 
Wonsan on October 10, two weeks before landings could be
9®Those present at the meeting were the Korean 
Ambassador, John M. Changj the Vice Chairman of the 
Korean National Assembly, T. S. Chang; the Korean Foreign 
Minister, Ben C. Limb; President Truman and Acting Chief 
of Protocol, R. D. Muir. See Muir, Memorandum of Conver­
sation, October 11, 1950, Truman Papers, OF, 1|.71 (191J.9-50), 
Truman Library.
^United States Foreign Policy in the Korean 
Conflict, Appendix III, 50•
100Ibid.
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made there by units of the U.S. Tenth C o r p s . I n  the 
west, however, Eighth Army met very strong resistance in 
its drive toward the North Korean capital city of 
Pyongyang. By October llj. Eighth Army had moved approxi­
mately one-third of the distance along the axis of 
advance toward its immediate objective, penetrating the 
major prepared defensive positions which the enemy had 
established between the thirty-eighth parallel and 
Pyongyang. The North Korean forces were now in confusion
and an integral front line of resistance had ceased to
102exist. However, a few Chinese Communist soldiers had
been captured by this time; an ominous portent of the
full-scale intervention which China had been threatening
103since American troops first massed along the parallel.
At this point, on October 15* a unique meeting was held 
between the Commander in Chief of the United Nations 
Command and his Commander in Chief.
The White House released a presidential statement
■*-°*Appleman, South to the Naktong, 612.
1 OPIbid., 623-30, pa-sslm; Esposito (ed.), West 
Point Atlas, II, Sect. 3» M&P Plate No. 7*
^^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 572. Early 
in October, the Joint Chiefs warned MacArthur that if 
"major Chinese units" intervened in Korea, he was to 
resist only so long as he had a reasonable chance to win. 
He was also warned not to attaok Chinese territory with­
out prior approval. JCS to CINCFE, October 9, 1950, 
printed in Par East Hearings, Pt. 1, 720.
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to the press on October 10, 1950, in which Truman
announced: "General MacArthur and I are making a quick
trip over the coming week end to meet in the Pacific.
The President’s message explained that he was meeting with
MacArthur to discuss the last phase of the United Nation
operations in Korea and other matters relating to the Par
East C o m m a n d . T r u m a n  explained in his memoirs that
he had several reasons for wanting to talk with MacArthur:
"The first and the simplest reason . . . was that we had
never had any personal contacts at all, and I thought
that he ought to know-’his Commander in Chief and that I
ought to know the senior field commander in the Par 
i o 6East." Truman said that he also made the trip because 
MacArthur was out of touch with America, having been away 
for fourteen uninterrupted years. This caused MacArthur 
to consider things from a limited perspective which gave 
priority to Par Eastern affairs. Truman hoped to help 
the General adjust his thinking to the world-wide picture. 
The President was also concerned about intelligence reports
10^Doo. No. 10, Statement by the President, October 
10, 1950, United States Policy in the Korean Conflict, 19. 
Text of Truman’s statement can aTsq be founc^lai' Mie ITew 
York Times, October 10, 1950; Far East Hearings, Pt. 5» 
3i|ti3~bZj.; Item No. 26ij., Statement by the President on His 
Forthcoming Meeting With General MacArthur, October 10, 
1950, Public Papers . • • Truman, 1950, 665-66.
lO^New York Times, October 10, 1950.
10^Truman, Memoirs, II, 362-63.
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and repeated threats from Peking that Chinese forces
would intervene in Korea, and he wanted MacArthur's views
on the possibility of such an attack. As for the timing
of his trip to the mid-Pacific (they met on Wake Island),
Truman explained that he had to speak on October 17 in
San Francisco and a week later address the UN General
Assembly in New York and he wanted to bring back a first-
107hand report from the United Nations Commander.
Secretary of State Acheson was invited by the 
President to join him in this conference with MacArthur. 
Acheson asked to be excused since he found the whole idea 
repugnant. He told Truman that the General had many of 
the attributes of a foreign ruler and was just as diffi­
cult to control. Acheson thought it unwise for the 
President to go to MacArthur. To the Secretary this was 
tantamount to acknowledging the General’s image as a 
sovereign. "I wanted no part of it," Acheson later wrote, 
"and saw no good coming from it. . . . talk should 
precede, not follow, the issuance of orders."-1-0® In terms 
of protocol, the normal procedure would be for the 
commander in chief to summon a field commander to Washing­
ton. However, as General Bradley later testified, Truman
1Q7ibid., 363. See also, Spanier, Truman-MacArthur 
Controversy, 110-11.
^O^Acheson, Present at the Creation, ij-56.
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was willing to go to MacArthur rather than pull him away 
from his command at this critical juncture for any length 
of time.109
The timing of Truman's visit was probably 
influenced by his concern over Chinese intentions and an 
incident on October 9 in which two F-80 fighter aircraft 
attacked a Soviet air station. The base was located 
sixty-two miles north of the Korean border and eighteen 
miles to the southwest of the Russian port of Vladivostok. 
When the Soviet Union protested this "gross violation" of 
its territory, an Air Force spokesman in Tokyo denied any 
knowledge of the charges and the State Department said it 
was a matter to be taken up with the United Nations, 
since the planes operated under its auspices. But the
day following the attack, the President announced he was
110going to Wake Island to meet with MacArthur. w
■^^Bradley testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2,
1115; Marshall testimony, ibid.7 Ft." 1, h39. MacArthur 
recalls receiving a cable Trom Secretary Marshall on 
October 12, indicating that the President wanted a con­
ference with him on the 15th and had suggested Honolulu as 
the meeting place. However, if MacArthur felt that this 
would keep him away from his command too long, Truman 
would be willing to go to Wake Island. MacArthur responded 
that he would be "delighted to meet the President" . . • 
on Wake Island. Reminiscences, 360* In his San Francisco 
speech on the 17th, Truman saTd he had gone to Wake Island 
because he did not wish to take MacArthur away from his 
command for any length of time. Item No. 269, Public 
Papers • . • Truman, 1950, 673*
110Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 111-12j 
Stone, Hidden History of the Korean War, 139-h0»
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While the incident was not widely noted at the 
time, it may have had a dramatic effect on the President.
He had been from the outset of the conflict vitally con­
cerned with keeping Korea a limited conflict, to avoid 
giving China or the Soviet Union a reason to intercede 
and widen the war. Nations had gone to war in the past 
for less provocation than that generated by the errant 
P-80's. Pour days after the Wake Island meeting,
Ambassador Warren Austin presented a report to the Security 
Council from MacArthur. The report attributed the attack 
to navigational miscalculation by the pilots and a failure 
properly to identify the target prior to their attack. 
Austin stated that disciplinary action was being insti­
tuted against the two pilots and that the commander of
111their air group had been relieved. Author John Spanier 
has suggested that the sequence of events following the 
incident indicates Truman’s concern and may have been a 
major factor in his decision to meet with MacArthur. If 
this is so, Spanier concludes, ”• • . it underlined the 
urgency of the President’s desire to achieve a better 
working relationship with MacArthur during this final
111Stone, Hidden History of the Korean War, li|.0.
On October 19# the UnXted states acknowledged responsi­
bility for the attack and offered to make restitution. 
Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 111.
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112stage o f  the cam paign."
Truman came to  Wake Is la n d  b earin g  g i f t s :  a f i v e -
pound box o f  candied plums fo r  Mrs • M acA rthur and a fo u r th  
Oak L e a f  C lu s te r  to  add to  th e  G e n e ra l's  D is tin g u is h e d  
S e rv ic e  M e d a l . P o r  h is  p a r t ,  M acA rthur s a id  he had 
been warned about Truman's "qu ick  and v io le n t  temper and 
p r e ju d ic e s ,"  b u t th a t  he found the P re s id e n t to  be c o u rte ­
ous and humorous: "He has an engaging p e r s o n a l i ty ,  a
q u ick  and w i t t y  tongue, and I  l ik e d  him from  the s t a r t . 
Truman r e c a l ls  th a t  M acA rthur— th e y  were m eeting  fo r  th e  
f i r s t  and la s t  t im e — was f r ie n d ly  and th a t  he " . . .
llfound him a most s t im u la t in g  and in te r e s t in g  p e rs o n ."  p 
The two men met p r iv a te ly  f o r  ap p ro x im ate ly  f o r t y - f i v e  
m inutes and th en  met w ith  o th e r  members o f  t h e i r  s ta f fs  
fo r  a g e n e ra l conference la s t in g  about n in e ty  m in u te s .
l-^Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 112.
I. P. Stone, in hi3 Hidden History of~bhe Korean War 
(p. l£0), agreed with Spanier that TiKe’"aTr attack on Soviet 
territory precipitated Truman's insistance on an immediate 
meeting with MacArthur. General Willoughby was certain 
that Truman came to Wake Island for political purposes 
only, with an eye to the November elections. He was able, 
thereby, to "drape the mantle of MacArthur about his 
shoulders," by misleading the people. Willoughby and 
Chamberlain, MacArthur, 382, 390-91. However, MacArthur 
did not agree with this judgment. He wrote that it was 
an injustice to say that Truman was motivated by political 
considerations. Reminiscences, 363-6l|..
■^spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, lOij..
■^•^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 361.
H^Trmnan, Memoirs, II, 365*
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What transpired in the private meeting is open to
conjecture, MacArthur declined to testify as to the
substance of their conversation during the hearings on
his dismissal in 1951* which was proper, since it repre-
116sented a privileged communication. General Whitney, 
MacArthurfs aide and biographer, felt oonstrained to 
reveal part of what the General told him about the conver­
sation. Whitney claims a passing reference was made to 
Formosa and that the bulk of the conversation dealt with
". . . the fiscal and economic problems of the Philip- 
117pines." In his memoirs, Truman recalled that only a 
brief reference was made to Formosa, but made no mention 
whatever of the Philippines. Instead, he wrote that Mac­
Arthur assured him victory in Korea was a certainty and 
Chinese Communist intervention was quite unlikely. The 
General also told the President that he should be able to 
release at least a division from Korea for service in
•^^MacArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1,
kl.
■'■■^Whitney, MacArthur, 387* This is partially 
borne out by the record of the general meeting at Wake 
Island, wherein Truman is recorded as saying that he had 
already talked at length with MacArthur about the Philip­
pines. He also said there was no need to discuss Formosa, 
since that subject had been fully "discussed with Mac­
Arthur and that they were in full accord." U.S., Congress, 
Senate, Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, 
Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conferences on 
October l5T"‘l§50, compTled by iSmar it. Bradley, 52 Cong.,
1 Sess. T^ashington, 1951)* 7-8. Hereinafter cited as 
Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island.
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Europe by January of 1951
The g e n e ra l conference a t  Wake Is la n d  s ta r te d
im m ed ia te ly  a f t e r  the  P r iv a te  session betw een Truman and 
119M acA rthu r. The m eeting began w ith  th e  G en era l t e l l i n g
th e  P re s id e n t th a t  fo rm a l re s is ta n c e  in  a l l  o f  Korea
should end by T h an ksg iv in g . I f  t h is  proved to  be the
case, he p lanned to  w ith d raw  th e  E ig h th  Army to  Japan by
C h ris tm as . M acArthur expressed the  hope th a t  th e  U n ite d
N a tio n s  would be ab le  to  conduct e le c t io n s  in  N o rth  Korea
soon a f t e r  the  f i r s t  o f  th e  y e a r , fo llo w in g  w hich  he
120
proposed to  p u l l  out a l l  o ccu pation  fo rc e s . L a te r  in
•^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 36i}-65j Spanier, Truman- 
MacArthur Controversy, 105»
11^The principal figures in attendance at this meet­
ing, in addition to Truman and MacArthur, were General 
Bradley, Ambassador Muccio, Ambassador-at-Large Phillip 
Jessup, Assistant Secretary Dean Rusk, Army Secretary 
Pace, W. Averell Harriman and Admiral Arthur Radford, Com­
mander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Substance of Statements 
Made at Wake Island, 1. This document was the cause of 
much controversy later. It was based on notes of the 
meeting taken by Bradley, Jessup, Harriman, Rusk, and two 
staff officers, also present. In addition, they draw from 
a reasonably full stenographic record taken unofficially 
by Jessup’s secretary, Vernice Anderson, whojwas waiting 
in an adjoining room to type out a communique on the meet­
ing. MacArthur and his aide, General Whitney, have claimed 
that Truman's Press Secretary, Charles Ross, had cautioned 
them that no notes were to be taken during the conference. 
See MacArthur, Reminiscences, 361 j Whitney, MacArthur, 388* 
381-92. For other commentary on these notes, see Truman, 
Memoirs, II, 365; Acheson, Present at the Creation, h56; 
Appleraan, South to the Naktong, fooTjnote',- 760\ i?ar East 
Hearings, F f c 7 T , T 7 ^ ,  Pt. 2, 926-28,
l^Qsubstance of Statements Made at Wake Island, 1,
6; Truman, M em oirs, T I ,  365-65; Fehrenbach, T h is  K ind  o f  
War., 277.
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the meeting, Bradley asked MacArthur if he would he able 
to spare a division for redeployment to Europe by 
January* MacArthur said he could have the' Second Division 
by then.’*’2-1* When asked by Army Secretary Pace if there 
was any more that needed to be done in terms of cooperation 
with the Ear East Command, MacArthur replied: "No com­
mander in the history of war has ever had more complete 
and adequate support from all agencies in Washington than 
I have."122
Toward the close of this meeting, Truman asked
MacArthur to estimate the chances of Soviet or Chinese
intervention in Korea. "Very little" the General replied.
"Had they intervened in the first or second months it
would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of
123their intervention." MacArthur went on to explain that 
the Soviet Union had no appreciable ground forces nearby 
and that the Chinese, who had about 125*000 troops along 
the Yalu River, could only commit about 60,000 across the 
river. Because they lacked a proper air force for support,
^2^Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island, 6.
^ ^Ibid., 3» During the 1951 hearings on his dis­
missal, MacArthur reaffirmed this statement, adding that 
it was correct up to that time. See his testimony, Far 
East Hearings, Pt. 1, 213*
•^^Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island, 5*
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MacArthur believed that ”. • • if the Chinese tried to get 
down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter 
As to the possible combination of Russian air support of 
Chinese ground operations, the General believed that 
liaison would be too difficult to be e f f e c t i v e S h o r t l y  
after this meeting ended, MacArthur flew back to Japan 
and Truman departed for San Francisco.
In a statement issued following the Wake Island 
conference, Truman described the meeting as ’’highly satis­
factory,” and indicated that a ’’very complete unanimity 
of view” had prevailed. The President said that he had 
primarily discussed with MacArthur the military aspects
of the Korean situation and the further steps which would
126be required to bring peace and security to the area.
12lj-ibid. See also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 366; 
MacArthur, Reminiscences, 362; Fehrenbacii, This Kind of 
War, 277.
•̂ ■̂ Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island, 55 
Truman, Memoirs, II,~36~5T MacArthur has since stated that 
the views he expressed on the possibility of intervention 
had been qualified beforehand as pure speculation, based 
on an entirely military point of view towards a question 
that was basically political. Reminiscences, 362. See 
also, Appleman, South to the Naktong, 76o. For other views 
of the Wake Island discuslTfon on the subject of Chinese 
intervention, see Whitney, MacArthur, 392-935 Fleming,
The Cold War, II, 617-18; Rovere and Schlesinger, The 
General and the President, 132-335 Willoughby and 
Chamberlain,“*HacArthur, 382-835 Collins, War ih Peacetime,
l53-5i|-.
126item No. 268, Statement by the President on 
His Meeting with General MacArthur at Wake Island,
October 15* 1950, Public Papers . . .  Truman, 1950,
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Speaking at the War Memorial Opera House in San Francisco
two days later, Truman said that there was no need for
speculation about why he went to Wake Island: "I went
because I wanted to see and talk to General MacArthur. • . •
There is no substitute for personal conversation with the
commander in the field who knows the problems there from
127first-hand experience."
Five days after the Wake Island Conference, the 
Eighth Army, employing a ground attack and parachute drop, 
enveloped and captured the North Korean capital city of 
Pyongyang. Resistance to the United Nation’s advance 
beceme increasingly sporadic, often confined to guerrilla- 
type actions of limited effect. MacArthur later wrote 
that the fall of Pyongyang, " . . .  symbolized the complete
1 0 0
defeat of North Korea." Truman cabled MacArthur his
congratulations for the "remarkable" progress made since
129their meeting at Wake Island. The General’s confidence 
that the fighting was over shows clearly in a message to
672. See also, Doc. No. 11, United States Policy in the 
Korean Conflict, 19-20; Collins testimony, Far EasT~ 
Hearings, Pt. 2, 1307; Ibid., pt. 5, AppendTSrvYrTfB), 
jlj.bli.-b5; New York Times, October 16, 1950.
127ltem No. 269, Address in San Francisco at the 
War Memorial Opera House, October 17, 1950, Public Papers 
. . . Truman, 1950, 673*
•^^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 36ij..
•^^Quoted in ibid.
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the Joint Chiefs on October 21. He informed his
superiors that he hoped to start the movement of the
Eighth Army back to Japan before Thanksgiving and intended
130to complete the transfer before Christmas.
The ROK forces driving northward from Pyongyang 
were moving too slowly to satisfy General MacArthur. On 
October 2l\., without prior consultation with Washington, 
he advised his commanders that he was lifting all restric­
tions on the use of non-Korean forces close to the 
Chinese border. The field commanders were instructed by 
MacArthur to ignore the restraining line he had previously 
imposed upon them and to use any and all forces at their
131command necessary to complete the capture of North Korea.
This order countermanded the JCS directive of September
27, which had restricted operations in the northern
provinces to Korean troops exclusively. The JCS informed
MacArthur on the same day that they were sure he had good
reasons for taking this action, but wished to be informed
132as to what these reasons were. Replying on October 25, 
MacArthur said that his orders were a matter of "military
■*-30j4acArthur to JCS, October 21, 1950, quoted in 
Par East Hearings. Pt. 1, 720.
l31Ibid., pt. 2, 1216-17, 12l;0. See also, Lichter- 
man, "To the Yalu and Back," 600} Higgins, Korea and the 
Fall of MacArthur, 61j..
132par East Hearings, Pt. 2, 121̂ 0.
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necessity” because the strength and leadership of the ROK 
forces were insufficient for the accomplishment of his 
objective. It was the General’s opinion that his new 
instructions were not in violation of the September 27 
directive. He also indicated that Secretary Marshall’s 
message to him of September 30 provided him with the 
"necessary latitude" to modify his instructions to suit 
the combat situation. MacArthur also said that the whole 
subject had already been covered in his meeting with 
Truman on Wake Island.̂ 3  While the Joint Chiefs 
apparently were still convinced that MacArthur had 
violated his instructions, they did not move to counter­
mand his orders. Nor is there any indication that the 
President was consulted. The matter was simply dropped, 
the Defense Department being unwilling to overrule a 
field commander arguing military necessity, particularly 
one of MacArthur’s prestige.^^
^ M a c A r t h u r  to JCS, October 25, 1950, quoted in 
ibid., Pt. 1, 721; Pt. 2, 12ljl. The paraphrase cited here 
was censored prior to publication of the testimony. The 
placement of the deletion marks would seem to indicate that 
MacArthur had amplified upon his reasons for the "military 
necessity" of using American forces in the drive to the 
Manchurian border. However, this is only speculation, 
since the deletions are still classified. See also, 
Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 600; Appleman, South 
to the Naktong, 670; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 
7£6l-62; Truman, Memoirs, II, 372.
13lj-Collins, War in P eacetim e, 180-81. See also, 
L ich te rm an , "To the Yalu and B a c k ,11 600-601; Appleman,
South to the Naktong, 670-71.
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During the Blair House meetings in which the 
decision was made to involve the United States in Korea, 
consideration was given to the possibility of Communist 
China entering the war. There was general agreement then 
that while a risk did exist, such intervention was not 
likely to o c c u r . I t  will be recalled that the direc­
tives to MacArthur regarding his operations above the 
thirty-eighth parallel, which Truman had approved in 
September, carried a restrictive proviso in the event of 
major intervention by Soviet or Chinese Communist 
Forces.*3^ Acheson testified later that it was the belief 
of the President’s advisers that crossing of the thirty- 
eighth parallel probably would not cause China to inter- 
v e n e . - * - 3 7  This‘belief must have been based on the 
assumption that the Chinese were only bluffing, for they 
had indicated otherwise on several occasions.
General Nieh Yen-jung, acting Chief of the 
Communist General Staff, had discussed the American 
crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel with the Indian 
Ambassador at Peking, Sardar K. M. Panikkar, on September 
2$. He informed the Ambassador that China would not
•^^Bradley testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 
938-39; Johnson testimony, ibid'., P't. Zj., £621-22.
3-36jfrid.t pt. 1, 718; MacArthur, Reminiscences,
35>8; Ridgway, Korean War,
1 3 7 p ar  East Hearings, Pt. 3, 2100-101.
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permit the United States to advance to the Yalu River.
In public speeches on September 31 and October 1, China's 
Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, said that his country 
would resist foreign aggression against its North Korean 
neighbors.^39 Qn October 3 Chou summoned Panikkar to 
inform him that if American troops advanced across the 
parallel China would enter the war. It was Panikkar's 
understanding that if only .South Korean forces entered 
North Korea, this would not precipitate Chinese inter­
vention.^®
The President and his advisers believed that Chou 
En-lai's warnings were designed to "blackmail" the United 
Nations. However, Truman concluded that the possibility 
of Chinese intervention was too great to be ignored. He 
ordered the Joint Chiefs to send a directive to MacArthur 
in the event that Chinese Communist Forces were committed
138spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 85*
139jbid., 86.
■^Acheson testimony, ~Far East Hearings, Pt. 3* 
1833. See also, Acheson, Present aF theCre a/fa ion, 452; 
Truman, Memoirs, II, 361-62; Lichterman, "To the Yalu and 
Back," 593; Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur,
Rovere and Schiesinger, TSie (jenhraT and the Presi­
dent, llj.7. The authors of the latter work disagree with 
the generally-accepted view that the Chinese Communists 
intervened because the U.S. forces crossed the thirty- 
eighth parallel. (See pp. Iif.7-l5l) They are supported in 
part by Willoughby and Chamberlain, who believe that 
North Korea had assurances of Chinese military support 
prior to the outset of the war. See MacArthur, 380.
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in North Korea. The instructions to the Par East Com­
mander, dated October 9, read, in part:
In light of the possible intervention of Chinese 
Communist forces in North Korea the following ampli­
fication of our directive . . .  is forwarded for 
your guidance:
Hereafter in the event of the open or covert 
employment anywhere inKorea of major Chinese 
Communist units, without prior announcement, you 
should continue the action as long as, in your judg­
ment, action by forces now under your control offers 
a reasonable chance of success. In any case you will 
obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking 
any military action against objectives in Chinese 
territory
Truman considered the October 9 directive to be a 
restrictive, cautionary gesture. In fact it allowed Mac- 
Arthur greater latitude. The September 27 directive had 
prohibited advancement into North Korea if Chinese actions 
constituted a major threat of intervention. The corollary 
of October 9 allowed MacArthur to continue his advance 
northward even if the Chinese did attack, so long as the 
General felt he could win. This willingness to risk a 
confrontation with a fresh new opponent was a product of 
the optimism generated by the triumph at Inchon and a
^ J C S  to CINCFE, October 9, 1950, quoted in 
Truman, Memoirs. II, 362. Message also appears in Far East 
Hearings, Pt. 1, 720. See also, Collins, War in PeacetimeT 
171J--75S Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 59*57 Richard 
E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leader­
ship (New York: New American Library, 1961}.), ljT^-33• 
Hereinafter cited as Neustadt, Presidential Power.
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failure of military and political intelligence.^^ Inchon 
had made the long-sought goal of Korean unification seem 
within easy grasp. MacArthur's military intelligence had 
informed him that Chinese armies were being moved to the 
banks of the Yalu. But it was assumed that with the North 
Korean Army in disarray and the presumed ability of 
American air power to prevent any sizable movement south­
ward by the Chinese, the logic of the military situation 
argued against an invasion.’*'^ The political intelligence 
that China would go to war regardless of sound military 
strategy was not available, as MacArthur later observed.
In the closing days of October, the evidence that 
Chinese troops were involved in North Korea began to 
accumulate. Truman had received a memorandum on the 
twentieth from the CIA that the Chinese would be moving 
into North Korea to establish a protective perimeter 
around several power plants on the Yalu which serviced
■^^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," £93* £96. 
Journalist James Res ton felt that Truman also allowed Mac­
Arthur to move northward as he wished because the General's 
political prestige was very high after Inchon and Truman 
could not afford an open break with his popular field 
commander. New York Times, November 30, 19£0.
^%acArthur testimony, Par East Hearings, Pt. 1, 
18-19* 8!j.j MacArthur, Reminiscences, 3£9» See also, 
Phillips, Truman Presidency, 323"
^^MacArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 
18-19» See also, MacArthur, Reminiscences, 36o.
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Manchuria.-!-^ ROK units close to the Yalu began to engage
in battle with Chinese units and on October 26 captured
llj.6the first prisoners from these units. The prisoners 
informed their captors that their units had crossed the 
Yalu on October 16. This was, Truman later wrote,
" . . .  only one day after General MacArthur had assured 
me on Wake Island that if any Chinese were to enter Korea1
they would face certain disaster but that he did not
expect them to try anything that f o o l i s h . B y  October
30 there were reports that elements of the Chinese 39th,
l|.Oth and ijiind Armies were in North Korea. The Par East
Command informed Washington that there was no confirmation
of these reports and that the Chinese engaged were
,.124.8probably volunteers." Truman ordered the Joint Chiefs 
to secure a complete and up-to-date assessment of the 
Chinese incursion from MacArthur.
On November I4 General MacArthur told the JCS that 
available combat intelligence was insufficient for the 
purpose of adequately estimating the degree of Chinese
•^•^Truman, Memoirs, II, 372. See also, Hanson 
Baldwin, New York Times, October 22, 1950.
^^Ridgway, Korean War, 5lJ Millis, Arms and Men, 
296. See also, Acheson te'st'imony, Far East hearings, Pt. 3# 
1833 J Acheson, Present at the Creation, 1{.62.
^7giruman> Memoirs, II, 373*
■^®Ridgway, Korean War, 51 •
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involvement. He felt it was most likely that China would 
provide some volunteers and military aid surreptitiously 
to the North Koreans. Regarding a full-scale military 
intervention by the Chinese Communist Government, Mac­
Arthur said, "While it is a distinct possibility . . . 
there are many fundamental logical reacons against 
it. . . . jj0 dosed by cautioning against drawing
premature conclusions pending accumulation and appraisal 
of military data. ^ 0 Matthew Ridgway, MacArthur*s 
eventual successor, felt that the Far East Commander 
"simply closed his ears" and ignored the early signs that 
the Chinese had crossed the Yalu in f o r c e . I n  a 
special report to the United Nations on November 5, Mac­
Arthur wrote that his forces were in "hostile contact"
152with Chinese Communist military units. On the following
day MacArthur issued a special communique which began 
with the declaration that the North Korean Army had been
^•^Q^oted in Truman, Memoirs, II, 373* See also, 
Acheson testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 3* 1833*
l£0Truman, Memoirs, II, 373. See also, Spanier, 
Truman-MacArthur Controversy, ll8j Appleman, South to the 
Naktong, f62; Acheson, Present at the Creation, k&3»
•^•^Ridgway, Korean War, Zj.7•
^%acArthur, "Special Report to the Security 
Council, United Nations," November 5, 1950, reprinted in 
Far East Hearings, Pt. 5, 3^92-935 New York Times,
November 7, 1950. See also, Spanier, Truman~MacArthur 
Controversy,118-19.
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decisively beaten and the Korean war had been brought to 
a "practical end." But the United Nation's Command now 
faced a "new and fresh arnny of Communist Chinese." By 
their actions, MacArthur said, the Chinese Communists 
". . • committed one of the most offensive acts of inter-
153national lawlessness of historic records. . . ." The 
statement closed by asserting that it was now the mission 
of the UN Command to destroy the force newly deployed 
against it in North Korea.
MacArthur had cautioned Washington on November If. 
against making hasty judgments regarding Chinese inter­
vention. But on the following day he sent orders to his 
air chief, General George E. Stratemeyer, telling him to 
concentrate his forces on the destruction of the Korean 
end of all bridges crossing the Yalu, as well as means of 
communication, factories and other installations in North 
Korea, except for the hydroelectric plants. Stratemeyer's 
first objective was to take out the bridges connecting
^ % e w  York Times , November 6, 1950. Reprinted in 
MacArthur, emln'isc ences, 368. See also, Truman, Memoirs, 
II, 376; Appleman, South to the Naktong, 762; Spanier, 
Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 119; Acheson testimony,
Far East Hearings, Pt. 3, lo3ll»
•*~%ew York Times, November 6, 1950.
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l££Sinuiju, North Korea and Antung, China. Three hours 
before the intended strike, Stratemeyer sent a copy of his 
orders to the Pentagon. Under Secretary of Defense Lovett 
immediately met with Acheson and Dean Rusk, Assistant 
Secretary of State. Lovett expressed a fear that Mac­
Arthur’ s order might cause the bombing of the Manchurian 
city. He also believed that destroying the bridges would 
not materially affect the flow of Chinese troops into 
North Korea. Rusk reminded Acheson of the American 
commitment to consult with Great Britain before moving 
against Manchurian targets. The three were in agreement 
that the proposed attack should be postponed pending con­
sultation with the President. Acheson called Secretary of 
Defense Marshall, who agreed to order the JCS to counter­
mand MacArthur’s orders to Stratemeyer, pending new instruc-
l£6tions from Truman.
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 371}-} Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, 463. See also, Appleman, SouthTo the 
Naktong, 71^} Higgins, Korea and the Pall of~~MacAr£5ur, 68•
*^ A c h e s o n ,  Present at the Creation, 463} Truman, 
Memoirs, II, 373-74} Collins, War in Peacetime, 200.
Acheson, Truman and Collins all ¥tat~e that the Pentagon 
copy of MacArthur’s orders was sent by General Stratemeyer 
to Washington, not by MacArthur, thus implying that the 
latter sought a fait accompli. The official Army history 
of the war says tliat the JCISf, " . . .  received from Mac­
Arthur a radio report of the order.” See Appleman, South 
to the Naktong, 7l£» MacArthur's Reminiscences (p. 368), 
HjKed no lighton who sent a copy of the orders to Washing­
ton, but the General does acknowledge that there was a 
danger of accidentally bombing Manchuria involved. He
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Shortly after talking with Marshall on November 6,
Acheson was able to reach the President by telephone in
Kansas City, where he had gone to cast his ballot in the
off-year elections. After being brought up to date by
the Secretary of State, Truman said that he was willing
to authorize any action necessary for the safety of the
troops. However, MacArthur's la3t message (on the
fourth) , had given no indication of movement across the
Yalu that would justify such an action. Truman repeated
that he wished to’do nothing that might jeopardize the
United Nations' forces, but approved of the temporary
cancellation of the bombing mission until MacArthur
1^7explained why the attack was necessary. Accordingly, 
less than two hours before the massive flight of bombers 
was to leave its bases in Japan, Truman's countermanding 
order was radioed to Par East Headquarters by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. MacArthur was informed that the impli­
cations of his proposed air strike were being considered 
on a governmental level. He was told of the need to con­
sult with the British prior to taking action which might 
involve Manchuria. Until such time as orders were issued
leaves the impression that the risk was no longer 
important, since some Chinese forces had become involved 
in the fighting. See also, Lichterman, "To the Yalu and 
Back," 602-603.
•^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 37k~7$i Acheson, Present 
at the Creation, lj.63-61j.jCollins, War in Peacetime, 200-201.
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to the contrary, MacArthur was instructed to adhere to a
v  ...
previous JCS directive which prohibited him from bombing 
targets within five miles of the Manchurian border. The 
Far East Commander was also ordered to provide Washington 
with a new estimate of the military situation and an
1^8explanation for his order to destroy the Yalu bridges. ^
"It would be impossible to exaggerate my astonish­
ment. . . MacArthur has written in describing his 
reaction to the order suspending the air mission against
159the Yalu bridges. He quickly drafted a dramatic 
response to the JCS request for justification. His 
message said that Chinese troops and military supplies 
were "pouring" across the target bridges. It was his 
belief that this movement not only endangered his troops, 
but also threatened to accomplish the total destruction 
of the armies under his command. MacArthur said that 
only destruction of the bridges could prevent reinforce­
ment of the enemy. He also advocated full utilization of 
his air power to accomplish the destruction of all instal­
lations in northern Korea which could contribute to the
^58jcs to MacArthur, November £, 1950, quoted in 
MacArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 20; Major 
General Emmett 0 1 Donnell 'testimony, lFid., Pt. If., 3090.
See also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 375J Acheson, Present at the 
Creation, k&ki MacArthur, Reminiscences, 368; Appleman, 
South to the Naktong, 715J Lichterman, "To the Yalu and 
Back,irToTT"
l 5 % aCArthur, Reminiscences, 368.
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support of the Chinese advance. The unusual, adamant 
tone of MacArthur*s closing lines reveal the fervor of 
his conviction that his superiors were in error. He 
appealed over their heads directly to the Commander in 
Chief:
I am suspending this strike and carrying out your 
instructions. What I had ordered is entirely within 
the scope of the rules of war and the resolutions 
and directions I have received from the United 
Nations and constitutes no slightest act of 
belligerency against Chinese territory, in spite of 
the outrageous international lawlessness emanating 
therefrom. I cannot overemphasize the disastrous 
effect, both physical and psychological, that will 
result from the restrictions which you are imposing.
I trust that the matter be immediately brought to 
the attention of the President as I believe your 
instructions may well result in a calamity of major 
proportion for which I cannot accept the responsi­
bility without his personal and direct understanding 
of the situation. . . .160
Upon receipt of this message in Washington, General 
Bradley called the President and read him the text.
Truman was very concerned about the danger of precipi­
tating a far wider war. "But," he wrote, "since General 
MacArthur was on the scene and felt so strongly that this 
was of unusual urgency, I told Bradley to give him the
l60Teiecon, MacArthur to JCS, November 6, 1950,
(Nov. 7> Tokyo), reprinted in Truman, Memoirs, II, 375* 
General Collins has described as an "extraordinary request," 
MacArthur*s request that the matter be brought directly to 
the President. War in Peacetime, 201. For copies of the 
paraphrased text of TSEis message, see MacArthur, 
Reminiscences, 368-69; Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 
603; Far East Hearings, Pt. I)., 3090; Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, £|.6l|.; Appleman, South to the Naktong, 715-TE; 
Phillips', Truman Presidency, 32$ •
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'go-ahead.' In their message transmitting the Presi­
dent's decision to MacArthur, the Joint Chiefs apparently 
could not resist chiding MacArthur for the extreme dif­
ference between the situations depicted in his messages 
of the fourth and sixth. They acknowledged that bombing 
the bridges would contribute to the security of his 
forces, but, since this action might bring full inter­
vention by China or the Soviet Union, his force would be 
in greater danger and the war vastly extended to a degree 
dangerous to American self-interest. However, MacArthur 
was allowed to proceed with his bombardment. The
directive expressly enjoined against attacks on dams or
l A?hydroelectric plants along the Yalu. The new concept 
of limited warfare is evident throughout the message.
Most notably, MacArthur was advised to be absolutely 
certain not to violate Manchurian soil or airspace,
". . . because it is vital in the national interests of
■^■^Truman, Memoirs, II, 375>-76. MacArthur later 
testified that it was his "violent protest" which caused 
rescinding of the countermand, see Far East Hearings.
Pt. 1, 20.
^•^Quoted In Truman, Memoirs, II, 376. See also, 
Bradley testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 7l£j Aoheson, 
Present at the Creation, libh; Collins, War in Peacetime, 
201-202; Appleman, South to the Naktong, 7l*5T Within a 
few days the bridges werelcnocked out. However, less than 
two weeks later the Yalu was frozen over, allowing the 
passage of even the heaviest military equipment. See 
Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 601}.•
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163the U.S. to localize the fighting in Korea. , .
A military intelligence estimate by MacArthur 
arrived in Washington on November 7* In it the "Par East 
Commander reaffirmed his belief that the Chinese inter­
vention did not constitute a full-scale intervention. But 
the General did add that the troops which had crossed the 
Yalu could be reinforced to the point where they could 
check the completion of his advance northward and, 
possibly, force him into a retrograde movement. MacArthur 
said he intended to advance against these new units in 
order to estimate their potential s t r e n g t h . T r u m a n  
already had in hand a Central Intelligence Report (dated 
November 6) which estimated that about two hundred 
thousand Chinese troops were poised in a striking position 
in Manchuria. The CIA estimate was in agreement with 
MacArthur that intervention by these troops would halt 
his advance and probably force a retreat. The drafter of 
the report were convinced that China was aware that such 
involvement could bring about a general war. The CIA
■^^Quoted Truman, Memoirs, II, 376. The follow­
ing day, Secretary Marshall wrote to MacArthur, telling 
him he appreciated the difficulty faced in fighting a 
limited war, but that conditions made it unavoidable. 
Marshall is quoted in MacArthur, Reminiscences, 370. The 
text of Marshall’s letter also appears in Higgins, Korea 
and the Pall of MacArthur, 71•
^Quoted in Truman, Memoirs, II, 377* See also, 
Par East Hearings, Pt. 3» l&3k*
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also told Truman that the Soviet Union was not inclined 
to join directly in the Korean fighting but hoped to keep 
the United States deeply involved there, thus allowing 
them freer rein in E u r o p e .  ̂ 5
In a second message on November 7 General Mac­
Arthur told of the ever-increasing number of Russian-built 
MIG-15 j©t fighter aircraft that were attacking his air 
units operating near the Yalu. The MiG's were using very 
effective hit-and-run tactics, striking quickly and then 
breaking contact and retreating across the border into 
Manchurian airspace. Since MacArthur had been ordered 
not to penetrate the border, pursuing aircraft had to 
halt at the Yalu River, the area beyond constituting a 
sanctuary. The General described this as an "abnormal 
condition" having a debilitating effect on combat 
efficiency and the morale of air and ground troops. He 
requested new instructions from Washing ton. What Mac­
Arthur wanted was the right of "hot pursuit," which he 
subsequently defined as permission ". . . to pursue an 
attacking enemy plane to the death, whether it was over 
the border line or not."^^^
l65Truman, Memoirs, II, 376, 378? Lichterman, "To 
the Yalu and Back," 666.
■^^MacArthur to JCS, November 7> 1950, quoted in 
Truman, Memoirs, II, 377•
•^^MacArthur testimony, 3?ar East Hearings, Pt. 1, 12.
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Th© principle involved in "hot pursuit" was clearly-
established in international law and by historical preced-
168ents involving the rules of warfare. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Defense Department, State Department and the
President were all willing to allow this latitude to
169pursuing aircraft. Secretary Acheson believed it
proper to inform the other nations with forces involved in
Korea that such an order was to be issued. Accordingly,
on November 13, he dispatched a message to the American
embassies in the nations concerned asking the ambassador
to inform the government to which he was accredited that
United Nations aircraft might soon be granted permission
to pursue attacking aircraft up to a limit of three minutes
flying time into Manchuria. Acheson concluded his
message by saying that since only limited application of
the pursuit doctrine was involved and because the order
was based on "military necessity and elementary principles
of self-defense," the concurrence of the respective
170countries was not being sought.
■^^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 60I4..
I69par Ea3t Hearings, Pt. 2, 887-88, 1388; Pt. 3> 
1722-2Ij.. See also, Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back,"
601\.; Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur, 70.
170j»or text of letter, see Far East Hearings, Pt. 3 » 
1928. Those governments, aside from tlie Iff.S. and Korea, 
contributing military forces to the fighting by mid- 
November, 1950, were Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, 
and the United Kingdom. See ibid., Pt. 3, 1929.
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Concurrence of the allies was not requested in
Acheson*s notification that "hot pursuit" might be
employed, but they responded— unanimously and negatively—
to the whole idea. The ambassadors reported that these
nations regarded hostile action over Manchuria as
undesirable and dangerous. In the face of such general
171opposition, the matter was dropped. The President's
views on the aerial pursuit question are not altogether
clear. Acheson does not recall Truman being consulted at
oil.172 jn memoi;rs t Truman did not offer any personal
judgment on the question, he merely recorded MacArthur's
message asking for a new directive to meet the situation.
However, he follows MacArthur's message with some general
commentary which reveals his concept of how he had to
conduct this unique type of limited, coalition warfare:
. . .  I valued the expression of MacArthur’s opinions, 
and so did the Joint Chiefs. There was never any 
question about my high regard for MacArthur’s military 
judgment. But as President I had to listen to more 
than military judgments, and my decisions had to be 
made on the basis of not just one theater of operations 
but of a much more comprehensive picture of our 
nation’s place in the world.
• . . neither he (MacArthur) nor I would have been 
justified if we had gone beyond the mission that the 
United Nations General Assembly had given us.
There was no doubt in my mind that we should not
■^•kAcheson testimony, ibid., 1722-24, 1735-36. 
See also, MacArthur, Reminiscences, 365.
^ ^ Far East Hearings, Pt. 3, 1723. Truman says 
that the "EoT pursuit" inquiries were submitted to the 
nations concerned with his approval. Memoirs, II, 382.
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allow the action in Korea to extend into a general 
war. All-out military action against China had to be 
avoided, if for no other reason than because it was a 
gigantic booby trap,173
The deep misunderstanding that developed between 
the Commander in Chief and his field commander was not 
lessened by these limitations imposed on the conduct of 
operations above the thirty-eighth parallel. The 
restrictive policy Truman adopted was designed to avoid 
any activity that would alienate American allies or serve 
to justify the enemy’s expansion of the conflict into a 
general war. Nor were these self-imposed limitations 
designed solely to prevent the onset of World War III,
They were also part of an "implicit bargain" with the 
Communists, Although Truman did not allow MacArthur to 
violate the Manchurian sanctuary in any manner, the enemy 
allowed the United States a privileged sanctuary. For 
example, enemy air power was very rarely employed against 
American ground units, supply depots, railroads, or 
bridges. Shipping was not endangered by enemy actions. 
Port facilities could offload military supplies at night, 
fully illuminated and inviolate. While it is difficult 
to speculate on the enemy’s motivations, save to suggest 
that they, too, may not have desired a general war " . . .  
it is important to remember that they did fight under
•̂ 73Truman, Memoirs, II, 377-78•
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limitations that were quite as restrictive as our own.
Amidst the uncertainties of Chinese Communist
intentions in the first week of November, Truman instructed
the JCS to provide him with their recommendations
respecting intervention. The President was given a three-
point memorandum on November 8. The Joint Chiefs
recommended first, that all available political and
diplomatic means should be employed to assure China that
the UN forces in North Korea did not constitute a threat
to their security. Secondly, since the military objectives
and degree ofinvolvement by the Chinese Communists were
still unknown, orders should remain unchanged, pending
later review. Lastly, all planning and preparations by
the United States should henceforth be predicated on the
assumption that the possibility of global conflict had
1 71?been increased. 1̂
The National Security Council met on November 9 to 
discuss the JCS recommendations and review the changing
■^^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back,” 605.
General Ridgway agrees that the UN forces enjoyed a 
privileged sanctuary, ”. . .  without which the Korean War 
could have been a far more tragic story." Korean War,
75* See also, Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 
277-79, Morton H. Halperin, "The Limiting Process In the 
Korean War,” in Guttman (ed.), Korea and the Theory of 
Limited War, 92-106, passim. Hereinafter cited as 
Halperin, ""limiting Process in Korean War."
175Truman, Memoirs, II, 37^5 Collins, War In 
Peacetime, 206.
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conditions of the war. Truman was not present. Speaking 
for the Joint Chiefs, Bradley said that the Chinese had 
three possible intentions: establishing a buffer zone
to protect the hydroelectric facilities along the Yalu; 
forcing the United States to fight a war of attrition 
that would weaken the nation decisively in the event of 
a global conflict with the Soviet Union; driving the UN 
command completely off the Korean peninsula. If the 
latter was their objective, Bradley stated, they would 
require a degree of Soviet assistance that might bring 
about another world war. MacArthur should be able to hold 
off an attack along his present line, but the proscription 
against attacking Manchurian bases left this questionable. 
Bradley did not agree with MacArthur that destroying the 
Yalu bridges could halt the Chinese. General Bedell 
Smith of the CIA noted that the Yalu would soon freeze 
over and be passable without bridges. Secretary Marshall 
told the council members that MacArthur’s eastern flank 
was dangerously thin and dispersed over a very wide area. 
Marshall explained that this was done so that MacArthur 
could carry out his primary objective to pacify, occupy, 
and hold elections in North Korea. The meeting ended in 
general accord with the principles expressed in the JCS
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memorandum of the e i g h t h . T h e Joint Chiefs’ memorandum 
and the Security Council meeting demonstrated that Truman’s 
civil and military advisers agreed on the potential 
capacity of Chinese forces to destroy what had been accom­
plished. But they could not solve the riddle of Chinese 
intentions, so they agreed that MacArthur’s strategic 
disposition should remain unchanged while the Administra­
tion sought answers through indirect diplomacy.
What Truman’s advisers did not know was that while 
they deliberated the Chinese were in the process of 
completing a massive infiltration into North Korea. Mac­
Arthur, after his earlier concern that the Chinese 
constituted a genuine threat to his forces, was convinced, 
from November 9 until the last days of the month, that 
the Air Force could prevent any major Chinese reinforce­
ment across the Yalu and that his ground forces would 
soon dispatch the remaining opposition in North Korea.
His reports in this period reflect calm assurance and 
heartening op t i m i s m . M e a n w h i l e ,  the Chinese Communist 
Forces were moving the last units of a force of 300,000 
into the mountains of North Korea. Moving only at night,
•*•7̂ Truman, Memoirs, II, 378-80. See also, Lichter- 
man, "To the Yalu and Back," 606-607; Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, lj.65-66; Collins, War in Peacetime, 206-20*57 
Neustadt, Presidential Power, l3̂ **3"7T
^■^^Ridgway, Korean War, 60.
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in a very effective "march and bivouac" discipline, the 
Chinese had accomplished one of the great secret mass 
troop movements in military history. American military 
intelligence, serial observers and aerial photographs all 
failed entirely to detect this infiltration which had 
begun some time in October.
As part of the diplomatic initiatives recommended 
to Truman by the Joint Chiefs, a resolution was introduced 
in the UN Security Council on November 10. It asked the 
Chinese to desist from continued intervention in Korea 
and affirmed that it was UN policy, ". . .to hold the 
Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to pro­
tect legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in the
179frontier zone." Speaking in support of the resolution 
in a public statement on November 16, his remarks clearly 
directed at China, Truman said that the United States 
fully endorsed and was acting within the scope of limits 
imposed by United Nations.- policy in Korea. He said that 
American policy "never at any time" envisioned carrying
■^^Appleman, South to the Naktong, 770; Esposito 
(ed.), West Point Atlas, lT7 Sec. "3, Map Plate No. 9* 
Regarding this undefect'ed infiltration, Senator Leverett 
Saltonstall asked Acheson: "They really fooled us when
it comes right down to it, didn't they? Acheson replied, 
"Yes, sir." Far East Hearings, Pt. 3, 1835*
179doc. No. 13» Joint Resolution in the Security 
Council, November 10, 1950, United States Policy in the 
Korean Conflict, 22-23.
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November 21. But on the northwestern flank, Eighth Army, 
advancing in widely separated columns, was finding it 
increasingly difficult to move forward.
In mid-November, as MacArthur planned his offensive, 
there had been growing concern over the deployment of his 
forces. Apparently General Ridgway was the first to note 
the danger in the tactical dispositions, wherein Eighth 
Army in the west and Tenth Corps in the east were not 
linked together or advancing at the same pace. In addition, 
these two forces were subdivided into unattached columns 
dispersed over a wide front. Given the logistical 
problems being encountered, the mountainous terrain, the 
oncoming winter and the possibility of major Chinese 
intervention, the United Nations Command could be in
iQc?jeopardy. ^ This situation was a principal subject for 
discussion between the Secretaries of State and Defense 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a meeting together on 
November 21. When Acheson expressed concern over the 
scattered forces, Marshall and Bradley said they were not 
prepared to order a change in MacArthur’s troop disposi­
tions since they were seven thousand miles from the front. 
Acheson concluded that their reluctance to ask the
•^®%acArthur, Reminiscences, 365-66.
•̂ ■'’Acheson, Present at the Creation, lj.67; Lichterman, 
"To the Yalu and Back, tr 602.
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l80the war into Chinese territory. The Security Council 
resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union on November 30, 
1950.181
On November 11 units of General Walker’s Eighth
Army advancing northward encountered stiff resistance
just above the Chongchon (Ch'ongch'on) River. Walker
reported to MacArthur that the opposition came from
”. . • fresh, well-organized, and well-trained units,
102some of which were Chinese Communist forces.” Six days 
later, determined to test the full extent of Chinese 
involvement and, if possible, complete the conquest of 
North Korea, General MacArthur informed the Pentagon that 
he intended to launch a general offensive on November 2ij., 
designed to bring his whole line of advance up to the 
Yalu.^8  ̂ Before the offensive got off, forward elements 
of Tenth Corps on the eastern flank reached the Yalu on
l^Oitem No. 28?, Press Conference, November 16, 1950, 
Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950, 711-12. Text of Truman's 
statement can also be found in New York Times, November
17, 1950; Ear East Hearings, PtV "5, Doc. No. lip,
United States Policy"in the Korean Conflict, 23•
l8lThe resolution had been sponsored by the United 
States, United Kingdom, Prance, Cuba, Ecuador and Norway. 
Doc. No. 13, United States Policy in the Korean Conflict, 
footnote, 22.
•^^Qaoted in Ridgway, Korean War, 59.
■ ^ A c h e s o n ,  Present at the Creation, I4-67. Mac­
Arthur explained the reasons why^he considered this 
advance necessary in his Reminiscences, 171-72. See 
a3so, Spanier, Truman-MacArtbur Controversy, 129-33*
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President for an order changing the deployment was based on 
an underlying respect for the "MacArthur mystique" and a 
lack of desire to restrain "the sorcerer of Inchon.
General Bradley testified (in 1951) that he would certainly 
have deployed the troops differently.^®"^ However, at the 
meeting of November 21, 1950, the generals, while express­
ing great apprehension, would not countermand the 
commander in the field. And, as Acheson later wrote, "I
was unwilling to urge on the President a military course
1 Rflthat his military advisers would not propose." This 
reluctance among Truman’s advisers left him unaware of 
the potential danger to these forces for which he was 
ultimately responsible. The Joint Chiefs were concerned 
enough to send MacArthur a message on the twenty-fourth 
suggesting that he halt his advance on the high ground 
which dominated the approaches from the Yalu Valley. The 
Par Bast Commander responded by saying that it would be
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 467.
■^^Bradley gave a full explanation of his position 
regarding MacArthur’s troops dispositions in response to 
questions from Senator J. William Fulbright, Far East 
Hearings, Pt. 2, 972-75> 1143-45•
■^^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 468; Ridgway, 
Korean War, 61. For MacArtHur1 s defense of his disposi­
tions, see Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 19, 192, 246-47? 
MacArthur, Iftemini sciences, 359-60. For an excellent 
analysis of why Truman's major advisers were reluctant to 
go to him for decision, see Neustadt, Presidential Power, 
138-40.
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"utterly impossible" to halt his advance at that line. He
also offered his personal view that Chinese plans could
189not be altered by American timidity.
General MacArthur flew to Eighth Army headquarters
on the Congchon River on November 2k to launch personally
the "final" offensive. He announced that the assault
should bring an end to the war. MacArthur also told his
corps commanders that he hoped American troops could be
190pulled out of Korea by Christmas. On the flight to
Korea, the General had ordered his plane to fly along the 
Yalu so that he might observe the area for himself. Upon 
his return to Tokyo, MacArthur issued a statement saying, 
"An air reconnaissance behind the enemy's line and along 
the entire length of the Yalu River border showed little 
sign of hostile military activity."191 on the day of this
■^^Texts 0f messages exchanged between the JCS 
and MacArthur are in Ear East Hearings, Pt. 2, 1229-30.
See also, MacArthur, Reminiscences, 373; Rovere and 
Schlesinger, The General and theHPresident, Ikl-k2* Lichter- 
man, "To the Yalu and Back/0 '66$;'"Spanier, Truman-MacArthur 
Controversy, 125-26. General Ridgway describes MacArthur1 a 
stubborn insistence on advancing to the Yalu as comparable 
to General Custer's behavior at Little Big Horn. Korean 
War, 76-77.
•^^New York Times, November 2ij., 25, 1950; MacArthur, 
Reminiscences, 37?. See also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 381; 
Ridgway, Korean War, 60. A discussion of MacArthur's un- 
fortunate ''home b‘y~Christmas" statement was held in a 
National Security Council session on November 28. Truman 
describes the commentary in his Memoirs, II, 386-87. See 
also, Acheson, Present at the Creation, 1+71.
^^New York Times, November 25, 1950.
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statement, Far East Headquarters had been provided with a 
copy of a CIA report which estimated that the minimal 
response from the Chinese Communists that could be expected 
was an increase in their military operations. They would, 
the CIA claimed, seek to immobilize the United Nations 
forces, wage a prolonged war of attrition and attempt to 
preserve the semblance of a Communist North Korean state.
But the Chinese had sufficient strength, if employed, to 
force the UN armies into withdrawal and a defensive 
posture."*-̂
The first two days of the offensive went well against 
light opposition. But on November 26, 200,000 Chinese 
Communist troops struck in the wide gap between Eighth 
Army and Tenth Corps. In a matter of hours they had 
swept through the R0K Second Corps and all but eliminated 
the right flank of Eighth Army.^^ Walker’s army began a 
retreat that continued until the Chinese temporarily broke 
contact, a distance of some forty miles. In the eastern 
sector, Tenth Corps advance units— First Marine Division 
and Seventeenth Infantry Regiment— were surrounded and cut
Memoirs, II, 381.
3-93flew York Times, November 25* 19^0. See also, 
Ridgway, Korean War, 6$; MacArthur, Reminiscences, 37b»
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off by several Chinese divisions.
It was the President’s usual routine to meet with
the White House staff before his business day began. On
November 28, in a quiet, solemn voice, he told the staff
that he had received a telephone call from General Bradley
at six-fifteen that morning. The Chairman of the JCS had
told Truman of a "terrible message" just received from the
Par East. "MacArthur said there were two hundred and
sixty thousand Chinese troops against him out there. . , ,"
Truman told his staff. "He says he's stymied. He says he
has to go over to the defensive. . . .  The Chinese have
195come in with both feet." MacArthur acknowledged that 
the Chinese attack had shattered the hopes he had enter­
tained that his offensive would bring a prompt end to the 
fighting: "We face," he said, "an entirely new war."^*^
Truman convened a special session of the National 
Security Council on the twenty-eighth to examine policy in 
light of the dramatic reversal of military fortunes in
^9^LiCh.terman, "To the Yalu and Back," 610; Phillips, 
Truman Presidency, 326; MacArthur, Reminiscences, 37k*
■^^Truman is quoted in Hersey, "Profiles," Pt. 2,
52. See also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 385.
■^^Quoted in Acheson, Present at the Creation, 14.69• 
See also, MacArthur, Reminiscences, 375? Truman, Memoirs,
II, 381+J Phillips, Truman Presidency, 326; Collins, War in 
Peacetime, 220-21; Fehrehbach, This Kind of War, 3771 Far 
East Hearings, Pt. 3» 18314-*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
567
Korea. All of the President’s military advisers— the 
Secretaries of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff— were in full agreement that the war 
had to remain limited. The United States should not allow 
itself to be drawn into a general war with China. Not 
only could the Communists draw on an enormous manpower 
reserve, but no additional reinforcements would be avail­
able for Korea until March of 1951* Additionally, an all- 
out war against China would necessitate halting the 
build-up of the military defenses of Western Europe 
(which was a primary objective set by NSC-68, the global 
policy statement drafted by this same C o u n c i l ) . T h e  
President’s advisers offered no recommendations for his 
decision, being content, for the time being, to wait for 
the battlefield situation to clarify.
MacArthur was left in a very difficult position.
The prohibitions against bombing Manchuria and the Yalu 
dams and hydroelectric stations remained, as did the 
denial of hot pursuit. While the United Nations Command 
was badly outnumbered and facing a fresh enemy, their 
commander was informed that he should not expect even 
limited reinforcements until the following March and few
197Truman, Memoirs, II, 385-86; Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, Ij.69. See also, Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 
TT7-7HT For Truman’s analysis of the international 
situation which determined his limited response in Korea 
at the time (November, 1950), see Memoirs, II, 380-81.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
568
replacements before January.-*-98 On November 29 a message 
arrived from General MacArthur asking the Administration 
to accept the offer of thirty-three thousand Chinese 
Nationalist troops made by Chiang Kai-shek at the outset 
of the war. After a long talk with the State and Defense 
Departments, Truman ordered the JCS to tell MacArthur that 
the subject was under study. But the message made it clear 
that for numerous diplomatic reasons, the proposal was not
T O Ofavorably received. 77
MacArthur's "general offensive" of November 2l\.t 
which he subsequently referred to as a "reconnaissance in 
force," had at least answered the question of Chinese 
intentions.^®® His critics have called the operation "a
19QTruman, Memoirs, II, 386-87; Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, lj.69, 1+71. While MacArthur continuously 
requested authority to bomb Manchuria and blockade the 
China coast, he never requested that his ground forces be 
used to invade mainland China. In his testimony in 1951 
he characterized such a suggestion as "utterly reckless" 
and "ridiculous." Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 29, 1+3*
W j C S  to MacArthur, November 29, 1950, printed in 
Truman, Memoirs, II, 385* See also, MacArthur, 
Reminiscences, 375-76.
^®®MacArthur to Frank W. Boykin, December 13* 1950. 
Truman Papers, OF, lj.71-B - Korean Emergency, Truman 
Library. See also, MacArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, 
Pt. 1, 21. Army Chief of Staff Collins testified that the 
advance by MacArthur was not a "reconnaissance in force," 
but a full-scale offensive designed to destroy the remain­
ing NKPA forces. See ibid., Pt. 5> 3^95•
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first class American defeat"2^  and "one of the most
202ignominious defeats in American history." MacArthur 
denied this, saying that his advance was designed to 
determine enemy capability and that his reversal was a 
strategic withdrawal, accomplished in "magnificent order 
and s h a p e . T h e  truth lies somewhere between these 
extremes, but it is worthwhile to note that--at the 
time— Truman's faith in MacArthur's generalship had not 
waivered. Queried about the developing crisis, Truman 
said:
People who don't know military affairs except 
everthing to go well all the time. They don't under­
stand. A general can't be a winner every day of the 
week. The greatest of generals have had to take 
reverses. I advise you to study the lives of 
Alexander the Great, Tamerlane, Gustavus Adolphus, 
Hunyadi--and Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson. 
You'll find they all won most of the time, but they 
all had their troubles, too. I'm not upset, like 
most people, about these reverses MacArthur is 
taking.2^4
The Chinese continued to press their advantage in 
the last days of November. They had driven a large wedge 
between the Eighth Army and Tenth Corps. The CCF
^Olspanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 133.
2®2Rovere and Schlesinger, The General and the 
President, 152.
2®^MacArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 
21. See also, MacArthur, Reminiscences, 3VU«
2<̂ Quoted in Hersey, "Profiles," Pt. 1, JLf.3•
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apparently planned to envelop the inland flanks of both
commands, drive them into defensive pockets on the coasts
and destroy them. Meanwhile, the major thrust of the
Chinese attack would advance southward through the central
20^breach down the entire peninsula. In a message
received by the Joint Chiefs on November 30 $ MacArthur
explained that if enemy pressure continued to develop as it
was at the time, he would contract the Tenth Corps into a
defensive sector between the deep-water ports of Hungnam
206and Wonsan on the eastern seaboard. Replying the same
day, the Joint Chiefs expressed concern over the exposed
positions of Tenth Corps. They suggested that MacArthur
attempt a coordination of Eighth Army with Tenth Corps
sufficient enough to prevent their being outflanked or
allowing any large CCF force to advance between them. If
207it became necessary, Tenth Corps should be evacuated.
On the morning these messages were being exchanged, 
the President held a press conference. He began by 
reading a statement to the reporters regarding Chinese 
intervention, which he described as a "new act of
20j?Esposito (ed.), West Point Atlas, II, Sec. 3,
Map Plate No. 9.
^^MacArthur to JCS, November 30, 1950, printed in 
Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, llij.6.
^°^JCS to MacArthur, November 30, 1950, ibid., 
llij.5-lf.6. See also, Collins, War in Peacetime, 2^7-28.
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aggression in Korea” by which China was being " . . .  forced 
or deceived into serving the ends of Russian colonial
Q
policy in Asia." While the battlefield situation was 
then uncertain, Truman said that the United Nations did 
not intend to abandon its mission. He described the attack 
as just a part of a global pattern which endangered all 
free nations and emphasized the necessity for reapidly 
expanding military defenses and establishing an integrated 
NATO force in Europe. The President said that he would 
immediately submit a request to Congress for supplemental 
appropriations, which would include additional funds for 
the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force. The purpose of these budgetary requests 
would be to expand the size of the armed forces and 
increase the effectiveness of the entire military-defense 
system. ̂ 09
Following his statement, Truman opened the press 
conference to questions. Early in the course of this 
meeting Truman defended MacArthur by explaining that he, 
as Commander in Chief, was kept fully informed by the 
General of "every detail" in his tactical planning. As
^®®Itera No. 295* Press Conference, November 30, 1950, 
Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950> 721J.-25*
209jbid. The text of Truman’s statement also 
appears in New York Times, December 1, 1950; Truman,
Memoirs, II,' 3ttb-9o; Far East Hearings, Pt. £, 3^96-97.
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the questioners persisted, Truman responded by telling 
them that MacArthur was doing a good job and had not 
exceeded his command authority. To further questioning, 
Truman revealed that he was still not going to use Nation­
alist Chinese troops in Korea and, while refusing to say 
whether MacArthur would be allowed to bomb beyond the 
Yalu, did acknowledge that if the UN authorized such a 
step, it would be taken. Elaborating on the latter point, 
the President said that he was prepared to take whatever 
steps were necessary to meet the new military situation.
A reporter asked if this included use of the atomic bomb.
210Truman replied: "That includes every weapon we have."
Continuing, in response to several more queries, the Pres­
ident went on to say that while the atomic bomb was a 
"terrible weapon" he did not want to employ, its use in
the Korean War was, and always had been, under active 
211consideration. Asked if atomic weapons would be used 
against military or civilian objectives, the President 
said: "It's a matter that the military people will have to
^^Item No. 295, Press Conference, November 30,
1950, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950> 727.
^^Ibid.j Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 398; Truman, 
Memoirs, II, 395* See also, S’t o n e Hid*3en History of the 
Korean War, 199; Phillips, Truman Presidency, 329; HTlTis, 
Arms and Men, 299. In response to a reporter's question in 
a press conference in July, Truman had said that he was not 
considering use of the atomic bomb in Korea. See Item No. 
203t Press Conference, July 27, 1950, Public Papers . • • 
Truman, 1950* 562.
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decide. I'm not a military authority that passes on those 
212things." Truman's answer makes little sense. He was 
the only human being in the world who had ever decided on 
the use of atomic devices and the type of target they were 
to be used against. After World War II he had wisely 
insisted that atomic weapons policy decisions rest exclu­
sively with the commander in chief. The President's 
exclusive control of nuclear weaponry was emphasized in a
clarifying statement issued by the White House shortly
21after the press conference ended. J American allies, 
most notably Great Britain, later required additional 
assurance that the bomb would not be used.^^
The message to Congress requesting supplemental 
appropriations was sent up on December 1, 1950. In it the
212jtem No. 295* Press Conference, November 30,
1950, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950* 727*
^■^White House Press Release, November 30, 1950, 
copy in Truman Papers, OF, U71-B - Korean Emergency,
Truman Library.
2l4]3ritish Prime Minister Clement Atlee flew to 
Washington on December ij. to receive personal reassurances 
from Truman respecting atomic policy. For accounts of their 
conversations, see Truman, Memoirs, II, 396-1j.13» Acheson, 
Present at the Creation, Zj.83-81}.; Warren, President as World 
Leader,' T?9-k7); Spanier,Tr\mian-MacArthur Controversy,
166-67; LaFeber, America, Russia, and EKe Cold War, 112; 
O'Connor, "Harry S. Truman: ftew Dimensions of Power," 27- 
28; "President's Communique of December 8, 1950, regarding 
His Conferences with Prime Minister Atlee," Far East Hear­
ings, Pt. 5>, Appendix G, 3501-50lj.; Item No. 30l, "Joini 
Statement Following Discussions with the Prime Minister of 
Great Britain, December 8, 1950, Public Papers . . • Truman, 
1950, 738-ij.O.
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President requested an additional $1.05 billion be pro­
vided the Atomic Energy Commission to increase its capacity 
to produce fissionable materials and fabricate nuclear 
weapons. He asked that $16.8 billion more be added to the 
Department of Defense budget for fiscal 1951* Truman said 
that this latter increment was necessary to sustain 
America’s military participation in the UN action in Korea 
and ". . .to increase the size and readiness of our armed
forces should action become necessary in other parts of the 
2X5world." The President’s message justified the need for 
additional funds and forces with much the same logic and 
language employed in the statement he read to his press 
conference the previous day. To Truman the Chinese attack 
was but one facet of a global strategy directed by the 
Soviet Union. In the process of implementing this policy, 
the Russians were knowingly running the risk of bringing 
on a third world war. Truman's assumption was neither 
provable nor subject to documented refutation. But it 
became the operating premise which guided the determination 
of American military policy for the remainder of his admin­
istration. In retrospect, while China’s intervention may
21Sitem No. 296, Special Message to Congress Request­
ing Additional Appropriations for Defense, December 1,
1950, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950, 728-31. Full text 
of this message is reprinted in Far feast Hearings, Pt. 5, 
Appendix F, 3^-97-3501. Truman signed the Second Supple- . 
mental Appropriation Act of 1951 (6)4. Stat. 1223), on 
January 6, 1951 •
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have neatly meshed with existing Soviet policy, national 
self-interest was the most likely primal determinant. The 
Chinese border was threatened by a large armed force rep­
resenting a hostile political ideology. China intervened, 
at least in part, to preserve a neighboring Communist
pi Lnation’s existence. However, it would be inaccurate to 
conclude that the President overreacted to the Chinese 
incursion by falsely assuming that it was part of a Soviet 
master plot. The Central Intelligence Agency had provided 
him with a great deal of data substantiating just such a 
conclusion. This intelligence appreciation was concurred 
in by Secretaries Marshall and Acheson.^^ It could well 
be that the American build-up and countervailing movements 
frustrated Soviet intentions.
In a lengthy report to the JCS on December 3, 
MacArthur described the situation of Eighth Army as 
"increasingly critical" and said that he was moving Tenth 
Corps into a beachhead as rapidly as possible. The TJN 
Commander said that the suggestion of a continuous, 
defensive line across the peninsula was militarily unsound 
because of the size of the enemy forces. MacArthur 
claimed his air power was diminished by the terrain and
O'] ZLItem No. 296, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950> 
728; Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 6l7-l8•
217Truman, Memoirs, II, 390-91; Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, if-73—7i|-*
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"enormously" hampered by the prohibition against attacking 
across the international boundary. Because the enemy was 
concentrating force along deep interior lines, amphibious 
maneuvers and naval gunfire support were rendered inef­
fective. Thus MacArthur’s air and naval superiority were 
of little use. He said that unless he received ground rein­
forcements "of the greatest magnitude," he would have to 
continue a costly withdrawal tactic or form beachhead 
bastions. MacArthur continued:
This small command actually under present conditions 
is facing the entire Chinese nation in an undeclared 
war and unless some positive and immediate action is 
taken. • . , attrition leading to final destruction 
can reasonably be contemplated. . . .
The directives under which I am operating based 
upon the North Korean Forces as an enemy are completely 
outmoded by events. . . . This calls for political 
decisions and strategic plans in implementation 
thereof, adequate fully to meet the realitiesinvolved.218
MacArthur's message, which Army Secretary Lovett 
described as a "posterity paper,1,21 ̂ prompted a meeting 
between officials of the Defense and State Departments and 
a subsequent meeting with Truman. In the Pentagon session 
the military advisers expressed the belief that
^ ®MacArthur to JCS, December 3, 1950> quoted in 
Truman, Memoirs, II, 391-93. Sec also, Collins, War in 
Peacetime, 228-29; Higgins, Korea and the Fall of'" Mac Arthur, 
86; Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 137-3F; Sherman 
testimony, Far EasT Hearings, ftt. £, 1617.
^■^Quoted in Acheson, Present at the Creation,
k7k-
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MacArthur's forces would face a crisis within three days. 
They believed that Tenth Corps had to be evacuated and that 
Walker's Eighth Army might eventually be forced to 
evacuate as well, unless a cease-fire could be arranged.. 
Acheson opposed asking for a cease-fire. Evacuation of 
all UN forces from the Korean peninsula— they were all 
agreed--should be undertaken only as a last resort. Mac- 
Arthur's decision not to attempt to form a continuous
O p ndefensive line would not be countermanded. The reason
for this, as explained by the Army Chief of Staff, was
that it was the "established policy" of the JCS not to
221override a theater commander. Apparently the Joint
Chiefs reasoned that MacArthur, conducting the war in 
Korea from Japan, four hundred miles away, had a better 
perspective than they did in Washington, seven thousand 
miles from the battlefield. There may have been another 
reason. General Ridgway, as the meeting ended, asked 
General Vandenberg, the Air Force Chief, why the JCS did 
not simply tell MacArthur what to do. Vandenberg 
responded, "What good would that do? He wouldn't obey the 
orders. What can we do?"222
220Ibid.,
22^Collins, War in Peacetime, 229.
222Ridgway, Korean War, 62.
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The President was apprised of the conclusions 
reached in this session shortly afterward by Marshall and 
Acheson. He immediately ordered the JCS to dispatch a 
message to MacArthur which read: "We consider that the
preservation of your forces is now the primary consider­
ation. Consolidation of forces into beachheads is con­
curred in."^2^ During this meeting with Truman, the 
Secretary of State urged him to declare a state of national 
emergency. Acheson reasoned that this would alert the 
public to the serious situation the Government faced as 
well as provide the President with the extraordinary 
powers he would now need to control wages, prices and 
production. Truman accepted the Secretary's suggestion and 
preparations to take this step were initiated.22^ Also, 
on the suggestion of Marshall and Acheson, the President 
directed that General Collins depart immediately for 
Tokyo and Korea to assess the combat situation and discuss 
operational planning with General MacArthur.^^
Collins returned on December 8 to report his
223Quoted in Truman, Memoirs, II, 393. Truman said 
that all his military advisers told him that holding the 
beachheads would be impossible. He said he wanted them to 
try, anyway. See ibid., 399. See also, Lichterman, "To 
the Yalu and Back,111 617J Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 381.
22^Acheson,. Present at the Creation, ij-75-76.
22^Collins, War in Peacetime, 229; Truman, Memoirs, 
II t 393* See also, Acheson, Present at the Creation, h l ’d ,
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findings to the President in a meeting held in the Cabinet 
Room of the White House. Also present were British Prime 
Minister Atlee, the British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, 
General Bradley and Secretaries Marshall and Acheson. The 
Army Chief of Staff explained to this gathering that it 
was no longer possible to hold the Seoul-Inchon area. He 
reported that General Walker felt he could hold again in 
the Pusan region, especially if he was reinforced by the 
Tenth Corps which, by now, MacArthur agreed, would have 
to be evacuated from the Hungnam-Wonsan bridgehead on the
Op Aeastern coastline.
Recalling his conversations with the Far East 
Commander, Collins said that MacArthur believed that there 
were now three possible courses of action open: First, to
continue fighting under the existing limitations against 
bombing Manchurian bases, using Formosan troops, imposing 
a naval blockade, or providing large-scale reinforcements. 
This, MacArthur believed, would be tantamount to surrender 
and would inevitably result in his command being driven 
from Korea entirely. Second, all the named restrictions 
could be dropped. In addition, Chinese Nationalist troops 
should be encouraged to attack South China. MacArthur 
favored this course. Third, if the Chinese Communist 
armies voluntarily confined themselves north of the
22^Collins, War in Peacetime, 232-33*
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thirty-eighth parallel, the United Nations could negotiate
an armistice on that basis. If the second alternative was
unacceptable, MacArthur felt the third course to be the
227next most desirable. '
After recording Collins’ report of MacArthur*s views 
in his memoirs, Truman wrote of his dismay that he and the 
United Nations Commander were so far from agreement.
Truman believed that the alternative MacArthur favored—  
particularly the introduction of Nationalists troops into 
South China— might well bring on an all-out general war, 
probably, an atomic war. *’I was left," Truman wrote,
"with just one simple conclusion: General MacArthur was
ready to risk general war. I was not."22®
In the early days of December Truman was subjected 
to severe pressures as numerous interest groups tried to 
influence his thinking on the Korean crisis. Much of this 
activity was based on press reports, which in turn were 
based on information emanating from MacArthur*s head­
quarters, to the effect that the General could win the war 
were it not for the unparalleled restrictions placed upon
227Truman, Memoirs, II, i|l5» See also, Collins,
War in Peacetime, 231-32. Sherman testimony, Par East 
Hearings, Pt. 2, 1617-18, 1628-30; Pt. ij., 2956'=57; 
Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, lj.05; Higgins, Korea and the 
Fall of MacArthur, 91-^2’.
Truman, Memoirs, II, ip.5-16.
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him by the Truman Administration.229 in a letter dated 
December 6 the national commanders of the four largest 
veteran's organizations in America petitioned the Presi­
dent to ". . . give General MacArthur full authority to 
employ such means as may be necessary. . . . ” These ex- 
warriors told Truman he must end the restrictions and 
delays and lift the "imposed limitations" because American 
soldiers " . . .  must not be sacrificed to delusions of 
appeasement."23° jn a joint letter on the fifth, eight 
Congressmen urged Truman to resist the pressures put on 
him by "buy peace in the Orient" by appeasing the Chinese 
Communists. They also wanted to know why he had not used . 
the Nationalist Chinese troops, who could make an 
important military contribution, and would also serve to
refute the charge that Korea represented an attack by white
231men on orientals. Senator Joseph McCarthy wired the
22^Ibid., 1|.15. In an interview on December 1, for 
example, MacArthur said that prohibition against striking 
at Manchurian bases was.a terrible handicap "without prece­
dent in military history.',* Quoted in Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, 71-72. For similar statements by MacArtEur, 
see Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 3l+2> 570-71* Truman finally 
caused a directive to be issued on December 6 which had 
the effect of ordering MacArthur to clear policy state­
ments through the Pentagon. See Spanier, Truman-MacArthur 
Controversy, 150-51*
230i2arl Cocke, Jr. to Truman, December 6, 1950,
Truman Papers, OF, 1|71-B - Korean Emergency, Truman Library.
231]Brooks Hays, Walter Judd, Kenneth Keating, at. 
al., to the President, December 5> 1950, ibid.
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President on December 2, saying that American mothers 
demanded to knw why he was allowing Acheson and the rest of 
the "crimson clique in the State Department" to "run 
amuck" with the lives of American soldiers. It would be 
necessary to impeach Truman unless he ended "this treason­
able farce," removed Acheson, and brought the Formosan
232forces into the fight. John Chang, the Korean Ambas­
sador, met with the President on December 6, imploring 
him to continue the military action in Korea in spite, of
the reversals. Truman assured the Ambassador that he
233would do all within his power to save Korea. A day
earlier the Chairman of the Korean National Assembly had 
informed Truman that a successful conclusion to the 
existing crisis called for an increase in American military 
assistance to build up the ROK f o r c e s . T h e  strain is 
evident in a diary note the President wrote on December 9: 
"I have worked for peace for five years and six months 
and it looks like World War III is near. I hope not--but
Joseph R. McCarthy to Truman, December 2, 1950 
(Telegram), ibid.
^^Memorandum Qf Conversation, John F. Simmons 
(Chief of Protocol), December 6, 1950. Truman Papers, OF, 
I|71> Truman Library.
^3^P. h. Shinicky to Truman, December 5* 1950 
(Telegram), Truman Papers, OF, Lf.71-B - Korean Emergency, 
Truman Library.
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we must meet whatever comes--and we w i l l .  " ^ 5
Truman called a meeting of the National Security 
Council on December 11 to discuss with them a cease-fire 
resolution soon to be proposed in the General Assembly.
The '■’resident told his advisers that he and Prime Minister 
Atlee had agreed not to seek a cease-fire in Korea 
unilaterally, but that they were undecided as to what 
position to assume with regard to the forthcoming resolu­
tion, sponsored by thirteen Asiatic nations. Additionally, 
he informed them that he had an understanding with Atlee 
that tne UN command would not surrender; it would only 
leave Korea if driven off the peninsula by force of 
arrns.^^ The Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense 
opposed a cease-fire for the present, particularly one 
without preconditions. Truman said he had no intention of 
accepting any armistice without first arriving at terms. 
Secretary Marshall asked the President if MacArthur should 
be ordered to withdraw to the thirty-eighth parallel in 
anticipation of it becoming the cease-fire line. Truman 
told him to let MacArthur*s orders stand (holding to his 
existing positions), until the Tenth Corps was safely
^Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, llj.3* Secretary of 
Defense Marshall agreed wTEh Truman on the seriousness of 
conditions. In a speech on December 8 he described the U.S. 
military situation as "more grave" than it had been in 
19ij.2. Payne, Marshall Story, 313-l̂ J-*
236jruman  ̂Memoirs, II, if.17*
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evacuated from the east coast and a satisfactory cease-fire 
arrangement had been concluded. Marshall pointed out that 
present JCS planning called for a gradual retirement south­
ward and asked if the President objected to this. Truman 
explained that he was only opposed to a hurried withdrawal 
based on political expediency; the rate of withdrawal
237should be determined by military considerations alone.
The Tenth Corps’ successful evacuation from 
Hungnam, which Truman described as "the best Christmas 
present" he could have, began on December 13.^38 The 
following day the TIN General Assembly adopted a resolu­
tion creating a three-member group to determine the basis
239for a satisfactory cease-fire. The United States voted
for the resolution. The member states participating in 
the Unified Command subsequently indicated general agree­
ment on the thirty-eighth parallel as an acceptable cease­
fire line. This decision represented a return to the 
original objective in Korea and a tacit repudiation of the 
October 7 resolution which sought unification of Korea
^37lbid.f lji8. See also, Lichterman, "To the Yalu 
and Back," 61b; Higgins, Korea and the Pall of MacArthur, 
92.
^®File memorandum, December 25> 1950, Truman 
Papers, OP, lj.71-B, Truman Library.
239d q c . No . 18, General Assembly Resolution,
December l!|, 1950, United States Policy in the Korean 
Conflict, 27.
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under one g o v e r n m e n t H o w e v e r ,  on the seventeenth a 
Communist Chinese envoy rejected the UN proposal, calling 
it a "trap" and stated that the conditions for peace were 
an end to American aggression and complete US withdrawal 
from Korea.
Truman spent a substantial part of the second week 
of December working on plans for declaring a state of 
national emergency. A brief survey of the available 
presidential powers had been made at the beginning of the 
Korean fighting. Although the President had available to 
him a vast range of powers to control the domestic economy 
and achieve industrial mobilization, most of these legis­
lative grants of authority were contingent upon a declara­
tion of national e m e r g e n c y . T h e  decision to declare 
such an emergency was discussed by Truman in numerous 
sessions with White House aides and speechwriters, at a 
Cabinet meeting on December 8, in two meetings with the 
National Security Council and in a stormy session with 
the congressional leadership on Wednesday, December 13.
In the latter conference, Republican Senators Taft and
^^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 618.
^~*~United States Policy in the Korean Conflict, 52•
^-%few York Times, June 28, 1950. See also 
("E.B.S.")To Charles S. Murphy, July 17, 1950, Murphy 
Papers, White House Piles, Presidential Powers folder, 
Truman Library.
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Wherry insisted that Truman had not shown just cause for
the proposed proclamation. However, the majority of those
present accepted the President’s e x p l a n a t i o n .  ̂ 3  o n  the
evening of the fourteenth, Truman reviewed an address he
planned to deliver the following day. He told his speech-
writ ers they would have to delete a line that read: "Our
troops are well able to take care of themselves. . . . "
Truman explained that he could not give any such
assurance, for he had just heard from Tokyo that Eighth
Army’s right flank was extremely vulnerable. He hoped
that the Tenth Corps, having been evacuated from the
east coast, could fill in the gaps and secure the line.
The President continued:
I think if we can pull back a little, to where their 
supply lines are stretched out, we may hold them a 
good long time and win out in the end. I ’ve thought 
so all this week, while everybody has been hollering 
about a Dunkirk. I ’m not giving up, you must under­
stand that. But at this moment I can’t honestly give 
the impression that our soldiers are going to stay 
right where they are. I don’t know that for a fact 
at this time.2i]J|
In his message to the nation, the President said 
that the Chinese intervention had pushed the world to the
^Truman, Memoirs, II, ip.7-27. See also, Item 
No. 302, White House Statement Concerning a Meeting with 
the Congressional Leaders to Discuss the National Emergency, 
December 13, 1950, Public Papers . • • Truman, 1950, Ikl •
^^•Quoted inJohn Hersey, "Profiles— Mr. President," 
Pt. 5, "A Weighing of Words," The New Yorker (May 5,
1951), 39. Hereinafter cited as Hersey'J "Profiles," Pt. 5»
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brink of general war, with the very future of civilization 
dependent upon American action. He set "four tasks for 
national security" in his speech: continued support of the
principles of the United Nations; continued cooperation to 
strengthen collective security; a build-up of the Army,
Navy and Air Force and the requisite weaponry; and an 
expansion of the entire economy, with safeguards against 
inflationary wage-price spirals. During the course of the 
speech, Truman indicated he was raising the military man­
power level from the existing two and one-half, to three 
and one-half million personnel. He also raised Selective 
Service quotas and ordered two additional National Guard 
divisions to active duty.2^  The formal proclamation
establishing a state of national emergency was issued by
21+6the White House the following morning. By this action, 
provisions of some seventy separate legislative acts 
became operative, significantly increasing the executive
2^Item No. 303, Radio and Television Report to the 
American People on the National Emergency, December 15, 
1950, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950* 7 4̂-1— 4̂-6• Text also 
appears in ffar East Hearings, Pt. 3>, 35l4~20. An abridged 
version is in-Truman, Memoirs, II, l\.27-29.
2^*Item No. 30i|, Presidential Proclamation No.
291kt December 16, 1950, Public Papers . . .  Truman, 1950* 
7l|6-ij.7. Text of this document is reprinted in Far East 
Hearings, Pt. £, 3520-21.
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authority of the President In addition, the President
asked for, and received, legislation extending and 
amending title II of the First War Powers Act of 19^1> 
generally concerned withgovernmental contracting powers, 
which became law on January 12, 1951.^®
General Walker’s Eighth Army had established a con­
tinuous defensive line across the Korean peninsula just 
north of the thirty-eighth parallel. This line was forti­
fied by elements of the evacuated Tenth Corps, now 
amalgamated into Eighth Army. But this line was thinly 
spread and could not hold against any serious Chinese 
pressure. The enemy had broken off pursuit, but intelli­
gence reports indicated they were preparing for an all-out
2k9resumption of the offensive on New Year’s Day.
The Eighth Army lost its commander in a fatal 
traffic accident on December 23. MacArthur immediately 
requested that General Matthew B. Ridgway, then Deputy
For a full description of the legislative acts 
placed in force by the national emergency declaration, see 
J. Howard McGrath to Secretary of the Air Force (Syming­
ton), December 18, 1950, RG3lj.O, S/AF, 031 .I* National 
Archives.
2^6(6Ii St at. 1257). Truman requested this additional 
grant of power in identical letters, dated December 18, 
addressed to the President of the Senate and the Speaker 
of the House. See Item No. 307* Public Papers . . •
Truman, 1950, 7^9-50.
Eighth Army line extended from the Imjin 
River on the west coast, through Yongpyong and Huachon, 
to Yangyang on the east. Collins, War in Peacetime, 235-36.
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Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, be 
appointed as Walker's replacement. The President gave his 
appro1 al, and Ridgway was briefed by MacArthur on the 
twenty-sixth and warned not to underestimate the ability of 
his e n e m y . B y  the next day Ridgway found himself in 
full tactical command of an endangered army, far removed 
from the serene corridors of power in the Pentagon.
With the knowledge that no immediate reinforcements 
were available for the United Nations Command and a 
resumption of the massive Chinese Communist assault in 
the offing, the President's military advisers were 
increasingly insistent that ways be considered for with­
drawing "with honor" from Korea. However, Acheson and 
the State Department felt the troops should not leave 
Korea unless they were driven out. "Anything else," as 
Truman phrased it, "would be an abandonment of the
251principle that caused us to go in in the first place."
This divergence of views caused Truman to summon Generals 
Bradley and Marshall and Secretary Acheson to Blair House 
on December 26. The Generals made it clear to the Presi­
dent that they believed a general war was near and that 
Korea was definitely not the place to fight it. Acheson
250Ridgway, Korean War, 79, 81-83, 100-101;
Collins, War in Peacetime, 238-37; MacArthur, Reminiscences, 
383J MacArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, l5o.
251 Truman, Memoirs, II, Ij.32.
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argued that the stakes involved in Korea were so high that 
the United Nations should fight on until Chinese strength 
and resolution had been fully tested. Then, Acheson said, 
if required by "dire military necessity," Korea should be 
evacuated. The Secretary of State suggested to the Presi­
dent that MacArthur1s directives be revised to allow him 
to inflict maximum attrition against the enemy up to the 
point where his own force was in danger of destruction. 
MacArthur should be warned against risking the loss of his 
command, since upon these forces the ultimate safety of 
Japan depended. Marshall and Bradley agreed to this, and 
Truman instructed them to prepare a new directive for his 
approval •
The Joint Chiefs transmitted the approved directive 
to the Par East Commander on December 29. Acheson has 
provided a concise summary of the message:
1. If with present UN strength, we could resist 
at some point in Korea without our incurring serious 
losses, and if the apparent military and political 
prestige of Chinese Communists could be deflated,it 
would be of great importance to our national interests.
2. "In the face of increased threat of general 
war" the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not commit 
additional U.S. ground forces in Korea. Major war 
should not be fought in Korea.
3. "Therefore • . .your directive now is to 
defend in successive positions, subject to safety of 
your troops as your primary consideration, inflicting 
as much damage to hostile forces in Korea as is 
possible."
^-^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 51 See also, 
Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back, " 619.
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I).. Decision was to be made ahead of time by the
Joint Chiefs on the last reasonable opportunity for
orderly evacuation, General MacArthur’s views were 
requested on the conditions which should determine evacuation.253
The directive reflects a change of policy of con­
siderable magnitude. The objective of Korean unification 
was not mentioned. The objectives of repelling aggres­
sion and restoring peace and security were to be
abandoned if unobtainable with the existing force. Mac­
Arthur was to take extreme care that his force not be 
placed in jeopardy, since— the directive emphasized— his 
primary objective was preservation of the security of 
Japan, not K o r e a . T h e  directive asked too much of 
MacArthur: without any increase in his forces, or
lessening of the restrictions upon his operations, he was 
asked to wage a war of attrition against a superior force 
without endangering his own troops.
MacArthur’s reaction to the December 29 directive 
was that it indicated to him that the Administration seemed 
to have lost the will to win in Korea: "President Truman’s 
resolute determination to free and unite that threatened
^^Acheson, Present at the_ Creation, 5li[., 755*
For text of the JCS message'To_TyfacArthur, see Far East 
Hearings. Pt. 2, llj.6Jj., I6l8; Pt. 3, 2179-80, 2*223-’2S7” 
22ijij.-ij.5J MacArthur, Reminiscences, 377-78. See also, 
Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 138-39.
^^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 620.
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land had now deteriorated almost into defeatism. Mac-
Arthur responded immediately to the JCS directive, saying 
that the continued restrictions on his air and naval 
operations deprived him of the available military capacity. 
The additional potential represented in utilizing Chinese 
Nationalist troops was also being ignored. If, MacArthur 
said, the United States were willing to make the 
"political determination" that a state of war existed 
because of Communist China's action, four desirable 
retaliatory measures could be taken: a naval blockade
of Chinaj air and naval action to destroy China's 
military-industrial capacity; procurement of needed rein­
forcements from Formosa; and an end to restriction on 
Chinese Nationalist attacks against the China mainland.
The bulk of MacArthur's message dealt with the advantages 
which would ensue from such- a course. The general tone 
of this communication was one of thorough dissatisfaction 
with the new directive and an urgent repetition of his
request that all tactical and political limitations be 
256removed. The resumption of the Chinese offensive on
p;jMacArthur, Reminiscences, 378.
^^Ibid., 378-80. For other texts of MacArthur's 
message of the 30th, see Guttman (ed.), Korea and the 
Theory of Limited War, 11-12; Bernstein and^Matusow Teds.), 
Truman Administration, lj.50-52; Lichterman, "To the Yalu 
and Back," 620; Far~East Hearings, Pt. 2, lij.65; Pt. 3 > 
2180-81. See also, Acheson, Present at the Creation,
51U“15j Truman, Memoirs, II, i+33; Ridgway, Korean War,
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the first day of 1951 made an end to this dispute 
essential.
The renewal of offensive activities on New Year’s 
Day forced the United Nations Command to abandon the 
South Korean capital of Seoul as they gave ground south­
ward. Meanwhile, Washington considered a reply to Mac­
Arthur 's message of December 30. At last, on the ninth 
of January, Truman approved a JCS message to the Par East 
Commander which informed him that the retaliatory steps 
he advocated had been given and were continuing to receive 
thorough consideration. MacArthur was informed that the 
Administration fully appreciated the difficulties he now 
faced because of Chinese intervention. However, the JCS 
message read, reconsideration of existing conditions led 
to the acceptance of certain new operating assumptions. 
Among the imperatives now accepted by the Joint Chiefs 
(and the President) was that conditions outside of Korea 
did not justify a strengthening of U.S. military forces 
there. Additionally, the proposed naval blockade and use 
of Chinese Nationalist troops were viewed with disfavor 
for diplomatic reasons. As for the bombing of 
objectives in China, this would only be undertaken in 
response to a Chinese attack on UN forces outside
91; Walter Millis, "Truman and MacArthur," in Guttman 
(ed.), Korea and the Theory of Limited War, lj..5-k6. Here­
inafter cited as Millis, '‘Truman and MacArthur."
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Korea.^-^ The JCS message concluded by repeating the
instructions.sent to MacArthur on December 29: "To defend
in successive positions, inflicting maximum damage to
hostile forces in Korea. . . with evacuation to be
undertaken if essential to the preservation of his
command in order to carry out the primary mission,
2^8defense of Japan. ^
Like MacArthur, President Rhee of South Korea had 
a plan for turning the tide of the war which he pressed 
upon Truman during the early days of January. Rhee 
proposed that the United States underwrite a dramatic 
increase in the size of the Republic of Korea Army. When 
queried about this by the JCS, MacArthur replied, on 
January 6, that given the performance levels of ROK Army 
units and friendly guerrilla units, the military equip­
ment involved could be put to better use if given to the
JCS to CINCFE, January 9# 1951# printed in Far 
East Hearings, Pt. 1, 332-33; Pt. 2, 1322. Message also 
appears in MacArthur, Reminiscences, 380. See also, 
Truman, Memoirs, II, k55-3k* Acheson, Present at the 
Creation^ 5l5# Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Ba"clc, 'r 621; 
Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, lij.1.
^®JCS to CINCFE, January 9# 1951# Far East Hear­
ings , Pt. 2, 1599-1600. Defense Secretary Marshall 
testified that MacArthur's proposals would, in his judg­
ment, not have brought a quick decision in Korea, but 
would have created a hazardous condition, if not world 
war. See ibid., Pt. 1, 369. For an examination of 
military and diplomatic objections to MacArthur's specific 
proposals, see Ridgway, Korean War, H j.6-!j.8.
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newly-formed National Police Reserve of J a p a n . R h e e
persisted, however. In a personal letter to Truman,
dated January 10, he told Truman that "even now you can
save the situation," by fully arming and equipping a
half-million Korean youths. The South Korean President
also asked Truman to grant MacArthur the authority to
". • . use any weapons that will check Communist
aggression anywhere, even the atom bomb. A few bombs on
260Moscow alone will shake the Communist world." Truman 
ignored Rhee’s message until February 10, when he sent a 
noncommittal response x^ritten for him by the State Depart­
ment.2^1
Truman and his military advisers found General 
MacArthur not as easy to ignore. Irritated by the JCS 
message of January 9# which he felt left all decisions 
contingent upon tactical actions initiated by the enemy, 
MacArthur, "shot a query right back."2^2 MacArthur
2^JCS to CINCFE, January 1̂., 1951# copy in Tannen- 
wald Papers, Subject File, Chronology, MacArthur Hearings, 
Truman Library. See also, CINCFE to Department of the Army 
(for JCS), January 6, 1951# ibid. See also, Far Ea3t 
Hearings, Pt. 5, 3530-32; Truman, Memoirs, II, 1+32-35•
2^Rhee to Truman, transmitted in letter, John M. 
Chang to Truman, January 10, 1951# Truman Papers, OF,
471-B - Korean Emergency, Truman Library.
Acheson to the President, February 9# 1951# 
ibid. See also, Truman to Rhee, February 10, 1951# ibid.
2 ̂ MacArthur, Reminiscences, 380-81.
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requested a clarification of his orders, since it was
"self-evident” that his command was not of sufficient
strength to carry out the twin tasks of holding in Korea
and simultaneously protecting Japan from assault. He
could hold a "beachhead line" temporarily, but only at
great cost. MacArthur reported his troops to be
embittered and worn out, with their morale at such an
ebb that their battle efficiency would be severely
impaired " . . .  unless the political basis upon which
they are asked to trade life for time is clearly
delineated, fully understood, and so impelling that the
..263hazards of battle are accepted cheerfully. . . . "  If
no such basis existed, MacArthur said his command should
be removed from Korea as rapidly a3 possible. "The issue
involves a decision of highest national and international
importance. • . .
Therefore, my query amounts to this: is it the
present objective of United States political policy 
to minimize losses by evacuation as soon as it can 
be accomplished, or to maintain a military position 
in Korea--indefinitely, for a limited time?
Under the extraordinary limitations and conditions 
imposed upon the command in Korea, as I have pointed 
out, its military position is untenable, but it can 
hold, if overriding political considerations so
^^MacArthur to JCS, January 10, 1951, printed in 
Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 906.
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dictate, for any length of time up to its complete 
destruction. Your clarification requested.2^
General MacArthur’s message clearly shifted respon­
sibility for any disaster involving Korea or Japan back to 
Washington, unless the "extraordinary limitations" were 
lifted. Reaction to the message was strong. Admiral 
Sherman believed that this message brought about a serious 
impairment of the normal command relationships between 
MacArthur and the JCS.2^  Secretary Acheson has written of 
the January 10 cable: "Nothing further was needed to con­
vince me that the General was incurably recalcitrant and 
basically disloyal to the purposes of his Commander in 
C h i e f . A w a r e  of the gravity of MacArthur's message, 
Secretary of Defense Marshall brought it to the President 
soon after receiving it. Truman recalls being "deeply 
disturbed" by MacArthur's words: "The Par East commander
was, in effect, reporting that the course of action decided 
upon by the National Security Council and by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and approved by me was not feasible."2^
26^Ibid. See also, MacArthur, Reminiscences, 380- 
81; Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 621-22; Spanier, 
Truman-MacArthur Controversy, llj.2; Phillips, Truman 
Presidency, 33^7
2^Sherman testimony, Par East Hearings, Pt. 2, 1600-601. -----------
266Acheson, Present at the Creation, 5l5*
2^^Truman, Memoirs, II, lj.34*
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The President reacted to MacArthur’s message by putting 
the JCS to work studying recourses and ordering a special
meeting of the National Security Council to convene on
, 9 268 January 12.
The Joint Chiefs drafted a directive for MacArthur,
but in consultation with the State Department, a dispute
arose over the inclusion of foreign policy matters in a
military directive. The disagreement was laid before the
President in the NSC meeting of the twelfth. He resolved
it by agreeing to write a personal letter to MacArthur
regarding the political policy matters the State Department
wished to emphasize and he approved the purely military
269directive which was dispatched immediately. This new 
directive began with the JCS informing MacArthur that they 
recognized, based primarily on information he had pro-* 
vided, that it would not be feasible to hold in Korea 
under extant conditions for any protracted period. How­
ever, national interests, the world-wide prestige of the 
United States, and the future of the UN and NATO organi­
zations rested upon his ability to inflict "maximum 
practicable punishment" on the aggressors. He was to 
evacuate only when compelled to do so by military
268Ibid.
^^Bradley testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2,
736-37.
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considerations.^7® The sense of the message was that 
MacArthur's orders remained unchanged.
The personal message Truman agreed to send MacArthur
on national policy is dated January 13. In part, it reads:
. . .  I wish in this telegram to let you have my
views as to our basic national and international 
purposes in continuing the resistance to aggression 
in Korea. • • . This present telegram is not to be 
taken in any sense as a directive. Its purpose is to 
give you something of what is in our minds regarding 
the political factors.
1. A successful resistance in Korea would serve 
the following important purposes:
(a) To demonstrate that aggression will not be 
accepted by us or by the United Nationse • . .
(b) To deflate the dangerously exaggerated 
political and military prestige of Communist 
China. • . .
(c) To afford more time for and to-give direct 
assistance to the organization of non-Communist 
resistance in Asia. • • .
(d) To carry out our commitments of honor to the
South Koreans. . . .
(e) To make possible a far more satisfactory 
peace settlement for Japan and to contribute greatly 
to the post-treaty security position of Japan in 
relation to the continent.
(f) To lend resolution to many countires not only 
in Asia but also in Europe and the Middle East • . . 
to let them know that they need not now rush to come 
to terms with Communism on whatever terns they can 
get, meaning complete submission.
(g) To inspire those who may be called upon to 
fight against great odds if subjected to a sudden 
onslaught by the Soviet Union or by Communist Chinav
(h) To lend point and urgency to the rapid build-up
of the defenses of the western world.
(i) To bring the United Nations through its first 
great effort on collective security and to produce a 
free-world coalition of incalculable value to the 
national security of the United States.
270JCS to CINCFE, January 12, 1951, printed in ibid.. 
Pt. 2, 737-38, 907, 1 W - 1 5 .  See also, Lichterman, "To 
the Yalu and Back," 623.
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(j) To alert the people behind the Iron Curtain 
that their masters are bent upon wars of aggression 
and that this crime will be resisted by the free 
world.
2. Our course of action at this time should be 
such as to consolidate the great majority of the- 
United Nations. . . . Further, pending the build-up 
of our national strength, we must act with great 
prudence in so far as extending the area of hostil­
ities is concerned. Steps which might in themselves 
be fully justified and which might lend some 
assistance to the campaign in Korea would not be 
beneficial if they thereby involved Japan or Western 
Europe in large-scale hostilities.
3. We recognize, of course, that continued 
resistance might not be militarily possible with the 
limited forces with which you are being called upon to 
meet larger Chinese armies. Further, in the present 
world situation, your forces must be preserved as an 
effective instrument for the defense of Japan and 
elsewhere. However, some of the important purposes' 
mentioned above might be supported, if you should 
think it practicable, and advisable, by continued 
resistance from off-shore islands of Korea. • • , if 
it becomes impracticable to hold an important portion 
of Korea itself. In the worst case, it would be 
important that, if we must withdraw from Korea, it
be clear to the world that that course is forced upon 
us by military necessity and that we shall not accept 
the result politically or militarily until the 
aggression has been rectified.
1+. In reaching a final decision about Korea, I 
shall have to give constant thought to the main 
threat from the Soviet Union and to the need for a 
rapid expansion of our armed forces to meet this 
great danger.
5 • . . . .6. The entire nation is grateful for your splendid 
leadership in the difficult struggle in Korea and for 
the superb performance of your forces under the mostdifficult curcumstances .271
^Truman to MacArthur, January 13, 1951 > printed 
in Truman, Memoirs, II, ij-35-36. Text of Truman's message 
also appears" in Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 503-505; Mac­
Arthur, Reminiscences, 381-b^. See also, Collins, War in 
Peacetime, 25>0-51; Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, lf.06-Zj.09T 
Whitney, MacArthur, I4.36—38J Higgins, Korea an(Tthe Fall of 
MacArthur, 97-98.
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By any measure, Truman’s message was an extra­
ordinary document. Not only was it a uniquely candid 
communication between the Commander in Chief and a theater 
commander, but also a concise, thorough delineation of the 
goals of national military and diplomatic policy. In 
paragraph (2) of the telegram, the President provided a 
definition of the new concept of limited warfare by 
acknowledging that there were militarily-advisable steps 
which were not being taken because of the danger of pre­
cipitating a wider war. MacArthur's reaction on receipt 
of the message was to inform his staff that the question 
of evacuation was settled; there would be none.^ 2  After 
MacArthur's recall, his spokesman, General Whitney 
maintained that Truman's cable was the first clear state­
ment the Far East command received indicating that the
273Administration desired to hold in Korea. Truman chose 
not to comment on this interpretation in his memoirs •
After quoting from his message, he said its purpose was 
to get General MacArthur to accept, • . as a soldier 
should, the political decisions which the civil author­
ities of the government had determined upon."^^"
^^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 382.
^^Washington Post, May 11, 1951; Far East Hearings, 
Pt. 2, 976-79, 1638-3^7"Pt. 3, 2208; Pt. IjT^TB^STi 
Whitney, MacArthur, [(.36-39 •
27i|-Truman, Memoirs, II, I4.36.
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MacArthur's message of January 10 generated feverish 
activity in the Washington hierarchy. The special session 
of the National Security Council, the JCS directive, and 
Truman's telegram have already been noted. Two other 
developments can also be attributed to MacArthur’s message: 
first, a study proposing numerous courses of action 
received "tentative approval" by the JCS and was sub­
mitted by Marshall to the Security Council for initial
275consideration on the twelfth. Secondly, in the NSC 
session, Truman approved a recommendation that two members 
of the Joint Chiefs— Collins and Vandenberg— be sent 
immediately to Japan and Korea for a fresh evaluation of 
the military situation.^^
The study tentatively accepted by the JCS was pre­
pared by its own Joint Staff. It contained sixteen 
courses of action which might be undertaken in the Par 
East in the event the United Nations force had to 
evacuate Korea and a full-scale war with China developed.
The proposals were military, economic and diplomatic in 
nature and included the four retaliatory measures against 
China which MacArthur had recommended on several
275jv[arshall testimony, Par East Hearings, Pt. 1, 32l±, 
335-36, 703.
^7^Ibid., 32k > Bradley testimony, ibid., Pt. 2,
907.
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277occasions. On January 12 the NSC deferred discussion 
of the Joint Chiefs’ study until their next scheduled 
session five days later. By that time their appreciation 
of the military situation had improved to the point where 
active consideration of the document was halted. Thus, 
while several of the proposed actions were later insti­
tuted, in whole or part, the full study was never imple-
278mented as a national policy directive.
277MacArthur's four proposals, as stated in his 
message of December 30 to the JCS called for: (1) air and
naval attacks against Chinese military bases and industrial 
plants; (2) naval blockade of Chinese coastline; (3) accept 
Nationalist Chinese volunteers; (Ij.) allow Formosa to attack 
mainland China. See MacArthur, Reminiscences, 378-80; 
MacArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, Pb. T, 13-16.
Some of the other proposed courses ofaction remain classi­
fied, but several have become public record through 
congressional testimony. Among them are: (1) continue
the bombing of military targets in Korea; (2) send a 
military training mission and increase MDAP aid to 
Formosa; (3) remove restrictions on air reconnaissance 
of China’s coastal areas and of Manchuria; (1̂.) continue 
and intensify economic blockade of trade with China; (5) 
stabilize military positions in Korea or evacuate to 
Japan; (6) press for the UN to brand Communist China as an 
aggressor. MacArthur’s suggested air and naval attacks on 
China, while included in the sixteen proposals, were made 
contingent upon China attacking American forces someplace 
other than Korea. Marshall testimony, Far East Hearings, 
Pt. 1, 333-3i> 3^0. As for (6) above, on February 1, l95l, 
the General Assembly passed a resolution denouncing the 
People's Republic of China as an aggressor in Korea. Doc. 
No. 28, United States Policy in the Korean Conflict, 37.
^7®Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 329* 335-36, 505-506; 
Pt. 2, 736^177“T321-22, 1551-33; Acheson, Present at the 
Creation, 5l6•
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MacArthur had been briefed on the JCS study in a
meeting with Generals Collins and Vandenberg, who had just
arrived from Washington on January 15 (Tokyo time). They
also discussed the Joint Chiefs’ directive and the Presi-
279dent’s telegram to MacArthur. Soon afterward, the two 
members of the JCS left for an extensive study of the 
Korean battlefields. Collins already knew, from private 
communication with General Ridgway, that the Eighth Army 
leader was far more confident than MacArthur that his
q Q a
forces could not be driven from the peninsula. In his 
talks with Ridgway and numerous other commanders in 
Korea, the Army Chief of Staff’s belief that they could 
hold and fight effectively was confirmed. In a message 
radioed to Bradley on the seventeenth and a subsequent 
meeting with Truman following his return to Washington, 
Collins said that the Eighth Army was in ’’good shape" 
and that the morale of the troops was "very satisfactory" 
under the circumstances. The Chinese were having severe 
logistical difficulties and had made no serious efforts 
to advance beyond the Han River (just south of Seoul). 
Collins remembers that the President and his advisers were
^^Collins testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 
1210-11, 1227-28; Vandenberg testimony, Ibi'dT, lij.72-73* 
For an account of the conference, see Collins, War in 
Peacetime, 251|.-55»
280collins, War in Peacetime, 251-52. See also, 
American Military History, 5&1»
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"reassured" by the reports that he and Vandenberg brought 
back from Korea: " . . .  though it was realized that rough
times were still ahead of us, no longer was there much 
talk of evacuation. General Ridgway alone was responsible
m Q * i
for this dramatic change."
By the third week of January it was evident that 
the Communist offensive had halted at a point just above 
the 37th parallel. Apparently the enemy could not sustain 
the offensive because of over-extended lines of communi­
cation and supply. Their logistical problems were made 
more difficult by persistent aerial interdiction. The 
bulk of the enemy force was withdrawn northward from the 
line of contact. Sensing this development, Ridgway sent 
out reinforced probes which encountered only thin 
screening forces. Accordingly, ridgway began to move 
cautiously to the offensive with reconnaissances-in-force 
in various sectors along the battle-line. Meeting with 
success, on January 25 > Ridgway ordered the western flank 
of his Eighth Army, the First and Ninth Corps, on a 
general sweep forward (Operation Thunderbolt). January 
ended with these forces encountering their first really
^Qlcollins, War in Peacetime, 253-55; Truman,
Memoirs, II, lj.36-37* See also, Marshall testimony, Far 
East Hearings, Pt. 1, 32lj., 332; Collins testimony, ibid.,
Pt. 2, 1211; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 5l6;
American Military History, 562; Higgins, Korea and the 
Fall of"'MacArthur, 96«
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stiff resistance from a Communist delaying action near the 
outskirts of Seoul,2®2
Stalled on the western flank, on February 5 Ridgway 
ordered the American Tenth and ROK Third Corps to advance 
in hope of reducing the deep salient in the central sector 
of his front line. This advance met strong opposition 
and a concentrated counterattack launched on February 11.
The center sagged, but reinforced by all available 
reserves, held, and the advance recommenced ten days 
later, eliminating the salient. On the western front, to 
avoid being flanked, the enemy withdrew all forces below 
Seoul on February 9, enabling UU forces to recapture 
Inchon and Kimpo airfield the next day. The combined 
Chinese and North Korean force mounted a stubborn defense 
in the capital city of South Korea and held it until mid- 
March. Ridgway, who was more concerned with destroying 
the enemy and maintaining the integrity of his line than 
with the acquisition of places, did not press an attack 
against Seoul, By the end of February, 1951* the UN forces 
occupied a line just south of Seoul, running from Inchon 
in the west to Kangnung in the east, having advanced 
roughly half the distance between the thirty-seventh and
2®2Esposito (ed.), West Point Atlas, II, Sec. 3>
Map Plate No. 11; Collins, War in !Peacetime, 257-58;
Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 12-13. See also, 
MacArthur, Reminiscences, 3&3-BE* Phillips, Truman Presidency, 
337I American Military History, 561-62.
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thirty-eighth parallels.283
While it is reasonable to conclude that the Adminis­
tration had by now given up any thought of reconquering 
North Korea, since that would entail a ground war against 
the almost limitless manpower reserves of China, MacArthur 
was still actively devising such a campaign. In long-range 
plans developed in February, MacArthur intended to first 
regain the Seoul line as a base of operations. He would 
then destroy the enemy's rear by massive air strikes 
along the top of North Korea. If still not permitted to
bomb enemy reinforcements in Manchuria, as he anticipated,
*
MacArthur planned to lay vast fields of radioactive atomic
wastes across all major enemy supply lines in North Korea.
Let the General describe his master stroke:
. . .  then, reinforced by Nationalist Chinese troops, 
if I were permitted to use them, and with American 
reinforcements on the way, I would make simultaneous 
amphibious and airborne landings at the upper end of 
both coasts of North Korea, and close a gigantic 
trap. . . .  It would be something like Inchon, but on 
a much larger scale .281j.
On March 7 General Ridgway began a new offensive
push (Operation Ripper), its objectives being the
destruction of enemy forces and the attainment of a new
283collins, War in Peacetime, 2£8-62; Ridgway,
Korean War, 1 0 7 - 1 1 2 . See also, Esposito (ed.), West Point 
Atlas, II," Sec. 3» Map Plate No. 11; American Military 
History, 5>62.
^^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 38ij-85. See also, 
Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 198.
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front line, code-named "Idaho," located just south of the
thirty-eighth parallel. As this movement advanced, it
resulted in the bracketing of Seoul, leaving the enemy
defenders in an untenable position. Without opposition,
the Eighth Army recaptured the capital on the morning of
March l5«^^ Korean President Rhee wrote to Truman
expressing gratitude for the return of Seoul. In the
same letter Rhee urged the President not to listen to the
"pro-Communist appeasers" who were urging him to stop at
the thirty-eighth parallel and seek a cease-fire. He
repeated his request that the United States immediately
provide arms and equipment for over a quarter-million
Korean youths who would be of material assistance in
driving the Chinese Communists back into Manchuria to
stay.288 By the final week in March Ridgway's forces were
at the thirty-eighth parallel, and he proposed to advance
and stabilize his position at a line (coded "Kansas")
slightly above the parallel. The Eighth Army commander
was instructed to hold below the line pending an attempt
287by the Administration to negotiate a settlement.
Truman's advisers in the State and Defense
28^Ridgway, Korean War, 113.
288Rhee to the President, March 26, 1951» Truman 
Papers, OF, 1+71 > Truman Library.
287collins, War in Peacetime, 262; Ridgway,
Korean War, 113-16.
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Departments had been meeting continuously, since Ridgway*s
success in January indicated to them the need to prepare
new policy recommendations for the President. From the
viewpoint of the State Department in early February, five
possible courses of action existed: abandoning Korea;
unifying the entire peninsula by force; extending the war
into China; enduring an indefinite stalemate at the current
288positions; and trying for a negotiated settlement. The 
planners were at loggerheads; State Department was 
reluctant to state political objectives until the Eighth 
Army's military capabilities were clearly established and
the JCS insisted political goals had to be set before
289military recommendations could be made. 7 At the same
time it appeared that the majority of UN member nations,
including those engaged in Korea, were against any
290"general advance" across the parallel.
On February 23 Secretary Marshall received from 
Acheson a draft memorandum which the Secretary of State 
suggested they send as a joint statement to the President. 
The memorandum cautioned against any general allied 
advance beyond the thirty-eighth parallel, but recognized
288Collins, War in Peacetime, 263.
289Ibid., 263-6!]..
290Ibid., 261]..
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that MacArthur should feel free to continue air and naval
operations along with any necessary, limited ground action
291north of that line. Marshall referred Acheson’s note
292to the JCS and the three service Secretaries. The 
latter group responded in agreement with Acheson’s memo­
randum that the UN resolution allowing advances north of 
the thirty-eighth parallel was "permissive not mandatory." 
They further agreed that the UN forces should not make a 
general advance beyond the parallel except for tactical 
reasons to acquire favorable defensive terrain. Army Sec­
retary Pace and Air Secretary Finletter also agreed that 
this policy should be made a matter of public record. On 
this last, Acting Secretary of the Navy Daniel A. Kimball
demurred, believing it would "hamper effective military
4.. i,293action.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff reported to Marshall 
their direct disagreement with the service Secretaries and
2<̂ 1Ibid.
2^2General Collins felt Marshall should not have 
consulted the service Secretaries: "So far as I know, this
was the first time that a question of major military sig­
nificance was referred to the service Secretaries for 
comment. It would have been unfortunate if they had been 
consulted regularly on such matters, because this would 
have tended to interpose them between the JCS and the 
Secretary of Defense, which was not contemplated by the 
National Defense Act of 19l|-7, as amended in 19lj.9.” See 
ibid., footnote, 265.
^^Pace, Kimball and Finletter to Marshall, Feb­
ruary 2lj., 1951, RG330, OSD, CD 092 (Korea), National 
Archives.
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Acheson's draft memorandum for the President. They argued 
that since there had been no change in the stated 
political objectives of the United Nations or the United 
States, no political reason existed for halting military 
operations beyond the parallel. MacArthur needed 
freedom of maneuver to keep the enemy off balance and 
ensure the safety of his own forces. The JCS urged that 
until such time as a new political objective was formu­
lated, MacArthur's directive remain unchanged. Backed 
by these opinions, Marshall told Acheson he would not sign 
the memorandum to Truman. The Defense Secretary joined 
the JCS in emphasizing the necessity for a definitive 
statement on political objectives in Korea. The President 
did not see the memorandum in question, since State and 
Defense were so far apart on its t e r m s . C l e a r l y ,  
however, there existed a tacit understanding that the 
nation must return to its original political objective of 
preserving South Korea. Except for General MacArthur and 
President Rhee, no one seriously proposed the reconquest 
of North Korea.
It was the success of General Ridgway's forces in
^^•C oil ins, War in Peacetime, 265-66. The reasoning 
of the Joint Chiefs canTe seen in General James H. Burns' 
commentary to Deputy Secretary of Defense Lovett on the 
State Department draft memorandum, February 26, 1951 > RG33Q* 
OSD, CD 092 (Korea), National Archives.
^-’Collins, War in Peacetime, 266.
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March that forced the Truman administration to a decision. 
By mid-March the State and Defense departments, as well as 
the National Security Council, were in substantial agree­
ment that the time was opportune to seek a ceasefire, 
looking toward a negotiated peace settlement. It was felt 
that the President, acting as executor for the United 
Nations, should initiate such an approach by a public 
appeal to the Communists. Truman agreed: '
. . .  in the first place, since we had been able to 
inflict heavy casualties on the Chinese and were 
pushing them back to and beyond the 38th parallel, 
it would now be in their interest at least as much as 
ours to halt the fighting, and secondly, the invaders 
stood substantially ejected from the territory of the 
Republic of K o r e a . 296
The draft of a statement was prepared for the Presi­
dent by the State Department and agreed to by all the 
principals on March 19. On the following day a message to 
MacArthur requested his recommendations:
State planning a Presidential announcement shortly 
that with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggres­
sors, United Nations now prepared to discuss con­
ditions of settlement in Korea. United Nations 
feeling exists that further diplomatic efforts toward 
settlement should be made before any advance with 
major forces north of the thirty-eighth parallel. • . •
Recognizing that the parallel has no military 
significance, State has asked Joint Chiefs of Staff 
what authority you should have to permit sufficient 
freedom of action for next few weeks to proved 
security for United Nations forces and maintain
296Truman, Memoirs, II, I4.38• See also, Collins, 
War in Peacetime, 266-67; Phillips, Truman Presidency,
33T.
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contact with the enemy. Your recommendations 
desired.297
MacArthur responded on March 21, telling the JCS 
that his existing directive was adequate and requesting 
that ". . .no further restrictions be imposed upon the 
United Nations Command in Korea."2^® Also, MacArthur 
granted final approval to Ridgway's proposed "Operation 
Rugged," which would carry UN forces slightly above the 
thirty-eighth parallel. This was entirely proper for 
MacArthur to do, for without new instructions from Wash­
ington, crossing the line into North Korea was simply a
P Q Qtactical decision.*" However, Truman did not consider 
MacArthur's next action to be entirely proper at all.
On March 2 (Tokyo time), MacArthur issued a 
communique which he described as "routine" and Secretary
29?JCS to CINCFE, March 20, 1951 > printed in Far 
East Hearings, Pt. 1, 3k3t 3k&S 5s 3180, 35kl» tfext 
also appears in MacArthur, Reminiscences, 386-87; Truman, 
Memoirs, II, ij.38-39; Collins, War in Peacetime, 267; 
Lichterman, "To the Yalu and B"aclc,"rr’627; Higgins, Korea 
and the Fall of MacArthur, 107 • For discussion of tKis 
document during the investigation of MacArthur’s recall, 
see Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 1007-1008, 1021-23, lllj.2-Ij.35 fET ITT91^7 2181+.
298]y[acArthur, Reminiscences, 387* See also, 
Collins, War in Peacetime, 2671 Truman, Memoirs, II, lj.39; 
Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 3ij.6; Spanier, Truman-MacArthur 
Controversy, 199.
299Ri(3gWay f Korean War, 116. See also, Lichterman, 
"To the Yalu and Back, " 629". On March 28, the Secretary 
of Defense announced that crossing of the thirty-eighth 
parallel was only a tactical decision. Truman confirmed 
this in a press conference on the twenty-ninth. .See Item 
No. 63, Public Papers . • • Truman, 1951» 203, 205-206.
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Acheson described as ". . • defiance of the Chiefs of 
Staff, sabotage of an operation of which he had been 
informed, and insubordination of the grossest sort to his 
Commander in Chief."300 In this controversial document 
MacArthur dwelt at length on the military weaknesses 
demonstrated in the fighting by the Chinese and on the 
success of his forces in spite of the inhibitions placed 
on their activity. The enemy should be aware, MacArthur 
said, that if the United Nations were to drop its 
"tolerant" efforts at keeping the war limited and allow 
operations against China, that nation risked total 
military collapse. Although the fundamental questions 
at issue in Korea were political and subject only to dip­
lomatic solutions, MacArthur announced his willingness to 
negotiate with the enemy commander in chief with a view 
to finding military means for achieving the political 
objectives of the United jNations in K o r e a . 3°1
The President called a meeting the following morning 
(March 2Lj., Washington time) to discuss MacArthur’s 
communique. In attendance were Acheson and Rusk from
300MacArthur, Reminiscences, 387? Acheson, Present 
at the Creation, 519•
•^■^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 387-88. Text of Mac­
Arthur's communique is reprinted in Truman, Memoirs, II, 
ljlj.O-lj.1; Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur, 108-110; 
Lichterman, "To the Yalu and 6a’cic,"TT "528; Fehrenbach, This 
Kind of War, Ij22-13«
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
615
State and Lovett and all the Chiefs of Staff. At the
time, the process of clearing the proposed presidential
statement with the thirteen nations having forces in
302Korea was just being completed. Nevertheless, Truman 
ordered the cancellation of his message, which would have 
proposed a cease-fire, to be followed by mutual with­
drawal, leaving to the United Nations the final solution 
of the Korean question.3°3 Truman later wrote that what 
was more important than the cancellation of his message 
and the furor among the allies was that " . . .  once again 
General MacArthur had openly defied the policy of his 
Commander in Chief, the President of the United States."30^ 
After ascertaining that everyone present agreed that his 
order of December 6, 1950* regarding the clearance of all 
public statements was at issue, Truman personally dictated 
an order to MacArthur:
302]ijarshall testimony, Far Bast Hearings, Pt. 1, 
Bradley testimony, iEi'd., Pt. 2,899.
^^Text Qf proposed statement is in Truman, Memoirs, 
II, I4.39—I4.O• While Truman's statement gives lip-service 
to the objective of a unified Korea, the principle 
expressed throughout was really status quo ante bellum.
See Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back,"628.
30lj.Truman, Memoirs, II, 1}1|.2. I. F. Stone believes 
Truman was relieved by MacArthur’s communique, for it 
gave him an excuse not to issue the statement he was 
reluctant to make. Hidden History of the Korean War,270.
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The President has directed that your attention be 
called to his order as transmitted 6 December, 1950*
In view of the information given you 20 March, 1951 
any further statements by you must be coordinated as 
prescribed in the order of 6 December.
The President has also directed that in the event 
Communist military leaders request an armistice in 
the field, you immediately report that fact to the 
JCS for instructions .305
Truman has stated— after the fact— that he had 
decided to relieve General MacArthur of command upon 
receipt of the March 2[j. communique, which the President 
regarded as extreme insubordination.-^^ However, another 
indiscreet statement by MacArthur two weeks later occurred 
before Truman acted. The final incident which may have 
confirmed the President in his resolve concerned an 
exchange of letters between MacArthur and Representative 
Joseph ¥. Martin, Jr., leader of the Republican minority 
in the House. Early in March Martin wrote to the General 
solciting his views on Ear Eastern policy and strategy.
In a reply dated March 20 MacArthur said he favored the 
conventional military approach of "meeting force with 
maximum counter-force." He also said Martin’s suggestion 
that the Nationalists on Formosa be allowed to open a 
second front in Asia was consistent with logic and
30£jCS to CINCFE, March 2b,., 1951* printed in Far 
East Hearings, Pt. 1, I4.O7* Pt. 5* 3181-82, 35i|2; Acheson, 
Present at frhe Creation, 519* Truman, Memoirs, II,
306Truman, Memoirs, II, iflj.2* kkk-k5» -
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tradition. The letter concluded:
It seems strangely difficult for some to realize 
that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators 
have elected to make their play for global conquest 
. . . here we fight Europe's war with arms while the 
diplomats there still fight it with words. . . .  As 
you point out, we must win. There is no substitute 
for victory.307
Without first obtaining MacArthur's approval, 
Congressman Martin read the letter from the floor of the 
House on April 5. A series of meetings began between 
Truman and various officials of the State and Defense 
departments the following day. The culminating session 
came on Monday morning, April 9* with Marshall, Acheson, 
Harriman and Bradley present, the latter reporting that 
the Joint Chiefs were unanimous in recommending the 
immediate relief of General MacArthur from command. All 
present concurred, including Truman, who revealed for 
the first time that he had arrived at this decision follow­
ing MacArthur's statement of March 2l\..3^® qijiq President 
directed Bradley to prepare the order which was trans­
mitted April 11 (Washington time):
307Quoted in Truman, Memoirs, II, ljlj.5-l|6. See 
also, Collins, War in Peacetime, 5S1; Far East Hearings, 
Pt. 1, i|l2; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 519-20; 
Higgins, Korea and the~~Fail oT~MacArthur, 112-lhl Fehren- 
bach, This Kind of filar, l£T5~TE.
-^®Truman, Memoirs, II, See also, Collins,
War in Peacetime, 563; Higgins, Korea and the Fall of 
MacArthur, 117-18.
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I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as Presi­
dent and Commander in Chief of the United States 
military forces to replace you as Supreme Commander, 
Allied Powers; Commander in Chief, United Nations 
Command; Commander in Chief, Par East; and Commanding 
General, U.S. Army, Par East.309
The President appointed Lieutenant General Matthew
B. Ridgway to MacArthurfs commands.310 Shortly thereafter,
on the recommendation of Secretaries Pace and Marshall,
Truman approved Ridgway’s elevation to the rank of 
^11General. Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet was 
ordered from the United States to take command of the 
Eighth Army.3**-̂ Ridgway recalls that upon taking over his 
new command he was determined not to exercise the tight 
tactical control which MacArthur had exercised but to allow 
Van Fleet the latitude necessary to field command. When 
he took command, Ridgway says, "clear policy decisions" 
had been communicated to him by Truman and the Joint 
Chiefs, ". . • the most immediate of which was to avoid 
any action that might result in an extension of
^O^Item u0# 77  ̂ Order by the President to General 
MacArthur, April 11, 1951# Public Papers • . . Truman,
1951# 222. The dismissal o? General MacArthur is the 
subject of the following chapter.
310Marshall to Ridgway, April 11, 1951# Truman 
Papers, OP, 58k> Dismissal, Truman Library.
311Pace to the President, May 8, 1951# Truman 
Papers, OP, 1285-B, Truman Library.
3^2Pace to the President, May 21, 1951# ibid.
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hostilities and thus lead to a worldwide conflagration.
By mid-April, as the change of commanders took 
place, UN forces had generally secured the "Kansas" line, 
a front about six to eight miles above the thirty-eighth 
parallel. On April 22, twenty-one Chinese and nine North 
Korean divisions began a massive counter-offensive along 
the entire front, but with major stress against the 
western flank, aiming at a recapture of Seoul. The 
Eighth Army was compelled to give ground, but did so in 
good order, moving to successive delaying positions in 
pre-established defensive fortifications. Van Fleet was 
thus able to contain the attack a few miles above Seoul.
The fighting ended five days later with the enemy’s with­
drawal northward. The Communist forces resumed their 
offensive on May 16, this time against the eastern flank, 
where they gained some thirty miles before being halted.
The "human wave" assault tactics of these two offensives 
had cost the enemy an estimated 200,000 casualties, or 
roughly one-third of the total Communist strength in 
Korea.33-U- Once the Communist offensive had been blunted, 
Van Fleet’s forces had little trouble driving them back 
until, by mid-June they reoccupied the Kansas line. Since
^•^Ridgway, Korean War, 162, 169.
•^^ichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 629; American 
Military History, 561j.-65j Esposito (ed.), West Point Atlas, 
II, Sec. 3, Map Plate No. 13, llj..
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no enthusiasm existed for advancing to the Yalu, either in 
Washington or the allied capitals, Van Fleet ordered his 
corps commanders to fortify the Kansas line in depth.
This was accomplished by construction of log-and-sandbag 
bunkers connected by deep, narrow trenches across the 
entire line of the peninsula, quite reminiscent of World 
War I entrenchments. The fluid phase of the Korean War 
had ended. From June 1951 until the final settlement in 
1953» military activity consisted mainly of constant 
patrolling and small, localized clashes.
The character of the Korean War was altered by a 
pivotal meeting of the National Security Council on 
May 16, 1951* It was the conclusion of this body—
subsequently approved by Truman--that a distinction must
henceforth be made between military and political
objectives in Korea. The political aim would remain the
same, establishment of a unified, democratic, independent 
Korean state. However, the military objective was now a 
repulse of the invaders and an end to the fighting through 
an armistice agreement. Following such a cease-fire, 
American purpose would be the securing of autonomy for 
the Republic of Korea south of a line not substantially 
below the thirty-eighth parallel, mutual withdrawal of
^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 73-75J 
American Military History, 310-11.
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non-Korean forces, and a buildup of ROK forces to a point 
where they would constitute an effective deterrent to 
renewed aggress ion.
Trygve Lie, UN Secretary-General, announced on 
June 1 that a oease-fire established in the proximity of 
the thirty-eighth parallel would accomplish the objectives 
of the United Nations in Korea. Speaking on the seventh, 
Acheson took the same p o s i t i o n . T w o  days earlier,
George P. Kennan, on leave from the Department but acting 
as Acheson's agent, had an "unofficial" conversation with 
Jacob Malik, chief Soviet delegate to the United Nations. 
Kennan learned that the Soviet Union desired a peaceful 
and rapid solution in K o r e a . O n  June 23, speaking on 
a UN radio program in New York, Malik said that his 
nation believed that it was time for the belligerents in 
Korea to discuss peace. The Peking People's Daily, a semi­
official organ of the Chinese government, endorsed Malik's 
statement two days later.319 Grasping at this slender
3l6iruman wrote that this policy "represented no 
change," when, in fact, it was a return to the original 
objective of American involvement. Truman, Memoirs, II, 
Jj-55-56. See also, Acheson, Present a.t the Creation, 529.
317'Truman, Memoirs, II, ij.55-56* See also, 
Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 630.
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 532-33*
•^■^Truman, Memoirs, II, lj-56; Hermes, Truce Tent 
and Fighting Front, l5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
622
straw, on June 29 Truman ordered the following message
transmitted to RidgwayI
The President has directed that 0800 Saturday Tokyo 
Daylight Saving Time you send following message by radio 
in clear addressed to Commander in Chief Communist 
Forces in Korea and simultaneously release to press:
"As Commander in Chief of the United Nations 
Command I have been instructed to communicate to you 
the following:
"I am informed that you may wish a meeting to dis­
cuss an armistice providing for the cessation of 
hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, 
with adequate guarantees for the maintenance of such 
armistice. . • ."320
A favorable response to this message was received
from the Communist commander on the first day of July. He
suggested that the meeting place be the town of Kaesong,
a site between the lines, quite near the thirty-eighth
parallel. The first plenary session of the truce talks
was held on July 10, 1951t with hostilities to continue
until an armistice was agreed upon. It would take another
158 such sessions, stretched out over more than two years
of bitter disputation before the fighting was at last
stopped.-^3- Throughout it all, until the end of his term
320jQg to Ridgway, June 29, 1951t quoted in 
Truman, Memoirs, II, lj-58. For text of the directive to 
Ridgway communicating acceptable terms, see ibid., 458- 
59. See also, Millis, Arms and Men, 300; Hermes, Truce 
Tent and Fighting Front, 16-IV.
^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 459; Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, 534“3f?JHF5eKrenbach, This Kind of War,~4W. 
See also, Steinberg, Man from Missouri, h00» Lichterman, 
"To the Yalu and Back," 630'; Stone, Hidden History of the 
Korean War, 28i|.—85•
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of office, Truman maintained an active supervision of the 
limited military operations and of the frustrating efforts 
to obtain a satisfactory cease-fire. Now, along with the 
daily battlefield reports he also received a daily account 
of the truce proceedings. As he recalled: "No major
steps were taken without specific approval of the Presi­
dent, even to the wording of announcements made by the Par 
East commander or the chief negotiator at crucial 
points."^^ The fact is that there was little need for 
Truman to exercise his powers as Commander in Chief 
following the removal of MacArthur and the decision to 
halt and seek a settlement near the thirty-eighth parallel. 
Tnlhile he continued to act as an overseer and exercise 
final authority, the decreased level of combat and smooth 
functioning of his subordinates sharply diminished his 
active participation in the conduct of the war. Truman 
now lost his trusted Secretary of Defense, General Marshall, 
who retired for personal reasons in September, 19£l> but 
was quite pleased with Marshall's successor, Robert A. 
Lovett.3^3 in May 195>2 Eisenhower resigned as Supreme 
Allied Commander in Europe in order to seek the Republican 
presidential nomination. Truman ordered General Ridgway
■^^Truman, Memo irs, II, lj.j?9.
323Marshall to the President, September 1, 195>1 > 
and reply, September 11, 1951* Truman Papers, OP, 1285* 
Truman Library.
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to assume the NATO command, which is seme indication of 
the declining importance to the President of the limited 
military activity in Korea. General Mark W. Clark served 
as Ridgway’s successor in the Par East command.
The policy adopted for military operations in Korea
in mid-195l was held relatively constant by the President
until the end of his term in January, 1953» his adherence
to this policy being reinforced by a recommendation of
the National Security Council in December, 1951 The
President did not "shortchange" the troops serving in
Korea, for he insisted that the "overriding priority" on
all military end items was to be accorded to combat con-
0 0  Asumption requirements. However, Truman also kept the 
troop levels in Korea substantially unchanged for the 
remainder of his Presidency.327 This assured a battlefield 
stalemate and may well have contributed to the protracted 
truce negotiations.
In June 1952 a public opinion poll revealed that
3^-Truman, Memoirs, II, I4.62. See also, American 
Military History, 56? J Mark W. Clark, From the Danube To 
the Yalu (New York: Harper and Brothers, i95^T> 30. 
Hereinafter cited as Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu.
^^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 130.
32^Truman to Lovett, January 9, 1952, RG330, OSD,
CD 091«3> National Archives.
327Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 331*
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forty-three percent of those surveyed believed that the 
United States should have been bolder in Korea, "• • • 
even at the risk of starting World War I I I ."328 Asked 
what policy should now be adopted to Korea, a majority 
(fifty-three percent) said that the United States should 
". . • stop fooling around and do whatever is necessary to 
knock the Communists out of Korea once and for all."329 
But the President was convinced that his course was the 
only proper one. In a meeting with the JCS and Secretary 
of Defense on September 15, 1952, Truman did authorize a 
very limited increase in military pressure in hope of 
forcing a more conciliatory attitude out of the Communist 
truce negotiators. But he told his advisers that he could 
envision no genuine prospect for any armistice other than 
by persisting with the established course of a c t i o n . 330
The campaign to select Truman’s successor was 
heating up in September, as were the Republican condem­
nations of his strategy in the Korean War. While an 
armistice at the time would have been of inestimable value
328Twenty-three percent felt the U.S. should have 
stayed out and let the Communists take Korea. Only nineteen 
percent endorsed the policies that had been pursued by the 
Administration. Roper, You and Your Leaders, I63-6I4..
32<?to this question, only twenty-two percent believed 
that the existing strategy should be pursued. See ibid.
330Memorandum for the record, Robert A. Lovett, 
September 15, 1952, USA, Office of the Chief of Staff,
091-Korea, National Archives.
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to his party and a desirable climax to his Presidency,
Truman refused to allow personal or political considerations
to influence his position on a negotiated settlement. His
determination is revealed in the excerpts below, taken
from the transcript of a meeting in the White House with
his principal advisers on September 21±:
The President stated that as he saw the situation 
we were faced with the question of whether "we should 
do anything in the world to get an armistice in 
Korea." He said that he was not willing to get an 
armistice just for the sake of an armistice, and 
particularly one which would leave the Communist 
Chinese in a position to renew hostilities. • . •
He added that we must maintain the morale of our
forces at home and abroad and strive to handle the 
worldwide situation in a way to prevent war. He said 
that he had been conducting his administration for 
seven years in an effort to avoid World War III and 
he did not want to wind up his political career by 
bringing war on. Nevertheless, he would not weaken 
on the les that we are striving to main-
September unacceptable, broke off negotiations in October 
1952. On the twenty-fourth of the month, the Republican 
nominee, General Eisenhower, made a major campaign address 
at Detroit in which he bitterly denounced the Korean 
policies of his former Commander in Chief. He said that 
Korea and the twenty thousand Americans who had died there 
were ". • . a  measure— a :damning measure— of the quality
tain.
The Communists, finding the American peace offer of
33lTranscript of White House meeting, September 2lj.,
19£2, ibid.
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332of leadership we have been given," Eisenhower said
that the Korean War was a direct result of Acheson's
"perimeter" speech. If elected, he would not be diverted
by political considerations (the implication being that
Truman had), but would go personally to Korea to determine
333how best to bring about an honorable settlement. In 
earlier speeches Eisenhower had given some indication 
that he would make Korea a major issue. Truman had written 
to him on August 13, inviting him to attend Cabinet 
meetings and receive full briefings from the White House 
staff. He also told the Republican candidate that he had 
arranged for the CIA to provide him and his Democratic 
opponent, Adlai Stevenson, with weekly intelligence 
summaries on the world s i t u a t i o n . R e p l y i n g  the next 
day, Eisenhower declined the invitation so as to remain 
free to "analyze publicly" the present administration.
While welcoming the weekly CIA reports> Eisenhower
33% e w  York Times, October 25, 1952.
333I b i d . In a press conference on December 11,
1952, Truman described Eisenhower’s announcement that he 
would go to Korea as "a piece of demagoguery" which Eisen­
hower was obligated to carry through on after the election. 
Item No. 3l].5* Public Papers . . . Truman, 1952-53? 1075* 
Truman repeated the' chargeof demagoguery againsu Eisen­
hower in interviews held late in December. See Anthony 
Leviero, New York Times, December 27, 1952; Edward T. 
Polliard, Washington Post, December 27? 1952.
33ij-Truman to Eisenhower, August 13, 1952, printed 
in Truman, Memoirs, II, 512.
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cautioned that he would not consider them a restriction
on his freedom to discuss foreign policy.^3$ Truman
admitted that the response made him angry. In a personal
note he told Eisenhower that he was very sorry that the
latter had allowed "a bunch of screwballs" to come between 
/
them. His closing sentence reads: "Prom a man who has
always been your friend and who always intended to be I"336 
The presidential campaign of 1952 must have been 
doubly disappointing to Truman. Not only because the 
result could be interpreted as a repudiation of his Korean 
policies, but also because Eisenhower, whom he greatly 
respected and admired and counted as a friend, chose 
unfairly (in Truman's view) to attack Administration policy. 
In the years between World War II and the 1952 campaign, 
the President had given every indication of his great 
faith in the general. In he had appointed Eisenhower
to the permanent rank of General of the Army for life.
As previously recorded, Truman subsequently made Eisen-. 
hower Chief of Staff of the Army, later Chairman of the
335Eisenhower to Truman, August llj., 1952, ibid.,
512-13.
336Truman Eisenhower, August 16, 1952, ibid.,
513. 
337Truman to Patterson, August 2, 19lj-6, OSW (211), 
AG031.1, National Archives. See also, Patterson to Eisen­
hower, August 23, 191+6, Eisenhower Papers, PP/DDE,
Patterson folder, Eisenhower Library.
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Joint Chiefs and, finally, NATO Supreme Commander. Their 
correspondence throughout these years is replete with 
mutual assurances of respect and loyalty. Eisenhower, for 
example, wrote early in 191+8 of the "high sense of distinc­
tion and privilege" he felt for the opportunity to serve 
under Truman and his gratitude for the President’s under­
standing, encouragement and friendship.33® Resigning 
from the chairmanship of the JCS in 191+9» the general 
assured Truman that it had been ". • . a  great honor and
privilege to do what I could . . .  under your direction as
339Commander-in-Chief. When Eisenhower resigned as Army
Chief of Staff in January 191+8, Truman told him: "You
have my heartiest good wishes in whatever you may decide 
to do— and my friendship and admiration always."3^®
There was a short-lived attempt to obtain the Democratic 
nomination for Eisenhower in 191+8 which he helped to kill 
himself. Writing to him after the election, Truman told 
Eisenhower that it had been unnecessary to reaffirm his 
loyalty to the President: "I always know exactly where
you stand.
33®Eisenhower to Truman, January 22, 191+8, Eisen­
hower Papers, PP/DDE, Truman folder (1), Eisenhower 
Library.
33^Eisenhower to Truman, August 17, 191+9 > ibid.
3^°Truman to Eisenhower, January 23, 191+8, ibid.
3^-Truman to Eisenhower, November 16, 191+8, ibid.
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Despite his personal pique at Eisenhower, Truman 
sent him a message of congratulations immediately after 
the election and offered the use of the presidential air­
craft should he still desire to go to K o r e a . 3 ^  This was 
the first of a series of messages exchanged between the 
two men in the next few days, in all of which Truman 
emphasized his strong desire to keep the President-Elect 
abreast of the international scene as well as to bring 
about as effortless a change of administrations as pos­
sible. 3^3 Truman’s sincerity in this was displayed in a 
letter he addressed to all of the principal officers of 
his Administration in December, asking their full cooper­
ation in facilitating an orderly transition. He required 
that each of them report to him on the steps taken in his 
respective enclave to bring this about.3^- In compliance 
with this request, Secretary Lovett reported that the 
Defense Department had provided General Eisenhower with 
transportation, accommodations and military intelligence
f November 5, 1952, quoted 
in Truman, Memoirs, II, 505* See also, Item No. 325, 
Statement by the President on the Election of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1952-53* 1028.
3̂ -3 The se several communications are all published 
in Truman, Memoirs, II, 505-510. See also, Corwin and 
Koenig, Presidency Today, 128-29.
3^Truman to Secretary of State, et. al., December 
31, 1952, Truman Papers, Murphy Piles, Correspondence and 
General Pile, Truman Library.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
631
on his trip to Korea, accompanied throughout by Omar 
Bradley, the JCS Chairman. Eisenhower, as well as the men 
he designated as appointees to the various posts in the 
departments, was being fully briefed and constantly 
acquainted with the military and administrative information 
necessary for the conduct of office.
Truman’s efforts resulted in a governmental change­
over brought about with minimal friction or disruption. 
However, he had little faith in his successor’s ability to 
govern. MacArthur has recorded that while he and the Pres­
ident were talking privately at Wake Island, the conver­
sation got around to politics. Truman renarked that while 
he liked the general personally, "Eisenhower doesn't know 
the first thing about politics. Why, if he should become 
President, his Administration would make Grant's look like 
a model of perfection. In his own memoirs, Truman
said he agreed with the observation of Sam Rayburn, power­
ful House Democrat, who, when asked to comment on the 
possibility of General Eisenhower running for the 
presidency said: "No, won’t do. Good man, but wrong
business.”3̂4-7 Contemplating the possibility of an
3^5>Lovett to the President, January 3, 195>3>
RG330, OSD, 031.1, National Archives.
3̂ -̂ MacArthur, Reminiscences, 363? Whitney,
MacArthur, 3 8 9•
3VJrruman, Memoirs, II, 187.
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Eisenhower victory in the summer of 1952* Truman report­
edly commented: "He’ll sit here and he'll say, ’Do this!
Do that!’ And nothing will happen. Poor Ike— it won’t be 
a bit like the Army. He’ll find it very frustrating.’’̂ ®
Certainly Truman found his own last months in office 
very frustrating. He relinquished national leadership on 
January 20, 1953* and left Washington for his home in 
Independence, his every effort to find a solution to the 
Korean conflict having ended in abject failure. Too 
politically weak at home to make peace and too wise to 
embark on military adventures that might have resulted in 
a general war, he chose to leave office with the great 
issue of his second term unresolved. But Eisenhower faced 
no such dilemma and was able to end the fighting (July 27, 
1953)* by accepting a settlement for which Truman would 
have been damned, a peace without victory.3^9
3^®Quoted in Neustadt, Presidential Power, 22.
3^9^axter Lippmann, New York Herald-Tribune, August 
2t\., 1956. See also, Warren, President as World Leader,
3U5.
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CHAPTER IX
THE RELIEF OF DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
He was insubordinate and I fired him, just like 
Lincoln fired McClellan. Sure I knew there would 
be a lot of stink about it, but I didn't give a _ 
damn. It was the right thing to do and I did it.
At the end of World War II, President Truman had 
boundless respect for his European and Pacific theater 
commanders, Generals Eisenhower and MacArthur. But his 
regard for both men was diminished by their separate 
challenges to his decisions as Commander in Chief.during 
the Korean War. Although Eisenhower's bid for the presi­
dency in 19!?2 was based on his credentials as a profes­
sional soldier, it was as a nominally-civilian candidate 
that he disputed Truman's military policies in the poli­
tical arena. The American system can tolerate this type 
of dissent. But the challenge with which MacArthur con­
fronted his Commander in Chief endangered the very basis 
of the civil-military relationship, if not the democratic 
system itself.
■^Truman is quoted in Phillips, wTruman at 7£»” 107.
633
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The man destined to clash with Truman over Korean 
strategy was unlike the President in almost every respect. 
Where Truman had failed to be admitted to the United States 
Military Academy, MacArthur had graduated from West Point 
with a superlative record. The blunt, earthy Truman was 
so avowedly middle-class, middle-American that he seemed 
at times to be a caricature of the virtues and foibles 
ascribed to the type. His frequent trips back to his small 
hometown in Missouri seemed to be a necessary restorative. 
The suave, articulate MacArthur, on the other hand, was 
the regal, proud heir of his father (Arthur), a Medal of 
Honor winner, who retired in 1909 with the rank of
plieutenant-general. Douglas MacArthur had not even visi­
ted the United States for over a dozen years prior to his 
relief in 1951* Aside from their both being born in the 
l88o*s and that both were sincere, dedicated Americans, 
there are few common denominators in the lives of the 
President and the General.
The potential for conflict had always been there. 
Truman was a firm believer in the principle of civil su­
premacy. MacArthur later testified to his acceptance of 
the fundamental concept of military subordination to
pJoseph G. Hopkins (ed.), Concise Dictionary of 
American Biography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
T96Ii!J7T9T."
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civilian authority. ̂ But there was a lofty, imperious at­
titude about the General, probably fostered by his years 
as American proconsul for Japan, that belied these assuran­
ces. Perhaps the best indicator of the attitude that will 
lead him into contention with Truman can be found in a 
framed quotation from Livy which was prominently displayed 
on the wall of MacArthur's office in the Dai-Ichi Building, 
his headquarters in Tokyo. In part, it read:
• • .1 am not one of those who think that comman­
ders ought at no time to receive advice. . . .  What 
then is my opinion? That Commanders should be coun­
selled chiefly by persons of known talent. • .who 
are present at the scene of action, who see the 
country, who see the enemy. • .and who, life people 
embarked in the same ship, are sharers of the danger. 
If, therefore, anyone thinks himself qualified to 
give advice respecting the war which I am to con­
duct. • .let him come with me into Macedonia. He 
shall be furnished with a ship, a horse, a tent; 
even his traveling charges shall be defrayed. But 
if he thinks this too much trouble, and prefers the 
repose of city life. . .let him not. • .assume the 
office of a pilot. The city in itself furnishes 
abundance of topics for conversation; let it confine 
its passion for talking within its own precincts and 
rest assured that we shall pay no attention to any 
councils but such as shall be framed within our 
camp.4
^See, for example, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 27-28, 
283-81j., 289, i|lj.9-50; MacArtEur, Reminiscences, 393* Truman 
made an extended statement on civil supremacy in his 
Memoirs, II, •
^Phe quotation from Livy is purported to be the 
views of Lucius Aemilius Paulus, a Roman general 
(c. 168 B.C.), see Rovere and Schlesinger, The General 
and the President, 120-21,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
636
It would be an injustice to MacArthur to assume 
that his attitudes parallel those of the Roman general 
quoted in Livy. MacArthur did not ignore the "councils” 
framed by the Joint Chiefs and the Commander in Chief, 
even though they did not go with him into "Macedonia.”
But there is ample evidence that he did fight mightily 
against any of their orders which ran counter to his own 
thinking. He was also not above giving an interpretation 
to his directives which had the effect of accomodating Ad­
ministration policy to his strategic concepts.
The first indication that MacArthur did not feel 
absolutely bound by the injunctions in his directives can 
be found in his order to the Par Bast Air Force on June 29, 
19J?0 (Korean time), prior to the President’s decision to 
become completely involved in Korea. MacArthur had ordered 
that airfields in North Korea be destroyed.'* His operat­
ing directive, dated June 26, gave the Par East commander 
the authority to attack by air all military targets south 
of the thirty-eighth parallel.^ The General made no ef­
fort to obtain clearance for an attack upon a nation with 
which the United States was not even "unofficially” at war. 
Courtney Whitney, MacArthur's aide and apostle, explained
qAppleraan, South to the Naktong, This incident
has been previously notedTn Chapter VTI.
^Far East Hearings. Pt. 1, 535* See also, Paige, 
Korean Decision, 179-02.
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ported to the President that MacArthur denied making any 
political comments in his conversations with Chiang and 
that while he disagreed on Formosan policy would . .as 
a soldier, obey any orders that he received from the 
President.”'1"1’
In a press conference following Harriman's return, 
Truman was queried about MacArthurfs views, which led to 
the following exchange:
Q, General MacArthur says there are defeatists 
and appeasers who are working against him. Is any­
body trying to set you against General MacArthur?
THE PRESIDENT. I haven’t met anybody yet.
Q. What was your answer, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT. I haven't met anybody of that
sort yet. General MacArthur and I are in perfect
agreement, and have been ever since he has been in 
the job he is now. I put him there, and I also ap­
pointed him Commander in Chief of American and Al­
lied Forces, at the suggestion of the United Nations. 
I am satisfied with what he is doing. ^
Truman's satisfaction with the perfect accord be­
tween himself and MacArthur was short-lived. The Presi-
Quoted from Harriman's report to the President, 
which is printed in Truman, Memoirs, II, 314-9-53. For Mac- 
Arthurls statement regarding’ Harr'iman»s visit, see his 
Reminiscences, 314-O-lp.. See also, Ridgway, Korean War, 38; 
Spanier, ̂ ruman-MacArthur Controversy, 70-72; Phillips, 
Truman Presidency,' 317; fteust'ad't,-Presidential Power, 2lj..
•^Item No. 209, Press Conference, August 10, 1950, 
Public Papers . . • Truman, 1950* 580. The reporter's ques- 
tion with regard to ^defeatists and appeasers” was probably 
inspired by a press release Issued by MacArthur just after 
Harriman's visit. Spanier believes the statement was di­
rected at MacArthur's superiors in Washington. Truman- 
MacArthur Controversy, 72-73.
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that the General had made a discretionary decision within 
the ’’normal latitude” granted to field commanders.^ Only 
an extraordinarily-broad reading of the directive would 
allow such an interpretation. In any event, on the fol­
lowing day, (June 29 in Washington), Truman approved an 
order giving MacArthur the authority he had already as-
Q
sumed to attack beyond the thirty-eighth parallel.
MacArthur paid a brief visit to Formosa on July 31, 
1950. While the General did not say so specifically, Tru­
man received the clear impression from newspaper accounts 
and statements by Chiang Kai-shek and his aides, that Mac­
Arthur rejected the President's decision to neutralize
qthe Nationalist Chinese refuge.7 Truman was concerned 
enough about the comments in the press to send Averell 
Harriman to Toyko to give MacArthur an account of the Ad­
ministration's views on foreign policy, particularly as to 
planning with regard to the Far East.10 Harriman later re­
^Whitney, MacArthur, 326.
®Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 536.
^Statement of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Au­
gust 2, 1950, in Far East Hearings, Pt. 5» 3383-8l|.. See 
also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 35̂ 4-J Collins, War in Peacetime, 
272. For MacArthuris statement regarding his trip to IPor- 
mosa, see New York Times, August 1, 1950. See also, a fur­
ther statement attributed to a ’’reliable source” in ibid., 
August 6, 1950.
10Truman, Memoirs, II, 353—5U-* Se® also, Collins, 
War in Peacetime,'
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dent later recalled that he erred in assuming n. • .Gen­
eral MacArthur would accept the Formosa policy laid down 
by his Commander in Chief,”^3 two weeks after Harriman's 
return, on August 26, Truman was given a copy of a message 
from MacArthur to Clyde A. Lewis, commander of the Vet­
erans of Foreign Wars. The message, sent at Lewis' request, 
was to be read at the National Encampment in Chicago on Au­
gust 28,^ MacArthur told the VFW that he believed it to 
be in the public interest that he clear up the w. • .mis­
conceptions currently being voiced concerning the relation­
ship of Formosa to our strategic potential in the Paci­
fic."^ He then went into detail on the great strategic 
importance that the island of Formosa represented, de­
scribing it as the keystone of the protective shield de­
fending the Pacific area and the Americas. After estab­
lishing that Formosa was pivotal to maintenance of the de­
fensive perimeter in the Pacific, MacArthur said that if 
this line were lost, war would inevitably result. The 
neutralization of Formosa, on the grounds that it lacked 
strategic importance and that any other course might alien­
ate continental Asia— which was Truman's policy as communi-
■^Truman, Memoirs, II,
^ I b i d . See also, Hunt, Untold Story of Douglas 
MacArthur, li&2.
^ New York Times, August 29# 1950.
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cated  to  M acArthur by H arrim an — was fa l la c io u s  reaso n in g  
by those who understood n e ith e r  ’’broad s t r a te g ic  con­
c ep ts ” nor the O r ie n ta l  m ind . To M acA rthur, e x is t in g  
p o lic y  was d e fe a tis m  and appeasement. He c losed  w ith  h ig h  
p ra is e  f o r  the P re s id e n t's  d e c is io n  to  in te rv e n e  in  
K o r e a .^
M acArthur l a t e r  w ro te  th a t  h is  VFW message was 
a p o l i t i c a l  and in  f u l l  sup po rt o f Truman's p o lic y  re s p e c t­
in g  Formosa. He sa id  he d id  n o t know how h is  message was 
so construed §s to  im ply  th e  re v e rs e  o f th e  in ten d ed  mean­
in g , nor how th e  P re s id e n t cou ld  be ”so e a s i ly  d e c e iv e d ,” 
presum ably, by h is  m i l i t a r y  o r p o l i t i c a l  a d v is e r s .^  T ru ­
man, on th e  o th e r hand, b e lie v e d  th a t  the  tone o f the en­
t i r e  message was an exp ress io n  o f c r i t ic is m  of th e  p o lic y  
M acArthur had to ld  H arrim an he would s u p p o rt, and th a t  th is  
was the way the  G enera l in te n d e d  i t  to  re a d . The P re s id e n t
Ibid. Text of MacArthur's message also appears 
in Far Bast gearings, Pt. 5, 3187-89; Bernstein and Matu- 
sow' (edsV)V frruman^Administration, I4J4.3—lp6• See also, Tru­
man, Memoirs, ll',‘ 3£U--55>; MacArthur, Reminiscences, 3I4.I; 
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 2+231 Spanler,' frruman- 
MacArthur Controversy, 73—72+ J Hunt, Untold Story of Doug­
las MacArthur, Lib2-bo.j Higgins, Korea and the Fall of Mac­
Arthur, 39.
^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 3hl-!j.2. General 
Whitney claims that MacArthur always felt that his message 
“innocently ran afoul” of a State Department scheme to 
turn Formosa over to the Communists. Whitney, MacArthur, 
381.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6I4.I
felt that the VFW message was a direct contradiction of 
his statements to Congress as well as his announcement of 
June 27. It was also, he felt, contrary to a letter Am­
bassador Austin had just written to the UN Secretary- 
General on his instructions.
Shortly after reading a copy of the VFW message 
on August 26, Truman attended a previously-scheduled meet­
ing with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, 
the Joint Chiefs, and Harriman. Acheson recalls that the 
President entered the room obviously disturbed, his lips 
!,white and compressed.** He read them MacArthur's message 
and then asked each in turn if he had any prior knowledge 
of the document. All responded negatively. Truman then 
instructed Secretary of Defense Johnson to inform MacArthur
.that-.he..(.the...President) was ordering him to immediately
19withdraw his statement to the VFW. Truman was aware that
Truman, Memoirs, II, For text of the
letter, Austin to Trygve Lie, August 25, 1950, see Far 
Ea3t Hearings, Pt. 5, 314-73—714.* The June 27 statement was 
Truman's original announcement of his decision to neutra­
lize Formosa. See Item No. 173, Public Papers . . .  Tru- 
man^i>1950, lj-92. I.F. Stone felt that MacArthur, through, 
means like the VFW message, deliberately tried to start a 
world war. See Hidden History of the Korean War, 92.
■^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 1̂ 235 Truman, 
Memoirs, II, 356. See also, Phillips, Truman Presidency, 
318. Many of those present at this meeting later testi­
fied to their views on the VFW message during the hear­
ings on MacArthur's relief. See Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 
716-18; Pt. 2, 929-30, 93h-36, l O ^ ^ T T ^ O b ,  1590-91;
Pt. 3, 2002; Pt. 4, 2586-87, 2589-90, 2616-17.
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th e  message, having  been re le a s e d  by M acA rth u r’ s s t a f f  to  
th e  press in  Tokyo, had a lre a d y  appeared in  s e v e ra l news­
papers and a t  le a s t  one n a t io n a l m agazine when he ordered  
i t  w ith draw n . But by o rd e rin g  i t s  r e c a l l  he cou ld  demon­
s t r a te  th a t  the  G e n e ra l’ s views d id  no t re p re s e n t n a t io n a l
p o l ic y ,  on w hich , Truman s a id , th e re  cou ld  be "o n ly  one 
20v o ic e " — h is .  The o rd e r re a d : ’’The P re s id e n t o f the
U n ite d  S ta tes  d ir e c ts  th a t  you w ith d raw  you r message 
f o r .  . .V e te ran s  o f F o re ig n  Wars because va rio u s  fe a tu re s  
w ith  re s p e c t to  Formosa are  in  c o n f l ic t  w ith  the  p o lic y  o f 
the U n ited  S ta te s . • • , " 2 -*-
P erson al memoirs are  p a r t ic u la r ly  suspect on such 
p o in ts , b u t Truman has reco rd ed  th a t  i t  was a t  th is  jun c­
tu re  he f i r s t  gave ’’ s e rio u s  tho ug ht" to  r e l ie v in g  MacArthur. 
I f  so, he ke p t i t  to  h im s e lf .  He r e c a l le d  th a t  he consid ­
ered  ta k in g  ju s t  the  f i e l d  command in  Korea away from  him  
and g iv in g  i t  to  Omar B ra d le y . Truman r e je c te d  th e  id e a  
s in ce  i t  would appear he was dem oting M acA rthur, whom he 
had no d e s ire  to  in ju r e  p e r s o n a l ly .22 In s te a d , he decided
20Truman, Memoirs, I I ,  355; New York H e ra ld -T rlb u n e , 
August 29, 1950.
21Johnson to MacArthur, August 26, 1950, printed 
in Far Bast Hearings, Pt. 5* 34®0; New York Herald-Tribune, 
August 29, l55o; Truman, Memoirs, II, 356.
22Truman, M em oirs, I I ,  356.
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on a far milder course, a note to his Par East Commander 
explaining the necessity for his order to withdraw the VFW 
message.
Truman wrote to MacArthur on August 29, enclosing 
a letter he had written to Ambassador Austin, and calling 
the General’s attention to a letter from Austin to UN 
Secretary-General Lie, a copy of which had been forwarded 
to Par East Headquarters on the date it was written, Au­
gust 25* The President’s note was brief, explaining that 
he was certain that once MacArthur had read these letters
he would understand why the withdrawal order was given. ^  
The letter Truman sent to Austin, dated the twenty-seventh,
the day after he became aware of MacArthur's message to 
the VFW, was released to the press by the White House. An 
obvious effort to counter the effect of the VPW message, 
it restated the points made in Austin's letter to the Sec­
retary-General, emphasizing that the ambassador’s letter 
accurately reflected the fundamental position of the Gov­
ernment respecting neutralization of Formosa and a desire 
to limit conflict in the Par East.^ The controversy died 
down soon afterward, smothered by the news of MacArthur’s
Truman to MacArthur, August 29, 1950, Truman 
Papers, OP, $81j-Mac Arthur's Proposed VFW Message, Truman 
Library.
^Truman to Austin, August 27» 1950, Tannenwald 
Papers, Subject Pile (Benton-MacArthur), Truman Library.
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smashing triumph in the Inchon invasion and the subsequent
elimination of the aggressors from South Korea.
Truman and MacArthur had their only face-to-face
meeting on Wake Island October 15* 1950* a month after
Inchon.^ Tv/0 years later, Truman said regarding Wake
Island: **I made a Hj.,l|.00-mile trip to get a lot of mis-
27information.” He described the misinformation from 
MacArthur as the assurance that China would not intervene, 
that the war was over, and that it would be possible to 
release a regular Army division from Par East service for
p Qoccupation duties in Germany. There is ample evidence
^Richard Lowitt (ed.), The Truman-MacArthur Con­
troversy (Chicago: Rand-McNally/ l9b7)* I'3~ 'Truman
claimed that in their private conversation at Wake Island 
(October 15)» MacArthur apologized for the embarassment 
caused by his VFW letter. See Memoirs, II, 3&5*
26Th is  m eeting has been examined a t  le n g th  in  the  
preced in g  c h a p te r .
27 Ite m  No. 3^5» Press C onference, December 11, 
1952, P u b lic  Papers . . .  Truman, 1952-53* 107J+. Truman 
had made an e a r l i e r  re fe re n c e  to  M acA rth u r's  mis judgment 
( a t  Wake Is la n d )  in  a J e ffe rs o n -J ac k so n  Day address,
A p r i l  llj., 1951. See M acArthur C hronology, e n try  f o r  Oc­
to b e r  15* 1950, Tannenwald P ap e rs , S u b je c t P i l e ,  C hronolo­
gy -M acA rthur H e a rin g s , Truman L ib r a r y .
p O Item No. 3I4.5, Press Conference, December 11, 
1952, Public Papers . . .  Truman, 1952-53* 107i|.. D.P. 
Fleming felt MacArthur lied about Chinese intent, that he 
already knew they were in North Korea in force. See The 
Cold War, II, 617-18, citing Gordon Walker, Christian 
Science Monitor, November 29, 1951.
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that MacArthur did make these estimates and that they were 
gross miscalculations of what subsequently transpired; but 
the General was guilty only of overconfidence. The same 
intelligence information upon which he based his unfortu­
nate estimates was also known to the President, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the others present at 
this meeting. No one saw fit at the time, nor, in fact, 
until events proved otherwise, to challenge MacArthur's
assertions.^9
In his post-Wake Island statements, the President
went to great pains to emphasize that there were no dis­
agreements on policy between himself and MacArthur. In 
a statement issued the day of the meeting Truman spoke 
of, 11. . .the very complete unanimity of view which pre­
vailed. . . . " 3 °  Two days later, speaking at San Fran­
cisco, the President admitted that one of his reasons for 
going to Wake Island was that he felt a need to make it 
clear, by talking with MacArthur, ”. • .that there is com­
plete unity in the aims and conduct of our foreign p o l i c y . " 3 i
^Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island 
(passim.); Appleman, South to the Naktong,' 761.
3°Item No. 266, Statement by the President on His 
Meeting with General MacArthur at Wake Island, October 15, 
•*•950, Public Papers . . .  Truman, 1950* 672.
3^Item No. 269, Address in San Francisco at the 
War Memorial Opera House, October 17> 1950, ibid., 673*
Full text of this address is also printed in' Far East 
Hearings, Pt. 5> 3*+86-91.
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To a press conference on October 19 Truman explained: 
"There is no disagreement between General MacArthur and 
m y s e l f . "32 MacArthur did not see it this way. When asked 
in his dismissal hearing if Truman’s statement regarding 
their complete accord, particularly regarding Formosa, wasi 
a misinterpretation, MacArthur agreed that it was. The 
day after his return to Tokyo, MacArthur testified, "I 
issued a statement. • .that there had been absolutely no 
change on my part in any views I held as to the strategic 
value of Formosa."^ This is most revealing of MacArthur’s 
inability to completely subordinate himself to the Presi­
dent’s authority. It seemed never to occur to him that a 
soldier on active duty should not issue press releases as 
counters to statements made by his commander in chief.
Two incidents which occurred shortly after the 
Wake Island meeting demonstrate MacArthur’s irresponsible 
disregard for the limitations imposed by modern warfare.
On October 21+ he told his commanders to use American units: 
in their drive to the Yalu, in unquestionable violation of
•^Itera No. 270, Press Conference, October 19,
1950, Public Papers • . • Truman, 1950, 679. See also,
Neus tadi, Pre s idential Power, 1+8.
33m&CArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 
l+l • See also, Fleming, The Cold War, II, 618. For Tru­
man’s initial statement regarding the accord on Formosa,860 Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island, 8; Brad­
ley teatimon'y,~~Far East Hearings ,~TPt. 2,' 92tf.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
61+7
a directive received a month earlier, stipulating that 
only Korean forces were to be used in the northern provin­
ces.^ Less than two weeks later (November £), MacArthur 
ordered the Air Force to destroy the Korean end of all 
bridges crossing the Yalu River. Again, his order was not 
consistent with his instructions regarding aerial opera­
tions near the Manchurian border.^5 in both instances the 
Far East commander did not request a change of orders. In 
both instances the General later explained away his pre- 
emptory actions on the basis of military necessity and a 
broad, unique interpretation of his directives that was 
never envisioned by their authors.̂ 6 MacArthur won both 
cases: in the first, the JCS deferred to his judgment,
although aware he had violated orders. In the second, he
^Collins testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 
1216-17, 1228-31, 121+0; Ridgway, KoreanTWar, 61. See also, 
Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 1&I+-25, 128-29.
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 1+63; Collins, 
War in Peacetime, 200; Truman. Memoirs, II, 373-71+. See 
also, MacArthur, Reminiscences, 360; Lichterman, ”To the 
Yalu and Back,” 602-603•
36In 195>1 Admiral Sherman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff testified: tt. . .throughout this period the conduct
of affairs was made difficult by a lack of responsiveness 
to the obvious intentions of the directives which were 
transmitted out there and a tendency to debate and in cer­
tain cases to criticize.tt Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 1630. 
See also, Bradley testimony, ‘ibid., 111+6; Payne, Marshall 
Story, 316.
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successfully appealed over the heads of his military su­
periors to the Commander in Chief. In winning these two 
skirmishes against Washington, MacArthur converted the 
strong likelihood of massive Chinese intervention into a 
certainty, and then lost this last battle of a brilliant 
career.
The overwhelming Chinese onslaught in late Novem­
ber brought about a dramatic military reversal and marked 
the beginning of the second and final phase of the con­
flict between the President and the General. Truman, 
while believing that the general assault northward begun 
on the twenty-fourth was ill-advised, did not blame Mac­
Arthur for failing to defeat a vastly-superior army.
What the President found inexcusable was MacArthur1s re­
sorting to public attacks on the Administration, alleging 
that extraordinary limitations made his defeat inevitafe-: 
ble.37
Prom the time China intervened until his relief, 
MacArthur persisted in taking his case to the people, ar­
guing that the military limitations imposed upon him were 
all that stood in the way of a decisive victory. On Novem­
ber 28 MacArthur denied that he had made the "home by 
Christmas” statement when launching the general offensive
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 381-82. See also, Hoare, 
"Truman," 202.
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38on the twenty-fourth. Two days later, responding to a 
radiogram from Arthur Krock, MacArthur said that every 
strategic and tactical movement made by his forces was in 
accord with UN resolutions and his directives. He had 
taken no "major steps" without prior, full approval. Mac­
Arthur told Krock that no "authoritative source" had ever 
suggested he halt his advance at any point before the Yalu 
River boundary. (The Joint Chiefs had made such a sugges­
tion. ) China's intervention, MacArthur continued, was 
long premeditated. "It is historically inaccurate to at­
tribute any degree of responsibility for the onslaught of 
the Chinese Communist armies to the strategic course of 
the campaign itself.
On the first day of December MacArthur granted an 
interview (by telegraph) to the editor of U.S. News and 
World Report. When asked how his military operations were 
affected by the imposed limitations, particularly regard­
ing the Manchurian sanctuary, the General described these 
limitations as "an enormous handicap, without precedent in
MacArthur to Ray Henle ("Sun Oil Three-Star Ex­
tra" radio news broadcast), November 28, 1950, quoted in 
Washington Post, November 29, 1950.
"^MacArthur to Arthur Krock, November 30, 1950, 
published in New York Times, November 30, 1950. Text is 
also printed in Far East hearings, Pt. 5, 3ij-96.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
650
military history."^5 In a telegram to the United Press of 
the same date, MacArthur expressed similar sentiments. He 
said that he was faced with an "entirely new war" against 
vastly superior numbers, a situation brought about by his 
having to accept military odds, • .without precedent in 
history— the odds of permitting offensive action without 
defensive retaliation."^ Comments in a similar vein from 
MacArthur were contained in a general press release to the 
Tokyo press corps on December 2 . ^
In all these statements to the press, MacArthur 
consistently stressed four points: First, he denied that
his movements toward the Yalu had in any way triggered 
China's intervention. Second, his "end the war" (or,
"home by Christmas," or, "reconaissance in force") offen­
sive launched on November 2l\. had forced the enemy to com­
mit forces prematurely and had totally disrupted the ene-
^°New York Times, December 2, 1950; See also, Far 
East Hearings, Pt. 5> 3532-33; Collins, War in Peacetime, 279. For a list of all restrictions placed upon the con­
duct of military operations in Korea, see Marshall to Rich­
ard B. Russell, May 23, 1951, printed in Far East Hearings, 
Pt. 5, Appendix K, 3192-93.
^MacArthur to Hugh Bailie, December 1, 1950, pub­
lished in New York Herald-Tribune, December 2, 1950.
^^Washington Post, December 3, 1950. MacArthur 
communicated similar messages to Barry Faris, Internation­
al News Service, and Ward Price of the London Daily Mail. 
See Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Cbntroversy, 11+9•
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
651
my ’s strategic plans, which called for the conquest of all 
Korea by a continuous sweeping movement southward. Third, 
MacArthur took exception to reports that his forces were 
in full retreat, explaining that his troops were executing 
a predetermined retrograde movement in magnificent order. 
Fourth, he was unable to defeat the Chinese because of the 
unreasonable strictures imposed upon the conduct of his 
operations .̂ *3
Truman grew quickly out of patience with the press 
barrage coming from his Far East commander. He was con­
cerned, too, over the confusion regarding American policy 
that MacArthur’s statements were generating in other 
nations.^- The President sent the following memorandum 
to all government agencies on 'December 6 :
In the light of the present critical interna­
tional situation, and until further written notice 
from me, I wish that each one of you would take 
immediate steps to reduce the number of public
^ These four "themes” in MacArthur's statements 
were identified and elaborated upon by Spanier, Truman- 
MacArthur Controversy, llj.9-50. See also, Rovere and. 
SchlWinger, The General and the President, 152-53; Hig­
gins, Korea diicT'the Pall of Ma'c'Ar~bhur, 5o« For his own 
exposition on the second and third' points, see MacArthur 
to Frank W. Boykin, December 13, 1950, Truman Papers, OF, 
lj.71-B - Korean Emergency, Truman Library.
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 383. Truman also wrote 
that while he was disturbed that he and MacArthur were so 
far apart in their viewpoints, H. . .it was always proper 
and appropriate for him to advance his opinion to his Com­
mander in Chief. If he had gone no farther than that, I 
would never have felt compelled to relieve him.n Ibid., hi6.
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speeches pertaining to foreign or military policy 
made by officials of the departments and agencies 
of the executive branch. This applies to officials 
in the field as well as in Washington.
No speech, press release, or other public state­
ment concerning foreign policy should be released 
until it has received clearance from the Department 
of State.
No speech, press release, or other public state­
ment concerning military policy should be released 
until it has received clearance from the Department 
of Defense.
In addition to the copies submitted to the De­
partments of State or Defense for clearance, advance 
copies of speeches and press releases concerning 
foreign policy or military policy should be sub­
mitted to the White House for information.
The purpose of this memorandum is not to curtail 
the flow of information to the American people, but 
rather to insure that the information made public 
is accurate and fully in accord With the policies 
of the United States Government.h?
In a memorandum to the Secretaries of State and De­
fense the same day, Truman instructed them to order all 
overseas officials, “including military commanders," to be 
extremely cautious in their public utterances and to ob­
tain clearance for all but the most routine statements. 
Additionally, they were to be Instructed, in Truman's words, 
". • .to refrain from direct communication on military or 
foreign policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publi­
city media in the United S t a t e s . A l t h o u g h  these messa-
h.5^ Truman's memorandum was transmitted verbatim to 
MacArthur in JCS to CINCPE, December 6, 1950, Truman Pa­
pers, OP, 58l4--MacArthur's dismissal, Truman Library.
^ I b i d . See also, New York Herald-Tribune, April 
12, 1951* !Far East Hearings, Pt. 5» 353^ > Guttraan (ed.), 
Korea and the theory of Limited War, 11; Collins, War in 
Peacetime, 280.
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ges were not addressed directly to MacArthur, there can be
no doubt that he was the target.^ General Bradley later
testified that prior to MacArthur’s press statements such
an order had never been necessary, ". . .because it is
tradition and custom and common practice of military men,
when speaking on policy matters, to submit them, submit
their views, for approval."^®
For the second time Truman considered dismissing
MacArthur, but rejected the idea. He later regretted it:
"I should have relieved General MacArthur then and there.
He said he did not because it would appear that MacArthur
was being fired for the failure of the November offensive. 
Truman said that he had no desire to hit the General while 
he was down. He did not even wish to reprimand him direct­
ly.^0 This, then, is the apparent reason for the "scatter- 
gun" technique of issuing orders that every government em- 
must clear military and foreign policy statements.
Il7^ See, for example, Truman, Memoirs, II, 383; 
Acheson, Present at the Creation, l\. 72; Aches on testimony, 
Far East Hearings, Pt. 3, 1863; Marshall testimony, ibid., 
Pt. 1", 314-2; Bradley testimony, ibid., Pt. 2, 880.
^ F a r  East Hearings. Pt. 2, 889. See also, ibid., 
1020. MacArthur's view was that he had been "rauzzle&w "by 
"anonymous sources high in government circles," who were 
propagandizing against him. See Reminiscences, 385*
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 38I4..
^°Ibid.
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The target of Truman's orders must have been hit 
by the salvo, for MacArthur was publicly silent on policy 
questions throughout December and January, He continued 
to struggle with the Joint Chiefs, but through the proper, 
non-public channels. The old warrior's private dissent 
was still vigorous. In a mid-January lotter to a West 
Point classmate, who had written to congragulate his on 
his seventy-first birthday, MacArthur said he was having 
a difficult time maintaining troop integrity and a stable 
situation because of the "handicaps and delimitations” 
which had been imposed upon him. The confusion which ex­
isted over the political ramifications determining mili­
tary conduct, he wrote, were without parallel in American 
history. MacArthur closed by telling his friend not to 
be shocked if news came that he had gone to his "last 
round-up” at the end of a rope, hanged from an oriental 
telephone pole,^
A "leak” developed in MacArthur's headquarters on 
February 6, 1951* The Associated Press reported that Mac­
Arthur had recommended the use of Chinese Nationalist 
forces against the Chinese mainland and in Korea. The un­
identified source also indicated that the General had, on 
three occasions, sought permission to bomb the "privileged
51MacArthur to Charles Patterson, c. January 15, 
1951, quoted in MacArthur, Reminiscences, footnote, 382.
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sanctuary11 in Manchuria. MacArthur was reportedly stress­
ing that there could be no turning back in the struggle
against Communism, not just in Korea, but throughout the 
52Orient. A week later, under his own name, MacArthur 
issued a public statement which attacked strategic propo­
sals then under active consideration by the Joint Chiefs, 
the National Security Council and the President. He said 
that he was still fighting a war of maneuver and dismissed 
nthe concept being advanced by some11 that a switch be made 
to positional warfare by the establishment of a defensive 
line across the Korean penisula. This, MacArthur said, 
was strategically unsound and would result in the piece­
meal destruction of UN forces. He again lashed out at the 
unprecedented military advantage which sanctuary gave to 
the Chinese, who were n. • .engaging with impunity in un­
declared war against us. . , .**̂ 3
General MacArthur must have come to a decision in
February that he could no longer remain publicly silent on 
policy. Whether he sought only personal exculpation from 
the defeat in Korea, or still hoped to garner victory by 
forcing Truman and the Defense Department to yield to mass
^2New York Herald-Tribune, February 7» 1951*
New York Times, February li|., 1951* Secretary 
Marshall later testified that this statement did not, in 
his judgment, comply with the December 6, 1950, directive 
of the President. Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, JLpT5•
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popular support for his ideas is not certain. He begins 
to emerge as a Billy Mitchell-type figure, striving to 
change the strategic thinking of a static bureaucracy.
There was one significant difference: MacArthur wished to
revert to an older concept of warfare, one that recognized 
no political limitations.
The depths of MacArthur*s bitterness and frustra­
tion can be gathered from a conversation he had in Febru­
ary with General Mark Clark, then Chief of Army Field 
Forces. MacArthur dwelt on the errors in policy of “great 
magnitude and danger” being made in Washington. His views 
and recommendations, he told Clark, had been largely ig­
nored “at critical times." In this regard, he was most cri­
tical of the Joint Chiefs. MacArthur found it incomprehen­
sible that the Administration continued to allow sanctuary, 
providing the enemy with a secure base of supply and air 
operations. Clark, who would eventually replace Ridgway 
in the Far East command post, agreed with MacArthur on the 
sanctuary question then and later.^
The Far East commander was back on his most persis­
tent theme, the "abnormal conditions" affecting his com­
mand, in another public statement issued March 7* 195l» 
MacArthur closed this release by insisting that important 
politico-military decisions, far beyond his authority, had
^Clark, Danube to the Yalu, 25-26.
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yet to be made. These decisions, he said, would have to 
provide ". • .on the international level an answer to the 
obscurities which now becloud the unsolved problems raised 
by Red China's undeclared war in K o r e a . L a t e r ,  when 
asked by Senator Lyndon Johnson if the closing lines of 
this release complied ’'meticulously" with the President’s 
directive, Secretary Marshall testified that he did not 
think that it did.^ The Secretary of State had an even 
stronger reaction to a statement by MacArthur to Hugh 
Bailie, president of United Press, eight days later. The 
General criticized the decision to halt at the thirty- 
eighth parallel, since this did not achieve the mission of 
Korean unification. Acheson believed that MacArthur’s 
March 15 statement was a new move, from "private harass­
ment" of the Administration, to open defiance of Truman’s
order regarding unauthorized comment on national policy.
The conflict between Truman and MacArthur was
rapidly intensifying. On March 20, as previously described, 
the Joint Chiefs informed MacArthur that the State Depart-
^ N e w  York Times, March 8, 1951* This statement, 
like those issued in February, was not cleared through the 
Pentagon. See also, Higgins, Korea and the Fall of Mac­
Arthur, 105-106.
^ F a r  East Hearings, Pt. 1, I4.76.
57 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 5l8.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6$8
ment was in the process of drafting a statement in which 
Truman would seek a negotiated settlement.-*® In a release 
from Tokyo four days later MacArthur stated his willing­
ness to negotiate a military settlement with the enemy com­
mander. His statement also contained a thinly-veiled 
threat that if a settlement were not reached the United 
Nations might well extend military operations to the coast­
al areas and interior bases of China, bringing about its 
military collapse.
An Administration spokesman quickly informed the
press that MacArthur’s statement involved political issues
Anbeyond his responsibility as a field c o m m a n d e r H o w e v e r ,  
convinced that any possibility for negotiations had been 
temporarily forestalled, Truman abandoned the effort. In 
the President’s view, MacArthur's statement ''flouted’* UN 
policy. The General, Truman said, was in open defiance of 
the Commander in Chief, challenging the very basis of the 
civil authority of the President over the military estab-
^®JCS to CINCFE, March 20, 19$1, copy in Tannenwald 
Papers, Subject Pile, Chronology-MacArthur Hearings, Tru­
man Library.
^ New York Times, March 2J4., 1951 p Text of MacAr­
thur 1s statement is" also printed in Reminiscences, 387-88; 
Far East Hearings, Pt. 5» 3181, 35̂ -1 ”1+2; towitt (ed.), 
Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 39. See also, Millis, **Tru- 
man and' MacArthur,d 50-5l.
®°M.J. McDermott (Statement), March 21}., 195l> Tru­
man Papers, OP, 581+, Truman Library.
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lished in the Constitution. "By this act,1* Truman wrote,
MacArthur left me no choice--I could no longer tolerate
6 " lhis insubordination.'* Despite this emphatic statement 
(in his memoirs), Truman waited over two more weeks before 
relieving the Par East commander. His only immediate act 
was to order the JCS to tell MacArthur that he (the Presi­
dent) was directing his attention to the December 6 order
and stipulating that any further statements be cleared
62through channels.
Millions of copies of his March 21}. statement had 
been printed and air-dropped over enemy territory on Mac­
Arthur’s authority. He explained later that this was part 
of "psychological w a r f a r e . * * ^  MacArthur testified in his 
dismissal hearing before Congress that his statement was 
a "cold military appraisal" designed to end the bloodshed 
and bring peace. It had, he said, no relationship to the 
JCS message of the twentieth regarding the drafting of a 
peace-feeler for issue by the President. Nor, according
^Truman, Memoirs, II, kl±2. See also, Hoare, 
"Truman," 203. For the views of other participants regard­
ing! the effect of MacArthur’s March 21}. statement, see Mar­
shall testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 3i|.9, lj.28-29* 
1}1}.2-1}.5> Ij.86-7; Co'llTns test'imonyT ibid., Pt. 2, 1196-97* 
1207? Sherman testimony, ibid., 1591-92; Acheson testi­
mony, ibid., 1591-92.
^2JCS to CINCFE, March 21}., 1951* copy in Tannen- 
wald Papers, Subject File, Chronology-MacArthur Hearings, 
Truman Library.
^MacArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1,
7 2 .
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to MacArthur, was his message designed to embarrass Tru­
man ”. . .or anyone else working to bring about peace.
Less than six months later, addressing the American Legion, 
MacArthur was to say that his statement had prevented a 
disgraceful plot to appease China by surrendering Formosa 
and turning Nationalist China’s United Nation's seat over 
to Peking in return for peace in Korea. MacArthur told the 
Legionaires that he had ”unquestionably wrecked’* this 
plot.6^
House Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin precipi­
tated MacArthur'a dismissal by disclosing a letter re­
ceived from the General on the floor of the House, April 5»
1951. Martin had written to MacArthur on March 8 request-
66ing his views on the Far East. The General's now-famed 
response wa3 not unique. He dwelt on the same basic themes:
^Ibid., 68-72, 285.
65Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 201. 
Without offering any more substantiation than MacArthur 
did, two of his boiographers claimed such a plot existed 
and that MacArthur deliberately blocked it with his 
March 2J4. statement. See Whitney, MacArthur, 1+67-68; Hunt, 
Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur, 507-5>l0»
^Martin to MacArthur, March 8, 195l> printed in 
Far East Hearings, Pt. 5» 3182, 35^3• Text of letter is 
also published in Hunt, Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur, 
511. For Martin's explanation "o'if why-Ee made MacArthur»s 
letter public (a ’’tocsin” needed ”to bring the President 
and the Secretary of State to their senses”), see Lowitt 
(ed.), Truman-MacArthur Controversy,
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Release from the imposed limitations, utilization of Chinese 
Nationalist armies, recognition that while Europe received 
all of the attention, he was fighting the Battle of Arma­
geddon in A s i a . M a c A r t h u r  considered the exchange of 
letters letters with Martin innocuous, just another cour-
/ o
tesy to a Congressman, phrased in very general terms.
Viewed as a piece of private corrospondence, it was just 
that. When Martin chose (without MacArthur’s consent) to 
make the letter public it became a controversial document.
Writing in his memoirs, Truman dealt at length 
with the letter to Representative Martin. He dissected 
the two principal paragraphs, noting MacArthur’s incon­
sistency on the employment of Formosan troops, disagree­
ing with the General's “Asia-first” philosophy, and hold­
ing that the idea of ‘‘meeting force with maximum counter- 
force'* was not part of the American tradition. He ended 
his examination of MacArthur's letter with the following 
comments:
67MacArthur to Martin, March 20, 1951* printed in 
Far East Hearings, Pt. 5* 3182, 3̂ 1p3 —Ult-* Test of the let­
ter also appears in MacArthur, Reminiscences, 386; Gutt- 
man (ed.), Korea and the Theory"of Limited War, 13; Tru­
man, Memoirs, II, J4J4.5— » Payne, Marshall Story, 317; 
Willoughby and Chamberlain, MacArtEur, lj.2l-£2.
/ o
MacArthur, Reminiscences, 386; MacArthur testi­
mony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, b.b-14-7* il3.
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The time had come to draw the line. MacArthur'a 
letter to Congressman Martin showed that the gener­
al was not only in disagreement with the policy of 
the government but was challenging this policy in 
open insubordination to his Commander in Chief,°9
It was not the Martin letter that determined the 
President to dismiss MacArthur. Truman wrote that after 
March 2lp he could no longer tolerate this insubordination.̂ 0 
That MacArthur was to be fired had already been decided; 
only the means and timing were undetermined. The Martin 
letter was merely the catalytic agent which initiated 
the process.^
Shortly after Martin read MacArthur's letter to 
the House of Representatives, Secretary of State Acheson 
received a call from the White House instructing him to 
meet with the President and Secretary of Defense Marshall 
the next morning. Acheson had no doubt as to the subject 
of this m e e t i n g . G e n e r a l  Bradley also received a call
69Truman, Memoirs, II, —14-7* For other partici­
pants opinions in testimony on the Martin letter, see Far 
East Hearings, Pt. 1, 113-15* 380, l|i|5-l+7, 572-73, 581-82.
^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 1}1}.2, L1J4.8.
71j .f . stone, for one, would disagree with this 
conclusion. He said that the Martin letter— an "open 
alliance" between MacArthur and the Republican opposition- 
precipitated MacArthur's relief. Hidden History of the 
Korean War, 275* Spanier takes a somewhaV similar view 
in Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 202-201}..
72Acheson testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 3,
1733, 1751, 1910. See also, Acheson, Present at the Crea­
tion, 520.
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that afternoon, although he was not able to recall who it 
was from, advising him that the President was very con­
cerned about MacArthur*s statements. Bradley held a brief 
meeting with the Chiefs of Staff immediately afterward, 
warning them that they should consider what recommenda­
tions they would make respecting the military implica­
tions of a possible relief of General MacArthur.73
Truman met wich Acheson, Marshall, Bradley and 
Harriman in his office, Friday morning, April 6. He asked 
for their views ovx what should be done about MacArthur’s 
open defiance of the Commander in C h i e f K n o w i n g  that 
if he stated his views it would influence the advice he 
received, Truman did not contribute to the discussion. 
Harriman offered the opinion that MacArthur should have 
been dismissed two years earlier. The three other advi­
sers present were more conservative in their remarks. 
Marshall wanted time to reflect. He also told Truman that 
firing MacArthur might cause problems in getting the mili­
tary appropriations bill through Congress. Bradley be­
lieved that on the basis of his statements the President
^General Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, was 
not present at this meeting. He was represented by his 
deputy, General Haislip. For testimony concerning this 
meeting, see Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 739* 7l4-5-M>, 
759-60, 1015,“ToiB^l9,“ 1601; pt. 3, 173i.
^Truman, Memoirs, II, ljij.7; Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, 521; Acheson testimony, Far East Hearings, 
PtT 3, 19l0.
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would be justified in relieving MacArthur, but indicated a 
desire to consult with the other members of the Joint Chiefs 
before making a final recommendation, Acheson agreed on 
the question of dismissal, but was concerned about the 
political, military and diplomatic repercussions. He cau­
tioned against making a hasty decision, since basic ques­
tions were involved, particularly the prerogatives and 
duties of the President as Commander in Chief in his rela­
tionship to a prestigious commander who was one of his 
most important military subordinates. He warned the Presi­
dent that if the decision was made to relieve MacArthur, 
he would face the greatest political battle of his Admini­
stration. Acheson later confided in his memoirs, "There 
was no doubt what General MacArthur deserved; the sole 
issue was the wisest way to administer it."7$ Truman 
made no decisions at this meeting. He asked those present 
to meet among themselves and then meet again with him the 
following morning.^
'^Acheson, Present at the Creation, £21. See also, 
Truman, Memoirs, II, I4J4.7i AciEeson testimony, Par East Hear­
ings, Pt. 3, 1*776-77, 1910, 1979-80.
^Bradley testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2,
10li7* Acheson testimony, ibid., Pt. 3, l7£l; Truman, 
Memoirs, II, J4I1.7-I4.8. During the Far East Hearings, Gen­
eral Bradley, under questioning by Senator Alexander 
Wiley (Republican, Wisconsin), refused to divulge what was 
said by any persons present at the meetings with the Presi­
dent regarding MacArthur*s dismissal: w. • .in my position
as an adviser, one of the military advisers to the Presi­
dent. e .if I have to publicize my recommendations and my
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The meeting together of the four advisers Friday 
afternoon and their subsequent meeting with the President 
on .Saturday, April 7# were inconclusive. In the Friday 
meeting General Marshall asked the others for their opin­
ions as to the possibility of ordering MacArthur to Wash­
ington for consultation and arriving at a final determina­
tion after that. Acheson, Bradley and Harriman were all 
opposed. The Secretary of State’s objections were all 
based on political considerations.^ Truman’s session with 
the Game four advisers on Saturday morning was brief. Mar­
shall told the President that he had read all the communi­
cations received from MacArthur since 191+.9 and now agreed
discussions. • .my value as an adviser is ruined.w Far 
Bast Hearings, Pt. 2, 7&3« Chairman Richard Russell 
^Democrat, Georgia), ruled that Bradley was justified in 
holding that his talks with Truman constituted a privi­
leged communication and was not, therefore, in contempt 
of Congress. Russell's ruling was appealed and a lengthy 
debate ensued lasting two days and occupying over one hun­
dred pages of the hearings record. The senators argued at 
length over the principle of the separation of powers, in­
vestigative powers of Congress, the relationship of the 
military to the Commander in Chief, and numerous other re­
lated questions. In the end, the chair was sustained, 
eighteen to eight, on a bipartisan vote. Four Republicans, 
voted with the majority, and two Democrats, J. William 
Fulbright (Arkansas), Guy M. Gillette (Iowa), voting with 
the minority. See Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 762-872. Tru­
man later had high praise for Bradley's refusal to testify 
to conversations held with him as Commander in Chief, be­
lieving it to involve a basic question as to the validity 
of the separation of powers principle. See Truman, Memoirs,
II, 1^52-53.
^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 521-22; Ache­
son testimony, Far Bast" Hearings, pt. 3, I75l> Bradley 
testimony, ibid., Pt"." 2, 161+7.
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with. Harriman that he should have been fired two years 
earlier. Truman directed Bradley to obtain the opinions 
of the Chiefs of Staff from a "purely military" point of 
view. He accepted a suggestion that all present dwell 
privately on the question over the weekend and instructed 
them to be prepared to make their final recommendations 
to him on Monday.^®
General Bradley met with the Chiefs of Staff at 
the Pentagon on Sunday afternoon, April 8, in order to 
obtain their views. They all concurred; MacArthur should 
be dismissed. There was discussion among them as to the 
feasibility of relieving MacArthur of just the Korean com­
mand and allowing him to remain in his post as Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers for Japan (SCAP), but this 
was ruled out as impractical. The four members of the 
JCS met later in the afternoon with Secretary Marshall, 
and each presented his own reasons for agreeing to the 
dismissal. As later reported by General Bradley, the 
Joint Chiefs had three basic reasons for concurring in 
the removal: first, the General's official communications
and public statements indicated a lack of sympathy with 
the limited war policy in Korea; second, MacArthur had
78Truman, Memoirs, II, Acheson, Present at
the Creation, 522; Marshall testimony, Far East Hearings, 
Pt. i, 31+5, 14-20; Bradley testimony, ibid., Pt. 3, 1751-52, 
1911.
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violated the President's directive relative to clearing 
public statements; third, ”. . .the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
have felt and feel now that the military must be controlled 
by civilian authority in this country,” and MacArthur*s ac­
tions were jeopardizing this c o n t r o l .
Meeting with the President at nine o'clock Monday 
morning, Bradley informed him of the unanimous concurrence
Qof the JCS. Marshall, Acheson and Harriman, each in his 
turn, indicated agreement that General MacArthur should be 
immediately relieved of all his commands. It was only 
then that Truman told them: ”1 had already made up my
mind that General MacArthur had to go when he made his 
statement of March 2l|..,*^‘ The President directed that or-
79'Bradley testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 
878-81; Collins testimony, ibid., 12X5-18. The reasons 
that the Joint Chiefs concurred in the dismissal were ex­
amined at great length by the members of the committee. 
Perhaps this was because MacArthur had repeatedly insisted 
that he and the JCS were in total accord. MacArthur testi­
mony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 283. The page numbers 
that follow all cite testimony on this singular subject of 
the reasons for JCS concurrence. Ibid., Pt. 1, 322-23, 
i+75, 517-18, 586-87; Pt. 2, 739-lj.oTTO, 908-909, 10k2-l|.3, 
1107, 1187, 1195-96, 1198-1200, 1209, 1215, 1252, 1264., 
1269, 1314.8-51, 1356-58, 1391, 1403, ll̂ l-lt.6, 1571-72, 
1578-79, 1598-99; Pt. 3, 23I4.6-I4.7•
®^Truman, Memoirs, II, iflj.8; Far East Hearings, Pt. 
1, 3^7. After his presidency, Truman said MacArthur would 
never have been relieved if the Joint Chiefs of Staff were 
in control of policy. Truman Speaks, 2l+.
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 1̂ 1-8; Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, 522. See-"also, Marshall testimony, yarHBast 
Hearings, Pt. 1, 3I4.5• ij.20-21; Acheson testimony, ibid.,
Pt."37 1752, 1911.
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ders be prepared relieving MacArthur and appointing General 
Ridgway as his successor. These orders and a draft public 
statement were brought to the President at three o'clock,
O pTuesday, April 10, and he approved them.
An unfortunate series of events disrupted the pro­
cess by which MacArthur was to be informed of his relief.
It was originally planned that the Secretary of the Army, 
Prank Pace, who was then in Korea, would personally inform 
the General in Tokyo. The orders were to be wired in 
State Department code to Ambassador Muccio in Pusan for de­
livery to Pace, whom, it was assumed, was with Muccio. 
However, Pace was visiting the front with Ridgway at the 
time. In addition, a power unit failed at Pusan, delaying 
receipt of the message from the State Department. At this 
point, General Bradley came to Blair House to tell Truman 
that the news had apparently leaked and wa3 to be published 
by a Chicago paper in the morning, long before Pace could 
reach MacArthur. The President, perhaps to avoid giving 
his antagonist an opportunity to resign before he was 
fired, ordered that MacArthur be informed immediately and
O p
Truman, Memoirs, II, l|l+8. See also, Far East 
Hearings, Pt. 1, 341? J Pt. 3, 17p2. Truman apparently 
erred when he wrote that he received and approved of these 
draft orders relieving MacArthur on Monday, April 9. See 
Memoirs, II, 1+48 •
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Qo
directly over the Array’s own comraunications network.
At one o’clock in the morning, April 11, reporters 
were summoned to the White House and given a series of 
hurriedly-reproduced copies of the dismissal order, a 
statement by the President, and several "background" docu­
ments.®^" The order, summarily relieving MacArthur of all 
commands, has been previously quoted.®^ In the accompany­
ing statement, Truman said it had become necessary to re­
move the General because he could not give "wholehearted 
support" to the policies of the United States and the 
United Nations. Acknowledging that "full and vigorous de­
bate" is a vital element in democracy, the President went 
on to say: "It is fundamental, however, that military
Q-j
Truman, Memoirs, II, J4I4.8—1+9; Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, 522-23. Afull description of the press 
■"Teak’1 can be found in Phillips, Truman Presidency, 3U-2 —i+3» 
For detailed testimony dealing with the method of relief, 
see Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 3k5-kh* 3k8-k9* l|.l8-19> 519- 
20, SBSjTfcT '2,' 714.6-1+7; pt. 3, 1777.
®^Fruman, Memoirs, II, 1+1+9• See also, Item No. 77 
Statement by the President on Relieving General MacArthur 
of His Commands, April 11, 1951* Public Papers . . .  Tru­
man, 1951* 222-23. The documents released to accompany 
this statement were copies of the President’s directive of 
December 6, 1950* the JCS messages of March 20, 21̂., 1951» 
MacArthur’s statement of March 21+, and MacArthur'3 letter 
to Congressman Joseph Martin. See ibid., 223. See also, 
Washington Post, April 12, 1951.
See preceding chapter. Text is also found in 
Far East Hearings, Pt. 5# 35hh.
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commanders must be governed by the policies and directives 
issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and ©on-
O/stitution.** Truman also addressed the nation by radio 
on the evening of April 11. The bulk of the speech ex­
plained basic policies in Korea. Only two paragraphs men­
tioned the dismissal of MacArthur and they were largely a 
rephrasing of the statement he had issued early that morn­
ing.
General MacArthur was informed of his dismissal by 
his wife, who learned of it from an aide listening to a
O Onews broadcast. The relief process was abrupt and lack­
ed the courtesy many felt he should have been accorded.
The method of dismissal did seem, as MacArthur said, to
89show w. • .callous disregard for the ordinary decencies.1* 
His relief came, he said, **. . .just when victory was 
within my grasp.1̂ 0 Shortly after the news was received,
®^Item No. 77, Public Papers • • • Truman, 195>1, 
222; Truman, Memoirs, II,Tp^.
®^Item No. 78, Radio Report to the American People 
on Korea and on U.S. Policy in the Par East, April 11,
1951* Public Papers . . • Truman, 19511 223-27*
OO
MacArthur testimony, Par East Hearings, Pt. 1,
26; Willoughby and Chamberlain, MacArthur, k23»
®^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 395* 3®® also, Wil­
loughby and Chamberlain, MacArthur, h17; Whitney, Mac­
Arthur, I}. 73.
^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 392.
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General Whitney told the Tokyo press corps somewhat melo­
dramatically: "I have just left the General. He received
the word magnificently. . . • His soldierly qualities were 
never more pronounced. I think this has been his finest 
hour.‘*91 MacArthur*s own estimate of his personal worth 
was never higher than when he described in his memoirs 
the world's reaction to the news of his dismissal;
Moscow and Peiping rejoiced. The bells were rung 
and a holiday atmosphere prevailed. The left-wingers 
everywhere exulted. But in the Far East, there wa3 
bewilderment and shock. I had been there so long in 
supreme command that I had become a kind of symbol 
of the free world--a bulwark against the spread of 
Communism. The removal of the symbol was not under­
stood, and tended to shake faith in our ways andmethods.92
Much of the intial response to MacArthur*s dismiss­
al in the United States took the form of vehement attacks 
on President Truman. He was burned in effigy in numerous 
cities. Dock workers in New York walked out in a protest 
strike. The Los Angeles City Council adjourned to sorrow­
fully contemplate the "political assassination" of MacAr­
thur. The legislatures of Illinois, Michigan, Florida and 
California all passed resolutions condemning Truman's ac­
tion. ̂  Time magazine commented, "Seldom had a more unpopu-
^■Quoted in Willoughby and Chamberlain, MacArthur,
11-23.
^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 395. See also, Whit- 
ney, MacArthur, l\73i Hunt, Untold' Story of Douglas Mac- 
Arthu'r, f?l6-l7.
^Spanier, Tnunan-MacArthur Controversy, 211; Lu* 
kacs, History of the ColcT War, fhaEnote, 9ll-«
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lar man fired a more popular one.M<̂  Many in the Senate 
were incredulous. Senator William Jenner announced solemn­
ly that "a secret inner coterie1* directed by Soviet agents 
was running the government of the United States. Senator 
Richard M. Nixon saw the dismissal as rank appeasement of 
Communism. He suggested that the Senate censure the Presi­
dent and insist that he reinstate MacArthur to command. 
Senator Joseph McCarthy said the President must have made 
his decision while drunk on benedictine and bourbon. Mc­
Carthy added: "The son of a bitch ought to be i m p e a c h e d .  "95
Writing at the time of the dismissal, journalist
Arthur Krock said that it is a "basic American principle" 
that the authority of the President as Commander in Chief 
must not be undermined by military officers: "This basic
principle General MacArthur disregarded with increasing
^■Quoted in Eldorous L. Dayton, Give 'em Hell 
Harry: An Informal Biography of the Terrible Tempered
Mr. T. *7New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1956), 2bl.
A report of a public opinion poll taken at the end of 
June 1951 showed Republicans to be very "solid" in their 
support of MacArthur in the dispute with Truman. Demo­
crats were "evenly divided" in their support according to 
a White House memorandum, Lloyd to Murphy, et. al., (un­
dated), Lloyd Piles, MacArthur Firing, Truman Library.
95Richard H. Rovere, Senator Joe McCarthy (New York: 
World Publishing Company, 1959), 12. Hereinafter cited as 
Rovere, Senator Joe McCarthy. See also, LaPeber, America, 
Russia, and the 'Cold War, 120; Spanier, Truman-MacArthur 
Cb'ntroversy,~212-13; Rovere and Schlesinger, Hh'e' General 
and the Preaident, 12-13; Warren, President as World leader,
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openness, but it certainly does not seem to be disapproved
by millions of Americans.‘*96 Author John Spanier claimed
that telegrams poured into Congress at a ratio of ten to
one against Truman’s decision.^7 if internal White House
reports can be accepted on this subject, Truman faired
much better in messages addressed directly to him. By the
end of the fifth week following MacArthur's relief, Truman
had received ij.6,389 letters and telegrams described as
"Pro MacArthur" and 37*708 that were "Pro President."^® 
Apparently some of the President's correspondents became
quite abusive in their denunciations of his decision.
Memoranda from the White House mail room listed a total
of 1,71|.5 letters and cards "critical of the President" as
99having been sent to the Secret Service.
Untold millions of Americans may have opposed Tru­
man’s recall of MacArthur, but an overwhelming majority of
96Arthur Krock, "MacArthur and Truman," New York 
Times, April 21, 1951, reprinted in Krock, In the Nation,
97Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 211.
oA 0Margeurite Mondlock to William Hopkins, May 8, 
1951, Truman Papers, OP, 58lj.-MacArthur 1 a Dismissal, Presi­
dent's Action in Relieving General MacArthur (folder 2), 
Truman Library.
99This figure is a compilation of data contained 
in numerous file memoranda from the weeks just after Mac­
Arthur 's relief, located in ibid.
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the working press supported his decision. An extensive sur­
vey of 332 newspaper and periodical correspondents in Wash­
ington, Korea, Tokyo, and at the United Nations was made a 
few weeks after the relief action.'*’00 Eighty-five percent 
of the reporters questioned believed Truman to be right in 
removing the General; only thirteen percent felt he was 
wrong. Most also agreed that the decision was ”. . .delay­
ed too long and delivered too bluntly. ”’*’0’*’ The main rea­
sons given by those correspondents who agreed that the re­
call was warranted were almost identical to the reasons 
stated for their concurrence by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
The reporters saw MacArthur as obviously out of sympathy 
with national policy. More importantly, they emphasized 
the necessity for civilian control: ”. • .we must pre­
serve the Constitutional right of the Commander-in-Chief 
to remove an insubordinate general.”^0^ With considerable 
foresight, seventy-two percent of the reporters polled in­
dicated a belief that the American people would eventually
'*’00Elmo Roper and Louis Harris, ”The Press and the 
Great Debate: A Survey of Correspondents in the Truman - 
MacArthur Controversy,” Saturday Review of Literature,
XXXIV (July II4., 1951), Hereinafter cited as Roper
and Harris, ”The Press and the Great Debate.”
101ibia.. 7.
102Ibld,, 6.
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approve the President’3 decision.
The emotional fever was running high as MacArthur 
arrived in San Francisco from the Far East. The defeated 
commander, stripped of all powers and accused of flagrant 
insubordination, was driven about the streets, not in a 
tumbrel, but in a Cadillac limousine of the type used for 
a conquering hero or a visiting monarch. In the minds 
of many, he was both. MacArthur described his welcome 
home as “tumultuous.“ With unabashed conceit he wrote:
“It seemed to me that every man, woman, and child in San 
Francisco turned out to cheer us.“^ ^  Having been invited 
to address a joint session of the Congress on April 19, he 
flew on to Washington where, the General recalled, ”. • .it 
looked as though the whole District of Columbia greeted
^Ibid., 8. Editor Harold Stein may have inter­
preted the public mood best when he wrota: “. . .the
noisy but evanescent outcry in MacArthur’s favor really 
reflected dismay over the dismal events in Korea, the 
stirrings of violent partisan political warfare, and gener­
al distaste with the Truman Administration; it did not 
represent any substantial support of MacArthur’s proposal 
to enlarge the fighting.” See “Editorial Comments: To
the Yalu and Back," in Stein (ed.), American Civil-Mili­
tary Decisions: A Book of Case Studies (University, Ala­
bama: University”"onf AlaBama Press, 1963), 61j.l. A similar
view has been expressed by John Spanier in his, American 
Foreign Policy, 96-97*
■^^Rovere and Schlesinger, The General and the 
President, 11.
^MacArthur, Reminiscences, lj.00.
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our arrival."10^
MacArthur*s speech to the Congress was a forensic 
masterpiece. He began by depicting himself as just another 
American "in the fading twilight of life," desiring only 
to serve his country. In the body of the speech he empha­
sized the importance of the Par East and his role there, 
glossed over the reasons for his recall, reiterated his be­
lief that there was no substitute for total victory, and 
dismissed the President’s policies as appeasement. He 
closed with the touching, now-famous lines about old sol­
diers not dying, but just fading away, promising to do 
likewise.
The "fading away" process was protracted and 
voluble. It began with MacArthur’s being borne from the 
Congress down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Washington Monu­
ment in yet another ceremonial automobile. As he rode be­
tween ranks of cheering admirers, formations of Air Force 
jet fighters and bombers provided an aerial escort. In 
ceremonies at the monument grounds, MacArthur was awarded 
a silver tea service by his followers along with a seven-
106Ibld.
107MacArthur, Address to Joint Meeting of the Con­
gress, April, 19£l> printed in Far East Hearings, Pt. 5> 
35>53-p8« Text of address is also published in MacArthur, 
Reminiscences, Bernstein and Matusow (eds.),
Truman Administration, l|bl-69.
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teen-gun s a l u t e . T r u m a n ,  sitting in the White House a 
short distance from this scene, had anticipated it all.
In a litter to a friend on the day he signed the dismissal 
order, he had written: 11 It will undoubtedly create a
great furor but under the circumstances I could do nothing 
else and still be President of the United States
Through these ceremonies and numerous addresses, 
General MacArthur had ample opportunity to present his 
case to the public. The climax came in the Senate investi­
gation of the reasons for MacArthur*s dismissal, which be­
gan on May 3, 1951* Thirteen witnesses were heard in a
forty-two day period in which a total of 2,l|.£0,000 words
110were recorded on 3*691 pages of printed testimony.
MacArthur, the lead-off witness, testified for three 
n  tdays. The General assured his questioners that he did
not "in any way" question the President's decision to fire
Rovere, The General and the President, 11. A 
similar reception followed shortly after in New York City 
where an estimated 7.5 million people lined the streets 
of his procession. See Spanier, American Foreign Policy, 
96; Rees, Age of Containment, i|0.
^•°^Truman to unidentified correspondent, April’10, 
1951* quoted in Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, 33*
•1-^Payne, Marshall Story, 319; !tA Brief Commentary 
on the Witnesses Appearing"Before the Committee,11 Far East 
Hearings, Pt. 5, 357k-
■^■^The bulk of testimony taken, in addition to Mac- 
Arthur's, came from General Bradley and Secretaries Mar:̂ »i 
shall and Acheson, who testified for five, eight, and nine 
days, respectively. Far East Hearings, Pt. 5>» 357^-75*
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him or his right to do so. But he repeatedly dismissed as
"completely invalid" the reason Truman gave for dismissing
him— a lack of sympathy with established policies— by
claiming that while he sometimes disagreed with the wisdom
and judgment of the orders and directives he received, he
112carried them out to the best of his ability.
There appeared to be an area of agreement between 
MacArthur and Truman over the command latitude that must 
be accorded by the commaider in chief to a theater comman­
der. MacArthur testified that once war began a theater 
commander had to direct— politically, economically, and 
militarily— the whole area encharged to him: "You have
got to trust at that stage of the game when politics fails, 
and the military takes over, you must trust the mili­
tary. • • ,"-^3 on the same subject, later in his testi­
mony, he said, ". • .there should be no non-professional 
interference in the handling of troops in a campaign. You 
have professionals to do that job and they should be per-
112MacArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 
27-28, 197, 282-8lj., 289, 308. An erabarassing typographi- 
cal error (or Freudian slip) at one point in his testimony, 
records MacArthur as saying: "I have not carried out every
directive that X have ever received. • • ." See ibid., 30. 
Emphasis supplied. For additional statements by WacArthur 
relative to his avowed belief in civil supremacy, see 
Reminiscences, 292-93*
113Far East Hearings, Pt. 1,
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mitted to do it. . . Truman once related in an in­
terview hia belief that one of MacArthur*s tactical deci­
sions seemed wrong, but that he did not countermand it be­
cause the General was commander in the field. He explain­
ed: ”You pick your man, you've got to back him up.
119That's the only way a military organization can work.** 
Truman's belief in allowing commanders tactical latitude 
was more than an abstract principle to him. He never pub­
licly criticized his commanders' conduct of field opera­
tions, nor dictated troop dispositions to them, except in 
the broad, strategic sense. For example, in July 1950 b.e 
told reporters: ”1 am not in charge of the military in
Korea. . . , a report is made every day by General MacAr­
thur, and he is the one to evaluate the situation. I rely
116on his evaluation.11 To this extent, the General and 
the President were in agreement on the civil-military re­
lationship.
^Ibid., 289.
‘̂ '’Quoted in Neustadt, Presidential Power, 12l|-25. 
See also, Dahl, Pluralist Democracy, ld)5»
^^Item No. 191, Press Conference, July 13, 1950, 
Public Papers. . • Truman, 1950, 523. In another press 
conference following MacArthur's removal, Truman said that 
the decision to send UN forces up to the Yalu was, n. • .a 
matter of tactics in the field, and is the responsibility 
of the field commander. I never interfere with the field 
commander in any of their maneuvers.” Item No. 95, ibid., 
(1951), 2614..
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A major area of disagreement between Truman and 
MacArthur which was highlighted in the latter’s testimony 
was, of course, the political restrictions which the Presi­
dent's limited war policy placed on the conduct of mili­
tary operations. "I do unquestionably state," MacArthur 
said, "that when men become locked in battle, that there
should be no artifice under the name of politics, which
t»117should handicap your own men. . . .  In voicing public
opposition to these limitations, MacArthur believed he was 
performing a service, because the American public had the 
right to know the truth and Truman had no right to "gag" 
him. In his memoirs, MacArthur quoted British Field 
Marshall Lord Alanbrooke, who had defended MacArthur's ac­
tions by saying that any general who is unable to obtain 
the political advice and guidance he seeks has a responsi­
bility to act on his own.119 The fullest expression of 
MacArthur's revolutionary interpretation of his responsi­
bility to civilian authority can be found in an address
•*~̂ F ar East Hearings, Pt. 1, See also, ibid.,
39-1+0, 67-5*57
^ ^Ibid., 99-100. For some general analyses of Mac- 
Arthur's testimony in the hearings, see Spanier, Truman- 
MacArthy Controversy, 236-38; Osgood, Limited War,' I73“7U-? 
Arthur ftrock, "hacArthur ’ s Test imony," Hew York"1 ¥Imes,
May 5, 19513 reprinted in Krock, In the Nation, 186-89.
119MacArthur, Reminiscences, 392-93*
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he made to the legislature of Massachusetts three months 
after his dismissal:
I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown 
and dangerous concept that the members of the Armed 
Forces owe their primary allegiance and loyalty to 
those who temporarily exercise the authority of the 
executive branch of the government, rather than to 
the country and its Constitution they are sworn to 
defend. No proposition could cast greater doubt on 
the integrity of the Armed F o r c e s , 120
The Truman Administration did not sit passively 
by during this period, but counterattacked; the basic ar­
gument being that the really "new and dangerous concept" 
was embodied in MacArthur’s public challenge to the poli­
cies of his Commander in Chief. A major response to the 
charges MacArthur was publicizing at the time was deliver­
ed by General Bradley one week after the dismissal. Speak­
ing at Chicago, Bradley refuted MacArthur point by point. 
Whereas MacArthur said there was no Korean policy, Bradley 
listed its primary objectives, making it plain that ap­
peasement— another MacArthur charge— was not part of that 
policy. Without naming him specifically, Bradley described 
MacArthur’s solutions for Korea as not being militarily 
feasible. Bradley emphasized that the Korean conflict had 
to be understood as part of a worldwide American commit­
ment to contain Communism and prevent the onset of a third
Quoted in Ridgway, Korean War, 233*
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121world war. To counter rumors to the contrary, on April 
19, 1951, the Pentagon issued a statement saying that 
**. • .the action taken by the President in relieving Gen. 
MacArthur was based upon the unanimous recommendations of 
the Presidents principal civilian and military advisers, 
including the Joint Chiefs of Staff."’*’22
Truman remianed publicly aloof from the contro­
versy engendered by MacArthur's relief throughout April, 
Issuing no statements in rebuttal and responding non- 
commitally to pointed questions in his press conferences. 
Privately, he was not as disinterested. For example, in 
a note to Averell Harriman on April 21}., Truman wrote:
"He (Eisenhower) seems to be on top of the situation and 
he also seems to understand the international situation 
better than another 5-star General I can name."^23 In a 
press conference held the day MacArthur first testified in 
the hearings on his dismissal, Truman openly joined the 
battle to defend his policies. The President told report-
•^■^DOD Release No. 72-51S, "Address by General Omar 
Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Na­
tional Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters, 
April 17, 1951,n copy in White House files, Korean Docu­
ments (folder 2), Truman Library. For examples of MacAr­
thur *s charges, see his testimony in Far East Hearings,
Pt. 1, 30, 39-40, 146-47.
122Statement on the Relief of General MacArthur, 
April 19, 1951, copy in White House Files, Korean Docu­
ments (folder 2), Truman Library.
■^Truman to Harriman, April 24, 195>1, Eisenhower 
Papers, FF/DDE, Truman folder (2), Eisenhower Library.
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ers that it was only ’just recently" that MacArthur had 
permitted the Central Intelligence Agency to operate in 
his command. He said that it was MacArthur's persuasion 
at Make Island that convinced him the Chinese Communists 
would not intervene in North Korea. Truman also told the 
assembled reporters that he was confident of vindication 
once testimony in the hearings was completed.
In a nationally-broadcast address on May 7 the 
President struck back repeatedly at the various charges 
levelled by MacArthur in his ju3t completed testimony. 
Acknowledging that he had refused to extend the Far East 
conflict, he explained that such action offered no real 
promise of ending the war, but posed the very real threat 
of expanding and protracting the hostilities. As to the 
As to the suggestion by MacArthur that the United States 
"go it alone," if the allies were unwilling to attack 
China, Truman said this would destroy the United Nations, 
NATO, and the entire collective security system. Through­
out, he returned to the overall guiding principle of his
■^^Item No. 95, Press Conference, May 3, 1951, Pub­
lic Papers . . .  Truman, 1951» 261-62. Truman had private­
ly expressed the belief that justification for his firing 
of MacArthur would emerge in the congressional hearings. 
Writing in late April to a New Jersey legislator, Truman 
had first expressed this conviction. Truman to Robert G. 
Hendrickson, April 27, 1951, Truman Papers, OF, 58h-Mae- 
Arthur Dismissal, President’s Action in Relieving General 
Douglas MacArthur of His Commands, (folder 2), Truman 
Library.
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policy decisions, the prevention of a third world war.^^^ 
MacArthur was never mentioned by name, but he was unques­
tionably the main topic, a point not lost to the press in
126their accouhts the next day.
In the lengthy, often tedious pages of the hear­
ings in Congress can be found the vindication which Truman 
had predicted. No objective reading of these pages can 
lead to any other conclusion but that the President was 
amply justified in removing MacArthur from command. Vir­
tually all of the testimony which followed MacArthur’a 
rebutted his basic contentions. This evidence, cited at 
great length throughout the present and preceding chapters, 
does not require restatement here. The case for MacArthur's 
dismissal was cogently summarized by General Marshall:
• • .the responsibilities and the courses of ac­
tion assigned to a theater commander necessarily 
apply to his own immediate area of responsibility.
It is completely understandable and, in fact, at 
times commendable that a theater commander should 
become so wholly wrapped up in his own aims and re­
sponsibilities that some of the directives received 
by him from higher authority are not those that he 
would have written for himself. There is nothing 
new about this sort of thing in our military his­
tory. What is new, and what has brought about the 
necessity for General MacArthur ’s removal, is the
125Item No. 96, Address at a Dinner of the Civil De­
fense Conference, May 7# 1951# Public Papers . . .  Truman, 
1951, 265-69, passim.
126See, for example, New York Herald-Tribune, May 8, 
1951# Washington News, May 8, 1951*
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wholly unprecedented situation of a local theater 
Commander publicly express'lng^hTs displeasure at~and 
his disagreemen'b with the foreign and military poTT^ 
cy of the United States.
TE became apparent that General MacArthur had 
grown so far out of sympathy with the established 
policies of the United States that there was grave 
doubt as to whether he could any longer be permitted 
to exercise the authority in making decisions that 
normal command functions would assign to a theater 
commander. In this situation, there was no other re­
course but to relieve him.127
Douglas MacArthur had described the onset of the 
Korean conflict as *Mars* last gift to an old warrior.**128 
Seemingly, fate had handed him the capstone for a career 
already legendary. Up to the moment of Chinese interven­
tion, the final chapter was ending in fairy-tale fashion; 
the hordes of the defeated aggressor in mindless flight 
from the righteous wrath of the avenging angel. Fortune, 
however, when shown a hero, wrote a tragedy. If was not 
the defeat, nor the conceit that could not acknowledge 
failure which tarnished the heroic figure, but the para- 
noidal assault on his civilian superiors, striking at the 
very base of the system to which he had devoted over a 
half-century of his life. Wilber Hoare has described Mac-
7par East Hearings, Pt. 1, 325. Emphasis supplied 
See also, Payne, Marshall Story, 319-20. The other impor­
tant Army commanders of the period are in substantial agree 
ment with Marshall. For example, see Bradley testimony,
Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 752-53* 10l}.l-I|4; Collins testi- 
mony, ibid., li9h-95; Ridgway, Korean War, lij.l-ij.2, 152-53#
T oAQuoted in Higgins, Korea and the Fall of Mac­
Arthur, 25.
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Arthur as a "politico-military anachronism,” whose • • 
sense of frustration and rage at being denied an unequivo­
cal victory were not those of a man who understood the
reasons for denial and opposed them, but of one who did
129not understand at all." But in view of MacArthur's ac­
knowledged brilliance, it is difficult to believe that he 
had no comprehension of the concept of limited warfare. 
Rather, it seems, he fully grasped the concept intellec­
tually, but rejected it as a principle for the conduct of 
military operations. Then, failing to win acceptance for 
his views through the established channels, he took his 
case to the public in clear and open opposition to the
Commander in Chief.
The historical parallel between Lincoln's diffi­
culties with General George McClellan and his with MacAr­
thur was not overlooked by a Civil War buff like Truman.
He recognized a basic difference, in that he was trying to
129Hoare, "Truman,” 199-200. For a discussion of 
the "living legend" image attached to MacArthur, see Ro- 
vere and Schlesinger, The General and the President, 3-5J 
Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, lij.7-ll9.
13°General agreement with the view expressed can be 
found in Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 198-99. 
Wilber Hoare disagrees with this interpretation. It is his 
belief that MacArthur never intended to dispute Truman's 
authority as Commander in Chief and never felt that he had 
done so. See Hoare, "Truman," 205-207. For an example of 
MacArthur's refutation of Truman's limited war policy, see 
his testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 39-lj.O.
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keep;a checkrein on MacArthur, whereas Lincoln was trying
131desperately to get McClellan to attack. But Truman im­
plies that McClellan (like MacArthur) was fired for politi­
cally opposing hi3 commander in chief, when in truth he 
was dismissed for his failures as a general.̂ 32 The real 
parallel may well be, as one writer noted, that like Mc­
Clellan, MacArthur was ". . .confusing his popularity as a 
symbol of patriotism in a nation at war with his duty as a 
general on active s e r v i c e . "^33 Had MacArthur first retired 
and then opposed Truman's policies in the political arena 
(as Eisenhower did), he would have been beyond reproach.
But by attacking from within, he forced his own dismissal:
• . .it is • • • obvious that a democratic govern­
ment cannot permit a general of the Mac(Arthur) type 
to continue in his position. His sustained opposi­
tion would unsettle the very basis of democratic 
authority. In such a situation the general can ren­
der a greater service to his cause and can stimulate 
democratic discussion of the issue involved by get­
ting out of the army and taking his case to the 
people. • «. .̂ 3q-
^ Truman, Memoirs, II, MacArthur unfavorably
compared Truman'3 attitude toward him with Lincoln's in a 
somewhat "comparable circumstance" involving General Grant, 
See his Reminiscences, 39k»
132t . Harry Williams, "The Macs and the Ikes, Ameri­
ca's Two Military Traditions," American Mercury, LXXV (Oc­
tober, 19f?2), 37* Hereinafter cited as Williams, "The Macs 
and the Ikes."
Korea;: and the Fall of MacArthur, ij.0. 
Another commentary orTTjKe parallels between McClellan and 
MacArthur is in Ridgway, Korean War, 15>2, 261,
‘̂Nfilliaras, "The Macs and the Ikes," 38-39.
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The basis for the disagreement between Truman and 
MacArthur rested upon fundamental strategic policy deter* 
minations. Truman had decided that extending military 
operations beyond Korea itself, in order to obtain a vic­
tory in Korea, involved too great a risk of general war. 
Also, the President determined that victory— in the sense 
of Korean unification— was neither worth the increased ef­
fort that would be required, nor esserbi/OL to American 
security.*^5 MacArthur, of course, o n.- idered the Par 
Eastern struggle to be the pivotal, climactic contest be­
tween the forces of capitalism and communism. Truman came 
to accept a military stalemate which preserved South Korean 
sovereignty as achievement enough; MacArthur could accept 
no alternative to complete victory. Since Truman neither 
could nor would relinquish his authority as Commander in 
Chief to conduct the war, MacArthur had to go.
The restrictions placed upon MacArthur by the 
limited war policy— a few were later lifted— did represent 
a significant check by the President on the conduct of 
military o p e r a t i o n s . * - ^  Raymond G. O'Connor correctly
*^Hoare, Truman,1* 205.
*-^MacArthur was denied permission to bomb Racin, a 
North Korean port near the Soviet border. In August,1951 
Ridgway was allowed to strike this target. Hermes, Truce 
Tent and Fighting Front, 107-108. In June 1952 Truman 
Tifted’ "the" ban on bombing dams and hydroelectrice plants 
on the Yalu. Ibid., 319-22. In July 1952 Truman allowed 
the bombing of Pyongyang which had previously been off- 
limits. Ibid., 321+.
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maintains that these controls ". • .enlarged the President’s
137role as Coramander-in-Chief. " He is probably correct in
holding that the conflict with MacArthur was an understand­
able consequence of Truman’s exercising this role. But 
O'Connor stands on shakier historical ground when he as­
serts that Truman's "detailed control of battlefield 
operations" was without any precedent. "Even Lincoln," 
O ’Connor says, "did not match Truman's interference with 
military t a c t i c s . s o  long as MacArthur (and his suc­
cessors) operated within the strategic guidelines imposed 
by the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, tactical 
decisions were neither dictated nor countermanded. Truman 
did not believe that the field deployment and utilization 
of forces was a proper function of a commander in chief. 
Lincoln, particularly when McClellan was in command in the 
East, was actively engaged in tactical direction of armies
in the f i e l d . ^39
Truman commented often, after the event, on Mac­
Arthur 's dismissal and its meaning. He believed that Mac­
Arthur did not deliberately set out to challenge his au-
137o'Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of
Power," 72.
130ibid.
^^See, for examples, Lincoln to McClellan, April 9, 
May 2i|., October 13, 1862, in Basler (ed.), Collected W orks 
of Lincoln, V, 185-85, 231-32, M>0-62.
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thority as Commander in Chief, but that his actions did 
endanger the principle of civilian control which Truman 
considered fundamental to the existence of a free soci- 
ety,,^^ As he wrote to the President of the University of 
Virginia: ‘*1 regret very much that the action had to be
taken but the civilian control of the military was at 
stake and I simply had to do something about it.n^ ^  
in a similar vein, to the mayor of Paterson, New Jersey:
". • .in time, people will realize and understand that 
military commanders must be governed by the policies and 
directives issued to them in the manner provided by our 
laws and Constitution.
A college student once asked the ex-President the 
rationale behind MacArthur’s firing. Truman said he fired 
him for disobeying orders. He added that "maybe" he should 
have court-martialed him as well.'*’̂  When an interviewer 
asked him if he considered relieving MacArthur the most 
courageous act of his Presidency, Truman told him that it
■^■°Truman, Memoirs, II, 1^3-l\$,
^■^Truman to Colgate W. Darden, April lip, 1951, 
Truman Papers, OP, 58Ij.-MacArthur’s Dismissal, President's 
Action in Relieving General Douglas MacArthur of His Com­
mands (folder 2), Truman Library.
■^■^Truman to Michael U. DeVita, April 27, 1951,
ibid.
^^Truman Speaks, 97.
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had not involved courage,. The General was insubordinate 
and was fired. That was all.*^ But at the time of the 
dismissal, Truman was not as cavalier as he was in his 
later comments. A week after the recall, he told Repre­
sentative Carl Albert that MacArthur's distinguished 
record of military service made his decision very diffi­
cult. Two days later the President wrote to another 
correspondent about the difficulty he had in determining 
to dismiss, "one of our greatest military commanders
Prom Truman’s letters in the weeks after the re­
call order there emerges a constant emphasis: he had 
acted only after being forced to by MacArthur in consid­
eration of his constitutional responsibilities as Comman­
der in Chief. As, for example, on April 23, he wrote:
"In justice to my own responsibility . • 0 I found myself
compelled to take this distressing a c t i o n . T h i s  same
lk8reasoning is repeated in his memoirs.^"
■^"Quoted in Phillips, Truman Presidency, 350.
^ ' ’Truman to Albert, April 17, 1951, Truman Papers, 
OP, 581j.-MacArthur!s Dismissal, President's Action in Re­
lieving General Douglas MacArthur of His Commands (folder 
2), Truman Library.
■^■^Truman to (Mrs.) W. Coleman Branton, April 19, 
3.951, ibid.
■^Truman to A.E. Augustine, April 23, 1951, ibid. 
This file contains many other letters in which Truman em­
phasized that he acted from a compulsive sense of duty.
■'‘̂ Truman, Memoirs, II, l|l|4“l4-5*
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In a letter to Dwight Eisenhower, then NATO Su­
preme Commander, Truman expressed himself on MacArthur's 
recall with his characteristic bluntness and pungency: 
”Dear Ike,1* he wrote on April 12, nI was sorry to have to 
reach a parting of the way with the big man in Asia but 
he asked for it and I had to give it to him.1*^^ And so 
he did.
The nation should not be made to endure another 
such controversy. For the future, a new philosophy must 
enter into the training of the military leadership. It 
must be clearly understood that the objective in limited 
warfare is not necessarily victory in the historic sense, 
but a modus vivendi, a reasonable peace which precludes a 
general war. Douglas MacArthur would consider this a 
shameful compromise with "evil.1* But Truman knew, that 
barring a fundamental change in man's nature, in a nuclear 
age there could be no other way.
■^Truman to Eisenhower, April 12, 19^1, Eisenhower 
Papers, PF/DDE, Truman folder (2), Eisenhower Library.
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CHAPTER X
A SUMMING UP
I will leave it to future historians to judge 
how well I have done.^-
The American presidency has evolved with the times. 
The less hectic pace of the first half of the twentieth 
century allowed the presidents time for personal direction 
of the government, time to examine all sides of an issue, 
time for an endless procession of pro forma ceremonials, 
and time to relish the perquisites of the office. The 
Roosevelt Administration may be viewed as a transitional 
phase. World War II greatly accelerated the continuous 
process of social, political and technological change 
with which a president must contend. The pace and com­
plex interrelationship of postwar issues have been such 
that the executive authority has expanded along with the 
difficulties of administering the office effectively.
^Truman to John T. Carlton, April 17* 1951» Tru­
man Papers, OP, 584> President’s Action in Relieving Gen­
eral Douglas MacArthur of His Commands (folder 2), Tru­
man Library.
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Harry Truman was the first incumbent in the "new" 
presidency. The preceding chapters represent only a se­
lective recounting of events relating to exercise of Just 
the military function during his two terms in office.
But there is enough here to suggest the enormity of the 
task which Truman faced. Considering this, Clinton Ros- 
siter wrote: "... • it was no mean achievement simply to
have gone through the motions of being President in these 
eight y e a r s . T r u m a n  came to believe that no one man 
could truly fill the presidential office because the re­
sponsibilities had become "too many and too g r e a t . H e  
also believed that there was a quality about the presi­
dential office that could make the man equal to the task:
It is a tremendous job. . . .  A really huge job.
One to make a person stop and think. . . .  Any man 
faced with this job, no matter what he's like, no 
matter how much or how little he's capable of to 
begin with— any man will be lifted up by the dig­
nity and responsibility of this job to a place 
where he can meet it.4-
Truman was a man of strong principles. Despite a 
lack of formal education, his own extensive reading in
pRossiter, American Presidency, 116.
3Quoted in Hillman (ed0), Mr. President, 10. See 
also, Phillips, "Truman at " i d E J Truman, Memoirs, I, 
199.
kQuoted in Hersejs, "Profiles," Pt. 5, J>2.
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history and government provided him with what Rossiter 
has called: ”. • • a more clear-cut philosophy of
presidential power than any predecessor except Woodrow 
Wilson.”** Truman saw the President as holder of the 
final authority, a responsibility that could not be dele­
gated to subordinates.^ He believed in strong executive 
leadership and emulated strong liberal Presidents like 
Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson and the two Roose­
velts. ? Truman was constantly wary of congressional en­
croachment on executive functions, believing entirely in 
the separation of powers principle, even to the point of
refusing a subpoena from a House committee on those
Qgrounds after his presidency.
qRossiter, American Presidency, 118. See also. 
Binkley, President and CongreSs, 3 jB. Truman wrote: "I
had trained myself to look back in history for precedents, 
because instinctively I sought perspective in the span of 
history for the decisions I had to make.” Memoirs, II, 1. 
He expressed the same sentiment in ibid., I, 121.
ATruman, Memoirs, I, 51+5-1+6*
7Ibid., II, 172-73; Truman, Mr. Citizen, 175.
See also, Paige, Korean Decision, 22^53> O ’Connor, ”Harry 
S. Truman: New Dimensions of Power,” 2l|.-25.
QTruman's rejection of the House Un-American Ac­
tivities Committee's subpoena (November 1953)» is quoted 
in Koenig (ed.), Truman Administration, 70-73. A speech 
Truman delivered May 8, 195l+> deals at length with the 
dangers of congressional encroachment on the executive 
powers. See ibid., 16-21. See also. New York Times, De­
cember 27» 19527”
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**The President,'* Truman wrote in his memoirs,** 
must use whatever power the Constitution does not express­
ly deny him.'*9 Despite the powers given to the office by 
the Constitution and legislative enactments, Truman felt 
that the prime power of the Chief Executive was exhorta­
tions **•-• .the principal power that the President has is 
to bring people in and try to persuade them to do what 
they ought to do without persuasion. . . .  That's what the 
powers of the President amount to.**1® Truman commented on 
the same subject in a meeting with James Forrestal in 19i+7» 
He said that, as President, most of his time was taken up 
soothing hurt feelings and **. • .saluting the backsides of 
a large number of people.'*11 On another occasion, without 
being anatomically specific, Truman told an interviewer:
**. • .1 sit here at the President's desk talking to people 
and kissing them on both cheeks trying to get them to do
what they ought to do without getting kissed.**1^
The Constitution, in particularizing the powers of
the President, invests him with only one substantive title,
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 1|73» See also, O'Connor, 
'*Harry S. Trumans New Dimensions of Power,'* 23.
_  -  • «j
Item No. 92, Remarks at the National Conference 
on Family Life, May 6, 1914.8. Public Papers . . . Truman, 
1914-8, 21+.7 •
11Diary Entry, September 25, 19lj.7, in.Millis (ed.), 
Forrestal Diaries, 319-20.
IPQuoted in Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, 11.
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that of Commander in Chief. The title and the military 
function it designates are inseparable from the office."^ 
Like many another President, however, Truman liked to think 
of his military command function as one of the separate and 
distinct ‘’jobs’* or "hats" incumbent within the executive 
a u t h o r i t y . A s  such, Truman conceived of his function as 
being executor of all military policy. He defined the 
issues and objectives, but did not personally determine 
military policy. Rather, the staff process, channeled 
through the National Security Council, presented him with 
military policy recommendations which he accepted, reject­
ed, or revised.^
Truman did not attempt to direct the military, but 
he did exercise unquestioned control. He usually enjoyed 
a harmonious relationship with the Joint Chiefs and the 
Defense Secretary, but never allowed them to intrude upon
^Fairman, "President as Comraander-in-Chief, ” ll|.5.
Among the other presidential "jobs" Truman has 
described at various times are chief executive, party 
leader, legislator, social head of state and chief diplo­
mat. Truman Speaks, 5-8? Hillman (ed.), Mr. President,
206; Koenig (ed•), Truman Administration,“31; item No. 366, 
Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the TJnion, 
January 7» 1953* Public Papers . . .  Truman, 1952-53» lllil-.
15For a detailed examination of the functional 
role of the President under the unification act (191+7)* 
see Fairman, "President as Commander-in-Chief," llj.5-61.
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his presidential prerogatives. Maintaining this control 
meant devoting much time and study to each military pro­
posal and directive. By requiring that all but the most 
routine of military matters receive his approval prior to 
issuance, he precluded the possibility of a strong, inde­
pendent military arising to intimidate the civilian lead­
ership. Truman trusted his military advisers (notably 
Bradley and Marshall) because they never gave him the 
slightest cause to mistrust them. He was also willing to 
allow theater commanders freedom of action, so long as 
they remained within established policy guidelines. Time 
and again he emphasized that he did not believe the Com­
mander in Chief should become involved in tactics: "I am
not a desk strategist and don't intend to be one,” Truman 
told reporters in 1950. ttI leave that to the military 
men.”1^ Or, again in 1951 '• ”That is a military matter, 
and the President of the United States has never inter­
fered with military maneuvers in the field, and he doesn't 
expect to interfere in it now.”^7
Truman was a strong Commander in Chief of the type
^Item No. 238, Press Conference, September 7,
1950, Public Papers • • • Truman, 1950* 622.
■^Itera No. 37, Press Conference, February 15, 1951, 
ibid., (1951), 154. For similar statements by Truman, see 
IbI5., (W ), 250-51; ibid., (1950), 523, 580; Truman, 
Memoirs, II, 402; Neust'adt, Presidential Power, 12l\.-2$,
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envisioned by the drafters of the C o n s t i t u t i o n H i s  ef­
fectiveness, unlike that of his predecessor, was not based 
on personal leadership, or any particular insight or in­
tuition.^ One of the major accomplishments of his incum­
bency was that he "institutionalized” the presidency.20 
While all of the structural components have not always
functioned as they were designed, the command system of 
today, somewhat modified, is that instituted by Truman.21 
In an age of intercontinental missies and thermonuclear 
weaponry, it can be validly argued that this structure is 
too cumbersome. Truman himself bypassed the staff mechan­
ism when the occasion demanded.
In the crisis over Berlin the President acted 
without waiting for policy recommendations to evolve. It 
was his decision alone to stay in Berlin and supply the
city by a i r l i f t . 2 2  j n  the early days of the Korean War
/
•^®Hoare, "Truman," 210.
■^Williams, Americans at War, U+2.
20Elmer Davis, "Harry S, Truman and the Verdict of 
History," The Reporter (February 3, 195>3)> 18. Hereinafter 
cited as Davis, "Harry S. Truman and the Verdict of His­
tory."
^Williams, Americans at War, llj.2-l|3> Hoare, "Tru­
man," 183—8Ĵ . See also, Davis, "Harry S. Truman and the 
Verdict of History," 18-19.
^See Chapter VI, passim.
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Truman unhesitatingly ordered ground troops into action
(one regimental combat team) from his bedside telephone.^ 
In the entire week-long process of decision committing
the United States in Korea, the President did not once 
involve the National Security C o u n c i l .  Also, Truman de­
cided to fire General MacArthur and then went through the 
motions of obtaining the recommendations of his military 
advisers. What he would have done had they not concurred 
remains open to conjecture.
In retrospect, one of Truman's most serious mis- 
judgments was allowing the success of the Inchon inva­
sion to influence a departure from the original objective 
in Korea. The United States had gone to war to repel the 
North Korean invaders and restore peace. The Inchon as­
sault restored the status quo. Truman then allowed what 
had been essentially a defensive action to become offen­
sive by sending MacArthur across the thirty-eighth paral­
lel. Through military operations the Administration hoped 
to gain a political objective— Korean u n i f i c a t i o n ^ ! ?  The
2^See Chapter VII, passim.
^See Chapter VII, passim.
2^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, $2. See 
also, Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back,™ 593; Brad­
ley testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 10$\\.l Ridg-
way, Korean War, 230-51. fc*or a full study of the factors 
which" led’ Truman to accept Korean unification as a new war 
objective, see Neustadt, Presidential Power, 125-32, llt.0- 
ip..
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United Nations, in a General Assembly resolution adopted 
October 7, 1950, sanctioned this action.
The Chinese Communist intervention in November re­
quired Truman to choose between committing far more re­
sources or modifying his war aims. He did not immediately 
act, but waited until~the UN forces had regained the 
thirty-eighth parallel before accepting a position approx­
imating status quo ante bellum as an appropriate basis for 
negotiation. It was in the hearings on MacArthur*s recall 
that this new policy was acknowledged. Secretary Acheson 
testified that the Apolitical objective” of the United 
States since 191J-5, and of the United Nations since 1914-7* 
was the establishment of a free, unified, democratic 
Korean state. The ’’military mission” was to repel the 
North Korean aggressors and establish peace and security 
in the area. ’’Unhappily,” Acheson said, ’’the interven­
tion of the Chinese Communists threw our forces back and
made it militarily difficult, if not impossible, to acheive
27the political objective.”
Truman's decision to invade and conquer North
^United States Policy in the Korean Conflict, 3*
27Acheson testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 3*
1729, 1731J.-35, 1782, 2256-57. Generals Marshall and Brad­
ley testified to the same effect, see ibid., Pt. 1, 570;
Pt. 2, 937-38. See also, Acheson, Present at the Crea­
tion, 517-18, 529, 531.
v.->-
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Korea was a revision of the containment doctrine. In pre­
vious applications of this policy during the Cold War— in 
Greece, Turkey and Berlin— the American military response 
had been carefully gauged so as to counter Communist ex­
pansionism and restore the status quo. Once this was a-
chieved, diplomatic means were found to end the confron- 
28tation. But by insisting on the unification of all 
Korea, Truman had taken the offensive, intent upon the de­
struction of a Communist satellite nation. The Communist 
version of containment then required a response which re­
stored equilibrium and culminated in a negotiated settle­
ment that returned the penisula to its prewar condition,
American strategic policy has generally been based 
not on action, but reaction to stimuli. In the post-World 
War II era the stimulus has been provided by "Communist 
aggression.1* This defensive posture, perhaps requisite 
in a democratic system, takes away any advantages that 
accrue to an aggressor, such as picking the time and place 
for disputation.
The "limited-action/limited-response" military de­
cisions made by Truman were ad hoc adaptations to a succes­
sion of tense confrontations in a sadly-bipolarized world. 
His decisions in each instance were designed to avoid the
28Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 259-60.
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atomic maelstrom of another total w a r . ^  In Truman's 
words: ". • .the one purpose that dominated me in every­
thing I thought and did was to prevent a third world 
•anwar.” As the sole human ever to press the nuclear 
ti er, Truman must have been more aware than anyone 
that atomic technology made total war the ultimate irra­
tionality. "The atomic bomb," John Spanier aptly ob­
served, !,made the world safe only for limited wars."-^ 
Viewed in that context, the fear of nuclear holocaust 
has returned a measure of rationality to warfare, reason 
dictating strict limitations on both means and ends.-^
It is to Harry Truman's everlasting credit that he estab-
^McLellan and Reuss, "Foreign and Military Poli­
cies," 31+.
3®Truman, Memoirs, II, Preface, x. See also, 
Osgood, Limited War, 169; Halperin, "Limiting Process in 
the Korean War," 97.
31^ Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy. 2.
James, Contemporary Presidency, 161. In his last 
annual message to" Congress, January Y> 19S>3> Truman empha­
sized this change in warfare. He said that nuclear war 
was ". . .not a possible policy for rational men." Then, 
addressing himself to Soviet Premier Stalin, he said:
"You claim belief in Lenin's prophecy that one stage in 
the development of Communist society would be war between 
your world and ours. But Lenin was a pre-atomic man, who 
viewed society and history with pre-atomic eyes. Some­
thing profound has happened since he wrote. War has 
changed its shape and its dimensions. It cannot now be a 
'stage' in the development of anything save ruin for your 
regime and your homeland." Item No. 366, Public Papers. • • 
Truman, 1962-63, 1125-26.
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lished a Cold War precedent based on this proposition.
There was certainly no diminution in the tradi­
tional role of the commander in chief during Truman’s 
tenure of office. In his exercise of the military func­
tion of the presidency, Truman had enlarged somewhat on 
the prevailing concepts. This is particularly true in 
consideration of his disregard for the military authority 
of the Congress. Truman decided to aid Turkey and Greece, 
defy the blockade of Berlin, and intervene in a foreign 
war, all without the prior approval of Congress. Also, 
after the Korean War began, Truman sent four Army divi­
sions into Europe to bolster NATO defenses in the beliefI
that the attack in Asia was simply a feint by the Soviet 
Union. The President did so despite strong minority op­
position from the Senate. "In so doing, he expanded 
presidential authority as Commander-in-Chief to encompass 
the peacetime disposal of forces in meeting the obliga- 
tions of a military alliance.
Through his efforts as Commander in Chief, Truman 
made the military establishment over, generally, for the 
better. His desegregation of the military services not 
only preceded but also had an immeasurable influence upon 
the domestic civil rights movement in the 1950’s and '60’s. 
Unification of the armed forces did not achieve all that
^ O ’C o n n o r ,  ’’Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of
Power," 59.
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Truman had envisioned. It did modernize the command sys­
tem and make the military establishment more responsive to 
the Commander in Chief's direction. But, for the most 
part, the massive Pentagon monolith absorbed the imposed 
reforms of unification and continued cn without marked 
change, save that it obtained strength from unity By 
the passage of the Atomic ini^rgy Act of 19l|-6 and his re« 
sistance to subsequent military encroachment on atomic 
weapons policy, Truman preserved for future commanders in 
chief the ultimate decision on utilization of the ultimate
35weapon. ^
Harry Truman was the kind of leader whom, in 
Clinton Rossiter's words, n , • .history will delight to 
r e m e m b e r . T h e  very foibles and contradictions for 
which he was scorned will set him apart from the mass of 
of his predecessors and successors who have been too often 
absorbed in posturing for posterity. He was not the most 
intelligent, articulate or inspiring President this nation 
ha3 ever had, and he was aware of that. Knowing it, he 
worked all the harder. One of his favorite, oft-repeated 
anecdotes concerned a gravestone in Arizona which bore the
^See Chapter V, passim.
35See Chapter IV, passim.
^Rossiter, American Presidency, 119.
A
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inscription: ’’Here lies Jack Williams, he done his
d a m n d e s t . p or Harry Truman's Presidency, no more 
fitting epitaph could be devised. Pour days after 
taking the oath of office as President he had said, "I 
ask only to be a good and faithful servant of ray Lord 
and my people.*^® And so it was; for whatever his short­
comings, the nation has never known a more dedicated or 
faithful servant.
•^Item No. 98, Press Conference, April 17, 1952, 
Public Papers . . • Truman, 1952-53, 270. See also, New 
York Times, December 27. 1952; Washington Post, December 
2?, 1952; Koenig (ed.), Truman Administration, 29.
^Item No, 2, Address Before a Joint Session of 
the Congress, April 16, 191+5, Public Papers . . .  Truman, 
19k5, 6.
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